#10
CDI Weekly Defense Monitor
Volume 6, Issue #15
May 23, 2002
www.cdi.org
The Nuclear Arms Pact: Storing the Legacy of the Cold War
Ben Friedman, Research Assistant, bfriedman@cdi.org

Announcing the completion of a strategic nuclear arms pact with Russia last week, President George W. Bush told Americans that the agreement would "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." But the agreement, negotiated from the handshake agreement Bush and Russian President Putin reached in Crawford, Texas last November, liquidates nothing. The United States and Russia will reduce their arsenals of operationally deployed strategic weapons from 6,000 to 1,700-2,200 by 2012. The states might destroy some of these weapons, particularly Russia, but neither side is obligated to do so. Rather than mandating the destruction of the legacy of the Cold War, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, this agreement allows the two states to put them in storage faculties in partially disassembled states, where they can be rearmed in short order. This "hedge force," offers the United States "strategic flexibility," according to administration officials. We are not then liquidating the legacy of the Cold War; we are redefining its use.

Will this agreement enhance American security? Yes, but probably not much. The agreement does nothing to address what the Baker-Cutler commission called the most pressing threat to American security –- the risk of theft or illicit sale of Russia’s unsecured nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Russia has a untold number of small, tactical nuclear weapons, (estimates range from a few thousand to 15,000) some with explosive power around the order of Hiroshima. These weapons are most attractive to terrorists because they are easier to handle and use than strategic nuclear weapons. The Bush administration recently announced that it would not pursue a treaty dealing with tactical nuclear weapons, but might seek their destruction by less formal means. The agreement also does not address the problem of lax security of fissile materials in Russia, which terrorists could use to cobble together a "dirty bomb."

Some analysts have even suggested that by forcing the Russians to store its nuclear materials to mirror the U.S. hedge force, where they might be vulnerable to terrorists given Russia’s inability to adequately protect such materials, the agreement will detract from American security. This analysis probably overstates the case, since the materials least protected and valuable to terrorists are fissile materials and perhaps tactical nuclear weapons, which are largely unaffected by storage of strategic nuclear weapons. But what is clear is that this agreement should be accompanied by an effort to improve and deepen cooperative threat reduction, an array of U.S. run programs named for their founders, Senators Sam Nunn and Dick Lugar, which aim to secure and dismantle Russians nuclear weapons and keep Russian scientists from peddling their intellectual wares to rogue states.

Accelerating and strengthening Nunn-Lugar would have a far greater impact on U.S. national security than this strategic arms agreement. The Baker-Cutler Task Force on Nonproliferation Programs in Russia, a bipartisan commission of national security experts chaired by former Senator Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, recommended spending $30 billion over a decade on Nunn-Lugar -– at the current pace the programs will cost around $10 billion over the same period. If that seems like a lot, note that the Bush administration’s FY 2003 budget calls for close to eight billion dollars for missile defense, almost eight times what is spent on cooperative threat reduction. The Nunn-Lugar programs, despite considerable success, have secured only about one third of Russia’s nuclear stockpile, leaving the rest vulnerable until they are dealt with in the coming years.

One solution to this funding shortfall has been proposed by the Bush administration. The plan, known as the "Ten plus Ten by Ten" plan, would ask major U.S. allies, principally the Group of Eight nations, to match the U.S. contribution to the programs, contributing a cumulative $10 billion over 10 years. This proposal, which would undoubtedly receive broad-based U.S. support, may be held up by European parliaments who are reluctant to spend on that order. A related proposal would forgive much of Russia’s vast debt (estimated around $41 billion) in exchange for greater Russian contribution to its non-proliferation efforts.

The agreement is a step toward the day when U.S./Russian relations are no longer guided by the prospect of mutual annihilation. But in 2012, when the agreement expires, each nation will still aim thousands of warheads at the other nation, able to destroy their allies’ citizens at a moment’s notice. That fact undermines the partnership growing between the two nations and demonstrates that overly cautious agreements, like this one, can preserve danger rather than hedge against it. In a sense this agreement is also is a wish for a return to the days of deterrence, when foes could be cowed by overwhelming firepower. But there is no deterring suicidal terrorists. In an age where terrorists threaten the United State far more than traditional rivals, our vast nuclear arsenal may be more trouble than it is worth.

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