#8
Vedomosti
May 23, 2002
Foreign Policy: Vladimir Putin's Emphases. Closer cooperation with the West and preservation of stable ties with other regions are most important for Russia today
By Vladimir Ryzhkov
(therussianissues.com)

End of May and start of June promise to be, without an exaggeration, a stunning period for the Russian foreign policy. Vladimir Putin will be rapidly moving from one European capital to another (including Moscow and St. Petersburg), with well-nigh each single movement of his holding out a "historic" promise. During a few days, all main novels of his foreign policy are due to assume the austere legal form.

At first, Vladimir Putin will receive George Bush on the Russian soil. The presidents will sign a treaty on further cuts in their countries' nuclear arsenals, reducing the number of nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 within ten years. Simultaneously one should expect grand gestures on the part of Washington, ones recognizing Russia a market economy and discarding at long last the ill-famed Jackson - Vanik. Since the first meeting of the two leaders at Ljubljana and particularly following Russia's resolute joining of the anit-terrorist coalition, relations between the partners have been on the upgrade and the forthcoming meeting is due to confirm and consolidate the advance.

Later both Bush and Putin will leave for an airbase in the environs of Rome in order to sign, along with other NATO leaders, instruments instituting a new format in Russia-NATO relations. As a result, Russia will have the status it likes most of all, that of a unique power. After all, no other NATO partner - neither Ukraine nor even the candidate nations - will have the kind of relations with the Alliance comparable to the status of the Twenty which is going to be created. Establishing new Russia-NATO Council, where Russian ambassador will be seated next to his Portuguese and Spanish counterparts, will give it a chance to join full-blooded NATO debates on many key problems. The list of themes to be discusses and addressed includes combating terrorism, nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons, tactical antimissile defense, peacekeeping operations, joint dealing with regional crises, emergencies, rescue at sea, cooperation in science and economy, and more. Decision-making will be by consensus and the Russian desire to have the veto right will to some extent be satisfied. Unlike the former Russia-NATO Council, the new outfit implies that each time the consensus will be found via an equal and open discussion. Who knows, maybe in some cases Russia will be able to lead a part or even majority of NATO countries in discussing some or other matter?

After Rome Vladimir Putin will come back to Moscow, where he is to have yet another meeting with EU heads in the person of Jose Maria Aznar, Romano Prodi and others. The traditionally extensive agenda of the new Russia-EU summit, which will focus not only on the EU eastern expansion, Kaliningrad, energy dialogue, etc., but also generally a long-term strategy for Russia-EU rapprochement within the framework of the united Europe concept, will reflect the dramatically grown importance of European direction in the Russian foreign policy.

After that, finally, St. Petersburg is to host a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional security organization, which has both Russia and China as its members. It has declared lately its intentions to revive military cooperation, including in the form of joint military exercises and by creating permanent joint bodies for cooperation in the defense and security area.

A considerable improvement in relations and new strategic understandings with the U.S. A new format of cooperation with NATO. Consistent rapprochement with the European Union. Better security in the east and the south. Not bad for two years of the new presidency. The more so if one takes into account the difficulty and unpredictability of the world situation in those two years.

Nevertheless, there are skeptics and critics, who will call things into question and criticize. They point out that the United States does only what it wants and nothing above that. The U.S. is burying, in cold blood and calculatingly, the START-2 Treaty and the AMB Treaty. Instead of destroying warheads to be reduced in accordance with the would-be treaty, it intends to stockpile them so as to have an opportunity to mount them again on strategic carriers the moment it wants. It increasingly closes its markets. It consistently builds up its military spending and goes on with construction of the national missile defense system. Its military bases are still in Central Asia and military instructors in Georgia. The U.S. is not particularly concealing the fact that it prepares an assault on Iraq.

Regarding NATO the skeptics and critics speak about there being no fundamental difference between the new Twenty and the former 19 + 1 formula. The list of themes for discussion is strikingly reminiscent of the one laid down by the Russia-NATO founding act on relations, cooperation and security. Skeptics claim that the new initiatives suggested to Russia are just a wish to take the edge off its expansion east and to the Baltic countries, which is certain to be decided upon in Prague next November. That NATO's military machine will be strengthened and modernized and that the Alliance is ready, already today, to use force outside of its responsibility zone. Simultaneously they indicate that the United States increasingly often leaves NATO out of business, which means that Russia is being engaged in cooperation with an organization, which loses its influence.

Besides, the core of the North Atlantic Alliance, to wit, its military component, will remain outside the purview of the Twenty. The Russia-NATO Treaty has nothing to do with NATO's collective defense commitments or its military organization in general.

Concerning the rapprochement with the EU, the skeptics and critics say that there are lots of words but no real progress. That Russian and European bureaucracies are slow and inefficient. That Brussels is unwilling to accept deeper practical cooperation with the Russians. The skepticism feeds on the lack of breakthrough solutions to such difficult and many-tiered problems as visa-free travel for Russian nationals via the Lithuanian territory, the general toughening of the Schengen visa regulations, and other things.

The Shanghai initiative is regarded as a mostly symbolic, dormant organization, which is yet to show its mettle. Even in cases that concern it directly (such as the anit-terrorist operation in Afghanistan).

There is a fair share of truth in those doubts. The record of the last fifteen years of Russian foreign policy is full of rapturous declarations about "historic breakthroughs" and subsequent disappointments. Many chances were allowed to slip through incompetence. Ruptures often followed rapprochements and cooperation was interrupted by grave crises.

The new emphases and major initiatives in the area of the Russian foreign policy leave open the question of prospects. The course for closer cooperation with the West and simultaneous preservation of stable ties with other regions of key importance for Russia has exceptionally favorable chances of being implemented. There are only two circumstances that can interfere with its success. First, sabotage by the bureaucracies in Moscow and Brussels, which in many respects are inclined to regard the mechanism of the Twenty as yet another senseless talking-shop for the sides, which remain potential adversaries and have fundamentally different geopolitical interests. Second, the potential for conflict inherent in the forthcoming expansion of NATO and the quite probable military campaign by the U.S. and its allies against Iraq. The pattern of "nattering till the first crisis" with subsequent breaking-off of relations may well recur again under the pressure of the still strong Russian lobby opposing this country's integration into the club of developed democratic states. Then the new foreign policy created bit by bit by Vladimir Putin will suffer a defeat.

But this outcome is not a foregone conclusion. Russia's foreign policy has been increasingly logical and consistent lately. It is becoming well adjusted and pragmatic. It is rejecting illusory and dangerous alternatives. It increasingly often puts the right emphases. Against this background, Vladimir Putin is as popular and as successful as before. It means something may work out after all this time over.

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