CDI Russia Weekly-#207 24 May 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. AFP: Bush arrives in Russia for historic summit. 2. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Mark Mackinnon, Unhip Bush dolls fail to stack up. Clinton and friends still rule Moscow's matryoshka market. 3. Interfax: Russians feel restraint towards U.S. - poll. 4. ITAR-TASS: Poll respondents think Russia-US ties should focus on anti-terror fight. 5. Moscow Times: Oksana Yablokova, Summit Leaves Everyday Man Unimpressed. 6. Moscow News: He smiles best... The Russian and U.S. presidents will sign several important interstate agreements. Someone is bound to describe this as "the dawn of a new era in the Russian-U.S. relationship." Even so, there is no cause for euphoria yet, says Nikolai Zlobin, an expert with the U.S. Center for Defense Information. 7. polit.ru: Igor Fedyukin, The Putin-Bush Summit: Funeral or Marriage? Putin-Bush summit is a wedding ceremony following a long period of courtship. 8. Vedomosti: Vladimir Ryzhkov, Foreign Policy: Vladimir Putin's Emphases. Closer cooperation with the West and preservation of stable ties with other regions are most important for Russia today 9. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA REAFFIRMS DISLIKE OF U.S. PULLOUT FROM ABM. 10. CDI Weekly Defense Monitor: Ben Friedman, The Nuclear Arms Pact: Storing the Legacy of the Cold War. 11. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, Mothballed warheads pose continuing threat. Russian missiles decommissioned under the new nuclear treaty are likely to land in poorly guarded storage depots. 12. gazeta.ru: Russian army fails to pass muster. 13. Asia Times: John Helmer, Russia draws fine line in Caspian. 14. Moscow Times: Matt Bivens, Mr. Bush's Most Excellent Exam Adventures. ******* #1 Bush arrives in Russia for historic summit May 24, 2002 AFP US President George W. Bush arrived in Moscow for a historic summit aimed at taking a new step on disarmament and shaping a 21st-century partnership for countries once bitter foes. Security was stepped up across the Russian capital and one newspaper cautioned Muscovites to watch for US secret service snipers as Russia prepared for Bush's first visit with pomp befitting a history-making event. "I am optimistic not only because of the documents that we will see signed, but also because of the real, mutual economic interests finally unfolding," said liberal lawmaker Irina Khakamada. "For the first time, the Kremlin is taking the lead in foreign policy instead of following public opinion polls, which still do not trust the US," she said. The fifth meeting between Bush and Putin on Friday will be crowned by a Kremlin signature of the first nuclear disarmament treaty between the two sides in a decade, along with a broader strategic partnership agreement. The fruit of painstaking work that threatened to collapse until the very end, the arms treaty slashes both sides' nuclear arsenals by two-thirds over 10 years. It should leave each side with between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads each. The two leaders will also sign documents cementing their unexpectedly strong cooperation in the fight against terrorism as well as a key policy paper aimed at coordinating their energy policies. "For the first time, we are moving from relations based on deterrence to one of a real partnership of equal partners," said parliament's foreign affairs chairman Dmitry Rogozin. Bush's visit has been celebrated by the Kremlin as a vivid reminder of how Putin has managed to drag Russia out of its post-Soviet malaise since becoming president two years ago and turn it into a trustworthy partner for the West. But this view has not won unanimous support from Russians hardened by decades of the cynicism that became entrenched during the Soviet era. "What is Bush bringing here? Mostly things that he needs for himself," the liberal Vedomosti business daily remarked. The respected paper said Bush's team would try to tap into Russia's lucrative oil and natural gas market without offering Russians assistance to export their goods to the equally lucrative US market. "There was hope that Bush could positively surprise by announcing the revocation of the Jackson-Venik treaty, or by finally recognizing Russia as a market economy," said investment bank strategist Roland Nash. But US diplomats said that "hiccups" have prevented the US Congress from lifting the 1974 law penalizing Moscow for its restrictions on the movement of Soviet Jews, putting breaks on favorable investment terms in Russia. "Unfortunately, small-minded men in the US Congress have once again prevented either," Nash wrote. Meanwhile the Communists and their nationalist supporters attacked the Russia-US disarmament treaty as a humiliation for Moscow that would leave Washington with a massive advantage in nuclear and other defense potential. Putin is trying to turn Russia "into a US satellite," grumbled Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov as 250 of his supporters picketed the US embassy compound, some holding signs that read "The Destruction of Our Defense." But the Russian army took a friendlier approach, with the official defense ministry newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda running a cozy interview with the US president under the headline: "George Bush: We are no longer enemies." "Russian generals are being turned face-forward toward the West," observed Izvestia daily in an article explaining that the Russian brass was now being briefed about their new role in an era of cooperation with Washington. And even firebrand nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who only years ago spoke of expanding the Russian empire from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, said he was "very optimistic" about the Bush summit. "I had criticized a policy of sucking up to Washington in the past but since September 11, they have themselves sought to cooperate with us. Why should we push them away?" ******* #2 The Globe and Mail (Canada) May 23, 2002 Unhip Bush dolls fail to stack up Clinton and friends still rule Moscow's matryoshka market By MARK MACKINNON MOSCOW -- This should be George W. Bush's week in Moscow. The U.S. President begins his first visit to Russia today and arrives in town with a new nuclear arms-reduction pact ready for the signing. But in the city's matryoshka doll markets -- the truest way to gauge what's hip in this country -- he stands beaten, as his father was, by Bill Clinton. Yesterday, 24 hours before Mr. Bush was to land in the city, souvenir sellers on Moscow's storied Arbat Street were hoping for brisk sales of the wooden dolls, some newly painted with the U.S. President's face, smiling under a large white cowboy hat. But the Bush dolls were being scorned by tourists in favour of Clinton dolls that have been on the market for years. "I guess he is not like Clinton, he is not so interesting," a vendor named Igor said. Clinton dolls were outselling Bush dolls two-to-one, he said, just as they would on any other day. At Igor's stand, the two presidents -- never known to enjoy each other's company -- were separated only by a serious-looking Harry Potter. The main difference between the two presidential dolls, both priced at a negotiable $30, is the story they tell. Traditionally, matryoshki are hand-painted wooden dolls depicting rosy-cheeked women in gaily coloured dresses. Beginning with the mother, each opens in the middle to reveal a smaller doll inside, with sometimes 20 or more dolls of descending size hidden inside the largest. Inside the Bush doll is a brief history of the U.S. presidency. The largest doll is Mr. Bush, with smaller dolls of his predecessors -- Mr. Clinton, George Bush Sr., Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter -- hidden inside. The Clinton doll takes tourists back to a simpler, pre-Sept. 11 time, when the world was obsessed with Mr. Clinton's office romance. "Inside are his friends," smiled Igor, proudly pulling the Clinton doll apart to reveal a few familiar faces. Monica Lewinsky, of course, in her blue dress, and Paula Jones. Igor stopped to consider the fourth doll, a blond woman with a striking resemblance to Mr. Clinton's wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, now a senator. "I'm not sure who this one is," Igor said with a shrug. The fifth and final doll carries a picture of a saxaphone. A few stalls away, Natasha, another vendor, said Mr. Clinton conveys a classic story of sex and intrigue that appeals to tourists more than Mr. Bush's good-versus-evil fight against the terrorists. "Bush is not popular. He is boring. Clinton is so fascinating -- to Russians, to Americans, to everyone," she said. Since the days of glasnost, and the first daring matryoshki of Mikhail Gorbachev, the dolls have been used to lampoon political leaders or honour celebrity. One stall along the Arbat, for instance, features a Beatles matryoshka, which opens from a wide-waisted John Lennon down to a tiny Ringo Starr. The most popular model is a caricature of Russian President Vladimir Putin, which opens to reveal his predecessors, from Boris Yeltsin to the last Tsar, Nicholas II. (Inside Nicholas is an infinitesimal Rasputin, the monk who wedged himself into the Tsar's marriage and helped the collapse of the House of Romanov.) Recently, terrorist matryoshki have become commonplace at souvenir stalls, with al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden playing the role of the mother, and other figures, such as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, lurking inside. However, the Osama dolls were reportedly poor sellers. ******* #3 Russians feel restraint towards U.S. - poll MOSCOW. May 23 (Interfax) - Russians have a feeling of restraint towards the U.S. On one hand, most Russian citizens do not harbor hostility towards the power on the other side of Atlantic. On the other hand, they are cautious about U.S. foreign policy in Russia. This is one of the results of a poll conducted by Gallup International, Russia's independent center for public opinion and market research. The center surveyed 1,000 Russians from the country's 10 major cities. The stats came in on the eve of the Russian-American summit in Moscow. Numbers show that 32% of Russians polled have a positive attitude towards the U.S., while 19% hold the opposite view. A total of 46% said that they are neutral toward the U.S. and only 3% were unable to answer. Almost half (46%) of Russians regard the struggle against international terrorism as the most urgent issue in relations with the U.S. A total of 11% give top priority in Moscow-Washington relations to the situation in the Middle East and nearly as many (10%) point to the problems caused by NATO's eastward expansion. Nearly 10% of Russians consider the human rights' record in Russia as one of the main problems in bilateral ties. Slightly fewer respondents (9%) believe that the main problem in Russian-American relations is the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. More than 5% of those interviewed mentioned the situation in Afghanistan and 8% were at a loss for an answer. Respondents were also asked to state their view on American culture. Of those polled, 10% said they do not like it. The majority (47%) favor some features of American culture, and 16% said that U.S. culture is too hard to stomach. Roughly the same number doubt the existence of American culture. About 10% found it difficult to answer this question. ******* #4 Poll respondents think Russia-US ties should focus on anti-terror fight MOSCOW, May 22 (Itar-Tass) --Russians think the fight of international terrorism should be a central part of Russian- American relations, a poll found. The poll was conducted by the independent research center ROMIR in ten large cities and involved 1,000 adults. Of those asked, 46.4 per cent said just prevention of terrorism should dominate in the relations with the US. Every tenth (10.8 per cent) was sure that the situation in the Middle East should be a main topic in the two state's relations. A similar number (10.4 per cent) pointed to problems related to NATO's eastward expansion. Only 9.6 per cent see Russia's human rights record as a key issue in relations with the US. Some 9.2 per cent were of the view that the relations should focus on strategic arms cuts. Only 5.6 per cent of the polled mentioned the situation in Afghanistan. The rest were uncertain. The poll's findings suggest that the Russians have no animosity toward the US. Thus 46 per cent of respondents said their attitudes toward the US were neutral. Almost a third (31.6 per cent) voiced positive and 19.2 per cent negative sentiments about the US. Others were uncertain. As for American culture, one out of every ten polled said they liked it. Most (47.7 per cent) made a reservation that they were positive about separate aspects of it. Some 16.4 per cent of respondents sharply reject American culture, and a similar proportion doubt that the US has any culture to speak of. About ten per cent were uncertain. ******* #5 Moscow Times May 23, 2002 Summit Leaves Everyday Man Unimpressed By Oksana Yablokova Staff Writer All the hubbub surrounding this week's summit between Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin fails to impress Felix Mikhailov, a 52-year-old auto plant worker. "Summits mean little these days and are only held to observe protocol and demonstrate mutual respect," said Mikhailov, pausing near Pushkin Square as he headed home from work. He said that the last time U.S.-Russian summits held any significance was in the 1980s, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan met to bring an end to the Cold War. Mikhailov is one of many ordinary Russians who are showing scant interest in the Bush-Putin summit, a sign that people are more concerned about their day-to-day lives than foreign affairs, analysts said. "Foreign policy remains on the periphery of public opinion and only occasionally receives attention when it gets into the media spotlight," said Andrei Ryabov, political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center. Two polls conducted ahead of the summit also illustrate the public's indifference toward foreign affairs. The polls arrived at contradictory conclusions. One poll found that the majority of Russians have negative feelings about the United States, while the other found that more people felt positively. Both polls, however, showed that Russians' attitude toward the United States has improved since early March, when many were incensed over the perceived ill-treatment of Russian athletes at the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City. "Now our people have recovered from the post-Olympic shock and see the United States in a more positive light," said Yelena Petrenko, research director at the Public Opinion Foundation, which conducted one of the polls. The Public Opinion Foundation survey found that 58 percent of Russians view the United States as an unfriendly nation, while 25 percent regard it as a friend. In March, 71 percent of respondents said the United States was unfriendly, and 17 percent said it was friendly. The foundation polled 1,500 people across the country. No margin for error was given. The other recent poll, conducted by the All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies, or VTsIOM, found that 59 percent of Russians had good or very good feelings toward the United States, while 34 percent felt negatively. In comparison, a similar VTsIOM poll conducted in March found that 48 percent felt good about the United States and 41 percent felt negatively. The latest VTsIOM poll interviewed 1,600 respondents across the country. No margin for error was provided. VTsIOM sociologist Leonid Sedov credited Putin's high popularity for the strong showing for the United States. "Putin's popularity is still very high, and his meeting with Bush is widely seen as something positive for Russia, " he said. "This makes the United States more attractive in the eyes of many." The VTsIOM poll also found that slightly more than half of Russians worried that U.S.-Russian relations were based on mutual distrust. On the street, some Muscovites said Russia was going too far in trying to improve ties with the United States. "It is one thing to just get along with a superpower like the United States and unite in the face of a terrorist threat," said Irina Fedorovskaya, a 29-year-old historian. "It's quite another thing to become both politically and economically dependant on the States. We should be more pragmatic in dealing with them." Others simply shrugged their shoulders. "All these American presidents sort of look the same and smile the same," said Gennady Artyomov, 39, a furniture maker. "But Bush is OK, a good guy." A pensioner shopping at an outdoor market near the Vodny Stadion metro station said she missed Bush's predecessor, President Bill Clinton. "I liked better the one they had before. What's his name ... oh, yes, Clinton," said the woman, who would only give her name and patronymic, Lidia Mikhailovna. Mikhailov, the auto plant worker, said he saw a big difference between Bush and Putin. "Putin came from the KGB but at least he is educated and intelligent, a thing that cannot be said about Bush," he said. ******* #6 Moscow News May 22-28, 2002 He smiles best... The Russian and U.S. presidents will sign several important interstate agreements. Someone is bound to describe this as "the dawn of a new era in the Russian-U.S. relationship." Even so, there is no cause for euphoria yet, says Nikolai Zlobin, an expert with the U.S. Center for Defense Information What do the main interest groups within the U.S. elite expect from Bush's visit to Russia? Do they have identical expectations? First of all, today the Russian-U.S. relationship is not a foreign policy priority either for the political elite or for President Bush. Actually, this is a welcome sign: It shows that there is no crisis in our relations. Tactically, the Americans do not need Russia. But strategically, far-sighted U.S. politicians believe that it is better to have Russia on their side. In the next five, 10 or 20 years the main problems will be coming from Asian, Islamic, countries. Many in Washington today realize that America may increasingly have to seek Moscows assistance. With the emergence of the G-20 - Russia-in-NATO - the alliance is approaching Chinese borders. The main brunt of the resultant problems will have to be borne by Russia. This will be very important in a decade, when China begins to show some activity which, say, may not be to the Western countries liking. It is not a matter of an all-out confrontation with countries opposed to each other. Russia should not necessarily be Europe's outpost in Asia, but it could put in place some intermediary mechanism to deal with outstanding contradictions. I believe that the presidents will discuss this issue. People in Washington are expecting Bush to give a coherent answer to the question of how the U.S. administration sees the relationship with China, and the role of Russia in this relationship. A considerable number of influential politicians and businessmen in the United States believe that Russias evolution as an energy alternative to the Middle East is a dangerous trend. Because Russia is unpredictable and Russian oil companies are the most opaque and corrupt setups in the world. Do not forget either that President Bush is the leader of U.S. oil lobbyists, who are not interested in creating a new competitor, especially with their own hands. That said, a part of the political elite hopes that President Bush will manage to convince Vladimir Putin that America is indeed interested in technological cooperation with Russia. Incidentally, one of the documents to be signed at the summit is an agreement on cooperation in the technological sphere. But there are also people on the U.S. political scene who are absolutely obsessed with the Iran-Iraq situation and Russian contracts. Not surprisingly, they are opposed to any improvement in relations with the Kremlin until the latter has completely and unequivocally abandoned its support for Saddam Hussein and all nuclear projects with Iran. That is to say, various political groups have their own interests - positive or negative - with respect to Russia. But the prevailing trend is indifference. What is your vision of the worst-case scenario for the negotiations? I believe that Bush would be only too happy to have his trip moved to a later date: After all, these arms reduction treaties and the declaration on a new partnership had to be drafted in haste. I suppose that the visit will on the whole be a success and that the presidents will have signed all the documents there are to sign. But this may be all. I think it is important for the two presidents to meet as often as possible. Then the failure of one meeting would not be so important. If something was not settled today, they could meet in a month and do it then. Otherwise U.S. interest in Russia will continue to diminish. Short-term, it is very bad if both sides, especially Russia, take an inflexible stand on the issue of Iran and Iraq. Yet this is as far as expectations are concerned. In broader terms, the results of the visit will not be known immediately. Are any secret agreements going to be signed? No, its not that. When all is said and done, the agenda of these negotiations is disappointing because it is largely connected with past problems. As for tomorrow, we have a glaring gap here. When we stopped treating each other as potential enemies, it suddenly transpired that there wasn't a new basis for Russian-U.S. relations. Today there is talk to the effect that we are partners in the fight against terrorism. But a relationship between countries cannot be built on a fight against something. If there is no base, old problems - say, disarmament or national missile defense - begin to take center stage. Or it suddenly comes to pass that Russia and the United States are utterly dependent on transient political developments. So the main outcome of the summit will lie in whether the two presidents begin to look for a new base for a long-term strategic partnership. The first serious problem here is whether they will manage to do this. The second is whether they will manage to explain the importance of what they have achieved to their elites and their people. Third, whether they will manage to follow up on this work at their next meeting. If the process stalls, it is not ruled out that Russia's future policy will be formulated by forces that will have pulled President Putin back - into Cold War ideology. What prevented the discussion of tomorrow, not yesterday, from becoming the focus of the summit? There is considerable inertia within the power elites both in the United States and Russia. In the Cold War era, both countries had forces that lived off the opposition to each other. Now these people have managed to put all of these missile issues on the agenda - moreover, make them a centerpiece of the summit. In America, however, it is no longer possible to make money or build a career on this. There is a large number of hardliners, even anti-Russian-minded elements, there, but they are not part of the decision-making group. Meanwhile, in Russia such sentiments in the power structures are still very strong. The Americans are worried by this; they are afraid that Russian hardliners will - under certain circumstances - pull Putin over to their side, and he will change his views. It is easier with Bush: He has no anti-Russian sentiments, he is a Cold War child, he played football in those years. Is Bush coming under pressure from the Republican right wing? Bush is under constant pressure. This is normal. All interest groups are seeking to exert influence - the right, left, centrists, liberals, and democrats. I think that for Bush as a politician and for the U.S. politics as a whole, there is no particular danger from the Republican right wing today. First of all, Bush enjoys colossal popularity among the electorate. So the party's right wing is interested in Bush more than he is interested in them. Second, Bush's present team is an assortment of people who do not always listen to the Republican right. Otherwise Bush would simply not be going to Russia. Are you saying that problems at the negotiations could only arise because of Russia? Certainly not: The U.S. side also has its share of problems - most of them of the Catch-22 kind. The United States is interested in Putin's pro-American position. At the same time the Americans need a democratic Russia. They want Russia to press ahead with economic reform and consolidate democracy, freedom, and openness. But this is where a Catch-22 situation comes up: If the Russian president is pressured and criticized for what is going on within the country, Putin's position could weaken while his foreign policy course become less amenable to the United States. If, however, you turn a blind eye to Russia's internal problems, democratic development in the country could be held up, which is bad in the long term. Another example: We are talking a great deal about the need to strengthen relations between Russians and Americans, which leads to yet another Catch-22 situation. On one hand, rapprochement is imperative. On the other, when they talk about integration, many fail to understand that it will come at a high price to Russia - not only in the economic and political but also the cultural and psychological sphere. Let us take the new declaration on strategic relationship. Here is an important question: To what extent are the two countries, especially Russia, ready to take on a measure of responsibility for the situation in the world at large? Will America adopt a new nuclear doctrine providing for the use of nuclear weapons first even against non-nuclear countries? Will Russia agree to this? There is yet another problem that should be on the summit agenda. I hope that the visa situation - absolutely unacceptable, in my opinion - will not be ignored. It is high time that America extended regulations applied to the East European states, to Russia. What about the storage of nuclear warheads? No, this is not going to be a big problem. The Americans no longer produce warheads while Russia is still able to do this. The Americans no longer conduct tests. So they say: Let us keep something. The problem of Iran and Iraq is far more serious today. What are the implications? Saddam Hussein, in the American view, is the main evil in the world today while Russia is his sole salvation. If everything remains as it has been, the Americans will see this in no uncertain terms: You have not as yet buried the ax. Bush will then have only one way out - to revise his position on Russia. A solution is needed here that will apparently involve some concessions on the part of Russia. America, for its part, could pledge to pay these countries debts or that the future regime will pay the debts. Some compromise could be found. This mainly concerns Iraq, but it will not work for Iran, where it is not just one person that matters. No, it won't work for Iran. Although a compromise is also essential here. At the very least, we could take care not to irk the West by energy projects, however peaceful. I believe that Iran should be kept within the sphere of Russian economic influence. Iran is a major player in the Middle East. I believe that the Americans want their influence on Iran to pass through, among others, Russia. To this end, however, it is necessary to agree on a common policy toward Tehran. President Putin could offer an acceptable alternative. Russia is afraid to lose its political clout. But why does it need it in the first place? To stand up to the West. Everyone remembers Gorbachev and East Germany, when Russia got nothing in exchange for its concessions. High-ranking officials often say: Look, we have taken so many steps toward the West, but what have we got in return? I say to them: You have done this not to please the West, but in the interests of Russia. And if this is the case, why do you expect something in return? If you have tried to sell yourselves at a higher price, this is a different matter. But you are not saying, are you, that you are selling yourselves. But this is so natural: You have made a present, you expect something in return. This is plebeian ideology. Look, Russia's most reliable partner in Europe is Germany. The only country that keeps saying that Russia should be integrated into Europe. Everybody else is against that. As to whether the Russians got or did not get a particular loan, which within six months will have been spent on daily subsistence, this is quite another matter. We should take a long-term view, but no one wants to do that because everyone is concerned about the next elections. ******* #7 polit.ru May 23, 2002 The Putin-Bush Summit: Funeral or Marriage? Putin-Bush summit is a wedding ceremony following a long period of courtship. By Igor Fedyukin (therussianissues.com) Western politicians and journalists have dubbed the Putin-Bush summit in Moscow "the funeral of the Cold War." In strategic terms the Cold War was buried a long time ago, but a different cold war still persists in the minds of top executives at Russia's Foreign Ministry, General Staff, and Defense Ministry. They are accustomed to seeing the world through the prism of the Cold War. There are "Cold War hawks" in the United States too (people like Vice President Chaney and Pentagon chief Rumsfeld). In that sense the Cold War is likely to be around for quite some time to come. Marriage rather than funeral is the word to describe the Moscow summit. The Bush visit crowns the triumphal period of Russia's foreign policy since September 11, the period between Putin's "decision to get married" and "the wedding ceremony." The bride has demonstrated its attractiveness to the groom and convinced him that marriage is better than cohabitation. Putin has achieved his objective of strategic rapprochement with the West to the extent that is at all possible in a real world. But what of the future? It is clear that Russia will not be an equitable partner, but that does not mean that trying to fathom the newlyweds' future relationship makes no sense. On the contrary, it would be worthwhile to take a close look at the two presidents' rhetoric and mimic, and that could say something about their intentions. So far, though, officials on both sides have tended to see the START treaty and declarations about a strategic partnership as an end in themselves without offering their vision of the post-summit world. The Moscow summit is the culmination of a long series of consultations between the two countries. For months journalists were trying to make a sensation out of the negotiators' statements. Western politicians were calling on the public and the press not to expect too much from the summit while the Russian side was making optimistic noises about "rapprochement with the West." Bush's speech last week where he announced plans to sign the START Treaty came as a surprise but the speech itself contained nothing sensational. Analysts have suggested different interpretations of the reasons behind Bush's statement. Many believe that in that way the American president wanted to amend the summit's agenda: now that he made it clear that the START Treaty would be signed anyway, during the summit he might concentrate on issues of more importance to him, such as Russia's nuclear cooperation with rogue states. On the other hand, by making that announcement, the White House might have wanted to expose the treaty to media criticism before the summit because otherwise the torrent of criticism would have coincided with it, and it could have been declared a flop. ******* #8 Vedomosti May 23, 2002 Foreign Policy: Vladimir Putin's Emphases. Closer cooperation with the West and preservation of stable ties with other regions are most important for Russia today By Vladimir Ryzhkov (therussianissues.com) End of May and start of June promise to be, without an exaggeration, a stunning period for the Russian foreign policy. Vladimir Putin will be rapidly moving from one European capital to another (including Moscow and St. Petersburg), with well-nigh each single movement of his holding out a "historic" promise. During a few days, all main novels of his foreign policy are due to assume the austere legal form. At first, Vladimir Putin will receive George Bush on the Russian soil. The presidents will sign a treaty on further cuts in their countries' nuclear arsenals, reducing the number of nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 within ten years. Simultaneously one should expect grand gestures on the part of Washington, ones recognizing Russia a market economy and discarding at long last the ill-famed Jackson - Vanik. Since the first meeting of the two leaders at Ljubljana and particularly following Russia's resolute joining of the anit-terrorist coalition, relations between the partners have been on the upgrade and the forthcoming meeting is due to confirm and consolidate the advance. Later both Bush and Putin will leave for an airbase in the environs of Rome in order to sign, along with other NATO leaders, instruments instituting a new format in Russia-NATO relations. As a result, Russia will have the status it likes most of all, that of a unique power. After all, no other NATO partner - neither Ukraine nor even the candidate nations - will have the kind of relations with the Alliance comparable to the status of the Twenty which is going to be created. Establishing new Russia-NATO Council, where Russian ambassador will be seated next to his Portuguese and Spanish counterparts, will give it a chance to join full-blooded NATO debates on many key problems. The list of themes to be discusses and addressed includes combating terrorism, nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons, tactical antimissile defense, peacekeeping operations, joint dealing with regional crises, emergencies, rescue at sea, cooperation in science and economy, and more. Decision-making will be by consensus and the Russian desire to have the veto right will to some extent be satisfied. Unlike the former Russia-NATO Council, the new outfit implies that each time the consensus will be found via an equal and open discussion. Who knows, maybe in some cases Russia will be able to lead a part or even majority of NATO countries in discussing some or other matter? After Rome Vladimir Putin will come back to Moscow, where he is to have yet another meeting with EU heads in the person of Jose Maria Aznar, Romano Prodi and others. The traditionally extensive agenda of the new Russia-EU summit, which will focus not only on the EU eastern expansion, Kaliningrad, energy dialogue, etc., but also generally a long-term strategy for Russia-EU rapprochement within the framework of the united Europe concept, will reflect the dramatically grown importance of European direction in the Russian foreign policy. After that, finally, St. Petersburg is to host a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional security organization, which has both Russia and China as its members. It has declared lately its intentions to revive military cooperation, including in the form of joint military exercises and by creating permanent joint bodies for cooperation in the defense and security area. A considerable improvement in relations and new strategic understandings with the U.S. A new format of cooperation with NATO. Consistent rapprochement with the European Union. Better security in the east and the south. Not bad for two years of the new presidency. The more so if one takes into account the difficulty and unpredictability of the world situation in those two years. Nevertheless, there are skeptics and critics, who will call things into question and criticize. They point out that the United States does only what it wants and nothing above that. The U.S. is burying, in cold blood and calculatingly, the START-2 Treaty and the AMB Treaty. Instead of destroying warheads to be reduced in accordance with the would-be treaty, it intends to stockpile them so as to have an opportunity to mount them again on strategic carriers the moment it wants. It increasingly closes its markets. It consistently builds up its military spending and goes on with construction of the national missile defense system. Its military bases are still in Central Asia and military instructors in Georgia. The U.S. is not particularly concealing the fact that it prepares an assault on Iraq. Regarding NATO the skeptics and critics speak about there being no fundamental difference between the new Twenty and the former 19 + 1 formula. The list of themes for discussion is strikingly reminiscent of the one laid down by the Russia-NATO founding act on relations, cooperation and security. Skeptics claim that the new initiatives suggested to Russia are just a wish to take the edge off its expansion east and to the Baltic countries, which is certain to be decided upon in Prague next November. That NATO's military machine will be strengthened and modernized and that the Alliance is ready, already today, to use force outside of its responsibility zone. Simultaneously they indicate that the United States increasingly often leaves NATO out of business, which means that Russia is being engaged in cooperation with an organization, which loses its influence. Besides, the core of the North Atlantic Alliance, to wit, its military component, will remain outside the purview of the Twenty. The Russia-NATO Treaty has nothing to do with NATO's collective defense commitments or its military organization in general. Concerning the rapprochement with the EU, the skeptics and critics say that there are lots of words but no real progress. That Russian and European bureaucracies are slow and inefficient. That Brussels is unwilling to accept deeper practical cooperation with the Russians. The skepticism feeds on the lack of breakthrough solutions to such difficult and many-tiered problems as visa-free travel for Russian nationals via the Lithuanian territory, the general toughening of the Schengen visa regulations, and other things. The Shanghai initiative is regarded as a mostly symbolic, dormant organization, which is yet to show its mettle. Even in cases that concern it directly (such as the anit-terrorist operation in Afghanistan). There is a fair share of truth in those doubts. The record of the last fifteen years of Russian foreign policy is full of rapturous declarations about "historic breakthroughs" and subsequent disappointments. Many chances were allowed to slip through incompetence. Ruptures often followed rapprochements and cooperation was interrupted by grave crises. The new emphases and major initiatives in the area of the Russian foreign policy leave open the question of prospects. The course for closer cooperation with the West and simultaneous preservation of stable ties with other regions of key importance for Russia has exceptionally favorable chances of being implemented. There are only two circumstances that can interfere with its success. First, sabotage by the bureaucracies in Moscow and Brussels, which in many respects are inclined to regard the mechanism of the Twenty as yet another senseless talking-shop for the sides, which remain potential adversaries and have fundamentally different geopolitical interests. Second, the potential for conflict inherent in the forthcoming expansion of NATO and the quite probable military campaign by the U.S. and its allies against Iraq. The pattern of "nattering till the first crisis" with subsequent breaking-off of relations may well recur again under the pressure of the still strong Russian lobby opposing this country's integration into the club of developed democratic states. Then the new foreign policy created bit by bit by Vladimir Putin will suffer a defeat. But this outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Russia's foreign policy has been increasingly logical and consistent lately. It is becoming well adjusted and pragmatic. It is rejecting illusory and dangerous alternatives. It increasingly often puts the right emphases. Against this background, Vladimir Putin is as popular and as successful as before. It means something may work out after all this time over. ******* #9 RUSSIA REAFFIRMS DISLIKE OF U.S. PULLOUT FROM ABM MOSCOW, May 23. /From a RIA Novosti correspondent/ -- On eve of the Russian-American summit in Moscow, Russia reaffirms its negative approach towards the United States' withdrawal from the antiballistic missile treaty. "We do not back this decision and believe that all responsibility for it lies with the United States", said a high-ranking official source in an interview on Thursday to Russian news agencies. At the same time, the sources said that "the United States' withdrawal from the ABM treaty is not the end of everything", the RIA correspondent reports. "What's more, this American initiative is not an impasse for Russia. We get a free hand, including for reciprocating in the sense of perfecting our own nuclear triad", noted the source. He believes that such measures will be asymmetric, much less expensive and, at the same time, ensure national security. "We have enough time and opportunities for that", said the source. He doubted that the United States would get down deploying its ABM very soon. Most probably, tests of land, air and sea systems will not be over before the end of this decade, believes the source. According to him, mutually acceptable solutions have to be found which would make it possible to go on strengthening relations and trust between Moscow and Washington. The source recalled that Moscow and Washington are setting up a high-level consultative group on confidence-building in the ABM field. ******* #10 CDI Weekly Defense Monitor Volume 6, Issue #15 May 23, 2002 www.cdi.org The Nuclear Arms Pact: Storing the Legacy of the Cold War Ben Friedman, Research Assistant, bfriedman@cdi.org Announcing the completion of a strategic nuclear arms pact with Russia last week, President George W. Bush told Americans that the agreement would "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." But the agreement, negotiated from the handshake agreement Bush and Russian President Putin reached in Crawford, Texas last November, liquidates nothing. The United States and Russia will reduce their arsenals of operationally deployed strategic weapons from 6,000 to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. The states might destroy some of these weapons, particularly Russia, but neither side is obligated to do so. Rather than mandating the destruction of the legacy of the Cold War, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, this agreement allows the two states to put them in storage faculties in partially disassembled states, where they can be rearmed in short order. This "hedge force," offers the United States "strategic flexibility," according to administration officials. We are not then liquidating the legacy of the Cold War; we are redefining its use. Will this agreement enhance American security? Yes, but probably not much. The agreement does nothing to address what the Baker-Cutler commission called the most pressing threat to American security –- the risk of theft or illicit sale of Russia’s unsecured nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Russia has a untold number of small, tactical nuclear weapons, (estimates range from a few thousand to 15,000) some with explosive power around the order of Hiroshima. These weapons are most attractive to terrorists because they are easier to handle and use than strategic nuclear weapons. The Bush administration recently announced that it would not pursue a treaty dealing with tactical nuclear weapons, but might seek their destruction by less formal means. The agreement also does not address the problem of lax security of fissile materials in Russia, which terrorists could use to cobble together a "dirty bomb." Some analysts have even suggested that by forcing the Russians to store its nuclear materials to mirror the U.S. hedge force, where they might be vulnerable to terrorists given Russia’s inability to adequately protect such materials, the agreement will detract from American security. This analysis probably overstates the case, since the materials least protected and valuable to terrorists are fissile materials and perhaps tactical nuclear weapons, which are largely unaffected by storage of strategic nuclear weapons. But what is clear is that this agreement should be accompanied by an effort to improve and deepen cooperative threat reduction, an array of U.S. run programs named for their founders, Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar, which aim to secure and dismantle Russians nuclear weapons and keep Russian scientists from peddling their intellectual wares to rogue states. Accelerating and strengthening Nunn-Lugar would have a far greater impact on U.S. national security than this strategic arms agreement. The Baker-Cutler Task Force on Nonproliferation Programs in Russia, a bipartisan commission of national security experts chaired by former Senator Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, recommended spending $30 billion over a decade on Nunn-Lugar -– at the current pace the programs will cost around $10 billion over the same period. If that seems like a lot, note that the Bush administration’s FY 2003 budget calls for close to eight billion dollars for missile defense, almost eight times what is spent on cooperative threat reduction. The Nunn-Lugar programs, despite considerable success, have secured only about one third of Russia’s nuclear stockpile, leaving the rest vulnerable until they are dealt with in the coming years. One solution to this funding shortfall has been proposed by the Bush administration. The plan, known as the "Ten plus Ten by Ten" plan, would ask major U.S. allies, principally the Group of Eight nations, to match the U.S. contribution to the programs, contributing a cumulative $10 billion over 10 years. This proposal, which would undoubtedly receive broad-based U.S. support, may be held up by European parliaments who are reluctant to spend on that order. A related proposal would forgive much of Russia’s vast debt (estimated around $41 billion) in exchange for greater Russian contribution to its non-proliferation efforts. The agreement is a step toward the day when U.S./Russian relations are no longer guided by the prospect of mutual annihilation. But in 2012, when the agreement expires, each nation will still aim thousands of warheads at the other nation, able to destroy their allies’ citizens at a moment’s notice. That fact undermines the partnership growing between the two nations and demonstrates that overly cautious agreements, like this one, can preserve danger rather than hedge against it. In a sense this agreement is also is a wish for a return to the days of deterrence, when foes could be cowed by overwhelming firepower. But there is no deterring suicidal terrorists. In an age where terrorists threaten the United State far more than traditional rivals, our vast nuclear arsenal may be more trouble than it is worth. ******* #11 Christian Science Monitor May 23, 2002 Mothballed warheads pose continuing threat Russian missiles decommissioned under the new nuclear treaty are likely to land in poorly guarded storage depots. By Fred Weir | Special to The Christian Science Monitor MOSCOW -- To terrorists trying to lay their hands on the stuff of atomic weapons, Russia's nuclear nerve center is a daunting fortress. High, video-monitored concrete walls, bomb-proof steel gates, and hundreds of military guards protect the 247-acre site of Moscow's Kurchatov Institute, birthplace of the USSR's first atomic bomb and still a beehive of research on fusion and on methods for storing radioactive materials left over from the cold war. But experts say the institute is the Russian nuclear program's best face. Flung across Russia's vast hinterland are 52 military storage depots for the enriched uranium and plutonium from which nuclear warheads are made. At those sites, security is often lax and weapons-grade materials are not closely accounted for. "Active-duty nuclear weapons are well protected, but there are serious security problems with stored warheads and other highly dangerous materials," says Sergei Yushenkov, deputy head of the State Duma's Security Committee. "The key problem in Russia, which will not be resolved by the current Russia-US dialogue, is that we have no civilian oversight in the nuclear sphere. The glimpses we have are very worrisome, but even in the Duma [Russia's lower house of parliament] we cannot get a full picture." In addition, at the hundreds of civilian facilities around Russia, where thousands of tons of spent reactor fuel and other nuclear wastes are stored, security is often nonexistent. While these materials might not be easily fashioned into atomic weapons, they could provide the ingredients for a so-called "dirty bomb" – radioactive substances wrapped around a conventional explosive. "Control over low-level nuclear wastes in this country is very weak," says Dmitry Kovchegin, a nuclear-safety specialist at the independent PIR Center for policy studies in Moscow. "Terrorists could easily acquire the means to make a dirty bomb in this country." Last winter a group of Duma deputies, environmental activists and a TV crew dramatized the danger by climbing through a broken fence and walking into a medium-security nuclear- waste storage center in Siberia, where they spent six hours beside a building housing 3,000 tons of radioactive spent reactor fuel. "I was amazed at how easy it was," says Sergei Mitrokhin, one of the deputies. "No one challenged us. Guards walked past us, and never asked who we were or what we were doing." Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has spent an average of $400 million a year to fund a range of measures known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Among other things, the money has gone to upgrade storage, oversight, and security at storage sites, and to supplement the meager salaries of thousands of Russian physicists and nuclear engineers who might otherwise be tempted to peddle their skills to third-world countries or terrorist groups. Even at the Kurchatov Institute, where the average paycheck hovers around 2,000 rubles (about $65) monthly, the subsidies have made a difference. "We have some of the world's top nuclear specialists here, earning less than what Americans spend on their lunches in a month," says Andrei Gagarinsky, Kurchatov chief of research and development. "Without extra sources of income, like those from Nunn-Lugar, we just wouldn't be able to continue." Washington is pushing for an additional $20 billion, that would be funded by the US and fellow G7 nations, to help Russia neutralize the danger posed by its nuclear materials. So far, only about 40 percent of Russia's bomb-grade materials and less than a seventh of enriched uranium stocks have been secured, according to a report issued by Harvard University this week. One major area of concern is the Russian Navy's nuclear-submarine fleet, most of which was hastily decommissioned following the Soviet demise. At the Kurchatov Institute, specialists are trying to devise ways to quickly dismantle and store the reactors and fuel rods from more than 100 nuclear subs, many of which are rusting away in open harbors on Russian naval bases. About five years ago, Gagarinsky says, a group of sailors in the northern naval base of Severodvinsk actually hijacked an entire reactor unit – complete with fuel rods – from a disabled submarine, hoping to sell it on the black market. "Of course they failed," says Gagarinsky. "But there's no doubt this area needs a lot of attention." No one is offering a guess at how much nuclear material may already be missing. The former USSR had more than 20,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and as much as 650 metric tons of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, experts say. Russia still deploys about 6,000 strategic and 8,000 smaller tactical warheads. Thousands of others have been safely dismantled over the past decade, and their materials stored, with major help from Nunn-Lugar funds. "The United States has paid for just about everything that has been done to dismantle Russian nuclear weapons," says Alexander Goltz, a military expert who writes for the weekly Ezhenedelni Dzhurnal newsmagazine. Meanwhile, some observers worry that Russia's Ministry of Atomic Power, which oversees both civilian and military nuclear programs and is a key recipient of outside funding, may be diverting the money to other purposes. Russia's State Accounting Chamber, a government watchdog that answers to parliament, charged in a report last year that $270 million given to MinAtom by Norway and Sweden between 1998 and 2000 to help process radioactive wastes simply disappeared. "That is the tip of the iceberg," says Maxim Shingarkin, a former major in the Russian Defense Ministry's department of nuclear forces who now advises environmental groups. "We know that US aid is sometimes being used by MinAtom to fund new nuclear research rather than retire old weapons ...," he says. "In the future there must be much tougher control over the disbursement of such funds." Mr. Yushenkov agrees. "Arms agreements are all very well," he says. "But the most urgent need is to enforce transparency and public accountability over Russia's nuclear establishment." Ironically, the arms-control deal to be signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George Bush on Friday will greatly increase pressure on Russia's dilapidated and insecure storage facilities. Experts say Russia would probably scale back its strategic nuclear forces to about 1,500 warheads within a few years, with or without an agreement. "The delivery systems are old and must be retired," says Mr. Goltz. "Russia can't afford to replace them, so the warheads must be stored." Russia will need massive assistance if it is ever to process the disassembled warheads into forms that cannot be refashioned into weapons one day. "These materials must be immobilized by being mixed with concrete or glass, and then safely stored, or they must be burned in breeder reactors," says Gagarinsky. "At the present time, we lack the means to do either." Vladimir Chuprov, a nuclear expert with Greenpeace-Russia, warns: "Stocks of plutonium in storage will skyrocket in the next few years. No one should imagine that Putin and Bush have brought this under control. The dangers are not receding, they are multiplying every day." ******* #12 gazeta.ru May 22, 2002 Russian army fails to pass muster On the very first day of the regular muster of top brass held in Moscow this week, Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov gave generals a severe dressing down for the lack of professionalism, initiative and purposefulness in the military and accused them of disrupting the winter military training season. It appears the castigation is aimed, first and foremost, at the chief of Russian General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, a staunch opponent of military reforms. The three-day gathering of Russias top military command, held at the Defence Ministry in Moscow, is to review the results of the armed forces military training in the course of the past six months, referred to as the ''winter period'', and to determine the key tasks for combat training during the summer period. Sergei Ivanov addressed the top brass with a highly critical opening speech on Wednesday. ''Assessing the completed work, the Defence Ministry has come to the conclusion that the set tasks have not been achieved in full measure,'' the minister told his subordinates. ''The insufficient level of skills, lack of initiative and purposefulness in the actions of many representatives of army command on various levels have prevented us from making consistent progress,'' Ivanov claimed. Ivanov directed his criticism at his deputies, heads of chief directorates of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff, as well as top army and navy commanders. But it appears that the ministers speech was addressed, first and foremost, to the chief of the Russias General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin. Kvashnin is in charge of army training and therefore, is required to report to the Defence Minister on the results of army training for the winter period. After long consideration and pressure from the Union of the Rightist Forces, President Putin has eventually ventured to launch military reforms, though at a much slower pace than the rightists suggested. Kvashnin and the General Staff that he heads are considered the main opponents of those reforms. As a result, Ivanov, who is in charge of implementing the reform, found himself in an unenviable position. On the one hand, he is to carry out the presidents plans to abolish conscription by 2010 and to create a professional army and on the other hand, he is faced with the fierce resistance of Kvashnin and other generals. This explains Ivanovs duality of attitude towards the reforms. On his tours to military districts, in front of TV cameras, he says that a professional army would cost the state huge amounts of money and is therefore absolutely impossible to implement quickly. And addressing the top brass, and especially Kvashnin, he blames them for all the Russian armys woes. The ministers speech at the muster is yet another example of this. ******* #13 Asia Times May 21, 2002 Russia draws fine line in Caspian By John Helmer MOSCOW - Over growing protests from Iran, Russia has decided to draw a fine line in the Caspian Sea to enable oil companies to drill for oil but avoid the legal problems of setting up national sectors in the sea. Russian policy is also aiming to settle the status of the northern Caspian oilfields without antagonizing Iran by pressuring for a similar deal in the southern sector of the sea. An agreement signed last week in Moscow by President Vladimir Putin and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan "solves the problem of the seabed oil deposits which were subject to disputes", according to Andrei Urnov. Urnov, who heads the Caspian working group at the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Moscow, told Asia Times Online, "The [newly signed] protocol divides not the Caspian Sea, but the natural resources of the seabed. By signing the bilateral protocol we try to solve the dispute, unfreeze the development of the deposits in the northern Caspian, and calm down and reassure investors. Before the protocol was signed, the deposits located in the north of the Caspian Sea were not properly assigned to either Russia and Kazakhstan." Iranian officials reacted swiftly, officially informing the Russian ambassador in Tehran that the document was "legally invalid" and "unacceptable". Industry sources say that Putin has seesawed between trying to accommodate Iran's demand for a consensus of all Caspian states before seabed exploitation can begin - a position originally favored by the Russian Foreign Ministry - and giving Russian oil companies the green light to start drilling. According to Urnov, the agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan draws a line that "takes into account the historical investments made by the two sides in the development of the three existing geological structures [oil deposits] in this part of the Caspian. Based on the historical investment of LUKoil, Russia was given jurisdiction over Hvalynskoye and Centralnoye, while Kazakhstan got Kurmangazy. A modified median line was drawn in such a way as to fix this." LUKoil, Russia's largest oil producer, claims to have invested about US$800 million in Kazakhstan and the offshore Caspian fields since 1996. It estimates it is currently producing about a million tonnes of crude annually from Kazakh territory, with a target of increasing this to 4 million tonnes. LUKoil officials say they "hope to get partial compensation for the expenses of exploration so far. Currently, Hvalynskoye is the only structure in the Northern Caspian with proven resources of oil. We regret that we have to give away part of the deposit, but we are certain that we will find a compromise with the Kazakh side." They estimate that exploration of Kurmangazy, the deposit allocated to Kazakhstan in the new agreement, will take five years and $500 million in new investment. Russian interests have been allocated a 25 percent stake in the new project, while the Kazakh share in the Hvalynskoye field has been fixed at up to 50 percent. Responding to the Iranian attack, Urnov told Asia Times Online that dividing up rights to seabed oil projects "doesn't violate the Soviet-Iranian agreements [which did not regulate seabed use]. Russia and Kazakhstan do not try to divide what doesn't belong to them." Urnov said Russian negotiators will try to reach a similar agreement with Azerbaijan in talks next month. "At this point," he cautioned, "it is not yet clear whether it will be possible to sign an agreement similar to that with Kazakhstan at once. Azerbaijan will have to find agreement on division of the resources of the seabed with Iran and Turkmenistan." According to Urnov, Russia and Azerbaijan may settle on an agreement in principle, and leave to later the problem of drawing the lines necessary to allocate development rights to the oil on the seabed. Iran has warned Azerbaijan that it was ready to use its naval forces to prevent exploration of the Caspian territory that remained to be demarcated. Putin has also ordered the buildup and exercise of Russian military forces in the northern Caspian. Russian officials say they want to reassure Tehran that the deal in the northern sector of the Caspian does not mean that the Kremlin will acquiesce in Azerbaijan's claims on southern territory claimed also by Iran or Turkmenistan. "Bilateral agreements," said Urnov, "decrease the pressure in the region, and provide at least partial legal ground for reaching consensus on the status of the Caspian Sea, and the division of the resources. There is still no full agreement with Iran on the principles of division of the seabed. But [Azeri President Haidar] Aliyev will go to Iran in July, and hopefully, there will be some positive results of this visit." At their meeting in Moscow several weeks ago, Putin and Aliyev agreed to modify the median line demarcation of the Caspian Sea frontier that Baku has been insisting on. According to Aliyev, "we agreed to begin work on drawing a median line between Russia and Azerbaijan", but he cautioned that "it's difficult to say how long it will take". The ambiguous statement by Aliyev was the first signal that Azerbaijan, which has laid claim to more than 20 percent of the Caspian seabed, is willing to compromise with both Russia and Iran. However, a meeting of presidents of all five Caspian states in Turkmenistan last month failed to indicate any progress between Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan. Russian policy makers are divided among themselves over how to deal with the Caspian conflict, with the Foreign and Defense ministries leaning more toward an accommodation with Iran. The special presidential negotiator Victor Kalyuzhny, a former oil minister and advocate of the domestic oil industry, has been openly hostile toward Iran, while LUKoil's chief executive Vagit Alekperov is considered by the Kremlin to be too close to Aliyev. ******* #14 Moscow Times May 22, 2002 Mr. Bush's Most Excellent Exam Adventures By Matt Bivens Logic and Problem-Solving 101 Yale University Midterm Examination Multiple Choice: Read the problem carefully and choose one of the five answers that follow. You are the president of the United States. A formidable and highly motivated terrorist group is seeking a nuclear bomb, which it would then use to destroy Washington or Los Angeles. Should the terrorists build or obtain such a weapon, there is, at this point in time, little chance of preventing its delivery by boat, either up the Potomac River or into, say, Marina del Rey. Naturally, you ask for a briefing: How can we prevent this? Your intelligence agencies tell you more than 600 tons of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium sit in poverty-stricken Russia -- enough, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office, to produce a staggering 40,000 nuclear bombs. Some of that material is pretty well secured. But the GAO reports that, incredibly, there are still "hundreds of tons" of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium -- i.e., enough for thousands of nuclear weapons -- stored in about 100 buildings in Russia that lack such basic security as fences (!), surveillance cameras or reinforced doors. This is so despite years of weakly funded and largely orphaned U.S. assistance programs to improve Russian nuclear security and buy up excess weapons-grade materials. You are shown intelligence that security is also lax around more than 10,000 warheads Russia has in stockpile storage and in quasi-portable "tactical" status. And then there are "research reactors" -- which use some of the best bomb-grade uranium and have some of the worst security. You are briefed on incidents in 1993 when separatists in Abkhazia overran a research reactor in Sukhumi and made off with 2 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, and how scientists at a sister reactor in the town of Mtskheta defended it with rakes and sticks. As it happens, the terrorists targeting the United States have ties to independence-minded Chechen rebels in Russia's south, and to their leader Shamil Basayev, who once fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Abkhaz separatists. Small world. Those Chechen rebels are experts at gaming the corrupt side of Russian society, so much so that they have bought weapons and ammunition from the very Russian troops they are battling in the field. All of which suggest that Russia's loosely secured nuclear weapons and weapons-grade materials are vulnerable and available to the terrorists. However, Russia is your new ally. You have looked into the eyes of Russian President Vladimir Putin and seen his good soul. In fact, you have seen that he is pretty much a doormat and will accept any arms control deal you care to offer. The Russian president has expressed a desire for deep cuts in "strategic" nuclear weapons -- the ones mounted on ballistic missiles. You have 6,000, he has 5,500. You each only need about 200 such weapons to provide a credible strategic deterrent. Were the United States to assume the financial burden of dismantling or securing all Russian weapons of mass destruction, it would cost billions of dollars -- but would still represent a mere fraction of annual U.S. defense spending. In fact, it would cost roughly what Congress has allocated each year for a national missile defense shield -- a shield that just weeks ago your Pentagon in essence admitted won't work, at least not as sold so far, by sheepishly suggesting it might need to use U.S. nuclear weapons to shoot down incoming hostile missiles. Logic dictates you should: A) Offer to reduce your "strategic" nuclear arsenal to about 200 weapons in return for a comparable Russian reduction -- but also in return for Russia publishing how many other kinds of nuclear weapons it has, agreeing to dismantle the vast majority of them and agreeing to work with U.S. experts to dramatically improve security around them. If necessary, point out that your government has only about 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons, including about 180 in European nations, and put them all on the negotiating table. B) Offer to cancel your ailing national missile defense program in return for Russia ending its nuclear flirtation with Iran -- and also for granting U.S. experts sweeping access to move in and secure Russia's weaponizable nuclear, chemical and biological materials. C) Tell the Russian president that the seven-year war in Chechnya is no longer "an internal matter," as it now threatens U.S. security. Seek to broker an immediate cease-fire, a withdrawal of Russian troops and a peaceful settlement of the conflict. D) Invest in a "reverse Manhattan Project" to shut down nuclear power plants worldwide, on grounds they can be used to fuel nuclear weapons. Replace them with cleaner alternatives and develop technology and infrastructure to identify nuclear weapons before they enter the United States' borders, whether delivered by truck or boat or backpack. E) All of the above. F) Cut taxes for the rich. Arbitrarily declare some days "red danger" days and others "orange." Wipe your feet on the Kremlin doormat by signing a three-page "treaty" with Putin that comes into effect ten years later -- at which time both sides can collectively have well over 30,000 nuclear weapons of various stripes lying about. Place not a single demand on Russia to report how many thousands of tactical weapons it holds. And since you're giving up nothing, expect nothing in return vis-a-vis biological weapons or chemical weapons. In fact, just for laughs, quietly cripple existing programs to secure Russia's weapons of mass destruction by jerking them around on the funding side, and use bureaucratic maneuvers like declining to "certify" Russia as serious about nonproliferation. Think of a catchy nickname for the Russian president -- Vlad-man, the Vladster, Vlad the Destroyer, Vlad-to-Meetchya, Pootser, Pootie-Poot, Shake-Your-Pootie, Pootin' on the Ritz ... Put out the word, pre-summit, that you are "brushing up on Dostoevsky." GRADER'S COMMENTS: Mr. Bush, A very few students got this question wrong by choosing answer A and reading no further. You alone selected answer F, which was included as comic relief. I can only assume you chose it in that same spirit. I have to say, now that I see it checked off, it's not so funny. We are basically chuckling about Washington or New York being vaporized, which will seem absolutely impossible right up until the day it happens. In future years, out of respect for the dead of Sept. 11, I will not include this option on the Logic and Problem-Solving midterm. I am also giving you a failing grade. Please try to approach the final with a bit more rigor and respect. Matt Bivens, a former editor of The Moscow Times, is a Washington-based fellow of The Nation Institute [www.thenation.com]. *******