#6
Moscow News
May 22-28, 2002
He smiles best...
The Russian and U.S. presidents will sign several important interstate agreements. Someone is bound to describe this as "the dawn of a new era in the Russian-U.S. relationship." Even so, there is no cause for euphoria yet, says Nikolai Zlobin, an expert with the U.S. Center for Defense Information

What do the main interest groups within the U.S. elite expect from Bush's visit to Russia? Do they have identical expectations?

First of all, today the Russian-U.S. relationship is not a foreign policy priority either for the political elite or for President Bush. Actually, this is a welcome sign: It shows that there is no crisis in our relations. Tactically, the Americans do not need Russia. But strategically, far-sighted U.S. politicians believe that it is better to have Russia on their side. In the next five, 10 or 20 years the main problems will be coming from Asian, Islamic, countries. Many in Washington today realize that America may increasingly have to seek Moscows assistance.

With the emergence of the G-20 - Russia-in-NATO - the alliance is approaching Chinese borders. The main brunt of the resultant problems will have to be borne by Russia. This will be very important in a decade, when China begins to show some activity which, say, may not be to the Western countries liking. It is not a matter of an all-out confrontation with countries opposed to each other. Russia should not necessarily be Europe's outpost in Asia, but it could put in place some intermediary mechanism to deal with outstanding contradictions. I believe that the presidents will discuss this issue. People in Washington are expecting Bush to give a coherent answer to the question of how the U.S. administration sees the relationship with China, and the role of Russia in this relationship.

A considerable number of influential politicians and businessmen in the United States believe that Russias evolution as an energy alternative to the Middle East is a dangerous trend. Because Russia is unpredictable and Russian oil companies are the most opaque and corrupt setups in the world. Do not forget either that President Bush is the leader of U.S. oil lobbyists, who are not interested in creating a new competitor, especially with their own hands.

That said, a part of the political elite hopes that President Bush will manage to convince Vladimir Putin that America is indeed interested in technological cooperation with Russia. Incidentally, one of the documents to be signed at the summit is an agreement on cooperation in the technological sphere.

But there are also people on the U.S. political scene who are absolutely obsessed with the Iran-Iraq situation and Russian contracts. Not surprisingly, they are opposed to any improvement in relations with the Kremlin until the latter has completely and unequivocally abandoned its support for Saddam Hussein and all nuclear projects with Iran. That is to say, various political groups have their own interests - positive or negative - with respect to Russia. But the prevailing trend is indifference.

What is your vision of the worst-case scenario for the negotiations?

I believe that Bush would be only too happy to have his trip moved to a later date: After all, these arms reduction treaties and the declaration on a new partnership had to be drafted in haste. I suppose that the visit will on the whole be a success and that the presidents will have signed all the documents there are to sign.

But this may be all. I think it is important for the two presidents to meet as often as possible. Then the failure of one meeting would not be so important. If something was not settled today, they could meet in a month and do it then. Otherwise U.S. interest in Russia will continue to diminish. Short-term, it is very bad if both sides, especially Russia, take an inflexible stand on the issue of Iran and Iraq.

Yet this is as far as expectations are concerned. In broader terms, the results of the visit will not be known immediately.

Are any secret agreements going to be signed?

No, its not that. When all is said and done, the agenda of these negotiations is disappointing because it is largely connected with past problems. As for tomorrow, we have a glaring gap here. When we stopped treating each other as potential enemies, it suddenly transpired that there wasn't a new basis for Russian-U.S. relations. Today there is talk to the effect that we are partners in the fight against terrorism. But a relationship between countries cannot be built on a fight against something. If there is no base, old problems - say, disarmament or national missile defense - begin to take center stage. Or it suddenly comes to pass that Russia and the United States are utterly dependent on transient political developments. So the main outcome of the summit will lie in whether the two presidents begin to look for a new base for a long-term strategic partnership. The first serious problem here is whether they will manage to do this. The second is whether they will manage to explain the importance of what they

have achieved to their elites and their people. Third, whether they will manage to follow up on this work at their next meeting. If the process stalls, it is not ruled out that Russia's future policy will be formulated by forces that will have pulled President Putin back - into Cold War ideology.

What prevented the discussion of tomorrow, not yesterday, from becoming the focus of the summit?

There is considerable inertia within the power elites both in the United States and Russia. In the Cold War era, both countries had forces that lived off the opposition to each other. Now these people have managed to put all of these missile issues on the agenda - moreover, make them a centerpiece of the summit. In America, however, it is no longer possible to make money or build a career on this. There is a large number of hardliners, even anti-Russian-minded elements, there, but they are not part of the decision-making group. Meanwhile, in Russia such sentiments in the power structures are still very strong. The Americans are worried by this; they are afraid that Russian hardliners will - under certain circumstances - pull Putin over to their side, and he will change his views. It is easier with Bush: He has no anti-Russian sentiments, he is a Cold War child, he played football in those years.

Is Bush coming under pressure from the Republican right wing?

Bush is under constant pressure. This is normal. All interest groups are seeking to exert influence - the right, left, centrists, liberals, and democrats. I think that for Bush as a politician and for the U.S. politics as a whole, there is no particular danger from the Republican right wing today. First of all, Bush enjoys colossal popularity among the electorate. So the party's right wing is interested in Bush more than he is interested in them. Second, Bush's present team is an assortment of people who do not always listen to the Republican right. Otherwise Bush would simply not be going to Russia.

Are you saying that problems at the negotiations could only arise because of Russia?

Certainly not: The U.S. side also has its share of problems - most of them of the Catch-22 kind. The United States is interested in Putin's pro-American position. At the same time the Americans need a democratic Russia. They want Russia to press ahead with economic reform and consolidate democracy, freedom, and openness. But this is where a Catch-22 situation comes up: If the Russian president is pressured and criticized for what is going on within the country, Putin's position could weaken while his foreign policy course become less amenable to the United States. If, however, you turn a blind eye to Russia's internal problems, democratic development in the country could be held up, which is bad in the long term.

Another example: We are talking a great deal about the need to strengthen relations between Russians and Americans, which leads to yet another Catch-22 situation. On one hand, rapprochement is imperative. On the other, when they talk about integration, many fail to understand that it will come at a high price to Russia - not only in the economic and political but also the cultural and psychological sphere.

Let us take the new declaration on strategic relationship. Here is an important question: To what extent are the two countries, especially Russia, ready to take on a measure of responsibility for the situation in the world at large? Will America adopt a new nuclear doctrine providing for the use of nuclear weapons first even against non-nuclear countries? Will Russia agree to this?

There is yet another problem that should be on the summit agenda. I hope that the visa situation - absolutely unacceptable, in my opinion - will not be ignored. It is high time that America extended regulations applied to the East European states, to Russia.

What about the storage of nuclear warheads?

No, this is not going to be a big problem. The Americans no longer produce warheads while Russia is still able to do this. The Americans no longer conduct tests. So they say: Let us keep something. The problem of Iran and Iraq is far more serious today.

What are the implications?

Saddam Hussein, in the American view, is the main evil in the world today while Russia is his sole salvation. If everything remains as it has been, the Americans will see this in no uncertain terms: You have not as yet buried the ax. Bush will then have only one way out - to revise his position on Russia. A solution is needed here that will apparently involve some concessions on the part of Russia. America, for its part, could pledge to pay these countries debts or that the future regime will pay the debts. Some compromise could be found.

This mainly concerns Iraq, but it will not work for Iran, where it is not just one person that matters.

No, it won't work for Iran. Although a compromise is also essential here. At the very least, we could take care not to irk the West by energy projects, however peaceful. I believe that Iran should be kept within the sphere of Russian economic influence. Iran is a major player in the Middle East. I believe that the Americans want their influence on Iran to pass through, among others, Russia. To this end, however, it is necessary to agree on a common policy toward Tehran. President Putin could offer an acceptable alternative. Russia is afraid to lose its political clout. But why does it need it in the first place? To stand up to the West.

Everyone remembers Gorbachev and East Germany, when Russia got nothing in exchange for its concessions.

High-ranking officials often say: Look, we have taken so many steps toward the West, but what have we got in return? I say to them: You have done this not to please the West, but in the interests of Russia. And if this is the case, why do you expect something in return? If you have tried to sell yourselves at a higher price, this is a different matter. But you are not saying, are you, that you are selling yourselves.

But this is so natural: You have made a present, you expect something in return.

This is plebeian ideology. Look, Russia's most reliable partner in Europe is Germany. The only country that keeps saying that Russia should be integrated into Europe. Everybody else is against that. As to whether the Russians got or did not get a particular loan, which within six months will have been spent on daily subsistence, this is quite another matter. We should take a long-term view, but no one wants to do that because everyone is concerned about the next elections.

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