CDI Russia Weekly-#206 17 May 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. strana.ru: Victoria Whall, Will the Bubble Burst at the Russia-U.S. Summit? Political elites buoyed by progress in U.S. - Russia Relations. 2. Newsday editorial: Collective Self-Interest...is drawing Russia into partnership with the West, to the benefit of the former enemies. 3. RFE/RL: Jeffrey Donovan, U.S./Russia: Analysts See Arms Treaty As Driven By U.S. Unilateralism. 4. Christian Science Monitor: Peter Grier, Remains of the cold war melting. Russia deepens its integration with former rival NATO, as President Carter tries to pry open US doors to Cuba. 5. Moscow Times editorial: Ending the End of the Cold War. 6. Gazeta: RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ON RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY. 7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Marina Kalashnikov, PAX AMERICANA POOLED. NATO is becoming increasingly less efficient. 8. Moscow News: Ilya Baranikas, Good Intentions at Russian Forum. 9. Russia Business List: Tom Adshead, Military reform. 10. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Don't wait for Pinochet. 11. Literaturnaya Gazeta: Oleg Moroz and Alexander Khramchikhin, DOCTRINES AND BOMBS. Implications for Russia of changes to US nuclear policy. ******* #1 strana.ru May 16, 2002 Will the Bubble Burst at the Russia-U.S. Summit? Political elites buoyed by progress in U.S. - Russia Relations By Victoria Whall A "man on the street" opinion poll on NATO-Russia relations, in which 46% of Russians asked responded that they were against entry into the alliance, presents a very different picture to the one the Russian political elite has been disseminating in recent weeks. Approximately 34% of those queried indicated they were in favor of entry, with 20% undecided. The results of the poll, which was carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation May 4-5th, demonstrates that the Russian public is far from certain that Russia should be allying itself with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 52% of the 1,500 people asked said the bloc posed a threat to Russia's security, with only 31% responding that it did not, which would suggest that for many, the cold war is still a reality. However, as far as the U.S. and Russian Foreign Ministers, Colin Powell and Igor Ivanov are concerned, the cold war is now over. This was confirmed when they speaking at a press conference in Reykjavik on Tuesday. But the Russian mass media has resisted getting swept away by the "new era" rhetoric, remaining suspicious of the new alliance. Coverage of the recent NATO and Russia ministerial talks focuses on the limits of the soon to be established Russia-NATO Council, and which side had gained/lost the most in the NATO deal. The new joint policy-making body will take cooperation to another level by enabling Russia and NATO to work together on security issues, but two of the core features of NATO membership will not hold for Russia, namely the right to veto NATO actions and the principle that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. The chairman of the Federation Council's Committee for International Affairs Mikhail Margelov seems satisfied with this. "In keeping with the formula chosen by the Russian President, we are ready to go as far in our cooperation with NATO as the alliance itself is ready to accept it," Margelov told reporters on Tuesday. He for one didn't seem to think that Russia had done more than it should have to reach agreement with the U.S., underlining that Russia's national interests would not be sacrificed in the name of closer cooperation. "This formula also says that (our cooperation will go as far) as the alliance is ready to respect Russia's national interests," the Chairman said. Meanwhile, since President Bush boasted recently that he is no more worried about Moscow's nuclear arms than about Britain's, experts are worried that the U.S. political elite might be getting ahead of itself. Michael McFaul, an expert on the U.S.-Russia relationship, has expressed concern that American leaders are not seeing the real Russia. He said that there was always an understandable risk of American leaders seeing the country through the eyes of the people they dealt with in Moscow, Reuters reported Wednesday. Progress in bilateral relations, Mr. McFaul said, could lead to U.S. leaders forgetting that Russia is not a consolidated democracy, and blind them to the threat that Russia could still slide into autocracy in the next decade. If the American leadership has been looking at Russia through rose-tinted glass, they will soon realize their mistake. Sentiments of the average Russian on the street towards the U.S. will come to the surface when President Bush makes his first official visit to Russia next week. ******* #2 Newsday May 16, 2002 Editorial Collective Self-Interest ...is drawing Russia into partnership with the West, to the benefit of the former enemies. A welcome momentum bringing Russia closer to the West has built with astonishing speed this week. First, Washington and Moscow reached a breakthrough agreement Monday to slash their nuclear arsenals, and the next day, NATO and Russia approved a landmark partnership breaching the final barriers between the two former Cold War enemies. The significance of these moves cannot be overstated. They could alter the strategic landscape profoundly for the United States and its allies - for the better. Tuesday's historic agreement establishes a NATO-Russia council, a joint decision-making body to fight terrorism and other security threats - such as weapons of mass destruction and regional insurrections - beyond NATO's traditional sphere, Western Europe. NATO's role would shift from that of a purely defensive alliance to one of cooperative security. As significant, the agreement to form the council - in which Russia will have equal status to current NATO members, but without veto power - comes despite U.S. intentions to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In fact, cooperation on the development of missile defense systems is an issue Russia agreed to discuss within the new council. With Russia no longer objecting to its enlargement, NATO has begun preparations to expand again to include the Baltic states, a development once thought to be too provocative because it would put NATO's borders up against Russia's. It is a move that has been resisted within the Russian power structure. But Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to have overcome those objections in his determined drive to forge closer ties to the West, particularly since its war on terrorism began. There is little doubt that Sept. 11 played a major role in prompting Putin to make this historic deal with NATO. Russia feels a great sense of threat from Islamic insurrections and terrorism within its borders. What will make this partnership work will not be rosy pictures of friendship between former enemies but a calculated exercise in collective self-interest. That's not a bad basis for this partnership. ******* #3 U.S./Russia: Analysts See Arms Treaty As Driven By U.S. Unilateralism By Jeffrey Donovan U.S. President George W. Bush announced on Monday that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin will sign a treaty to cut their strategic nuclear arsenals by two-thirds at a summit in Russia later this month. But analysts wonder if mutual security will really be improved by a deal that provides for far less than Putin had hoped. Washington, 15 May 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Russia didn't give in to U.S. demands on nuclear-arms cuts simply because it can't keep up with the American military machine. It gave in because Washington would have done what it wanted with its nuclear arsenal regardless of Russian concerns. That, at least, was the one assessment that U.S. analysts on both the right and left shared when they debated the newly announced arms-control deal between Russia and the United States yesterday. On Monday, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin will sign a treaty to cut offensive nuclear arsenals by two-thirds when they meet at a summit in Moscow and St. Petersburg from May 23-26. Bush said the pact, which followed months of tough talks during which the Russian side repeatedly saw its requests fall on deaf American ears, would "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." But some analysts beg to differ. They say despite the reduction from roughly 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads apiece to between 1,700 and 2,200, both countries will still possess the unique capability they achieved during the Cold War: to annihilate each other several times over. Joseph Cirincione, the director of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington think tank, said: "When President Bush and President Putin shake hands on this deal in Moscow, the [U.S. nuclear] strategic command will be targeting Putin's office. It remains in the target base." Cirincione, like other moderate and liberal American analysts, said the announced agreement represents a "missed opportunity" to enhance the security of both countries, as well as to further solidify the improved ties that developed after Putin backed the U.S.-led war on terrorism last fall. Cirincione said that because of economic constraints, Putin was willing to sign a treaty pledging deeper, faster, and more permanent cuts in arsenals. Moscow also sought to destroy the warheads, but the U.S. insisted they be stored in "deep freeze" for use in emergencies. Cirincione said that regardless of the pact, 10 years from now the U.S. will still have nearly 10,000 warheads in its arsenal. "In effect, the Russians served up their nuclear-weapons arsenals on a platter for [the United States] -- and [the United States] couldn't take 'yes' for an answer," Cirincione said. But the proliferation of nuclear materials -- considered as a key threat to U.S. security following the terrorist attacks of last September -- is Cirincione's most pressing concern. And it is here he said the treaty simply doesn't add up. Although the three-page pact has yet to be made public, Cirincione believes it will not deal with tactical nuclear arms. He said Russia enjoys a large numerical superiority in this area and that U.S. experts don't know how many tactical warheads Moscow has -- whether it's 5,000 or 15,000. And a key issue that could have answered that question -- a mechanism for ensuring transparency -- is not even mentioned in the treaty, Cirincione told a roundtable discussion on the upcoming U.S.-Russia summit at his group's Washington headquarters. The treaty, which will require approval from the U.S. Senate and Russian Duma to be brought into force, reportedly stipulates that each country can decide how to reduce its weapons over the next 10 years. The treaty also expires in 2012 and can be withdrawn from with prior notice of three months. U.S. officials maintain that the Pentagon will retain "maximum flexibility" from the treaty, but Cirincione disagreed on the need for so many weapons of mass destruction still pointed at a country that is no longer considered an enemy. "They successfully have sucked most of the substance out of this agreement, so we have what I think of as 'legally binding mush,'" Cirincione said. But both Cirincione and his Carnegie colleague, Rose Gottemoeller, agree that Putin needed a formal deal with the U.S. to boost his domestic political stature, and that he had little bargaining power to sway a Washington clearly bent for some time on going its own way on security issues. And Gottemoeller -- who was the lead U.S. official in overseeing the removal of nuclear arms from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in the early 1990s -- said this treaty is better than no treaty for Putin. She said that, at the very least, the treaty will provide for implementation measures such as site inspections, monitoring, and data exchange that will lay an important foundation for the U.S.-Russian cooperative security relationship over the next decade. Gottemoeller also said the Bush team told the Russians it will not bring into force past arms-control agreements that ban multiple warheads on intercontinental ballistic weapons. She said Russia, out of financial considerations, may not opt to deploy such warheads, but the option is now open and the precedent set for a "circular game" to be played if both sides take this route. And like Cirincione, Gottemoeller is concerned about the way Bush announced the deal -- informally to reporters while walking to his helicopter. She said it suggests that all his pronouncements about U.S.-Russian rapprochement may be insincere. "If he had really felt that he wanted to help out Putin politically, he would have rolled it out in a way that it could have been done as a joint action, as a partnership action, rather than a kind of off-the-cuff statement on the way to his helicopter," Gottemoeller said. But some conservative members of Bush's Republican Party had argued against signing any treaty, saying such a deal was unneeded by the world's sole superpower. The Bush administration, since taking office in January 2001, has insisted that it would take unilateral actions in the security sphere. Its first major step in that direction came earlier this year when it announced that it would unilaterally pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Although the Russians said that treaty had been the cornerstone of international security for 30 years, Washington argued that it was a Cold War relic that was preventing it from developing a nuclear missile-defense system that America needed even more after the destruction of 11 September. The idea that Russia is no longer an enemy -- just another country to do business with -- and that America will now act unilaterally in the security realm was articulated by Richard Perle, a key Pentagon adviser and former assistant secretary of defense. Perle, a leading advocate of taking preemptive military action against Iraq, told a political discussion hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations that America's enemies are completely different today from during the Cold War. "I think that decisions about the nature, size, [and] composition of our nuclear force should be driven by considerations that have little or nothing to do with the size, nature, or composition of the Russian force. It no longer makes sense to think of them in relation to one another," Perle said. Indeed, in the wake of the September attacks, there is growing concern in America that despite the war on terrorism, the country remains vulnerable to another attack -- perhaps even with a radiological "dirty bomb" built by terrorists with fissile military technology somehow acquired in Russia. A new movie to be released this week written by spy novelist Tom Clancy, called "The Sum of All Fears," tells of terrorists detonating a nuclear bomb near the Super Bowl American football championship in the eastern city of Baltimore, just north of Washington. Karl Inderfurth, a former assistant secretary of state, is head of a group called the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign. Inderfurth told the roundtable at Carnegie that he believes such a scenario is plausible. "There is no question that if [Osama] bin Laden and Al-Qaeda had the opportunity to get a nuclear bomb, place it in the center of Manhattan or Washington or wherever, they would do it. And we've got to take steps, working with the Russians to secure their arsenals so that one very dramatic source of possible nuclear materials is choked off," Inderfurth said. But according to Jon Wolfsthal, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment's nonproliferation project, that danger may now become even greater as a direct result of U.S. demands that the new treaty allow for the storage, but not destruction, of nuclear arms. Wolfsthal fears that fissile material stored unsafely or improperly in Russia could wind up in terrorists' hands. "The only good nuclear weapon is a dead nuclear weapon. That's where there's a gaping hole in this agreement," Wolfsthal said. However, all of the analysts said they believe the treaty is a positive step, even if they wonder whether the Bush administration will follow it up with further efforts to cut arms and combat nonproliferation. Yesterday, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer suggested that it will. Though the treaty will stipulate the destruction of only some warheads, Fleischer said the Bush administration will also push U.S. programs that seek to safeguard nuclear materials in Russia, such as the program named after former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar. "We will continue to work with Russia through the Nunn-Lugar program and other programs that we have to ensure that the safekeeping of Russian weaponry is maintained no matter what the status of the warhead," Fleischer said. Putin and Bush are also expected at the summit to produce a document on another arms-control issue: Bush's plans to test and develop a national missile defense. Though that issue has divided the leaders in the past, Inderfurth said he believes the U.S. may be willing to work with Russia on missile defense, and perhaps even on developing a shield together. Inderfurth said that far from being a point of contention, missile-defense cooperation could become a keystone of the new U.S.-Russian strategic framework. And if that happens, he said, the Cold War and its crowning document, the ABM Treaty, will truly have been surpassed. ******* #4 Christian Science Monitor May 16, 2002 Remains of the cold war melting Russia deepens its integration with former rival NATO, as President Carter tries to pry open US doors to Cuba. By Peter Grier | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor WASHINGTON – The cold war has been over for years. But it may be only now – after a decade of false starts, tentative handshakes, and bruised feelings on both sides of the old Iron Curtain – that the lukewarm peace that will replace it is finally developing. Since the Berlin Wall fell during the administration of the first President Bush, some of the greatest strategic issues of modern European history have been resolved. Germany is one nation again, and has been integrated into the political structure of the continent. Eastern Europe is free from domination by any neighboring great power. There's even some progress toward stability in the Balkans – albeit progress made in the wake of brutal regional wars. Still, the integration of Russia with the West continues. And this week, that grand, uncertain enterprise was boosted by two remarkable events – the US-Russian nuclear-arms deal, and NATO's acceptance of Russia in a closer partnership. To see how far relations between the nations formerly known as superpower rivals have come, consider two scenes that played out on opposite sides of the world this week. In Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter met dissidents. He lectured Fidel Castro – a living icon of the cold war – about human rights. He called for an end to the 40-year-old US embargo on Cuban trade. All-in-all, Mr. Carter focused on issues that have been central to US – Cuban relations (such as they are) since John F. Kennedy was in the White House. Meanwhile, at a meeting of foreign ministers in Reykjavik, Iceland, US Secretary of State Colin Powell smiled broadly as he shook hands with his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov. Mr. Powell noted that one of the hottest US-Russian issues was frozen chicken parts. Cheap American poultry – mainly the dark meat – has flooded Russia, hurting domestic producers. In response, Russian authorities slapped an embargo on the imports last month. They've loosened a bit since, but new shipments have not yet begun to move. "I'm more worried about chickens going back and forth then missiles going back and forth," said Powell. "This is good." This week's sense of a page turning in the book of world geopolitics began with President Bush's surprise announcement of an agreement between the US and Russia on a deal to slash their remaining nuclear arsenals by two-thirds. In terms of pure numbers, that's more progress than a generation of arms negotiators made during innumerable trips to Geneva. Despite the fact that the Bush administration hadn't initially wanted a formal treaty, officials now believe the pact makes sense. "It helps further codify and establish predictability in the long-term US-Russian relations in a way which will go beyond [Bush] and President Putin," said a senior official at a briefing for reporters. The NATO deal, meanwhile, will allow Russia to become a full discussion partner with the 19 alliance members for a variety of issues – though not core military decisions. For Russia, the move represented a significant improvement over its former looser consultant relationship with NATO. Experts noted that Moscow likely sees benefit in this week's moves because Mr. Putin's main foreign-policy goal appears to be a predictable relationship with the US. "International stability is a critical element for Putin and the Russian government to enable them to tackle [their] overwhelming array of domestic challenges, especially economic challenges," says Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution here. IN that context, what Putin most wants from his US counterpart is not acceptance of particular Russian positions, but assurance that the US will act in a multilateral fashion, with the rest of the international community, says Ms. Hill. That's because, given its volatile neighborhood, encompassing the Middle East, Central Asia, China, even North Korea, Russia could find itself dealing with negative fallout from unilateral US actions in, say, the war against terrorism. Russia also wants to have a seat at the table when Europe discusses issues such as openness to trade, free transit of people across borders, and expansion of NATO and the continent's other defining club, the European Union. "The real concern for the Russians is that they're going to get closed out, that there's gong to be a new 'Iron Curtain' .... for European expansion and all of its institutional forms," says Hill. ****** #5 Moscow Times May 16, 2002 Editorial Ending the End of the Cold War It seems the Cold War is dead, again. The latest cause of death was Tuesday's agreement between NATO and Russia to form a new partnership. "This is the last rites, the funeral of the Cold War," said British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. The day before, in announcing that a treaty to cut nuclear warheads will be signed in Moscow next week, U.S. President George W. Bush said the treaty would "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." The thing is that this final demise of the Cold War, which had kept the world on edge for decades, was not necessarily big news. The Washington Post buried its report on NATO on page 19. The New York Times played the news much bigger, running its story on the front page. But it contained a nice tidbit about a slip of the tongue by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. Describing the arms control agreement to reporters on his plane, Powell inadvertently referred to the "Soviets" (so perhaps reports of the Cold War's death were premature after all). Powell explained his gaffe by saying, "When you're as old as I am ..." The major Russian newspapers, however, didn't consider it terribly interesting that Russia had agreed to a partnership with its former enemy. Izvestia's front-page news Wednesday was the death of a head Soviet soccer coach, while the NATO article was relegated to page 2. Many papers carried no news of the NATO deal at all. The issue, in any case, is not burying the Cold War but creating a new framework and finding a new way to look at the world. This will be much harder, as Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said when speaking to reporters in Reykjavik: "We must now together build the new world order, and this will be a long process, a difficult process." Part of this process will be recognizing that Russia has its own national interests, and they do not always coincide with those of the United States and Europe. In the meantime, may the Cold War rest in peace. ******* #6 Gazeta No. 85 May 2002 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ON RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE CAPABILITY Ivan YEGOROV, Andrei REUT Two very important for Russia military-political events took place on one and the same day. Firstly, we were admitted, in "the twenty" format, to the NATO bloc, which the Warsaw Pact, led by the USSR, had opposed throughout its existence. Secondly, - the creation, on the basis of the collective security treaty (CST), of a military organization with the participation of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan. This organization will become the first military bloc in what was formerly the USSR after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, this alliance will not be aimed against NATO or anyone else. Gazeta has collected the opinions of political scientists Vyacheslav NIKONOV, Sergei KARAGANOV and military expert Maxim PYADUSHKIN, which reflect different viewpoints on the importance of these events for Russia's foreign policy and defense capability. Vyacheslav NIKONOV, president of the Politika (Politics) Foundation: "we should ensure security ourselves." That on one and the same day we came to terms with NATO concerning "the twenty" and created the CST alliance is highly symbolical. For some reason, we got used to opposing ourselves to the West and seeing everything connected with the CIS through an anti-western prism. This is an obviously obsolete view. The integration of the post-Soviet environment and cooperation with the west are not at variance with each other. It is beyond doubt that we had to do something about the CST treaty because over the past decade it had not shown its efficiency, considering the fact that military cooperation between the CIS countries had always been more advanced than in other fields. Today, no matter how Russia-NATO cooperation may develop, none of the CST countries will be admitted to NATO. This is why we should ensure security ourselves. From the military point of view, the CST is a stronger alliance for Russia than one with NATO, of course. I would not exaggerate the importance of what was reached in Reykjavik and what will be signed by Vladimir Putin in Rome on May 28. So far, all this is just a modified "19+1" formula. There is nothing principally new about it, because NATO proper does not pass any decisions. NATO is bureaucratic structure, while all decision-making is done in Washington. Brussels only formalizes these decisions. Sergei KARAGANOV, president of the council for foreign and defense policies: "saying that the CST is another Warsaw Pact is ridiculous." Russia does not need the CST in the form it existed, because most countries that are party to it are security "consumers," not "suppliers." On the other hand, we need to cooperate with neighboring countries in order to ward off new global threats and prevent "the Georgian disease," that is, complete disintegration. However, saying that the CST is another Warsaw Pact is at least ridiculous. The Warsaw Pact made the Soviet Union with weak allies an enemy of all developed countries. Today, Russia has to deal with even weaker allies. The new treaty can serve as a counterbalance to NATO only in the political-psychological sense, for certain groups of the nostalgic elite, while its real possibilities are even weaker. The CST might be a useful step, of course, but I am skeptical about it. It did not work in the past and I do not see why it should start working now. On the contrary, cooperation with NATO will become a step towards the creation of a new alliance, possibly on the basis of NATO. This alliance will help us meet challenges to security and avoid conflicts with NATO, when we are unable to prevent its expansion. Maxim PYADUSHKIN, deputy director of the Center of the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies: "the new military bloc has no enemies." Speaking of the transformation of the treaty into an organization, this step has long been overdue. This is a natural process for any viable treaty, which has been exiting for a long time. The CST treaty cannot be called another Warsaw Pact - they differ in scale and region. The CST does not resemble NATO either, although it is not ruled out that the experience of NATO transformation may be used in creating it. However, several questions about the real capability of this organization arise right away. Firstly, the new military organization is being created actually without a real aim. The wording that its creation is due to "the fast changing geopolitical situation and the need to meet new non-traditional challenges and threats facing the CST member- states" is vague, to put it mildly. That the specific enemy is not named is politically correct, of course, although usually, military coalitions are created against a specific enemy. This was the case with NATO, created as an alternative to the Warsaw Pact. After the latter was disbanded, the alliance had serious problems finding a new enemy and threats, something that led to the transformation of the whole organization, as a result. Secondly, in the CST organization the mechanism of giving assistance to the member-states will radically differ from NATO, where it is given automatically in case of aggression against any of the NATO countries. In the CST, even in case of aggression against any of its member-states, consultations will be held first, after which the presidents will decide whether to give aid or not. This is a very unstable mechanism which may, in the future, undermine the viability of the whole organization. The more so that we should not forget about the alternative to the CST - the nascent pro-western GUUAM alliance (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova). Earlier, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan were also party to the CST but then they withdrew from it. One should not rule out that our current partners may do the same. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that in the near future any of the CST members may be subjected to an aggression from outside. The only thing that is really possible is an attack by terrorist units, as was the case with Kirghizia two years ago. However, even in this case, far from all parties to the CST will be able to dispatch forces to help others. Attempts to create CIS collective peacekeeping forces have been made for ten years. Formally, they exist but in actual fact, these are 100% Russian troops. As to the direct military cooperation between the states party to the CST, it has long been developing actively enough. There is a joint air-defense system, joint exercises are constantly being held and officers from these republics are being trained in Russia. There are also normative documents on arms supplies to the CIS countries. Thus, today they all must be carried out at internal Russian prices, although the notion of "internal prices" is vague enough and quite often "internal prices" practically do not differ from market ones. But even if these deliveries are carried out at prices lower than on the external market, Russia will not lose from it either economically or politically. The times when we could supply huge amounts of technology abroad on a gratuitous basis, proceeding from political expediency only, are a thing of the past. Today, such supplies are possible only in one case - if real threats to some of the CST countries arise. ****** #7 Nezavisimaya Gazeta May 16, 2002 PAX AMERICANA POOLED NATO is becoming increasingly less efficient Author: Marina Kalashnikov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE NATO SUMMIT HELD IN REYKJAVIK OUTLINED THE BASIC CURRENT PRIORITIES OF THE ALLIANCE. FIRST OF ALL, THIS IS THE BATTLE AGAINST TERRORISM, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL UNCLEAR WHAT EXACTLY THIS IS. THE US IS DEFINING THE TERMINOLOGY AND DECIDING WHICH NATION OR GROUP IT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO. Landmarks in NATO have changed completely. The final documents of NATO sessions are now beginning with short references to September 11, but not to the ruin of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, as before. The new reference point dictates very much. Terrorism has by now had no international legal definition. In fact, terrorism is those states and organizations the US is battling. The complete list is drawn by John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, the central American press has informed the other day. American newspapers write that Bolton's choice is sometimes dubious. As any person, he has his preferences and ambitions. NATO is currently opposing the sort of terrorism as outlined by Bolton. But as he his is an employee of the administration of the superpower dominating in the bloc, every NATO member, as well as candidates and sympathizers, including Russia, are obliged to make contributions to the common cause. This was the keynote of the decisions of the NATO session in Reykjavik, as well as the agendas of the subsequent series of international meetings which have actually been shaped. The package of issues considered in Reykjavik can quite distinctly be divided into two: what Europe in the person of the European Union must contribute to the global security and what Russia must. During the meeting, NATO Secretary General George Robertson repeated stated his demand to the permanent members, novices, and partners: "Dues, dues, dues!" meanwhile, the U.S. representatives appealed that the EU finally create serious forces of rapid response, not to divert the NATO resources and combative power. The US has grave claim to EU states. Despite the line to spend no less than 2% of GDP on military issues, Europeans are lagging behind this figure increasingly further. The main infringer is Germany that has reduced this share twice since 1990: from 2.8% to 1.4%. The communique for the meeting between EU and NATO ministers in Reykjavik says that Europeans will have to "undertake more responsibility" for the situation in the Balkans and in general do everything possible "to institutionalize the EU-NATO relationship". The same 2% is presently the main obstacle for newcomers striving for NATO. Along the way, the meeting in Reykjavik decided how exactly the new bureaucracy would function - the "Council of Twenty" with the participation of Russia. Moscow let them understand through the politically correct language that it had expected more in relation to the influence on making the most important decisions. Since Russia's share in the arising of Pax Americana is also great, though hard to measure in real money: granting flyover rights acros its airspace, not opposing the American expansion in Central Asia, and distancing itself from its former allies in the "multipolar world", for instance Iran. Apart from that, leading expert in foreign policy issues and longstanding adviser of the German chancellor Michael Stuermer noted that Russia might also be useful to NATO as a source of intelligence. Meanwhile, its oil supplies to the international market could quite compete with those of the Middle East suppliers, depriving them of the opportunity to dictate their terms to the West engaged in the battle against the world evil. Newcomer candidates are contributing to the NATO security moneybox what they can. Thus, Romania offered itself as the base for a military transit to Georgia, both by sea and by air. Bulgaria's share is passing on into the channel of enmity towards Russia. Although this does not quite meet the new line in the issue of friends and enemies, it was apparently considered that this approach would stimulate Bulgaria to part with its past as soon as possible, as it is incompatible with the NATO standards. Thus, the forum made another step in solving the main problem - how to mobilize the European resource to support the new NATO plans. Along the way, it turned out that the US might have much less trouble with Russia in the settlement of this task than with Europeans. ******* #8 Moscow News May 15-21, 2002 Good Intentions at Russian Forum By Ilya Baranikas The World Russian Forum was anything but a dull meeting. Most of the speakers there had something important to say U.S. Lawmakers Line Up It is not often one can see members of both houses of Congress attend a gathering sponsored by Russians and dedicated to Russia. None other than the House Speaker himself came to address the Russian Forum. Dennis Hastert was one of the dozen or so federal legislators who attended the forum, which took place in the Senate Dirksen Office Building. The legislators were supposed to be the first to take the floor. But on several occasions, a congressman entered the hall only to find the rostrum already occupied by a senator, and had to wait for his turn anyway. Clinton Lashed, Putin and Bush Extolled Most of the lawmakers who came were Republicans. Why? Probably because the Democrats were scared of coming under fire - the forum had heard a great deal of criticism targeted at Bill Clintons Democratic administration. Some speakers had pointed to connivance between Yeltsin and the Clinton administration, alleging that America had been giving material aid to the wrong quarters in Russia, turning a blind eye to the plunder going on there. "Is it surprising, then, that anti-American sentiments prevail in Russia?" Republican Congressman Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania asked rhetorically. He is the chief initiator of the U.S.-Russia rapprochement. The Russians are better disposed toward Americans today thanks to the joint efforts of the Kremlin and the White House, many speakers at the forum pointed out. Dennis Hastert, for one, argued that the turn for the better in relations between the United States and Russia was one of the great changes on the world arena, and had had a positive impact on the entire system of international relations. Not Everyone in Russia Dislikes Americans Curiously, Russian speakers who insisted that anti-Western and anti-American sentiment had been growing in Russia were refuted by some Americans who had first-hand knowledge of the mood in this country. One American lady who attended the forum works with the Khanty-Mansiysk Oil Company. She said that she and other Americans were well treated in the Siberian hinterland. Another American delegate cited his pleasant experience of communicating with Russians in the city of Irkutsk [Siberia]; a third, who had had occasion to work in Ryazan [in western Russia], said he was sure he had not come across xenophobia. It seems that in the provinces people are indeed friendlier than in the former imperial capitals. Russia Should Be in NATO The issue of Russias relationship with NATO is central to Russian-American relations, and to Russias relations with the West in general. Addressing the forum, William Lind, a representative of the Free Congress Foundation [a conservative political think tank] and a military policy expert, expressed his conviction that NATOs eastward expansion was a move against Russia. "What else could it be directed against?" he asked. "Against a return of Mongolias Golden Horde? Or against the Swiss Empire?" Another well-known political scientist and veteran journalist, Arnaud de Borchgrave, stated his firm belief that now that NATO expansion was an established fact, Russia must be admitted to that military-political organization. Otherwise Russia would be encouraged to collaborate with China and Islamic countries, including those whose regimes the United States saw as a threat to Western civilization. He Who Is Not with the West Is with the East Nearly all the speakers agreed that it was in the Wests interests to promote Russias integration into the Western community as soon as possible. Russia is to join both the WTO and the European Union shortly, and so it must also be made a NATO member in one way or another. Even Republican Senator Richard Lugar shares that view. I say "even" because in an interview he gave to me 16 years ago, he spoke extremely harshly about the Soviet Union. Moreover, as history professor Alexander Yanov stressed, it is precisely Russias integration into the West - and not just an alliance with America - that we need. Such an alliance is hardly possible right now; there is a time to every purpose. Eduard Lozanskys Ten Commandments Military-political cooperation is by no means the only factor in U.S.-Russian relations. The various aspects of the two countries relationship are summed up in the 10 objectives conceived by the World Russian Forums chief architect, Eduard Lozansky, president of Russia House in Washington and of the Continent-USA media group. Those 10 objectives, or the Ten Commandments as Lozansky calls them, are designed to: 1. Bring about a close alliance between Russia and NATO, leading to Russias full membership in that military-political bloc. 2. Facilitate Russias joint work with the United States and other NATO countries to create an anti-missile defense system. 3. Create a powerful military and intelligence grouping to fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. 4. Draw up joint programs for scientific research in the fields of space exploration, medicine, ecology, etc. 5. Expand the American University in Moscow. 6. Foster ties between American and Russian educational establishments, and jointly elaborate distance learning programs. 7. Broaden the scope of cultural and educational exchanges to a significant degree. 8. Support democratic parties, movements, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. 9. Normalize the process of issuing American visas to Russian nationals. 10. Abrogate discriminatory laws against Russia that hamper bilateral business and commercial relations. Senators and Congressmen Back Alliance with Russia Those "Ten Commandments" largely repeat the substance of a document signed by 142 congressmen, including the chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Joseph Biden) and the House International Relations Committee (Henry Hyde). It has also been signed by Senate Defense Committee Chairman Carl Levin, and numerous other people in high places. Most unfortunately, though, ordinary mortals tend to break commandments. Take, for example, item No. 9 on the above list: A large group of Russians could not attend the forum because they were denied American visas. How Far Will Russia Go To Defend Its Own Interests? There were obviously many more Americans than Russians at the World Russian Forum. One fascinating speaker there was Russias Deputy Minister for the Economy and Trade Mikhail Dmitriev. Another notable Russian was Sergei Generalov, chairman of the State Duma Committee for Investment Policy. St. Petersburgs Deputy Governor Viktor Krotov was there, too, but no one from Russias top leadership came. One more thing: Russia could probably help volunteers like Lozansky to build a strong lobby that would uphold Russias interests in America. (If Greece and Taiwan do so in a big way, Russia should be able to follow suit). It seems to me that, for Russia, having its own lobby would be more fruitful than pumping millions of dollars into a U.S. public relations firm among whose clients were Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and the Central African Republics man-eating emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa. ******* #9 From: Ben Aris Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 15:34:33 +0500 Subject: [RusBizList] RBL318 -- May 11 - 13 Russia Business List #318 Saturday, May 11, 2002 7. Tom on Military reform Tom Adshead Troika Tuesday, May 14, 2002 May 9 was Victory Day in Russia,which is marked as though Nazi Germany was defeated much more recently than 57 years ago.Even Russian MTV was showing films about the war .Since precious little happens in the first half of May because of the holidays,this seems like a good time to think about the military. President Putin has made some changes in the military .We have a new defense minister,who does not come from the military,and we have had the first corruption trial of a senior general.We are also seeing some steps toward the abolition of conscription.All of this has been encouraging,although we have some questions about how much of it is hype and how much is actually going to change. We do not see the major changes which were expected when Sergei Ivanov replaced Ivan Sergeev as defense minister.There do not seem to have been any major shifts in military doctrine indicating a shift from the missile and tank based tactics of the Soviet Army.Of course,this move takes time,but there has not even been a roadmap published.It seems likely that the military has asked for more time to think and will take at least a couple of years actually to produce any kind of position,which will probably be that nothing needs reforming. The trial of General Oleinik,who was involved in a complex scheme involving transfers of material to Ukraine and payments to Gazprom,looked more like a show trial designed to demonstrate that something was being done about corruption in the military.It looks as though Oleinik was the one who signed the documents on behalf of his superiors and was made to take the fall . The new law on the draft has gone through and although it does provide for alternative services,it requires individuals to prove their conscientious objections to military service.It also gives the draft board (made up of army officers)the decision as to whether or not these objections are real.Of course,the militaryís suggestion that alternative service should be as far from the objectorís hometown as possible,and served within military camps,was rejected,which is scant comfort.There is talk about reducing the period of military service from two years to one and a half,which is a step in the right direction. As for the creation of a professional army,there is some movement .A pilot project will start later this year and is due to end in mid 2003.This will give an idea of how much money is needed to do this. Again,the Defense Ministry has been obstructive,hugely inflating the cost of moving to a contract army and demanding for instance that such a move also require a huge house building and rearmament program. Marshal Sergeev,who now acts as an advisor to Putin,said a month ago that the transition to a contract army needed to happen at the same time as a program to modernize the army,especially communications,intelligence,strategic nuclear forces and the development of a space army.The first two are fair enough,given how bad they are at the moment,but the latter two are emphatically not a strategic priority.In fact,it was insistence on diverting resources to these projects which led to Sergeev being fired. The military brass wants more spending,because this will give it greater opportunities to steal .In late April,Ivanov said that the number one task for the leadership of the Defense Ministry was to stop theft in the army.Most of the problems of the army have their origins in this one issue,according to Ivanov. This is quite a statement,given the other problems which the ministry has to deal with,like Chechnya and more general reform in the face of completely new strategic tasks. Normally,ictory Day is a chance for the countryís leadership to reassure the military that it is still loved and can still count on getting a large share of GDP.We did not see this .Putinís major meeting was with a group of veterans,where he reassured them that their pensions would be increased.No major meetings with generals and no ceremony giving them patriotic honors. Putinís speech emphasized that victory over fascism was achieved by an alliance.Today,a new alliance has been formed to combat terrorism.This is different rhetoric and underlines the fact that Putin is leaning towards the West.Previous Russian leaders were not so outward looking and talked about victory as a purely Russian thing.The Russian military is not happy with Putinís West leaning foreign policy,but he took the opportunity of the military parade to reiterate that he is not going to weaken in his resolve. The military had it easy under Yeltsin because he owed them for support in 1991 and 1993.Also,he was brought up in the Soviet tradition which idolized the army for its role in defeating Hitler.So there was not much hope that he would initiate any reform in the army.He promised to create alternative service when he ran for president in 1996,and never delivered,under pressure from the army. Putin has no such agenda .Even if he did,he has shown himself capable of turning his back on those who brought him to power.But the fact is that his efforts to force the military to reform itself have not met with any success.You would have thought that finding corrupt generals would be like shooting fish in a barrel,but Ivanov has found only one,so far. So the military sits there,useless and unreformed,like Putinís other failed reform projects.Of course, reform has not actually stopped,but has just got bogged down in review committees and document preparation.But if its opponents can make this process indefinite (and they think that they can),then the reform is as good as over,without actually having been killed. None of this really matters,of course,because the Bush circus will roll into town next week and gloss over these problems.We will get a strategic arms treaty,which is meaningless in the post September 11 world.The US government may grudgingly admit what the market worked out years ago,that Russia is a market economy.If you are looking for real progress,then keep an eye on the oilmen around Bush,who may be fooled by the pretense long enough to open their checkbooks and invest in the Russian economy,while the unreformed bureaucracy looks for ways to deprive them of their investment. ****** #10 The Russia Journal May 13-19, 2002 Don't wait for Pinochet By ALEXANDER GOLTS The death of Krasnoyarsk Gov. Alexander Lebed in a helicopter accident raises a question that now and then preoccupies Russian life: What role does the military play in politics? Five years ago, the arrival of prominent generals such as Lebed, Lev Rokhlin, Alexander Rutskoi and Ruslan Aushev into politics had many analysts feeling concerned, if not afraid. The generals, who all had combat experience and were popular with the troops, didn't hide their preference for an authoritarian style. Lebed, for example, said quite plainly that "Pinochet was a good thing for Chile" and remarked that a democratic general was as exotic an idea as a Jewish reindeer herder. Some said a "Russian Pinochet" would be a tragedy; others saw it as Russia's only hope. But whether for or against, everyone thought it a possible turn of events. The surprising thing is that there are more generals in politics now then in the mid-'90s. Yet no one worries about a possible Pinochet. With Lebed's recent death, the last of the generals who came into politics on the wave of the democratic revolution have now left the scene. Aushev, Rutskoi, Rokhlin and Lebed had different, often thoroughly opposite, views. They were men of varied aims and character. What they had in common was a deep contempt for the authorities that brought them into politics in the first place. These were the same authorities whose orders they were committed to following without question as military officers. The generals, who had known war and had brilliant careers behind them, felt insulted at the way the Kremlin bosses, first Mikhail Gorbachev and then Boris Yeltsin, threw the army into dubious undertakings and then pretended that everything had been the generals' initiative. Rutskoi became a political figure after striding to the podium at the Congress of People's Deputies to denounce the authorities for sending troops to Vilnius and Tallinn. Aushev decided to run for president of Ingushetia out of disdain for the way Moscow reacted to the conflict between Ingush and Ossetians in the Prigorodny district. Rokhlin was initially ordered to go into parliament by the defense minister, but he became an independent political figure when he decided that Yeltsin and his entourage had betrayed the country and the army. Lebed was probably the most prominent of them all. He insisted that he had always only followed orders. When the order came, he took his division to bring order to Baku. A year later, during the coup attempt of August 1991, then-Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered him to defend the White House. Lebed obeyed and would never agree later when people said he had saved democracy. A year later, he was ordered to enter the Transdniestr region, where his tough and decisive action brought the bloody conflict there to a halt. But Lebed only became a real politician when, while still an active general and commander, he began relentlessly criticizing the authorities, including Grachev, for leading Russia into the debacle in Chechnya. As a result, his popularity with the Army and the public shot up. Indeed, he became so popular that the authorities decided it was best that he be relieved of his duties. But his dismissal from the Army only further helped his political rise. He was elected to the Duma and then took third place in the 1996 presidential election. He ensured his votes went to Yeltsin in the second round in return for the post of national security adviser. By then, he was only half a step away from the summit of power. As it turned out, there was no need to fear that one of the generals would become a Russian Pinochet. The generals, Lebed included, had taken part in enough misadventures brought about by others to have an aversion to launching their own. Despite their dislike of the democrats, each of them - even Rokhlin, a fierce critic of the Kremlin - had his share of problems under the Soviet regime and did not want the Communists to return to power. In any case, none of them had his own ideas on how to run the state. Eventually the angry generals were absorbed into the political system and accepted their roles as regional leaders. There are more generals in politics today than in Yeltsin's time. But the authorities don't fear rebellion from disgruntled generals, because they were the ones who appointed them to their political posts. Top generals and people from the secret services have become the main personnel pool for the "managed democracy" system under Putin. The authorities needed someone reliable to be president of Ingushetia, and they helped ensure that FSB Gen. Marat Zyazikov got elected. The Navy's Baltic Fleet commander, Adm. Vladimir Yegorov, answered the call when the authorities sought a loyal governor for Kaliningrad. Of the seven presidential representatives to federal districts, five are retired military officers. The situation has changed so much that, today, overly active military officials are deliberately moved into politics. This was the case with Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, for example, who threatened in 2000 to remove his stripes if Putin stopped the troops at the Terek River in Chechnya. The authorities decided Shamanov should become governor of the Ulyanovsk region. But Putin's appointees won't turn into Pinochets: They don't have political initiative of their own. ******* #11 Literaturnaya Gazeta No. 18-19 May 8-14, 2002 DOCTRINES AND BOMBS Implications for Russia of changes to US nuclear policy Author: political observer Oleg Moroz, Alexander Khramchikhin, director of the analytical department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] ANALYSIS OF THE LATEST CHANGES IN US NUCLEAR POLICY, AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE GLOBAL MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION. THESE TWO ANALYSTS SAY RUSSIA WILL NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTIONS TO CHANGES MADE BY THE UNITED STATES. THEY BELIEVE RUSSIA'S REAL OPPONENT IS CHINA, AND RUSSIA OUGHT TO BECOME A NATO MEMBER. Nuclear weapons, the Americans, and Russia's long-term interests Oleg Moroz: The Pentagon's nuclear policy review, recently published by The Los Angeles Times, has certainly caused a stir around the world - particularly in Russia. It is widely believed that the US nuclear doctrine is becoming more rigid and less predictable, but I do not think we have any grounds for such conclusions. Alexander Khramchikhin: I agree. This is a normal policy for a nation which understands its own national interests and has made an appropriate assessment of the global situation (appropriate from its own point of view, that is). The policy is indeed rigid and uncompromising, like everything else in America, but it is quite predictable. There is nothing new about it for anyone who has studied related issues for years. Oleg Moroz: Observers in the West applaud the fact that the nuclear arsenal of the United States is no longer targeted at a single rival superpower, Russia; but covers several targets at once - Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya. Allegedly, all these states pose threats of a different nature. Russia and China have to be watched because they possess sizeable nuclear arsenals; while - so the Americans believe - the five other states are hostile toward the United States and its allies, have contacts with terrorist organizations, and are aiming to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It looks like the truth, and it would have been the height of folly on the part of the Americans to disregard it. By the way, it is the height of folly on our part too. Revolutionary leaders like Saddam Hussein or Muamar Gaddafi are psychologically unstable: best friends today, they may become bitter enemies tomorrow. Their cultural mentality, the oriental mentality, only facilitates this changeability. In other words, Russia is making a grave mistake in relying on their eternal friendship. Nikita Khruschev or Leonid Brezhnev might have relied on it and got away with that; but contemporary Russia isn't all that different from the United States, from the viewpoint of those nations. The changes the Americans are making to their nuclear policy make it defensive rather than offensive. This assumption is supported by the fact that the Pentagon is proposing to build a new generation of low-powered nuclear weapons that penetrate the ground and would be effective against bunkers and underground fortifications currently invulnerable to conventional bombs. In other words, "carpet bombing" is no longer the aim. The aim is to destroy targets - underground bunkers where leaders are hiding, command posts, army depots, storage facilities for chemical and biological weapons, and so on. Or we can put it differently. The purpose of the changes is to prevent these well-concealed facilities from being used in attacks on the United States and its allies. The published plans for reorganization of the American strategic forces explain the reckless ease with which Bush is prepared to accept even unilateral reduction from 6,000 warheads to 1,700 - 2,000 (without destruction of warheads, they are to be stored). Emphasis is being placed on the national missile defense system, penetrating nuclear weapons, and conventional high-precision weapons systems or the so-called smart weapons. In a serious conflict, they may be used to destroy part of the enemy's strategic facilities. In other words, a new system of nuclear deterrence (more accurate and more technologically advanced) is being constructed. Alexander Khramchikhin: First and foremost, the United States is ensuring that it will be able to safely and painlessly disarm any enemy. As far as Russia is concerned, for example, the major threat to it is not posed by these 6,000 or 2,000 nuclear warheads. The major threat is posed by conventional weapons, because about 15 years from now the Americans will probably have a real chance of disarming Russia (and anyone else) even without using nuclear weapons at all. The United States would be able to use high-precision weapons systems, Stealth aircraft, and unmanned aircraft. Actually, the Americans already use all this, but 15 years from now it will be elevated to an entirely new level. The report we are discussing here says so openly, by the way. The United States will feel absolutely safe then, at least from the armed forces of any other country. And the strikes it will deliver at others will not always be "defensive". Oleg Moroz: All this, plus Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's statement, indicates that the Kremlin is not going to challenge the United States or become involved in any serious confrontation with it over the planned changes to US nuclear weapons policy. Otherwise, Moscow would be drawn into another round of the arms race - which in its present situation would be an expensive way of committing suicide. It seems that we are destined from now on to look for asymmetric responses, or cheap and simple responses, to each US move and innovation. The question is: will options such as these always be available? Generally speaking, I don't think the Americans will have any substantial advantage, whatever changes they make to their nuclear doctrine. The United States and Russia have thousands of warheads, and if anything broke out (God forbid), it is naive to expect them to be suppressed in a matter of minutes by conventional high-precision weapons systems, penetrating nuclear weapons, etc. It is likewise naive to expect a missile defense system to be able to take all of them out. At the same time, it is common knowledge that the United States will not tolerate any nuclear explosion over its territory (it is like Russia, where nuclear explosions were numerous - in Semipalatinsk, Totsk, Novaya Zemlya). What I mean is this: the Americans will never think they have an absolute advantage as long as we retain the capacity of detonating even one nuclear warhead over the United States. And I think this will always be an option. Alexander Khramchikhin: It is important to specify here what we mean by the US military advantage or superiority. Technically, we do not need parity in nuclear warheads. Our leaders still cherish this, erroneously still regarding Russia as a superpower. You are right, the Americans do not want even one warhead being detonated over their territory. They will never go to war while there is a possibility of that happening. What does this mean? In my view, the conclusion is simple: even if we have many fewer warheads than the Americans, a guaranteed ability to deliver at least one of these few to the United States will be quite sufficient. It would mean a situation where all the US warheads pose no threat to Russia. I repeat: we do not need parity, because it would break us again, but much faster than it broke the Soviet Union. Something else poses a real threat. Unfortunately, it will never occur to anyone at the Russian Defense Ministry to demand restrictions on unmanned aircraft. Take the situation with the Topol, the missile whose modernization required almost all of Russia's defense budget under Minister Igor Sergeev. These missiles are supposed to be such a significant weapon due to their mobility. They are constantly changing location. Unfortunately, the Americans know the areas where the Topols shift positions - and if the Americans watch these areas via their satellites, they will see them via unmanned aircraft too. Unmanned aircraft like that already exist, by the way. The Global Hawk, meant for strategic reconnaissance missions, can cover several thousand kilometers, remaining in the air for several days at a time. And it is cheap. Imagine: after a visit by such an unmanned aircraft, a B-2 bomber follows, which our air defense doesn't see, because it is invisible to its radars - and it uses a conventional bomb to obliterate a Topol. The Americans have a few B-2 bombers, only 21 of them, but they have plans to build enough F-22 and F-35 fighters which may replace B-2s on similar missions. Moreover, the F-35s would take off from aircraft-carriers. In other words, we should be looking for asymmetric responses, that much is undisputable; but joining NATO is in fact the only truly effective asymmetric response. We will not be able to do anything otherwise. Either we become their allies, or they get a chance to disarm us, sooner or later. Oleg Moroz: Who will want us in NATO? Stable relations with neighbors (no local conflicts, no territorial disputes) and a stable domestic situation are the two major requirements for membership in the Alliance. But Russia has the constantly restive region of the Caucasus, a smouldering conflict with Ukraine over the Crimea, and a vast and potentially unstable border with China... Alexander Khramchikhin: Yes, China is our major strategic opponent. This is the source of the major threats, both nuclear and conventional. That is why, for Russia, NATO membership would be a solution to the problem of the United States - and, more importantly, to the problem of China. The Chinese are pragmatists, they will not take on all of NATO. Besides, China is America's opponent as well. It will benefit NATO, in other words, to have a border with China along the Amur river, not the Bug river. Oleg Moroz: We do not know what they consider to be of benefit. We know from history books that instead of trying to come to Russia's aid, the West reserved for Russia the role of a barrier on the path of mass penetration from Asia. It is reasonable to expect pretty much the same thing from the West in future too. Alexander Khramchikhin: If you ask me, admitting Russia would be much better for NATO than keeping it out. The potential threats posed by Russia, and discussed in the Pentagon's review, would be nullified as soon as Russia becomes a NATO state. Unfortunately, NATO politicians and generals are sometimes as short-sighted as Russian leaders. They do not perceive their own long-term interests. Oleg Moroz: With Putin in power, I don't think we are going to have any serious problems with the US modernizing its nuclear arsenals. But if someone less pro-Western replaces Putin in the Kremlin one day (and that's quite possible, judging by the moods of the masses and the top brass), we may once again be saddled with nuclear parity as a goal, trying to catch up with the Americans again, and then it would be the end. Alexander Khramchikhin: Yes. Catching up with the United States in the arms sphere is impossible. Firstly, our economic resources are not in the same league. Secondly, we would fail because our leaders would probably place an emphasis on the wrong things again. I mean that our leaders may decide to rely on the Topols, modernized or not, while the Americans would concentrate on other approaches and solutions. It would only mean a waste of our limited resources, with nothing to show for it. ******