CDI Russia Weekly-#205 10 May 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Russia: Victory Day A Bitter Holiday For Many Veterans. 2. AFP: PUTIN'S PRO-WEST POLICY LEADS TO GLOBAL SHIFT: IISS REPORT. 3. Voice of America: Analyst Predicts Increasing US-Russian Cooperation. 4. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA, USA JOIN HANDS AGAINST DIRTY BOMB. 5. RIA Novosti: NATO ADMITS IN PUBLIC CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA ARE WITHIN SPHERE OF ITS INTERESTS. 6. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: NEW IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORHOOD OF NATO AND EU. 7. Vremya Novostei: Elena Suponina, NEW SANCTIONS WITH OLD PROBLEMS. Russia, the United States, and sanctions against Iraq. 8. Christian Science Monitor: Richard Sokolsky, Put a cork on Iran's weapons program. 9. Asia Times: Gustavo Capdevila, Central Asia, Eastern Europe, see 'remarkable growth' 10. UPI: US fights Cen. Asian militants. 11. Moscow News: FSU Citizens in Palestine. 12. The Russia Journal: Ira Straus, Whose double standards should apply? 13. Krasnaya Zvezda: Alexei Lyashchenko, THE FOURTH WORLD WAR: MYTH OR REALITY? ******* #1 Russia: Victory Day A Bitter Holiday For Many Veterans (Part 1) By Francesca Mereu Russia today celebrates Victory Day to commemorate the millions of soldiers and civilians who perished in World War II. Veterans mark the day by wearing their military orders and medals, and public respect is still high for those who served in the war. But a veterans' spokesman says the lives of millions of servicemen and women are scarred by disappointment at what they see as a lack of gratitude for the sacrifices made in defeating the German army 57 years ago. Moreover, the growing prevalence of neo-Nazi gangs in Russia has only added to the woes of the veterans, who say the skinhead presence mocks their achievements in the fight against fascism. Moscow, 9 May 2002 (RFE/RL)) -- Their chests bristling with medals, hundreds of aging World War II veterans gathered today on Moscow's Red Square to commemorate the Soviet Union's role in the allied victory over the Nazis 57 years ago. Russian President Vladimir Putin, addressing more than 5,000 military personnel gathered for the event, used the occasion to liken the fight against fascism to the current global fight against terror. Putin pointed to the reappearance on Earth of "forces of evil" that have the potential to become "as dangerous as Nazism." Putin called on the Russian people to join forces in battle against a common enemy, much as they once did against fascism. "Today, we will once again unite, and we are uniting against a common threat. Its name is terrorism," Putin said. Victory Day remains one of the most significant public holidays in Russia, where even young people are raised to respect the memory of the 1941-45 struggle, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Union entered the war after a nonaggression pact between Josef Stalin and Adolph Hitler was broken and German troops attacked the country in June 1941. Some 34 million people were mobilized for service during the war. Today, nearly all Russian families have at least one relative who served. The Red Army was instrumental in securing an Allied victory over Hitler's forces and are credited with liberating much of Europe from Nazi oppression. But the victory came at a high cost for the Soviet Union. Some estimates put the number of Soviet deaths during the struggle at a staggering 27 million. Even today, the war remains a deeply emotional issue for many Russians. Russian television this week marked Victory Day -- also called "the holiday with tears in its eyes" -- in traditional style, broadcasting well-known war films and performances of popular war songs. Viktor Gaevskii is the deputy chairman of the Moscow Veterans Committee of World War II. Gaevskii, a retired colonel, took part in the capture of the Austrian capital, Vienna, in April 1945. He said his memories of the war are still vivid. He remembers it as a time when the Soviet people were truly united in a single cause: to defeat the Nazis. "The most significant thing was the harmony and the friendship among people of different nationalities: Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Georgians. Everybody fought under one banner, against fascism," Gaevskii said. Gaevskii said Victory Day, however, has evolved into a bitter occasion for many veterans, who say their meager state pensions are inadequate compensation for the tremendous hardships endured during the Great Patriotic War. Although retired servicemen do enjoy certain benefits, such as free public transportation, their pensions fall well below livable standards. A retired colonel may receive a maximum of 3,000 rubles a month -- about $100 -- and former frontline soldiers receive even less -- between 1,200 and 1,500 rubles, or $40 to $50. "[Veterans] don't have a good life in Russia. It has been almost three years since our government last increased servicemen's pensions. Civil pensions have been increased, but not the military ones. [The government] pledged to increase the salary and pensions for the military on 1 July. But we doubt that will happen. We've been promised that the [minimal] pension will be increased to 1,800 rubles [$60] or even doubled. But the retired servicemen will be deprived of their main benefits," Gaevskii said. In remarks to veterans yesterday, Putin reiterated the pledge to raise pensions by 1 July and guaranteed other benefits as well. But Gaevskii said that even if pensions are doubled, they still will not be enough to meet the cost of living in Russia, which is becoming increasingly expensive. Gaevskii spoke bitterly about Russia's transition to democracy, saying the past decade of reforms has done little, if anything, to improve the lives of average citizens. Under the Soviet system, he said, the country was able to rebuild from the devastation of World War II in just five years. "After World War II, in five years' time, we were able not only to rebuild what was destroyed during the war, but also to make some sectors of our national economy surpass pre-war levels. If before the war we were the second industrial world power, after the United States of America, now we have rolled down to 57th place," Gaevskii said. This situation, Gaevskii said, has left many people believing that the Soviet Union -- and now Russia -- would have been better off if it had surrendered to the Nazis. That way, he said, the country would have at least been able to have enjoyed the benefits of U.S. aid offered to Europe under the Marshall Plan. "People say: 'If we hadn't won the war, we might be living better now.' Look at Germany. We destroyed it, but now they live better than we do. Perhaps it wasn't worth the lives of 27 million people and 30 percent of our national wealth. [People say: 'It would have been better] to surrender to the enemy and then to use the help of Uncle Sam and others to quickly recover,'" Gaevskii said. Gaevskii said that in addition to low wages and pensions, the ongoing military operation in Chechnya has contributed to a growing disenchantment with the army in Russia. Moreover, he said, many veterans feel humiliated by the recent rise of neo-Nazi gangs in Russia, who they say mock their achievements in World War II and the battle against fascism. Pavel Dyuzhev, a 19-year-old student in Moscow, said that, although he appreciates what the veterans did for the country, he feels they were not successful in defeating Nazism for all time. "Half of my relatives died because of [World War II]. For that reason, I respect our veterans. They fought, after all. But if we still have Nazi groups, it means that [the veterans] were unable to defeat [the Nazis] once and for all. They didn't fully destroy them," Dyuzhev said. World War II officially ended on 8 May 1945 with the surrender of the German Supreme Command. The news was broadcast in the Soviet Union with these words: "The Great Patriotic War has ended triumphantly. Germany has been fully defeated." The announcement was rebroadcast by television stations throughout Russia this week. ******* #2 PUTIN'S PRO-WEST POLICY LEADS TO GLOBAL SHIFT: IISS REPORT AFP LONDON, May 9 - Russian foreign policy has taken a "clearly pro-Western turn" since the September 11 attacks on the US, according to an annual report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), released Thursday. The shift by Russian President Vladimir Putin is "one of the most striking features of the global strategic realignment" after the terror strikes, according to the London-based think tank. "Russia has emerged as an important partner in the US-led international campaign against terrorism," says the IISS's Strategic Survey 2001-2002. "For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the West share important common interests in fighting international terrorism in all its forms." This was particularly evident during the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban and chief terror suspect Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network, said the report, an annual retrospective view of the years political and military trends. Putin has been "surprising in his pragmatic willingness to supercede some of the iron taboos of Russia's post-Soviet foreign and security policy." His agreement to allow US troops to be deployed in Central Asia and the Caucasus "has rendered obsolete the concept of 'post-Soviet space' ... as an area of Russia's exclusive sphere of influence." Putin's "audacious" actions have provided new impetus to Russian-NATO relations while "reinforcing the Western commitment to promoting Russia's economic development and political stability". However, the Russian leader's support for the West carried "considerable political risks", including domestic accusations that he is making unilateral concessions to the West. But the IISS report noted that Putin was enjoying strong political and popular support. This was the result of Russia's economic growth over the past three years, which had provided "enough stability and prosperity ... for foreign policy issues to drop to the bottom rung of public concern." Meanwhile, growing support for Putin in the West had "generated expectations that in the long run, Putin's decisions will advance Russia's international integration and economic development". The post-September 11 convergence of Russian and Western interests did not represent a radical turn, "but rather the logical continuation of Putin's push for Russia's modernisation and integration," the report said. Among the dangers for Putin because of his support for the West were that any problems with the economy -- such as declining oil prices or Russia's mounting debt obligations -- up to early 2003 were likely to cause a change in the public mood and leave him open to criticism. Problematic areas for Russia included any military action by the US against Iraq, and the protracted presence of US troops in Central Asia. Economically, Russia would need the support of the West in addressing three major concerns -- its debt, its heavy reliance on the oil sector, and EU enlargement, the IISS report said. "Unlike NATO enlargement, which constitutes a largely psychological and emotional threat to Russia's security, EU enlargement is likely to impose a real economic price on Russian businesses in dealing with neighbouring states and the EU in general." ******* #3 Voice of America Analyst Predicts Increasing US-Russian Cooperation Barry Wood Washington 9 May 2002 With the May 23 meeting in Russia between Presidents Bush and Putin only two weeks away, a leading British expert on Russia says prospects are better than ever for increased cooperation between the United States and Russia. Anatole Lieven, a visiting fellow at Washington's Carnegie Endowment, addressed a public policy forum May 8. Mr. Lieven regards President Putin as a pragmatic politician determined to connect Russia with Europe. He says the former KGB official has abandoned all claims of Russia retaining its former superpower status. Instead, he told an audience at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Mr. Putin is reaching out to the West cooperating in the war on terror and approving the stationing of American troops in what was once Soviet Central Asia. Mr. Lieven, an author and former newspaper correspondent in Moscow, says Russia has dropped its opposition to the three Baltic states becoming part of NATO. But, he says, as part of its strategy of promoting itself by playing Western Europe off against the United States, the elite in Russia are beginning to favor an even larger NATO expansion. "The argument is, of course, that the more one enlarges NATO, certainly by bringing in countries like Romania and Bulgaria which unfortunately by no means are fully comparable to central Europe in terms of successful economic reform or democratization - the more one expands NATO in this way and the more one tends to dilute it, and to weaken its ability to act in common," he said. Mr. Lieven says Russia is making progress in building democratic institutions, although the transformation away from totalitarianism is far from complete. "If one looks at the world in general, one would certainly have to say that Russia under Putin, while undoubtedly it is nowhere near the top end of the scale as far as democracy is concerned, it certainly isn't anywhere near the bottom of the scale either," he said. "You know, in a world which includes Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and various other charming figures." Mr. Lieven says western pronouncements on Russian reform should be a better mix of encouragement and criticism. "We have to develop a new balance between cooperation and criticism," he said. "And I would say we need to move more towards the model we pursue in relations with allies, partners, countries with which we wish to cooperate." Mr. Lieven concedes that Vladimir Putin is an unlikely leader, a bureaucrat thrust into power by former president Boris Yeltsin. He is, says Mr. Lieven, unable to exercise the absolute power of former Soviet leaders and must gain the favor of Russia's new economic elite the industrial barrons who control much of Russia's mineral wealth. ******** #4 RUSSIA, USA JOIN HANDS AGAINST DIRTY BOMB WASHINGTON, D.C., May 9 /from RIA Novosti's Arkadi Orlov/ - The Russian and US governments determined to establish a joint ad hoc team which will bar the way of nuclear substances and materials from falling into terrorist hands lest they make radioactive bombs, generally known as dirty. Spencer Abraham, US Secretary of Energy, and Alexander Rumyantsev, Russia's Minister of Nuclear Power Industry, made the announcement at a joint news conference in Washington today. The team will identify and take stock of all tentative sources of radioactive substances--in particular, medical isotopes or radioactive-powered autonomous electric generators, which may some day attract terrorists. The team will also draft recommendations for bilateral teamwork in that field, said Mr. Abraham. Russia also regards such sources of radioactive materials as a formidable problem, and is determined to take them all under strict supervision, added Mr. Rumyantsev. Russian experts formerly designed lasting nuclear isotope-powered power packs used in the Arctic and other outlying areas. Their salvage was debated at the negotiation table in Washington, and Russia has by now started the job in Belarus with IAEA assistance. Alexander Rumyantsev referred to the plight of two men injured in contact with a similar device in Georgia. One of them is undergoing treatment in France, and the other in a Russian hospital under the Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry. "The fact shows how serious the problem is, and we are ready to cope with it," he said. ******** #5 NATO ADMITS IN PUBLIC CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA ARE WITHIN SPHERE OF ITS INTERESTS BRUSSELS, May 9. /RIA Novosti/ - NATO for the first time has openly outlined its strategy after admittance to the Alliance of Central and East European states and establishing new relations with Russia. As well as ties with Russia and Ukraine, the strategy envisages the development of contacts with Caucasian and Central Asian countries, according to Nickolas Burns, US Permanent Representative to NATO. The Alliance should make sure that a cooperation axis can run through all the countries standing up for peace in Europe, according to Mr Burns. The United States and other NATO members take a great interest in expanding their activities to Central Asia, he emphasised. These countries have gained significance in the wake of the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan. Although they do not seek the NATO membership, but do want to develop relations with the Alliance, said the US official. They are after strong political and military contacts, something which can be achieved thanks to new relations with the partners. The Caucasus and Central Asia are known to have been maintaining contacts with NATO as part of its Partnership for Peace programme and within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC. The whole of the region is living through a transitional period, a high-ranking NATO diplomat said on condition of anonymity. Many of the regional countries have given considerable assistance to the US and its allies in their effort against Afghanistan's Taliban movement, said a diplomat. Partnership for Peace Programme was established in 1993-1994 and was oriented toward Central and East European countries. Three of them have since become NATO members, with the rest being this year's candidates for the membership in the organisation. ******** #6 Jamestown Foundation Monitor May 9, 2002 NEW IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORHOOD OF NATO AND EU. Next week in Reykjavik, NATO will hold the first in a series of high-level meetings that may, within a few short months, invite up to seven candidate countries to begin membership negotiations, and offer noncandidate Russia a seat in a specially created "NATO at 20" forum with carefully circumscribed functions. Membership invitations to the seven countries would ensure that NATO enlarges across the continent from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea. For its part, the European Union plans to admit some or most of these same countries by 2004. But what will happen next to the immediate neighborhood of an enlarged NATO and EU? The countries in that neighborhood emerged only ten years ago from a long Soviet subjugation. Some have already tied their fate and future with the West; others, or their leaderships, are tied by their past to Russia; yet others experience frustration with Western insistence on certain standards to be met before a Western welcome is extended. --Belarus In the heart of Europe on NATO's present border, Belarus shows how the Kremlin supports an anti-Western dictator in return for his political and military loyalty. President Vladimir Putin recently backed the Soviet-style reelection of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, demonstratively snubbing the Belarusan democratic opposition. Russian diplomacy steadfastly defends that dictatorship in international forums, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the consensus rules of which give Russia de facto veto power. With Moscow's backing, Lukashenka has recently stopped the work of the OSCE's mission in his country, kicked out the mission's senior diplomats, and now demands with Russian approval that the mission's mandate be diluted into insignificance. --Moldova In Moldova, the Kremlin poses a twofold problem for the Euroatlantic community. The first issue is emerging as another Kaliningrad, a Russian military outpost at a strategic crossroads in Europe outside Russia's borders, in this case, on the threshold of the Balkans. Moscow is obligated to the OSCE to withdraw all of its 2,600 troops from Moldova and to either scrap or withdraw its remaining arsenals by December of this year. But it has not even begun doing so. Instead, it proposes to keep its troops in place as "peacekeepers" in Moldova's Transdniester region. There, Russia's military and government have for the past ten years armed, financed, staffed and provided political and diplomatic support for the separatist authorities, who are in fact Russian Federation citizens and officers. In parallel, Moscow is now working closely with Moldova's official government--Europe's sole communist regime--in an effort to bring Moldova back under Russian dominance. The Russian government and Putin personally have repeatedly blessed Moldova's Soviet-nostalgic authorities as "democratic," assailed the regime's internal critics, encouraged it to reorient Moldova's economy rapidly toward the CIS, and urged the Moldovan leadership to embark on cultural and linguistic re-Russification, which has triggered massive protests. The Kremlin hopes to keep its troops in Moldova either legally, with the approval of Moldova's Red parliament, or de facto as heretofore with the cooperation of Transdniester; and it seems prepared to face down the OSCE here as well. --Ukraine Ukraine forms a keystone in the post-Soviet international order, not just for this part of Europe but for Eurasia as well. In Ukraine's recent parliamentary elections, Moscow campaigned against Ukraine's Western-oriented, pro-market parties; and it openly helped antireform, corruption-tainted political forces unfriendly to the West. Nevertheless, the new parliament may well be able to muster reformist, European-minded and indeed pro-NATO majorities, mainly from former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc, but also from parts of the large and heterogeneous bloc nominally loyal to President Leonid Kuchma. Communists and other leftists have suffered massive losses in these elections. Ukraine has an impressive record of close cooperation with NATO in recent years, a stark contrast to Russia's troubled relations with the alliance. The new parliament, being the least leftist since 1991, seems prepared not only to deepen the relations with NATO--which influential presidential officials also favor--but to undertake overdue economic reforms as well. NATO and the EU should waste no time responding: NATO, by continuing its successful policy of pursuing relations with Russia and Ukraine on parallel but separate tracks, without letting either relationship get in the way of the other. And the EU, by developing a policy toward its eastern neighborhood--Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova--that would reflect Ukraine's incomparably better foreign and security policies. --Armenia Along with Belarus, Armenia belongs to the Russian-led CIS Collective Security Treaty, which, like the Warsaw Pact of old, puts a multilateralist cover on what in essence are bilateral arrangements by Russia with each member country. In this case, Russia enabled Armenia to defeat Azerbaijan in the war for Karabakh almost a decade ago, whereupon Russia obtained long-term basing rights for its troops in Armenia. The country has drifted into military dependence on Russia, political quasi-isolation in the region and deep poverty (which has resulted in a massive population exodus). By now, Armenia has drawn three lessons: first, that the West, not Russia, can help Armenia recover from economic disaster; second, that economic recovery can come only after substantial progress toward settling the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and normalizing Armenia-Turkey relations; and, third, that Moscow is not seriously interested in either, because its influence in this as in other post-Soviet regions depends on keeping local conflicts in a smoldering state. In view of this, Armenia's leadership is now cautiously embarking on an adjustment of its foreign policy. Without questioning the alliance with Russia, it realizes the need for security cooperation with the United States and NATO and a dialogue with Turkey. Progress in these directions can in turn improve the prospects for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, finally putting Armenia on the path to economic development. --Azerbaijan, Georgia Oil-rich Azerbaijan and strategically vital Georgia have cast their lot with the West--a choice bolstered by active American, Turkish and British engagement. Georgia is the necessary route for all the westbound oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian basin. This explains Russia's ongoing attempts to change Georgia's policy through military pressure and the encouragement of ethnic separatism in parts of the country. Those breakaway enclaves are protected by Russian troops acting as "peacekeepers" without any valid mandate, and using methods that have nothing in common with internationally accepted notions of peacekeeping. This month, the United States is deploying some 200 special troops on a mission to train and equip Georgian lightly armed security forces. The American move also sends a political signal, underscoring the Western stake in stabilizing Georgia and safeguarding its independence. Meanwhile, Russia keeps thousands of troops and large arsenals at several bases in Georgia. One of those bases, Gudauta, was due to have been closed last July, in accordance with the OSCE's decisions and under its observation. Nevertheless, Russia retains Gudauta to this day, has interdicted the mandatory OSCE inspection, and recently used the base for staging military incursions into Georgian territory. Such disrespect for the OSCE in Georgia and Belarus should serve as a warning against introducing anything similar to OSCE-type consensus rules when Russia joins the planned "NATO at 20" forum. For its part, the "NATO at 20" forum has its work cut out for it on peacekeeping issues. Georgia and Moldova cannot be independent, let alone secure, countries as long as the Russian "peacekeeping" farce continues. These countries, along with Ukraine and the South Caucasus, are no longer to be viewed as Moscow's "near abroad." They now form the enlarging West's immediate neighborhood. ******** #7 Vremya Novostei May 8, 2002 NEW SANCTIONS WITH OLD PROBLEMS Russia, the United States, and sanctions against Iraq Author: Elena Suponina [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, WHICH HAVE BEEN IN FORCE FOR TWELVE YEARS ALREADY, MAY SOON BE FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED. TODAY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL WILL VOTE ON A PLAN WHICH HAS BEEN THE CENTER OF HEATED DEBATES AMONG RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN EXPERTS. AT LAST THEY HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT. International sanctions against Iraq, which have been in force for twelve years already, may soon be fundamentally changed. Today the UN Security Council will vote on a plan which has been the center of heated debates among Russian and American experts. At last they have reached an agreement. The Washington Post, describing the project as purely American, reports general approval from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, including Russia. Companies which have become accustomed to working with their Iraqi partners via the existing, complicated, schemes will have to change their methods of operation. This primarily concerns Russian companies, since Russia is Iraq's largest trade partner, with turnover of more than $2 billion a year. The project envisages setting out a simplified list of goods which can be imported into Iraq, without long and unpleasant discussions in the UN Sanctions Committee. However, goods which are not on the list will be monitored even more strictly, or maybe even prohibited. The changes do not imply improvements in any case. The new regime of sales may not seem easier to all, although American experts, as well as their Russian colleagues, insist on this. Some will find it harder to trade with Iraq under the new sanctions, and the United States is sure to keep control over trade with this Persian Gulf state. The description of technical details of the project runs to more than 200 pages. The Foreign Ministry says that Moscow has managed to soften the original US plan, which was approved at once by all the other members of the UN Security Council, even China and France. However, Iraq, whose opinion does not interest the United States very much, distrusted this project. Baghdad is in no hurry to express its point of view, but it is on the alert. Our sources in Iraq note that the impending changes do not imply that the oil and gas fields of Iraq will be developed soon. This is the most important issue for Russia and Iraq. There is no chance that the sanctions against Iraq will be lifted. (Translated by Daria Brunova) ******** #8 Christian Science Monitor May 9, 2002 Put a cork on Iran's weapons program By Richard Sokolsky Richard Sokolsky is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies. These are his personal views. WASHINGTON – Over the past year, the United States and Russia have built a closer relationship, overcoming many hurdles. But on one issue, a huge gap remains: Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear-weapons and missile-development programs. The Bush administration needs to take bolder actions on this, beginning later this month at the presidential summit in Moscow. Iran's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would threaten the United States and its friends in the Middle East and Europe. For many years, Russia has been Iran's principal supplier of technology, equipment, and components for ballistic missiles and nuclear-weapons development. Ending the aid would make it far more difficult for Iran to develop advanced weapons. US efforts to halt Russian transfers of dangerous technologies to Iran have met with little success, for several reasons. The US has yet to offer Russia many positive incentives that would offset for powerful domestic interests the value of such assistance. The United States' use of sanctions against Russia has poisoned the atmosphere for cooperation. And Russian officials either do not see Iran as a threat or believe they can manage the consequences if Iran does acquire WMD capabilities. Ending Russia's weapons assistance to Iran should be an important US strategic priority, and the Bush administration should take steps that are commensurate with its importance. At the same time, the US cannot submit to Russian blackmail or compromise other core security interests in pursuit of a US-Russian deal. What options are available? First, the US should offer major financial incentives to compensate Russia for the economic losses it would suffer from ending its assistance to Iran. Much of this increased aid – for example, US cooperation in improving the commercial value of Russia's nuclear energy industry – could also be used to downsize Russia's bloated nuclear infrastructure. Second, it is time to "think outside the box." Other issues may be more important to Russia than supplying nuclear and missile technologies to Iran. These include support for early entry into the World Trade Organization on terms favorable to Russia, greater access to Western investment and technology, and debt relief. The US should seek to leverage these issues to get what it wants on Iran. Third, Washington should link its missile defense program, US strategic force reductions, and Russian transfer of sensitive military technologies to Iran. Iranian success in acquiring long-range ballistic missiles for delivery of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will influence the future capabilities of a US missile defense system and US strategic force levels. The United States should underscore that, in return for concrete actions to cut off dangerous assistance to Iran, the US would consider more favorably Russian proposals to limit missile-defense deployments and to reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile. Washington also needs to emphasize that significant US-Russian ballistic missile-defense cooperation will not be possible if Russia does not shut off its WMD spigot to Iran. Last, the US should press for greater European support. The importance Russian President Vladimir Putin assigns to deepening ties with Europe gives America's European allies considerable leverage over Russian policies. The US should urge its European allies to condition their growing economic assistance and investment in Russia on concrete Russian actions to cut off WMD assistance to Iran. At this month's summit, beginning May 23, President Bush will need to impress on President Putin that stanching the flow of Russian WMD aid to Iran will be critical to strengthening the US-Russian partnership. Coming up with the right incentives for Russia is no guarantee of success, but neglecting to do so is a sure recipe for failure. ******* #9 Asia Times May 7, 2002 Central Asia, Eastern Europe, see 'remarkable growth' By Gustavo Capdevila GENEVA - Russia and the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, former members of the now-defunct Socialist Bloc, were among the world leaders in growth in 2001. The economic growth of Eastern Europe and Central Asia surpassed that of the rest of the countries belonging to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which includes Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan, for a total of 55 members. ECE executive secretary Brigita Schmognerova said the economic outcome in 2001 for the 27 ECE transition economies was "surprisingly good", with an average growth of 5 percent. But the top prize went the group of countries that form part of the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), created after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The overall gross domestic product (GDP) increase of the CIS countries was 6.2 percent, and half of those economies experienced nearly 9 percent annual growth. In presenting the ECE economic report in Geneva, Schmognerova highlighted the success of Russia, "an engine of growth for the rest of the CIS countries". The transformation of Russia since the August 1998 financial crisis "has been remarkable", stated the Slovak economist who has been at the helm of the ECE since February. From 1999 to 2001, Russia's GDP climbed at an average annual rate of 6.5 percent. The ECE analysts attribute this strong performance to two factors: the sharp depreciation of the ruble after 1998 and the success of the energy sector, which benefited from favorable market prices. But the report also recognizes the merits of the Russian authorities, who made "a considerable effort to accelerate systemic transformation and market reforms". In 2001, Russia introduced more comprehensive legislative reforms than in all the years since the fall of the communist regime. Most of these reforms are aimed at economic liberalization, and Schmognerova said she is confident that they will contribute to consistent future growth. However, the interim director of the ECE Economic Analysis Division, Dieter Hesse, a German national, points out that "dependence on commodities exports [particularly in the energy sector] cannot be a long-term economic strategy" for Russia and the rest of the CIS. The chief of the Transition Economies section, Rumen Dubrinsky of Bulgaria, commented that Russia would need the price per barrel of crude to remain at US$22.5 in order to benefit. For every dollar less per barrel on the international market, Russia's GDP shrinks 1 percent, said Dubrinsky. To confront the setbacks that could arise from dependence on petroleum, "the task for Russia is to develop a competitive industrial structure to diversify its exports", said Hesse. Sustained economic growth was reported in other parts of the region, such as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where it reached 6.2 percent. The average GDP growth in most of the East European transition economies was around 3 percent, but was "pulled down by the weak performance by the largest regional economy, Poland, whose GDP increased by just one percent", says the ECE report. The only negative report from the transition economies, a 4.6 percent GDP decline, was in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was shaken by the internal military conflict. Growth decelerated in Hungary and Slovenia. "The effect of weakened demand in Western Europe was more pronounced in these two economies," said Schmognerova. Transition-economies expert Dubrinsky reckoned that the relatively delicate situation of countries such as Poland and Hungary - which earlier were among the vanguard of the transition economies - is because they are undergoing different phases in the reform process. The CIS countries and some of their neighbors are just now entering the main phase of transitional recovery, while the more advanced countries are now entering a second phase in the process, in which "they are dealing with different types of economic problems as they are starting major institutional and structural reforms", he said. As is the case of Poland, these reforms sometimes come at a substantial cost, added Dubrinsky. The ECE predicts moderate growth of the transition economies in 2002, a slowdown from last year due to global economic stagnation and the slow recovery in Western Europe. The regional UN agency forecasts growth of around 5 percent for the CIS this year, a deceleration with respect to the 6.2 percent average recorded for 2001. In the Baltic states, economic expansion is expected to be slightly more than 4 percent, while in Eastern Europe it will reach approximately 2.75 percent, says the ECE. Russia should see 4.3 percent GDP growth, though the ECE experts recognize that it will depend on how international petroleum prices play out. "In Poland, the austerity measures the government is expected to implement are likely to slow down economy activity and GDP is likely to grow by just 1 percent," said Schmognerova. Nevertheless, "the CIS is likely to remain the fastest growing region of the ECE area in 2002. The majority of those countries are predicted to see GDP growth in the range of 5 to 8 percent," she said. The ECE report forecasts grow of 1.6 percent for the United States in 2002, 1.4 percent for Canada, and 1.4 percent for Western Europe as well. Japan's economy, however, is expected to see a 1.1 percent decline. (Inter Press Service) ******* #10 Analysis: US fights Cen. Asian militants WASHINGTON, May 9 (UPI) -- The United States has focused on fighting Islamic militants in Central Asia to stabilize governments since its stunning victory in Afghanistan. U.S. advisers landed in Georgia last week to help the local military fight al Qaida and Taliban influence in the republic's notorious Pankisi Gorge. U.S. officials believe about 100 Arab al Qaida fighters and several hundred Chechens linked to Afghanistan's former Taliban regime are still active in the area. "But our main objective is to help stabilize regional governments and enable them to govern effectively," a senior U.S. official told United Press International. "In Georgia, we will train and equip four battalions; three from the defense forces and one from the border guards," he said. The Americans have also made similar arrangements with other Central Asian republics. Under this "train and equip program," they will provide similar facilities to the military in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. Both republics have borders with Afghanistan and have a major border control problem. Currently, local forces supervised by Russian military officers man their borders with Afghanistan. The presence of U.S. military advisers in the region has caused concern in Moscow. Washington has responded by assuring the Russians that the United States "recognizes and respects" Moscow's political and strategic interests in Caucasian and Central Asian region. It also recognizes that because of its long association with these republics, Russia has a special relationship with them and does not intend to interfere in their mutual ties. "But we believe that these are now sovereign states, free to make their own decisions," the U.S. official said. Washington also has acquired military bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which were used for operations into Afghanistan during the war against the Taliban. "Even during the war, and later, we made it clear to Moscow that we have no interest in acquiring permanent military bases in the region," said the U.S. official. He said the United States and Russia have regularly consulted each other on these issue. A U.S. delegation visited Moscow on April 15 for talks with Russia officials on these issues while another will be going soon. "We are transparent and sensitive to Russia's concerns and see no clash of interests here." Americans believe that it is also in Russia's interest to eradicate remaining pockets of Islamic militancy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Steeped in secular traditions left behind by 70 years of communist rule, Central Asia -- although Muslim -- was never a fertile ground for Islamic militancy. The influence of the militants further declined after the humiliating defeat of the Taliban and al Qaida forces in neighboring Afghanistan. But during their five-year association with the Taliban, Muslim rebels in Russia's breakaway republic of Chechnya established several small pockets across the region. In a recent report, the New York-based Eurasianet news agency reported that the American military advisers, who landed in Georgia on April 28, were also "on a mission to contain al Qaida loyalists who might be operating in the lawless Pankisi Gorge." A mountainous area 150 kilometers northeast of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, the Pankisi Gorge became a problem spot when local authorities admitted 7,000 Chechen refugees in 1999. Since then, Moscow has exerted continuous pressure on Georgia to crack down on the movements of Chechen separatists. Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Georgia has also come under U.S. pressure to curb lawlessness in Pankisi. The area, approximately measuring 2 miles by 18 miles, is populated by Kists, ethnic Chechens of Georgian citizenship who escaped "cleansing" by the Russian Empire in early 19th century. Kists have adopted some Georgian traditions and even family names, but they also have maintained cultural links with their ethnic kin in Chechnya. This cultural bond was a major reason Chechen refugees settled in Pankisi. The refugees also included Chechen fighters who later established close links with the former Taliban rulers of Kabul, using the so-called Afghan corridor from Chechnya through Georgia and Azerbaijan into Afghanistan. After the collapse of the Taliban regime, several hundred Chechen fighters returned to Pankisi, bringing along about 100 Arab fighters of Osama bin Laden's al Qaida network. Most prominent among them is a Jordanian known only as Khattab. U.S. officials see the presence of these Arabs and Chechen fighters as "a destabilizing factor" and are encouraging the Georgian forces to "take action in the Pankisi Gorge." The Americans also view this problem as linked to the general situation in Chechnya where thousands of Chechens have been killed fighting the Russian military. While helping regional authorities fight Chechen and Arab terrorists, the Americans also urge the Russians to seek a peaceful end to the crisis in Chechnya. They believe that without a political solution the Chechen problem will continue to destabilize the entire region. U.S. observers say that the situation in Pankisi is directly linked to the Chechen crisis. In rest of the region, Islamic militancy is on the decline. ******* #11 Moscow News May 8, 2002 FSU Citizens in Palestine By Nadezhda Spiridonova, Vremya MN It is but rarely that the Russian media recall the existence of our compatriots, past and present, on the territory of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This is unfair if only because for the last 18 months they have been living in the line of fire There are no accurate statistics on how many FSU citizens live in the PA. According to some sources, there may be up to 1,500 of them. These are mainly women married to Palestinians who used to study in the Soviet Union. Most of them have a university degree. Some have lived in Palestine for more than 20 years while some arrived three to four years ago. Before the intifada, almost all of them worked at schools or local ministries doing jobs they had been trained for in the Soviet Union. All have learned Arabic. In the course of my business trips to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, I often met these people, invariably embittered that Russia had forgotten about them. This bitterness comes not of a vain desire to show off: There are some matters on which support from their native country is of paramount importance to them. The main issue - documents - is extremely sensitive to many. Women who had retained citizenship of a post-Soviet state, told me before the intifada that if a husband, after five years of study, returned home immediately, he kept his PA residence permit. Yet if he had for some reason stayed longer, his papers were automatically canceled, and so were the papers of his spouse and children. All they could do was wait until the Palestinian's parents secured a three-month invitation for them. But if afterwards a Russian or, say, Ukrainian woman wanted to travel to Moscow or Kharkov or Tver to visit with her parents, her chances of subsequently getting a residence permit in the PA were virtually zero. True, before the intifada, there was still hope of getting the necessary papers: These matters were handled by special Palestinian-Israeli commissions. Now the commissions have been abolished, and our compatriots have nowhere to turn to. Generally, after the intifada began (September 2000), a lot of these people ended up in a critical situation. Many became all but illegal aliens. The fact is that Israeli authorities are reluctant to grant them residence permits or extend their visas: As a result, a person finds it easier to leave the country. Should you choose to return after all, I was told, your presence in the PA becomes illegal. Knowing that, the Israelis, at the start of Operation Defensive Wall, announced they would deport all those they would detain in the PA without the necessary papers. Recently I got in touch on the phone with Tatyana al-Khatib, our former compatriot who now lives with her family in Ramallah. Her husband, Saadi al-Khatib, a Russian university alumnus, is now the PA first deputy information minister. They said that during the first ten days of the operation, power and water supplies were cut off and telephones were not working throughout the city. Ramallah, divided into sectors, is under a round-the-clock curfew. People can only occasionally leave their homes: Once they go out, it is touch and go whether they manage to return the same day. In some areas people are even forbidden to look out the window. Shopping is allowed once every three to four days. But, Saadi said, 60 percent of families have already run out of money. True, people themselves are reluctant to go out, what with snipers everywhere. Tatyana spoke of an incident after which the city became deserted. Despite the curfew, a Palestinian woman ventured to go to the hospital to have her plaster cast removed. On leaving the hospital, she was killed by a sniper's bullet. In other instances, ambulances were not let through, so those who were not badly injured had to carry their seriously wounded friends or relatives to a checkpoint, where the ambulance had to wait. Russian interests in the PA are represented by Sergei Peskov, an RF envoy to the Palestinian Authority. He defines the main task of our small diplomatic corps, comprised of only five officers, as "deepening Russian-Palestinian interaction with a view to expediting a Middle East settlement." The situation today, however, is such that in addition to their basic functions, diplomats have to provide assistance to Russian nationals living in the PA. This is not easy since our "diplomatic rearguard" in Gaza is not authorized to provide consular services. Nonetheless, amid an ongoing blockade of Palestinian territory, when ordinary citizens are simply unable to move about freely, Russian diplomats have assumed courier functions, delivering documents to Tel Aviv, where our embassy and consulate are based, and back. Asked how many Russian nationals currently live in the PA, Peskov said: Approximately 550; many have expired documents. The Russian representative pointed out that not even the diplomats can move about without hindrance. At checkpoints, scattered throughout the region, they have to witness mini-shows put on for their benefit: Hours spent to establish identity and various little tricks to exert psychological pressure are commonplace. Sometimes diplomats get in the line of fire. ******* #12 The Russia Journal May 6-12, 2002 Whose double standards should apply? By IRA STRAUS Russian diplomats and analysts are constantly complaining about the "double standards" of the West – so much so that it comes to sound tedious to Western ears. After all, everyone has double standards. Nevertheless, there is a real problem behind these complaints. The West should pay heed. The problem is not that the West skews its moral standards to take into account its selfish interests. Everyone does this, Russia included. Here, the Russian complaints are indeed tedious. The sensible approach to this is not to try to get rid of all double standards – that would be utopian – but for Russia and the West to reach a joint conception of their global interests, so that they could have one and the same set of double standards on most issues. The real problem, meanwhile, is that the West pursues certain double standards even when they run contrary to its selfish interests. It has double standards based on what look like rhetorical vendettas against certain countries, including Russia. This cannot be good for relations with Russia. Let us look at one telling instance. Russia is said to be ineligible for NATO membership because of its handling of ethnic minorities, while Georgia is sometimes discussed as a potential member, and Estonia and Latvia are fully expecting to receive membership invitations this November. Georgia is a basket case by every NATO standard, yet it ranks ahead of Russia in Western discourse on NATO expansion. Perhaps oil interests can explain this discrepancy. But what about the Baltic states? Does the West need the Baltics in NATO? Hardly. Bringing them in would actually run contrary to the security interests of the West. It would be a dangerous overextension of Article 5 of the alliance treaty as long as Russia is not included in a comparable manner but is left outside as the implied adversary. Yet discrimination against ethnic Russians in the Baltic states is treated as acceptable for NATO, as long as the most extreme manifestations of it are moderated. It is not a national interest that is being served here, but a psychological interest – supposedly a way of rewarding countries that meet democratic standards, but in view of the skewed standards, perhaps it would be better to call it a vendetta. In the 1990s, NATO invented its current standards on ethnic-minority issues for a very specific, practical reason: so that new members would not drag the alliance into ethnic disputes, especially ones involving cross-border co-ethnics, that in turn could drag NATO into conflict with neighboring states. Estonia and Latvia are the cases where this concern is the most relevant. Their ethnic issues do indeed spill over to draw in a neighbor, a big powerful neighbor with nuclear weapons at that. They are indefensible militarily; they bring NATO no military benefit, only a big risk. To fail to insist on the most stringent standards of ethnic conduct in their case is to fail to attend to the West’s basic security interests. Despite this, Westerners often speak as lawyers for the two Baltic states, explaining away their shortcomings, showing irritation that the question is even brought up, insinuating that this is being done as a pretext for Russian imperialism and excusing any problems by pointing to greater historical injustices suffered at the hands of Russia in the past. Nadya Arbatova, a sociologist with Moscow’s Institute of World Economics and International Relations and a member of the Russia in Europe committee, has described this as a policy of "selective historical indignation." She reminds us that "all history is a graveyard of grievances" and that there is a big difference between redressing grievances and nursing them. The West is not applying double standards here out of any valid selfish interest. It is doing it out of pure sentimentality – at best a love of the Baltics, at worst a more negative feeling against Russia. Meanwhile, Russian shortcomings in ethnic policy are treated to denunciations in the most extreme language. Every rhetorical effort is made to exaggerate them, just as every effort is made to minimize the failings in the Baltic cases. No attention is given to the fact that the relevant standard of comparison for Russia is not a single small Eastern European state, but all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans combined. Russia has as many people – and even more ethnic minorities – as all of these states put together. Several of Russia’s minorities have taken semi-secessionist steps, usually for the sake of control of resources – in contrast to the good behavior of Russians in the Baltics. Russia has handled almost all of these difficult situations peacefully. On balance, Russia has come out considerably better on minority matters than Eastern Europe and the Balkans, where there have been multiple wars and ethnic cleansings. Only in Chechnya has Russia failed; and a fair-minded observer would have to admit that the blame is not on Russia alone, the Chechen nationalists and militants having posed a problem far more intractable than any of the ethnic groups in Eastern Europe. Russia’s record has been unusually good – without even mentioning its broader record of guaranteeing the general peace during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Arguably this is for the very reason that it has held together as a vast pluralistic state. It has not succumbed to small-state ethnic nationalism as in much of Eastern Europe and the Trans-Caucasus. Ethnic minorities in Georgia would love to be annexed by Russia. Small has been ugly, at least in ethnic relations: here Bush the elder seems to have been right in his much-derided 1991 speech in Kiev about "suicidal nationalism." Despite this, Russia is treated in Western discourse as the greatest offender on ethnic minority relations, excepting only Serbia. Even the worst Balkan, Caucasian and Central Asian states are allowed to leapfrog ahead of Russia in being thought about for NATO membership, not to mention the two Baltic states. By every consideration of Western self-interest, NATO should be skewing its judgments in favor of Russia, whose ethnic problems do not threaten to entice any neighboring states to invade – and should stop skewing its judgments in favor of small states whose ethnic problems often do threaten to draw in bigger neighbors. By every consideration of global Western strategic interest, too, Russia should be judged more generously than the others, as the one potential new member that can be of strategic help to the West. Instead, the judgments are skewed against Russia. It is depicted as a pariah on ethnic matters. Many people in NATO circles say that it must be excluded from NATO on this very ground. It should be evident by now that it is not really the ethnic issue that is keeping Russia out of NATO, it is the prejudice against Russia that is leading to misjudgments on this issue. This prejudice is rooted in other sources of distrust, some of which may raise real difficulties for integration of Russia with the West, but which cannot be addressed or resolved as long as they are expressed in such a mystified form. This is not only harmful to Russia, it is harmful to the West. Russians notice when the West skews its rules at the expense of its own interests, with no apparent pattern except that it is also at Russia’s expense. They draw all the conclusions that seem objectively logical about Western goals and intentions, even if, subjectively, Westerners cannot imagine that such conclusions could be drawn about them. And this in turn tells us what the basic problem is on double standards. It is a pattern of distortions arising out of prejudices and passions – prejudices and passions that are blinding the West not only to justice but to its own vital interests. ******* #13 Krasnaya Zvezda No. 79 May 2002 [translation for personal use only] THE FOURTH WORLD WAR: MYTH OR REALITY? By Alexei LYASHCHENKO, Krasnaya Zvezda The world is now celebrating the 57th Victory in Europe (VE)-Day anniversary. The Second World War became the most devastating war in history. Right now, millions of people the world over are paying their tribute to all those, who died for the sake of preventing any other global wars. Nevertheless, quite a few analysts, specialists and mass-media bodies are saying ever more loudly that the fourth world war has now engulfed this planet. In their opinion, this rather unusual war differs greatly from the First and Second World Wars, as well as the Cold War, which is sometimes referred to as the Third World War. However, the fourth world war encompasses well-nigh the same political, economic and military fronts. The Political Front Political hostilities allegedly began right after the Cold War, which was called on to demolish the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. The bi-polar world, which had existed during the Cold War, was maintained through a balance of power and with the help of deterrents. However, such deterrents vanished into thin air after the Cold War, thus destabilizing the global situation. Well, such a situation could not persist for a long time at this stage. A struggle for a new world order got underway, with Washington advocating a uni-polar and US-led world. Moreover, Washington claims the right to decide the world's destiny. However, this concept doesn't suit many countries, Russia, China and India, in the first place. These three countries suggest establishing a multi-polar world order, which would enable every Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern state to develop independently in conditions of peace, stability and national security. The struggle for the Soviet Union's legacy became one of this war's manifestations. The disintegration of the socialist bloc removed a buffer zone dividing the First World and the Third World. Consequently, the so-called Golden Billion, i.e. prosperous countries, keep fighting the opponents of globalization and that cultural- civilization expansion. Incidentally, the Third World had voiced the relevant ultimatums several days prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist acts in the United States. Durban hosted a conference on racism, with conference delegates demanding that Western countries pay multi-billion-dollar reparations for slave trade. Previously, this demand was made after the G-8's summit in Genoa, that is, after the Third World became convinced that the First World was in no mood to write off specific debts and to scale down trade barriers hindering the importation of products from under-developed countries. Moreover, it became clear that the First World didn't intend to render substantial aid in overcoming poverty and backwardness. Therefore one can safely say that some Third World countries are becoming a "hornet's nest" of terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and other modern global troubles. New York and Washington were subjected to horrendous terrorist attacks September 11, 2001, with the entire world accepting America's leading role in the struggle against international terrorism virtually without any reservations. However, any other scenario seemed impossible just because mankind must now cope with this terrible challenge. As a result, Washington has now decided to consolidate its gains; for example, the US side wants to list specific terrorists and their accomplices all on its own, meting out the appropriate punishment. The US side is making it clear that it doesn't want to pander to those countries opposing Washington. This is proved convincingly by a recent information leak concerning the Pentagon's possible nuclear targets. At the same time, the United States is lavishing unprecedentedly massive appropriations on the modernization of its war machine, which would enable Washington to rule the roost in a uni-polar world. The Economic Front This "war" also has its own economic specifics. Naturally enough, the scale of economic "hostilities" and their methods differ considerably from military operations. Nonetheless, such "hostilities," which began several years after the USSR's demise, entail the same, and even greater, destructive consequences. One can mention numerous economic "offensives" in this connection; I'm talking about South-East Asian economic crises of the mid and late 1990s. (South-East Asia is the Japanese industry's main "assembly shop" -- Ed.) Add to this automobile wars between the United States, Europe and Japan, European-US trade wars, those "steel" battles between Russia and the United States, as well as that really tough rivalry on the global arms market. The US congress likes to impose economic sanctions on those specific countries, which don't suit Washington for political reasons. Well, these sanctions are also a component part of economic wars. US involvement in the latest abortive Venezuelan coup (that aimed to overthrow President Hugo Chavez) speaks volumes here. The aforesaid coup was also called on to reduce OPEC's influence on the global oil market. The fight against terrorism in Afghanistan (that can enable the United States to obtain Caspian oil), the projected military operation against Iraq and the decision to include Iran (both countries are big- league oil-market players) into the "axis of evil" also fit nicely into this strategy. The Military Front Resolute political and economic actions, nonetheless, imply that the concerned parties will try to avoid real wars because any war might spell mankind's demise. Still this doesn't mean that no battles are being fought along the military front. Their list includes the show of force, regional conflicts and small wars, i.e. NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia and the present- day counter-terrorist operation on Afghan territory. Meanwhile swelling defense budgets and the development of new-generation weaponry are seen as the main aspect of military activities. The United States also keeps setting the pace in this field. The list of new-generation weapons systems includes the NMD (National Missile Defense) system, as well THAADS (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) systems, which the US side wants to deploy. Moreover, the Pentagon's plans for developing miniature nuclear devices were leaked to the public not so long ago. The United States is just about the only country of the world, which can deploy large aircraft carrier task forces, strategic air-transport commands, impressive satellite clusters, as well as reconnaissance and data-exchange networks. Still it's crystal clear that the world has responded adequately to this US challenge. For example, America's NATO allies have now stepped up their efforts in order to establish European armed forces, which would not depend upon the United States. Meanwhile China has boosted its defense budget by an unprecedentedly great margin this year. According to analysts, the bulk of Chinese military spending will be used to develop space rockets and satellites in line with a new national strategy. What Should Russia Do? President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation delivered his annual state-of-the-nation address before the Federal Assembly (Parliament) this past April, emphasizing the fact that tough competition for markets, investment, as well as for political and economic influence, was a salient feature of the modern world. Such competition has assumed truly global proportions, Putin stressed. Russia had to cede many global- market niches as a result of its weakness; such niches were immediately seized by others. No one wants to give them back just like that; and nor will anyone do this, the President went on to say. This statement highlights Russia's positions in the struggle for a new world order, also suggesting ways of rectifying this situation. It goes without saying that Russia must once again become a powerful and prosperous country; such is the main trouble- shooting option. Russia has all the required pre-requisites for accomplishing this objective. I'm talking about abundant mineral deposits, a tremendous intellectual potential and many other factors, too. However, all these factors have to be merged into single whole and used to attain this goal. The Russian foreign policy, which should also serve this goal, should be based on cynical pragmatism. To cut a long story short, Russia should aspire for close-knit cooperation with other countries in every profitable sphere; this concerns long-term prospects, as well. Russia will apparently have to experience some rather unpleasant events already in the near future. For example, it's still unclear whether a new START agreement will be signed in the course of the forthcoming Russian-US summit. Still one thing is clear. The United States and NATO, which maintain special relations with Russia, and which are ready to cooperate with it in line with the 20-country format, don't want to renounce NATO's projected eastward expansion. The relevant decision will be made already this year. Consequently, the war machine of this mightiest organization will move ever closer toward Russian borders. ********