#11
Literaturnaya Gazeta
No. 18-19
May 8-14, 2002
DOCTRINES AND BOMBS
Implications for Russia of changes to US nuclear policy
Author: political observer Oleg Moroz, Alexander Khramchikhin, director of the analytical department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

ANALYSIS OF THE LATEST CHANGES IN US NUCLEAR POLICY, AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE GLOBAL MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION. THESE TWO ANALYSTS SAY RUSSIA WILL NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTIONS TO CHANGES MADE BY THE UNITED STATES. THEY BELIEVE RUSSIA'S REAL OPPONENT IS CHINA, AND RUSSIA OUGHT TO BECOME A NATO MEMBER.

Nuclear weapons, the Americans, and Russia's long-term interests

Oleg Moroz: The Pentagon's nuclear policy review, recently published by The Los Angeles Times, has certainly caused a stir around the world - particularly in Russia. It is widely believed that the US nuclear doctrine is becoming more rigid and less predictable, but I do not think we have any grounds for such conclusions.

Alexander Khramchikhin: I agree. This is a normal policy for a nation which understands its own national interests and has made an appropriate assessment of the global situation (appropriate from its own point of view, that is). The policy is indeed rigid and uncompromising, like everything else in America, but it is quite predictable. There is nothing new about it for anyone who has studied related issues for years.

Oleg Moroz: Observers in the West applaud the fact that the nuclear arsenal of the United States is no longer targeted at a single rival superpower, Russia; but covers several targets at once - Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya. Allegedly, all these states pose threats of a different nature. Russia and China have to be watched because they possess sizeable nuclear arsenals; while - so the Americans believe - the five other states are hostile toward the United States and its allies, have contacts with terrorist organizations, and are aiming to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It looks like the truth, and it would have been the height of folly on the part of the Americans to disregard it. By the way, it is the height of folly on our part too. Revolutionary leaders like Saddam Hussein or Muamar Gaddafi are psychologically unstable: best friends today, they may become bitter enemies tomorrow. Their cultural mentality, the oriental mentality, only facilitates this changeability. In other words, Russia is making a grave mistake in relying on their eternal friendship. Nikita Khruschev or Leonid Brezhnev might have relied on it and got away with that; but contemporary Russia isn't all that different from the United States, from the viewpoint of those nations.

The changes the Americans are making to their nuclear policy make it defensive rather than offensive. This assumption is supported by the fact that the Pentagon is proposing to build a new generation of low-powered nuclear weapons that penetrate the ground and would be effective against bunkers and underground fortifications currently invulnerable to conventional bombs. In other words, "carpet bombing" is no longer the aim. The aim is to destroy targets - underground bunkers where leaders are hiding, command posts, army depots, storage facilities for chemical and biological weapons, and so on. Or we can put it differently. The purpose of the changes is to prevent these well-concealed facilities from being used in attacks on the United States and its allies.

The published plans for reorganization of the American strategic forces explain the reckless ease with which Bush is prepared to accept even unilateral reduction from 6,000 warheads to 1,700 - 2,000 (without destruction of warheads, they are to be stored). Emphasis is being placed on the national missile defense system, penetrating nuclear weapons, and conventional high-precision weapons systems or the so-called smart weapons. In a serious conflict, they may be used to destroy part of the enemy's strategic facilities. In other words, a new system of nuclear deterrence (more accurate and more technologically advanced) is being constructed.

Alexander Khramchikhin: First and foremost, the United States is ensuring that it will be able to safely and painlessly disarm any enemy. As far as Russia is concerned, for example, the major threat to it is not posed by these 6,000 or 2,000 nuclear warheads. The major threat is posed by conventional weapons, because about 15 years from now the Americans will probably have a real chance of disarming Russia (and anyone else) even without using nuclear weapons at all. The United States would be able to use high-precision weapons systems, Stealth aircraft, and unmanned aircraft. Actually, the Americans already use all this, but 15 years from now it will be elevated to an entirely new level. The report we are discussing here says so openly, by the way. The United States will feel absolutely safe then, at least from the armed forces of any other country. And the strikes it will deliver at others will not always be "defensive".

Oleg Moroz: All this, plus Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's statement, indicates that the Kremlin is not going to challenge the United States or become involved in any serious confrontation with it over the planned changes to US nuclear weapons policy. Otherwise, Moscow would be drawn into another round of the arms race - which in its present situation would be an expensive way of committing suicide. It seems that we are destined from now on to look for asymmetric responses, or cheap and simple responses, to each US move and innovation. The question is: will options such as these always be available?

Generally speaking, I don't think the Americans will have any substantial advantage, whatever changes they make to their nuclear doctrine. The United States and Russia have thousands of warheads, and if anything broke out (God forbid), it is naive to expect them to be suppressed in a matter of minutes by conventional high-precision weapons systems, penetrating nuclear weapons, etc. It is likewise naive to expect a missile defense system to be able to take all of them out. At the same time, it is common knowledge that the United States will not tolerate any nuclear explosion over its territory (it is like Russia, where nuclear explosions were numerous - in Semipalatinsk, Totsk, Novaya Zemlya). What I mean is this: the Americans will never think they have an absolute advantage as long as we retain the capacity of detonating even one nuclear warhead over the United States. And I think this will always be an option.

Alexander Khramchikhin: It is important to specify here what we mean by the US military advantage or superiority. Technically, we do not need parity in nuclear warheads. Our leaders still cherish this, erroneously still regarding Russia as a superpower. You are right, the Americans do not want even one warhead being detonated over their territory. They will never go to war while there is a possibility of that happening. What does this mean? In my view, the conclusion is simple: even if we have many fewer warheads than the Americans, a guaranteed ability to deliver at least one of these few to the United States will be quite sufficient. It would mean a situation where all the US warheads pose no threat to Russia. I repeat: we do not need parity, because it would break us again, but much faster than it broke the Soviet Union.

Something else poses a real threat. Unfortunately, it will never occur to anyone at the Russian Defense Ministry to demand restrictions on unmanned aircraft. Take the situation with the Topol, the missile whose modernization required almost all of Russia's defense budget under Minister Igor Sergeev. These missiles are supposed to be such a significant weapon due to their mobility. They are constantly changing location. Unfortunately, the Americans know the areas where the Topols shift positions - and if the Americans watch these areas via their satellites, they will see them via unmanned aircraft too. Unmanned aircraft like that already exist, by the way. The Global Hawk, meant for strategic reconnaissance missions, can cover several thousand kilometers, remaining in the air for several days at a time. And it is cheap. Imagine: after a visit by such an unmanned aircraft, a B-2 bomber follows, which our air defense doesn't see, because it is invisible to its radars - and it uses a conventional bomb to obliterate a Topol. The Americans have a few B-2 bombers, only 21 of them, but they have plans to build enough F-22 and F-35 fighters which may replace B-2s on similar missions. Moreover, the F-35s would take off from aircraft-carriers.

In other words, we should be looking for asymmetric responses, that much is undisputable; but joining NATO is in fact the only truly effective asymmetric response. We will not be able to do anything otherwise. Either we become their allies, or they get a chance to disarm us, sooner or later.

Oleg Moroz: Who will want us in NATO? Stable relations with neighbors (no local conflicts, no territorial disputes) and a stable domestic situation are the two major requirements for membership in the Alliance. But Russia has the constantly restive region of the Caucasus, a smouldering conflict with Ukraine over the Crimea, and a vast and potentially unstable border with China...

Alexander Khramchikhin: Yes, China is our major strategic opponent. This is the source of the major threats, both nuclear and conventional. That is why, for Russia, NATO membership would be a solution to the problem of the United States - and, more importantly, to the problem of China. The Chinese are pragmatists, they will not take on all of NATO. Besides, China is America's opponent as well. It will benefit NATO, in other words, to have a border with China along the Amur river, not the Bug river.

Oleg Moroz: We do not know what they consider to be of benefit. We know from history books that instead of trying to come to Russia's aid, the West reserved for Russia the role of a barrier on the path of mass penetration from Asia. It is reasonable to expect pretty much the same thing from the West in future too.

Alexander Khramchikhin: If you ask me, admitting Russia would be much better for NATO than keeping it out. The potential threats posed by Russia, and discussed in the Pentagon's review, would be nullified as soon as Russia becomes a NATO state. Unfortunately, NATO politicians and generals are sometimes as short-sighted as Russian leaders. They do not perceive their own long-term interests.

Oleg Moroz: With Putin in power, I don't think we are going to have any serious problems with the US modernizing its nuclear arsenals. But if someone less pro-Western replaces Putin in the Kremlin one day (and that's quite possible, judging by the moods of the masses and the top brass), we may once again be saddled with nuclear parity as a goal, trying to catch up with the Americans again, and then it would be the end.

Alexander Khramchikhin: Yes. Catching up with the United States in the arms sphere is impossible. Firstly, our economic resources are not in the same league. Secondly, we would fail because our leaders would probably place an emphasis on the wrong things again. I mean that our leaders may decide to rely on the Topols, modernized or not, while the Americans would concentrate on other approaches and solutions. It would only mean a waste of our limited resources, with nothing to show for it.

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