CDI Russia Weekly-#203
26 April 2002
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036
phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, 
economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation,
CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense 
Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. 
  CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/
  Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org

Contents:
  1. Jamestown Foundation Russia's Week. (commentary on Putin's 
state-of-the-nation address)
  2. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Russia: U.S. Chamber Of Commerce Chief 
Praises Economy.
  3. RIA Novosti: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION IN WORLD 
COMMUNITY BUT NOT ON ANY TERMS.
  4. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Lesson Hasn't Been Learned.
  5. Rossiiskiye Vesti: Artem Ulunyan, HAS THE KREMLIN ABANDONED ITS 
MULTIPOLARITY DOCTRINE?
  6. The Russia Journal: Peter Lavelle, Russian anti-Americanism and 
construction of public opinion.
  7. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Marina Kalashnikova, THE PENTAGON INCLUDES RUSSIA 
IN ITS ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY. Referring to the Council of 20, NATO drives 
Moscow the into geopolitical backwaters.
  8. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Russia seen undermining Caspian Sea 
solution.
  9. Washington Times: Brett Wagner, Nuclear terrorism protection.
  10. Interfax: Russian liberal politician concerned by attacks on Putin's 
foreign policy views. (Yavlinsky)
  11. Moscow News: Viktor Loshak, Warning Shot in the Head.
  12. Reuters: Ghost towns, geiger counters-- Chernobyl welcomes you.

********

#1
Jamestown Foundation
Russia's Week: 24 April 2002
24 April 2002--Volume VII, Issue 16

THE USUAL SUSPECTS....
President Vladimir Putin delivered his annual
State-of-the-Nation address on April 18, and, despite the
official secrecy that had surrounded the speech's contents prior
to its delivery, rumors that his main theme would be the need to
streamline the state apparatus turned out to be true.

Indeed, while listing the achievements of his governance over
the past year--a modest reduction in unemployment, a modest
growth in real wages and the passage of measures to reform the
tax and judicial systems, to cut red tape for businesses and to
permit the free sale of some land--the mood of the Russian
president was well short of euphoric. He also faced reality and
made note of it: Forty million Russians remain in poverty; the
economy's slowing growth rate is likely to prevent Russia from
catching up with the developed world. Having earlier castigated
his cabinet for overly timid growth projections, Putin then
declared that the main obstacle to rapid economic growth is
Russia's "awkward, ineffective state apparatus." This, he said,
remains "a black box" for most citizens and is mired in
corruption. The problem, he continued, is not the state
bureaucracy's size. He insisted, rather unconvincingly, that
Russia's state apparatus is no bigger, and perhaps even smaller
than those in other countries. The problem, he claimed, is that
it is "badly organized" and staffed by people unacquainted with
"system management." Calling for an "administrative reform" that
would turn the state apparatus into a "compact working
instrument of state policy," Putin ordered the cabinet to
present restructuring plans forthwith.

If all of this had a familiar ring, it's because it had all been
said before, in so many words. In his March 1997 address, then
President Boris Yeltsin assailed top state officials for their
"lack of will and indifference, irresponsibility and
incompetence in dealing with state problems" and then reshuffled
his cabinet. The Russian media speculated at the time that
Yeltsin's next step would be to radically restructure the state
apparatus. Izvestia even reported that Anatoly Chubais had been
transferred from the post of presidential chief of staff to that
of first deputy prime minister in order to change the
government's "size and functions." A year later, in June 1998,
Yeltsin that his administration had "begun to reduce drastically
expenditure on the state apparatus." Two months later, the
country's financial system collapsed.

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO....
A cynic might deduce that when Russian leaders hit a dead end in
their bid to reform the country, they start attacking
officialdom. And while this is a minority view in the case of
Putin, whose popularity rating remains steady at around 70
percent, it is still difficult to ignore.

One among this minority, Pyotr Aven, president of Alfa Bank and
a former foreign trade minister, critiqued the status quo in
unequivocal terms during last week's Russian Economic Forum in
London. Providing one of the few sour notes in an otherwise
upbeat event, Aven declared that no economic liberalization
whatsoever was underway in Russia. "I am sure that the majority
of those present in this room hold accounts in foreign banks,
that many have real estate abroad, and that under Russian law
all of us are criminals," he told the audience, which included
the leading lights of Russia's political and business elite.
Russian banks, Aven added, account for only 3 percent of the
country's domestic investment. "What is the largest portion of
Russian banks doing if they are not fulfilling their main
function--crediting?" he asked. "They are involved in money
laundering." He also lashed out at Russian government spending,
saying that it amounts to 33 percent of the country's gross
domestic product--"a huge burden on Russian business and a brake
on economic growth." By way of invidious comparison, he noted
that government spending in China accounts for only 13-17
percent of that country's GDP.

While Aven is himself a major beneficiary of oligarchic
capitalism and no one would ever mistake him for Mother Theresa,
he has frequently been refreshingly straightforward about
post-Soviet Russia's economic realities. In 1994, for example,
Aven declared that in Russia, millionaires were "appointed" by
the state. In 1999, he wrote a devastating critique of
Yeltsin-era economic reform, noting, among other things, that
the country's largest enterprises had been "purchased with
government money" and that the privatization of one aluminum
factory alone had been "accompanied by twenty murders."

A NEW THREAT....
A rather more unexpected subject in Putin's annual address to
the nation was, as he put it, "the rise of extremism." This, he
said, was a "serious threat" to Russia's stability and security.
It was expressed, he continued, "above all in slogans and
fascist and nationalist symbols that lead to pogroms, people
being beaten up and killed." While "bands of extremists" were
acting essentially as organized crime groups and should be
treated accordingly, he said that prosecutors and police did not
have "sufficiently effective instruments" to bring the
organizers of extremist crimes to justice.

The reason this section of the presidential address was
something of a surprise was that Putin's accession to throne
following the mercurial Yeltsin was supposed to mark the advent
of relative political tranquillity and predictability. So, at
least, went the conventional wisdom. Now, all of a sudden,
Russia's head of state was confirming what newspapers were
declaring in boldface headlines: The country was under threat
from young white supremacists sporting swastikas and buzz cuts.
Indeed, last week Muscovites and foreigners alike nervously
awaited April 20, Adolf Hitler's birthday, with foreign
embassies receiving emails from "Ivan," a self-proclaimed
skinhead leader, warning that foreigners would be attacked, even
killed, in memory of the Nazi dictator.

The skinhead movement in Russia, in fact, is not new. Indeed, as
the newspaper Moskovskie Novosti noted last week, it was alive
during the Soviet era and has been growing steadily ever since.
In April of last year, about the time of that Hitler birthday
anniversary, skinheads stabbed a Chechen man to death in central
Moscow. Last October, two "non-Slavs" were murdered during a
large-scale skinhead rampage on the Russian capital's outskirts.

EVEN PARANOIDS HAVE ENEMIES....
But is the growth of skinhead violence in Russia a more or less
spontaneous manifestation of socioeconomic dislocation and
ethnic tension, as in other countries? Or is it something more
Byzantine?

--Communists

Russia's leading Communist says the latter. The day after
Putin's national address, Gennady Zyuganov claimed that media
reports on the skinhead threat were part of an organized
campaign of "hysteria" designed to guarantee the passage of a
restrictive Kremlin-backed law on extremism aimed, he alleged,
at weakening "organized opposition forces"--meaning, of course,
his own Communist Party of the Russia Federation (KPRF).

If Zyuganov's comments could be dismissed as the kind of
conspiratorial ranting one would expect from the leader of the
"national-patriotic" opposition--particularly since the KPRF was
kicked out of its leadership posts in the State Duma earlier
this month--the same could not be said about a pair of articles
that appeared in two leading Russian publications. Echoing
Zyuganov, the daily newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda said that one
possible explanation for "the antiskinhead outcry" was the need
"to scare public opinion" and thus ensure passage of the
anti-extremism law. For its part, Profil, the weekly magazine
published in conjunction with Business Week, noted the
authorities could no longer rely on anticommunism to rally
voters, as in 1996. With parliamentary elections set for 2003
and Putin up for re-election the following year, Profil wrote,
the fight against extremism could provide the incumbent
authorities with a compelling argument to the electorate voters
on why they deserved four more years.

--Skinheads

Whatever the case, the feared skinhead pogroms did not take
place on the Hitler birthday anniversary this year. But while
some attributed this to the heightened police and Interior
Ministry troop presence in Moscow and other Russian cities,
other observers, including the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomlets,
warned that the skinheads had merely postponed their
Gotterdammerung plans. In addition, and more sensationally, that
paper's reporter Svetlana Meteleva was able to hang out with one
of the capital's skinhead groups for a week in mid-April. She
described firsthand how its members received military-style
training in the headquarters of the Moscow OMON special police
unit, from OMON instructors.

If such official collusion with the skinheads has been
authorized at high--or even the highest--levels, it is a
dangerous game. "If this genie is let out of the bottle, it will
not go back," Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote. "The seeds of
nationalism may be spread by the skinhead gangs throughout the
country, to create some horrifying offshoots. We do not know
what Russian nationalism is, and God help us if we should find
out."

--Religion

Those seeds may already be sprouting. Cossacks in Rostov Oblast
called for the expulsion from that region of foreigners and
people without local residency registration, and demanded that
the authorities deputize armed municipal Cossack detachments to
battle illegal migrants. Meanwhile, Bishop Jerzy Mazur--a Polish
citizen who is one of four Catholic bishops in Russia and whose
diocese is in eastern Siberia--was refused entry into Russia on
April 19. His visa was canceled, effectively banning him from
Russia. Earlier this month, Russian immigration officers at
Moscow's Sheremetevo Airport confiscated the visa of an Italian
priest, who had been working in Russia for more than a decade,
as he was catching a flight to Italy. In what is clearly part of
the escalating battle between the Russian Orthodox Church and
the Roman Catholic Church over the latter's activities in
Russia, both men were told they were on a Russian special
services' blacklist.

--Foreigners

While there is no obvious link between the Russian president and
any of the more blatant xenophobic tendencies increasingly
manifest in Russian society, Putin showed that he was not
insensitive to the new mood by publicly taking the side of those
seeking to outlaw land sales to foreigners. "I understand the
concerns of those who think that probably at the current stage
we should not allow foreigners to legally buy land," he said. "I
admit that for a time, until we understand what is going on,
maybe we should not act hastily."

Compared with the skinheads' shenanigans, a ban on land sales to
foreigners, and even the expulsion of foreign clerics and
Draconian measures against illegal aliens, seem almost like
reasonable measures. Precisely the point, the conspiracy
theorists would say.

*******

#2
Russia: U.S. Chamber Of Commerce Chief Praises Economy
By Francesca Mereu

The president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Thomas Donohue, has praised 
Russia's economic reforms and investment climate. Donohue, who recently spent 
three days touring Russia, said his organization will do its best to push 
hard for Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization. 

Moscow, 25 April 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Thomas Donohue, the head of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, has offered praise for the progress Russia has made 
toward creating a market economy. Donohue -- who spent three days in Russia 
sizing up the country's investment climate -- says the improvements have been 
significant.

"[First], you can see the emergence of a vibrant entrepreneurial business 
sector. I was here three years ago, and the improvements that I'm talking 
about are real and substantial.... [Second,] I've heard a number of positive 
reports from major American companies doing business here. Yes, there are 
roadblocks and there are frustrations, but on the whole the business 
community is optimistic about the long term."

Donohue says there has been "a fundamental and positive" shift in relations 
between the two countries since the terror attacks on 11 September and 
Russia's support for the U.S.-led war against terrorism. He says this 
improvement in relations -- combined with the fast growth of the Russian 
economy and the implementation of economic reforms -- presents a significant 
opportunity for expanding trade and investment.

But he cites two areas where he says improvement is needed. Donohue says, 
first of all, that the U.S. Congress should officially designate Russia as a 
"market economy" and get rid of the Jackson-Vanik amendment -- a Cold War-era 
law that links Russia's trade privileges to its policies on Jewish 
emigration. And he says Russia should get rid of lingering barriers to 
investment.

"First, the United States must get rid of Jackson-Vanik legislation and 
designate Russia as a market economy for trade purposes. These are vestiges 
of the past, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States will press hard 
for immediate action on these issues. Now, what should Russia do? First, stay 
the course on economic reform. Russia must remove restrictions on investments 
and ensure protection of intellectual propriety rights. Russia must ensure 
that the court decisions are enforced and make sure economic reform moves to 
the states and to the bureaucracies. The next question is, 'What should 
Russia and the United States do together?' The first is to recognize that it 
is in both of our interests to have Russia join the [World Trade 
Organization] and for us to work together to make this happen as soon as 
possible." 

Donohue says access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is important for 
Russia -- and for the U.S. First, he says it will help Russia complete its 
transformation to a market economy. Secondly, he says, it will force Russia 
to become part of what he called a "rules-based system."

Donohue says in order to join the WTO, Russia has to negotiate separate trade 
agreements with all 144 WTO countries. Russia has already succeeded in 
negotiating agreements with more than half of the members, but it still has 
to reach individual deals with the U.S., the European Union, China, Japan, 
and others.

Donohue says the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents 3 million 
companies and organizations, will campaign intensively for Russia, as it did 
for China. "We pushed hard during the Chinese acceptance to [the] WTO to 
complete negotiations with the Chinese and then to have our Congress approve 
it. We will help the Russians negotiate their agreement with the United 
States, and assuming that it is successfully concluded, we will press hard to 
have it confirmed in the United States in a very short time."

Donohue tried to minimize recent trade disputes between Russia and the U.S. 
on steel and poultry. The U.S. recently announced it would impose tariffs of 
up to 30 percent on steel imports from many countries, including Russia. 

For its part, Russia recently imposed a partial ban on imports of U.S. 
chicken products, citing concerns about sanitary conditions in U.S. poultry 
plants and America's use of antibiotics and feed additives. It later 
announced it would relax the ban.

Donohue says neither issue should obscure the bigger picture of improving 
conditions: "The question is about poultry and steel. First of all on the 
steel problem, the United States, as many people know, has put some quotas 
and restrictions on the import of steel. It is a political decision. It is 
the wrong decision, in my opinion. And it will continue to change on a 
week-by-week basis. I think that the concerns of the Russian government and 
its companies will be dealt with in the near time. And my own prediction is 
that for the most part, those restrictions won't be in place for very long. 
On the poultry issue, I'm pleased that there seems to be a settlement of that 
matter."

Now, Donohue says, the two countries should work together to eliminate 
barriers to capital investments, to ensure legal protection for companies and 
products, and to work on intellectual property problems.

*******

#3
THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO RUSSIA'S INTEGRATION IN WORLD COMMUNITY BUT NOT ON 
ANY TERMS 

MOSCOW, APRIL 25. (FROM RIA NOVOSTI CORRESPONDENT). There is no alternative 
to the process of Russia's intensive integration in the world community, 
Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov said when addressing the "Gorchakov 
Readings" which opened in Moscow and which were named in honour of the 
outstanding Russian diplomat, Alexander Gorchakov (1798-1883). 

But the minister stressed that Russia "is not indifferent to the terms on 
which this process will take place, what will be the country's place in the 
system of international relations". 

According to Ivanov, Russia "will not pursue, under any circumstances, the 
passive or isolationist foreign policy". On the contrary, Ivanov pointed out, 
the interests of the country make it play "not simply active but in many 
respects the system-forming role in international relations". 

"It is possibly more important for the present-day Russia than ever before to 
remain in the centre of the world politics in the new, rapidly changing 
world, which is going through a complicated process of the formation of the 
principles of its future order," Igor Ivanov emphasised. 

According to the minister, "the historically established deep involvement of 
Russia in the system of international relations placed it before a difficult 
choice -- to search for the right balance between the volume of the 
international obligations of the state and the material resources which these 
obligations should support." Ivanov stressed that today Russia "consciously 
refuted the global messiah ideology which was characteristic of the USSR." 
But, according to him, this does not mean the refusal to pursue the active 
foreign policy and influence the formation of a new world order. 

The main foreign policy aims of Russia at the present stage, Igor Ivanov 
pointed out, are ensuring strategic stability in the world, strengthening the 
security of Russia and its partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
before the new threats and challenges, taking further steps for integration 
in Europe, and actively collaborating with its partners on the international 
scene. 

"The Gorchakov Readings" commence a wide programme of measures devoted to the 
200th anniversary of the Russian foreign ministry". 

******

#4
Moscow Times
April 25, 2002
Lesson Hasn't Been Learned
By Pavel Felgenhauer   

In his annual state of the nation address to parliament last week,
President Vladimir Putin outlined a program of liberal economic reforms
that the Kremlin hopes will accelerate Russia's development.

Putin used the right words: "protection of ownership rights," "the
development of economic freedoms" and so on. If the Kremlin actually does
what it says, Russia may be on the right track. However, on military reform
and the situation in Chechnya Putin did not say anything new and this
places in doubt the credibility of all the rest of his address.

For 10 years officials have been talking about military reform, but
virtually nothing has been accomplished. The armed forces and defense
industry have deteriorated, while generals and arms producers waited for
what they believed was a temporary cut in budget financing to end with the
inevitable restoration of Soviet-era military might.
 
Today, many officers in the armed forces are bitter that Putin is not doing
enough to renationalize and spend the country's wealth that was stolen by
the oligarchs in the 1990s on defense. Most of our military chiefs also
believe that true "military reform" can begin only when defense spending is
quadrupled. While this dream is not yet becoming reality, Russian generals
are desperately trying to keep alive what remains of Soviet global military
power.

Putin announced that instead of meaningful reform, the Defense Ministry
will be running "experiments at selected military units" to evaluate the
plausibility of building an army from volunteers. But the generals want
these "experiments" only in order to buy time and will surely conduct them
in such a way that the result is negative.

Russian generals truly believe the Soviet military system was the best.
They also need to keep alive the threat from the West, since without it
there is no reason to maintain a massive Soviet-style military machine.

In Chechnya inept, undisciplined, badly trained and badly armed Russian
units from all of the country's many armies (Defense Ministry, Interior
Ministry, border guards and so on) have failed to keep the peace and
eradicate the separatist guerrillas. Some of the units in Chechnya are in
fact all-volunteer, but they are no better than the rest.

Last week Putin stated that the "military phase of the conflict may be
considered closed." But military victory in Chechnya has already been
claimed many times before. Since the capture of Grozny in 2000, the Kremlin
has several times announced plans to partially withdraw its troops from
Chechnya, but they have never materialized.

Putin also announced: "Now we're not bothered about how many [rebels] there
are. What we need to know is where they are." Well, if Putin and his
generals are genuinely at a loss, the enemy is in Chechnya, a relatively
small republic that is 160 kilometers in length and 80 kilometers in breadth.

The actual fighting is taking place in an even smaller strip (some 30
kilometers wide and 60 kilometers long) from Samashki in the west to
Kurchaloi in the east, and centered on Grozny. This war zone is densely
populated agricultural land -- not like the desert steppes north of the
Terek River, or the barren Caucasus Mountains in the south, where there is
virtually no action.

Most of the 80,000-strong occupying force is grouped in this area; it is
there that the zachistki and the revenge guerrilla attacks take place. The
rebels are heavily outnumbered and outgunned, but survive as a fighting
force because of the support and cover given by the population. To sever
the link between the resistance and the people, the Kremlin has been
spending some $500 million a year on reconstruction and on encouraging
Chechen refugees to return. This program of "return to normality" has been
successful in part: New jobs have been created despite massive
misappropriation of reconstruction money.

However, even a partial return of refugees has only boosted the rebels'
recruitment base. Russia has got itself into a vicious circle of violence
in Chechnya: If the security forces keep a low profile, the rebels grow in
numbers and influence; and if the undisciplined units begin house-to-house
searches, their actions in turn increase rebel support.

Russia will never take its due place in the international community nor
will it have a truly "attractive business climate" while the brutal and
costly war in Chechnya continues, and the nation's military is unreformed
and anti-Western in character. But Putin, judging by his address, has not
learned this lesson yet.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.

*******

#5
Rossiiskiye Vesti
No. 15
April 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
HAS THE KREMLIN ABANDONED ITS MULTIPOLARITY DOCTRINE?
By Dr. Artem ULUNYAN (History)
     
     My interest was drawn to that part of the presidential 
address in which he spoke about the international stance of 
Russia. Judging by everything, the Kremlin has abandoned its 
multipolairty doctrine in favour of a completely new formula of 
the multivectoral nature of Russia's interests. 
     The stress was put not on confrontation with adversaries 
and potential opponents but on the principle of survival in 
this complicated world. This ideology is based not on any 
unions, "triangles" of allies or anything of the kind, but on 
policy with regard to Europe. It appears that Russia has 
finished its "Asian march." Vladimir Putin as a man who knows 
Europe better than the East is logically attracted to the 
European miracle more than to the Chinese "leap." 
     A year ago the Kremlin tried to win the East as its ally 
against the West and Europe as its ally against the USA. Today 
only the latter part of the formula is still operational. There 
are grounds to assume that the new foreign policy of the 
Kremlin was chosen consciously and with one goal in mind: to 
ensure at least a relatively objective, from the viewpoint of 
Vladimir Putin, attitude to Russia's efforts and interests 
above all in the economic sphere. 
     The Russian president, who has come face to face with 
reality, seems to be no longer interested in deliberations 
about a "great nation" and other myths. His expectations of 
"the stabilisation of the situation," "normalisation" and the 
like proved to be excessive. Oil prices, which provoked the 
euphoria of many economists and politicians, have not become 
the potent cure against socio-economic flops. The Kremlin is 
coming to see that much depends not on primitive price hikes in 
periods of international cataclysms and conflicts but on a 
substantiated foreign policy and stand on the international 
scene. 
     This forced the president to admit that nobody intends to 
fight or attack Russia. But the world is not altruistic either.
Of course, the president wanted his words to be heard not only 
in Russia. But anyway, he renounced the dogmas of a certain 
collusion against Russia, the creation of a "terrorist ark" 
from the Balkans to the Philippines, and so on, which polluted 
the power corridors. 
     Yet the Kremlin is worried by the situation that developed 
in the world by the spring of 2002. It was not by chance that 
the president has stated, just as before, that Moscow would pay 
priority attention to relations within the CIS. There are 
grounds to believe that, seeing the impossibility of competing 
on a par with industrialised countries in a vast geographical 
area, Russia will try to maintain its leading role within the 
framework of the CIS. 
     But this is where Moscow will have quite a few surprises 
(which Vladimir Putin did not mention). To begin with, the 
current CIS policy of the Russian Foreign Ministry will hardly 
yield good fruit. The political regimes in the CIS countries 
are changing and Russia will have to seek for allies in their 
societies in relations with many CIS countries. This entails 
more underwater reefs than the conventional relations with the 
USA, France, Germany or Britain. Regrettably, the presidential 
address did not say anything about the new principles of 
Russia's foreign policy in the post-Soviet space. 
     
*******

#6
The Russia Journal
April 19-25, 2002
Russian anti-Americanism and construction of public opinion
By PETER LAVELLE 

Public-opinion polls on the popularity of the United States among Russians
are very curious. I am never really sure if the questions asked attempt to
gauge the popularity of the United States or some of things the United
States is doing or has done. I am still convinced that public-opinion
polls, if they have any veracity at all, only desire to determine what is
unpopular. Public-opinion polls on politics serve the interests of the
state in Russia. However, we are often led to believe otherwise.

A case in point is Boris Kagarlitsky’s Moscow Times piece "Roots of
Anti-Americanism." He provides a reasonable breakout of who is
anti-American among the elite. He is right that anti-Americanism is a tool
in the hands of part of the political elite. Unfortunately, Russia’s
political elite constructs most public opinion; it does not reflect it.
Kagarlitsky is good at description but a bit light in the area of analysis.
Kagarlitsky must be a sociologist of elites.

In reality, most Russians don’t have an opinion on anything related to
politics. Yes, I am constantly reminded by my non-Russian friends of the
anti-American feelings during the bombing of Belgrade. That "outrage"
against the United States lasted as long as the media dwelled on the
subject. The events of Sept. 11 did engender a modicum of sympathy for
Americans, but not much more either way. Some polls claim the level of
anti-Americanism increased with the invasion of Afghanistan. I work and
have contact with hundreds of Russians on a daily basis; the subject is
almost never brought up. In short, politics in an everyday sense just does
not cut the mustard here. Actually, I hear more about the politics of oil.

The Olympic Games were different. Indeed there was a dislike, albeit a
media-enhanced one, of the United States during the trails and tribulations
of the Russian team. Dig a little deeper, and we would probably find
something very encouraging about this criticism beyond the hype whipped up
by the political elite. It had less to do with disliking America than being
concerned with the fate of athletes with familiar names and faces. If I am
right, this means the civil-society project may have some meaning for some
Russians.

What is often overlooked is the fact the average Russian knows far more
about the United States than his or her counterpart in the United States
knows about Russia. Every evening Russia’s major TV networks have a story
on the United States. American TV serials flood the airwaves. MTV invades
many a household. Russians have a lot of material at hand to draw
conclusions about the United States, Americans and the American lifestyle.
It is no wonder that Russians form cultural and social opinions about
themselves in juxtaposition to Americans. Regrettably, the cultural and
social are rarely translated into the political. Politics is still
something that only goes on up above. 

Though Americans might not think so, there are good reasons to be
legitimately wary of, and even dislike, the United States. The first thing
that comes to my mind is hypocrisy. U.S. foreign policy is a progressive
revelation. The United States, it would seem, has the right to determine
who are the good guys or bad guys depending on national self-interest at a
particular moment. Preaching the ideal of free trade goes as far as local
political concerns do. Terrorists are only people who don’t like the United
States. The list is very long. The current Palestinian-Israeli conflict is
the most glaring example of United States naivete and indifference to
nuances. Believing the average Russian cannot see the difference is
insulting. The fact that many do not formulate a strong opinion on these
subjects is lamentable. And, even if they did, should this be considered
anti-Americanism?

At the end of the day, the level of Russian anti-Americanism is inversely
related to the perception of self-content and sense of national pride.
Russians are painfully aware of their country’s weaknesses. They are angry
and resentful about Russia’s present. While many in the political elite go
to extremes to blame Russia’s misfortunes on the United States, most
Russians understand their own traditions and politics very well – few in
the elite give a hoot about the fate of Russia and the average Russian.

Thus, is disliking something America has done the same as anti-Americanism?
I think clearly not. Public-opinion polls often have a built-in bias. Often
questions on politics create awareness of certain issues that may not
really be there. Opinion polls rarely gauge the political sophistication of
the test sample as well. Russians certainly think about the United States;
they have little choice if they watch Russian TV. The level of importance
the United States plays in their everyday life is most likely negligible.
There are plenty of other things to think about.

When sociologists like Kagarlitsky write about anti-Americanism more
consideration needs to be given to why such thoughts come to mind. One
thing I have noticed about Russians: They hate being insulted by authority.
They revel in never telling them what they really think.

Peter Lavelle is head of research at a Moscow-based brokerage.
 
*******

#7
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
April 25, 2002
THE PENTAGON INCLUDES RUSSIA IN ITS ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Referring to the Council of 20, NATO drives Moscow the into 
geopolitical backwaters
Author: Marina Kalashnikova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE RUSSIA-NATO ROMANCE, CHAPERONED AND ENCOURAGED BY THE MEDIA, IS 
EVOLVING TOWARD ITS CULMINATION: THE APPEARANCE OF THE COUNCIL OF 20. 
AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE WATCHING AN UNPRECEDENTED REVISION OF POST-
SOVIET TERRITORY AND ADJACENT REGIONS. 
The world may change greatly by the end of the year 

     Major events in the zone of the so-called European-Atlantic 
partnership take place on two planes. The Russia-NATO romance, 
chaperoned and encouraged by the media, is evolving toward its 
culmination: the appearance of the Council of 20. At the same time, we 
are watching an unprecedented revision of post-Soviet territory and 
adjacent regions. Official bodies comment on this revision in a fairly 
shallow manner, and the Russian authorities do so with apparent 
reluctance.
     As usual, the major events will take place far from the 
diplomatic hurly-burly of Brussels. The general outline of these major 
events will be represented by the new zone of responsibility of the US 
army group in Europe. The Pentagon announces that it will cover all of 
the Russian Federation from October 1, 2002. The European command, 
with its headquarters in Stutgart, will spread its protective hand 
over the Caspian Sea as well.
     Before the United States moved into the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, these regions were included in the zones of responsibility of 
the European and Central commands in 1998. The Pentagon is once again 
promoting the objective of "developing direct military contacts" 
through establishing joint formations and organizing joint exercises, 
among other things.
     In the meantime, the United States and NATO - with their long-
range radars, ELINT systems, and military bases - are approaching the 
borders of the Krasnodar territory, Pskov, Saratov, Chelyabinsk, and 
other regions of Russia. Air Force exercises near the north-western 
borders of the Russian Federation will begin in April, on the eve of 
the series of summit meetings. In late June, NATO will drill 
peacekeeping operations in Georgia, specifically at the Vaziani base. 
And so on.
     NATO's move beyond the borders of its traditional territory marks 
a revolution in the history of the Alliance. Brussels is already 
thinking along the lines of forming a special command for operations 
worldwide, the so-called Force Projection Command. In this way, it 
will usurp UN global police functions. In the UN, Russia is one of the 
decision-makers. In NATO, it is just an advisor, on probation.
     The existing Russian-NATO Permanent Council was formed in 1997 to 
sweeten the pill of the first wave of NATO expansion. The Council 
exhausted its usefulness the day Yevgeny Primakov's plane made a U-
turn over the Atlantic. When NATO attacked Yugoslavia in March 1999, 
Russia accused it of being an aggressor and quit the Council. It was 
not yet the time for the West to manipulate Moscow directly.
     Actually, Moscow slammed the door then - only to cool down 
somewhat and return. Indeed, why play boycott games, when the new 
Belgrade leadership itself turned over the former leader to The Hague 
(and is waiting for the promised investment)?
     This year the matter concerns a much more substantial expansion 
of the Alliance. An entirely new configuration is to be established, 
an unbroken NATO front from Ivan-Gorod to Ismail. To one extent or 
another, its influence will infiltrate Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
some Russian regions - beginning (naturally) with Kaliningrad.
     Moscow is not worried. It is now entitled to a greatly expanded 
bureaucratic presence in the Belgian capital. The future council, 
where "Russia will sit somewhere between Spain and Portugal" according 
to Lord Robertson, will employ a number of functionaries and advisers. 
According to preliminary reports, the team will handle virtually 
everything - from considering the challenges of the 21st century to 
joint searches for terrorists and drug barons. There are other 
international bodies already handling these matters, but who cares? 
The range of Russia-NATO contacts will grow enormously.
     The UN Charter still recognizes Russia as a victor in World War 
II and legalizes its nuclear arsenals. NATO is not going to give 
privileges such as these to Russia. On the contrary, under its charter 
and in accordance with the will of its leaders, the Alliance will do 
everything in its power to have Russia cut back its deterrent weapons 
as soon as possible. All this will be done under the slogan of 
strategic stability and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, 
issues Moscow itself will have to handle within the Council of 20. We 
do not know what the US and NATO have planned for Russia. Judging by 
the scale of preparations, however, their plans are considerable. The 
world may undergo dramatic changes by the end of the year.

*******

#8
Asia Times
April 25, 2002
Russia seen undermining Caspian Sea solution 
By Sergei Blagov 

MOSCOW - There were few hopes of any dramatic breakthrough as Turkmen 
President Saparmurat Niyazov played host to the leaders of Russia, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Kazakhstan in the capital Ashgabat on 
Tuesday and Wednesday. Yet circumstantial evidence indicated that Russia 
moved closer toward separate deals with northern Caspian littoral states 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on how to agree on the sea's division. 

After heated debates at the summit, the five presidents failed even to sign a 
joint declaration, let alone solve the dispute over the Caspian. "There were 
more problems than originally expected," Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev conceded. 

Paradoxically, with a backdrop of the clear failure to agree on anything 
concrete at the Caspian summit, Russian comments still sound upbeat. The 
general picture "has become more optimistic than it was yesterday", the 
official Russian Information Agency commented on Wednesday. The summit failed 
to produce a miracle yet it opened a way out of a stalemate, RIA said. 
Sources at the Russian delegation told RIA that the dialogue at the summit 
proved "constructive" and allowed for the launch of a "mechanism" to solve 
the Caspian Sea problems. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the Caspian solution should be 
phased. He also suggested the establishment of an inter-governmental center 
of environmental monitoring. Incidentally, Viktor Kalyuzhny, Russia's special 
envoy on the Caspian and the Russian deputy foreign minister, said that 
Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are to to meet next month to clinch a deal 
on the division of their respective sectors of the Caspian. 

Azerbaijan's President Heidar Aliyev had preiviously stated that a separate 
deal on the Caspian could be reached in June. And upon arriving in Baku, 
Aliyev described the summit as a "very important event". The issue of the 
status of the Caspian is not about dividing seabed, it's about the 
environment and bioresources, Aliyev was quoted as saying by RIA. He also 
advocated a median-line principle as a basic principle to divide the sea. 

The Azeri leader also lashed out at Niyazov, who is known as Turkmenbashi, or 
"Father of All Turkmens". Niyazov draws the median line as he likes, 
therefore it caused disputes and the final declaration was not signed, Aliyev 
was quoted as saying by Interfax. 

However, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami described the summit as a 
successful exchange of views. In response, Putin suggested holding the next 
Caspian summit in Tehran. 

Niyazov has attempted to host summits several times before, most recently 
last October, but all have been put off because of the remaining differences. 
Niyazov suggested the formation of a Council of Presidents of the littoral 
states. On Tuesday, Putin and Niyazov signed a "friendship and cooperation 
treaty". 

However, Niyazov presumably became upset by the news that that Russia, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were to to meet next month to strike their deal. 
Turkmenistan had previously opposed "the creation of a Caspian 'union' and 
'bloc' of one nation against others". Moreover, on Tuesday, a disgruntled 
Niyazov claimed that "Russia did not have any clear-cut position relative to 
the Caspian". 

"Some countries became unhappy with the draft of the declaration because they 
failed to amend the document," Putin's foreign policy adviser Sergei 
Prikhodko was quoted as saying by Interfax. He also strongly disagreed with 
Niyazov's remarks that the draft was "empty" and not worth of signing. 

Even before the littoral states' leaders gathered at the summit in Ashgabat, 
the Kremlin had warned against "excessive optimism" relative to the ongoing 
search for a mutually acceptable solution on how to divide the sea's 
lucrative resources. 

The Caspian, the world's largest inland sea, is a focal point of the clash of 
interests among the five countries. The Caspian, as an inland sea, has never 
been subject to international maritime laws and its status was regulated by 
bilateral treaties of 1921 and 1940 between the former Soviet Union and Iran. 
The Caspian Sea region has been widely viewed as important to world markets 
because its large oil and gas reserves. Proven oil reserves for the entire 
Caspian Sea region are estimated at 18 billion to 35 billion barrels. The 
basin is also believed to hold some 5 trillion cubic meters of natural-gas 
reserves. 

Russia currently controls 19 percent of the Caspian - according to the length 
of its shore - and also stood to gain from equal division. Kazakhstan (29 
percent) and Azerbaijan (21 percent) were against the idea. Russia eventually 
changed its view and backed Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which argued for the 
delineation of the seabed but not the water itself. 

Russia believes that the status of the Caspian has already been sufficiently 
determined by the 1921 and 1940 agreements. According to Russian officials, 
the water should remain shared, while the seabed needs to be divided on the 
principle of equal distance or median line, basically according to the length 
of the shore. 

Seeking a larger share of the Caspian, Turkmenistan and Iran have disagreed 
with Russia's plan for splitting the sea bottom along a "modified median 
line" while keeping the waters in common. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have 
agreed and now are moving toward clinching separate deals with Russia. 

In order to forge a group among the littoral states, Russia has offered a 
sort of economic carrot. Moscow has indicated that some littoral states - ie, 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan - could get more access to Russia's pipeline 
system. Notably, Russia plans to increase the capacity of the 
Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline to 18 million tons a year, as compared with 
some 2.5 million tons now. Russia has long lobbied in favor of the CPC 
(Caspian Pipeline Consortium) pipeline that runs across Russia from the 
Tengiz field to Novorossisk on Russia's Black Sea coast. 

Although in January Niyazov warned that the Caspian summit could only be "an 
exchange of views", subsequently the Turkmen leader has been keen to hold a 
successful gathering. On the eve of the summit, Turkmen government sources 
indicated that Niyazov was going to announce new plans on how to divide the 
Caspian riches, including problems of bio-resources and navigation. Moreover, 
Turkmen officials had indicated plans to offer Russia a 10 percent stake in 
the planned trans-Afghan natural gas pipeline. Judging from the conference's 
results, Russia, presumably, was not exactly inspired by the Turkmen offer. 

Incidentally, after the summit Putin traveled to Russia's Astrakhan region on 
Wednesday, reportedly for a three-day visit of oil projects and the Caspian 
Naval Force, Russia's military muscle in the contested sea. 

The remaining differences between the littoral states arguably suggest that 
the actual settlement of the status of the Caspian Sea is still some time 
off. Moreover, the Kremlin's maneuvers to clinch separate deals with some 
littoral states could indicate that the Caspian legal limbo is likely to 
continue well into the future. 

*******

#9
Washington Times
April 25, 2002 
Nuclear terrorism protection
By Brett Wagner

     The events of September 11 sent an urgent wake up call that the United 
States should take very seriously the continuing efforts by terrorist groups 
to acquire nuclear weapons. Fortunately, Sen. Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico 
Republican, has heard that call and introduced a bill that could help prevent 
a nuclear September 11.
      The State Department currently lists more than a dozen rogue states and 
terrorist organizations, including Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda, that are 
actively seeking nuclear weapons.
      Russia's vast and undersecured stockpiles of excess fissile materials 
represent the most likely potential source of terrorist nuclear capability. 
According to U.S. intelligence agencies, Russian criminal groups are already 
supplying al Qaeda with components for nuclear weapons. All that's missing is 
the nuclear material itself.
     In the days following the September 11 attacks, Russia's Federal 
Security Service reportedly thwarted an attempt by one of these criminal 
groups to sell stolen or diverted nuclear weapon-grade material to an 
unidentified buyer.
      For several years, Russia has been hinting that it would be interested 
in selling these same nuclear materials to the United States for peaceful 
uses. Unfortunately, these hints have usually fallen on deaf ears.
      Now, thanks to Mr. Domenici's leadership, we stand at the threshold of 
just such an agreement, and the timing could not be more critical.
      Russia's Cold War-era nuclear stockpiles, which include 700 to 800 tons 
of highly enriched uranium and 150 to 200 tons of weapon-grade plutonium, 
pose a growing risk because of serious gaps in Moscow's nuclear security. 
Many of these scattered stockpiles are stored in makeshift warehouses, 
protected only by $5 combination locks or the equivalent. Small amounts of 
these materials have already been confiscated by European law enforcement 
officials from sellers looking for buyers.
     It would take only 15 to 20 pounds of this uranium, or an even smaller 
amount of plutonium, to arm a device capable of leveling downtown Washington 
or lower Manhattan. Iraq and the terrorist group Islamic Jihad have each 
reportedly offered Russian workers enormous sums of money for enough nuclear 
material to produce a single weapon.
      The blueprints and non-nuclear components necessary to build crude but 
highly effective nuclear weapons are readily available. The only component 
prohibitively difficult to develop or acquire is the nuclear material.
      There is no reliable way of keeping a nuclear weapon or contraband from 
being smuggled into U.S. territory if it ever does fall into the wrong hands. 
Fortunately, Moscow appears willing to sell these same materials to the 
United States, or to a U.S.-led group of international investors, for just a 
few thousand dollars per pound.
     Mr. Domenici has introduced a bill that establishes a framework for how 
such a transaction might take place. Under the bill's provisions, the U.S. 
government would guarantee loans to Russia in increments of $20 million, up 
to $1 billion at any one time, accepting Moscow's fissile materials as 
collateral. For each $20 million loan, Russia would place 1 metric ton of 
uranium and 1 metric ton of plutonium under International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards at a secure facility in Russia that is mutually acceptable 
to both Russia and the IAEA.
      As part of the deal, Russia would guarantee that the fissile materials 
placed under IAEA safeguards would remain there indefinitely, meaning until 
they are used as nuclear fuel or otherwise permanently disposed. This entire 
process could be completed within just a few years.
      The opportunity has never been greater to resolve the tremendous risk 
to U.S. and international security posed by Russia's enormous stockpiles of 
undersecured nuclear materials.
     Rep. Lois Capps, California Democrat, has introduced a companion bill in 
the House. Congress should move quickly to consider these two bills, make any 
necessary revisions and deliver legislation to the president as soon as 
possible for his signature.
      The only problem is, the bill has been introduced in each chamber of 
Congress by a member of the minority party in that chamber. Consequently, the 
House version of the bill is tied up in the International Relations 
Committee, while the Senate version languishes in the Foreign Relations 
Committee.
      One possible solution to breaking the current impasse would be for Mr. 
Domenici to call up his Republican colleagues in the House, remind them that 
H.R. 3290 is the House version of his bill and ask them to put it on the fast 
track. Correspondingly, Ms. Capps should call up her Democratic colleagues in 
the Senate, remind them that S.1277 is the Senate version of her bill and ask 
them to free it up as soon as possible. 
      Otherwise, the next "act of war" against the United States might very 
well turn out to be an act of nuclear war.
      Brett Wagner is president of the California Center for Strategic 
Studies, a non-profit non-partisan policy think tank based in Santa Barbara, 
and executive director of the Swords Into Plowshares Project.

*******

#10
Russian liberal politician concerned by attacks on Putin's foreign policy
views 
Interfax

Moscow, 24 April: The leader of the Russian liberal party Yabloko, Grigoriy 
Yavlinskiy, has said he is concerned over the fact that the foreign policy 
pursued by President Vladimir Putin has lately endured pressure from certain 
circles in the political and bureaucratic establishment, targeted at revising 
this policy.

"The systematic, harsh criticism of the Russian president's foreign policy by 
the military-political bureaucracy, widely using he Russian media for this 
purpose, causes serious concerns," Yavlinskiy told Interfax on Wednesday [24 
April].

"This has become especially notable after the president said in the address 
to the Federal Assembly [parliament] that 'the period of confrontation has 
ended' and 'we are building normal constructive relations with all countries 
in the world', that 'it is particularly important for our country to be able 
to find allies and be a reliable ally itself', that it is necessary 'to take 
numerous concrete steps towards integration with Europe', 'to continue active 
work with the European Union aimed at creating a unified economic territory', 
and that 'we are maintaining a permanent dialogue with the United States and 
are working to change the quality of our relations with NATO'," Yavlinskiy 
said.

"Provincial isolationists, who had long been keeping silent and standing 
behind the president's back, considering him to be 'their' man, are now 
pursuing a very dangerous policy of splitting the executive authorities into 
irreconcilable political camps, and are preparing political revenge," 
Yavlinskiy said.

"Our history already saw this in 1964 and 1991 and it is well known where 
this led," the Yabloko leader said, implying the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev 
in October 1964 and the attempt to remove Mikhail Gorbachev from power in 
August 1991.

"The Russian democratic party Yabloko is categorically against making use of 
even the most gross mistakes in domestic and economic policies for 
reactionary purposes, such as the undermining of the political system and 
destabilization of the situation in the country," Yavlinskiy said.

*******

#11
Moscow News
April 24-30, 2002
Warning Shot in the Head
By Viktor Loshak 
Moskovskiye Novosti editor-in-chief

hat lies behind the president's state of the nation address, presented last 
Thursday - so much wishful thinking or a coherent program?

Will the 50-minute presentation be followed up by anything more substantial 
than the merry reemergence of the listeners from the Marble Hall into the 
foyer where they joined a long line to get back their cell phones that they 
had to surrender at the door? These questions are now being posed by 
journalists who, in the two days after Vladimir Putin's speech, have parsed 
it sentence by sentence and word by word, even analyzing the president's 
facial expression as he went along.
Putin has once again shown himself a liberal far more radical than those who 
vote for him and who support him in parliament. There are only a few 
politicians who, speaking from a public rostrum, will have the nerve to say 
that "the most important thing today is to create conditions that would 
enable Russian citizens to make money."

The Westernizers heard almost all they wanted to hear. Irina Khakamada, a 
leader of the Union of Right Forces, said quite bluntly: "This is in fact our 
own message." Putin stated in no uncertain terms, not so much to the outside 
world as to his own country, how important Western appraisal and Russia's 
integration into the world market are for him.

Clearly, the presidential address is also a product of lobbyist consensus. 
The final amendments to the document are known to have been made on the night 
before the presentation. We can only guess as to what struggle was unfolding 
around it. One thing is certain, though: This round has been won by the 
government and presidential representatives.

Until concrete steps have been taken, it is not entirely clear whether laying 
into the bureaucrats is the familiar Soviet-era ploy or a warning shot in the 
head. Because statements to the effect that "the executive needs to be 
restructured," that "the country's room for maneuver is blocked by an 
inefficient state apparat," and that "the state apparat is ill-equipped to 
deal with state tasks," while any administrative barriers in this apparat 
"are surmounted by means of bribes," simply must be followed up by action. 
With his state of the nation address Putin has created a base for a minor 
personnel revolution - to end what he sees as a "senseless competition 
between the people and the ruling establishment."

In the wake of some of the presidential comments, new government appointments 
will come as no surprise. For instance, if it is said that "we still do not 
know the real volume of the state sector" of the economy, is this not cause 
enough to replace the leadership of the State Property Management Committee, 
which is so badly out of touch with public opinion?

It will be recalled that Putin has already issued a warning to the 
government. He spoke, half-jokingly, about a possible cabinet reshuffle back 
at an informal pre-New Year's meeting with Kasyanov and his ministers. At the 
same time, by directing the prime minister to come up with proposals on 
reorganization of the apparat, the president indicated that there was nothing 
threatening Kasyanov for the time being.

It is not ruled out that the cadre revolution will primarily affect not the 
government but the apparat of the presidential envoys in the federal 
districts as well as the envoys themselves. Officials at the Presidential 
Staff are already openly talking about the inefficiency of these 
over-inflated structures and the disturbing propensity to intervene in 
economic matters displayed by some regional leaders.

So, what, or who, will the president begin with, and will he begin at all? 
Who will be tapped? The address all of sudden showed that the Duma's pet 
trick - statist hysteria - is no longer in demand (the president did not even 
broach the subject), and so quite a few politicians who gambled on the 
"statist" struggle against the WTO and the West in general look set to fall 
by the wayside. To get even a modicum of sympathy from the Kremlin, they will 
have to change tack as a matter of urgency. I believe they will easily manage 
the maneuver.

I remember that at one presentation of the presidential state of the nation 
address, some over-liberal passages provoked angry rumblings in the part of 
the hall to the speaker's left. The April 18 presentation passed in silence. 
Maybe the left had a very limited choice: either keep silent or grumble 
non-stop.

Although Putin said things that may not have pleased many of those present 
(after all, it was not a Union of Right Forces congress), everyone seemed to 
be happy. I believe that the president said plenty of words that are 
necessary and important for business (e.g., about the harmfulness of the new 
social tax). Now, what Duma deputy or government minister (let alone their 
spouses and children) is not a businessman in Russia?

********

#12
FEATURE-Ghost towns, geiger counters-- Chernobyl welcomes you
By Elizabeth Piper

CHERNOBYL, Ukraine, April 25 - Ghost towns, geiger counters, white masks and 
rubber boots -- Welcome to Ukraine's much-touted new tourist hotspot, 
Chernobyl.
 
Equipped with a 13-room hotel, Soviet-style buses and a winding pot-holed 
road, some tourist agencies in Ukraine hope to make a buck or two out of the 
world's worst civil nuclear disaster by offering tours around the 
contaminated area.
 
But those adventurous tourists who have fought their fears of radiation 
sickness and want to see the highly-patrolled area all but deserted after 
reactor number four exploded on April 26, 1986, might find the staff less 
than welcoming.
 
"There cannot be family tourism here, we cannot allow walking holidays. There 
can only be bus tours for about four to six hours," said Mykola Dmytruk, 
deputy director of the agency which coordinates visits by specialists.
 
"As for extreme tourism, I am not sure this place is extreme enough. There is 
not much need for adrenaline on a bus ride...This is a place of tragedy."
 
Sixteen years on, the tragedy of Chernobyl's exploded reactor which spewed 
deadly clouds of radioactive dust over Russia, neighbouring Belarus and much 
of Europe is still being lived out by thousands.
 
Many areas still have dangerously high levels of radiation. Stories of death, 
illness and poverty pepper conversations. Old women and men have returned to 
contaminated ghost towns after becoming unhappy with government efforts to 
resettle them.
 
The staff, who battle with the stigma of contamination for living in the 
region and face months of unpaid wages, say the site is best left in the 
hands of caring scientists who monitor ever-changing levels of radioactivity 
and still strive to make the area finally safe.
 
Beer-drinking, smoking tourists, hoping for an adrenaline-boosted thrill by 
meandering around pinewoods and fields which bloom once again around the 
encased reactor are not the order of the day, they say.
 
"There are more interesting places in Ukraine where you can get a trip on a 
boat, or get drunk," Dmytruk said.
 
TACKY CHERNOBYL T-SHIRTS
 
Agencies have been offering day-trips to Chernobyl for $250 a couple, 
including lunch -- but make sure you are over 18, are not a hippie and do not 
want to make a tour of the souvenir shops before you leave.
 
Six people have signed up so far -- teachers hoping photographs and 
first-hand stories would educate their children.
 
For Dmytruk and colleague Rimma, long-standing workers for Ukraine's 
Emergencies Ministry in Chernobyl, the idea of tourists having a good time 
where people perished makes them shudder. They advise a visit to a adventure 
park instead.
 
And T-shirts and caps with the Chernobyl name emblazoned on the front seem a 
little tacky.
 
"The agencies say we should make T-shirts and caps with Chernobyl written on 
them, but surely they would be bad luck," said Rimma, a bubbly Russian woman 
dressed in a U.S. camouflage jacket.
 
"It's like buying a T-shirt with the name of the Buchenwald concentration 
camp on it."
 
She is equally dismissive of an idea by the United Nations to promote 
eco-tourism. The world body described much of the so-called restricted area 
as an "extraordinary environmental opportunity" in a report earlier this year.
 
"The natural environment has returned there," Kalman Mizsei, an official of 
the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) told a news conference in February.
 
"It is a huge area that is very natural, with lots of wildlife and unique 
types of animals."
 
Rimma calls the idea "stupid" and launches into a joke with her colleague, 
Dmytruk.
 
"Hippies are not going to be allowed in. They'll want to lie on the grass and 
then smoke it," Dmytruk laughed, adding seriously that walking in the grounds 
without permission could be dangerous for those with a more adventurous 
spirit.
 
"The law does not stop adult people from visiting -- people who are older 
than 18 years and who have some kind of interest in this region...The most 
important thing for this region, is making it safe."
 
VILLAGE VISITS
 
But there are those, in tiny hamlets, who would not mind seeing a few new 
faces banging at their doors.
 
Seventy-eight-year-old Anastasiya Chikalovets, who was forced to leave her 
khatta -- a small peasant house -- in 1986 returned to the village a year 
later. Now 26 people live in the village, once home to more than 1,000.
 
"This is the place where I was born," says Anastasiya, who is known fondly by 
those patrolling the controlled area as Baba Nastya or grandma Nastya.
 
"But it is sad no one comes here and people just leave, mainly for their 
graves," she laughs heartily, scraping a pig's guts on a wooden bench to make 
into sausages later.
 
"Tourists would be fun. Just come."
 
She says life is better in the village -- a ramshackle collection of tiny 
cottages empty and often falling down -- than in the flat her and her husband 
were re-settled to.
 
"Radiation? What radiation? It was a ploy to get money," says Nastya, wearing 
a colourful scarf around her head, as she walks off to bring some home-made 
moonshine.
 
"I took some meat to market and our pork registered a lower radiation level 
than that meat which came from Kiev."
 
Baba Nastya would not be on the tour, Rimma says. Tourists would have to stay 
on the bus at all times, although they would get the chance to see the 
deserted town of Pripyat, where thousands will never be allowed home.
 
Yellow water drips on to the broken tiles of what was the main grocery shop 
in Pripyat, a town which stands almost in the shadow of rector four. The 
toilets have been ripped out, the refrigerators stripped bare. A small sign 
dangles over one of the shelves, saying "Children's Food."
 
The town, now surrounded by barbed wire and watched by checkpoints, was 
evacuated after the explosion. Many took what they could, but later others 
have come and trashed rooms in the search for something valuable.
 
Tower blocks stand empty. Apartment doors hang on hinges, the odd boot or 
children's toy lie underneath shards of glass. Mattresses with their springs 
showing sag in hallways and the wind screams eerily through broken windows 
and bare lift shafts.
 
"Now tourists could come here and see the real Chernobyl...Every person who 
has a child should come here and understand the tragedy. I doubt they will," 
Rimma sighs.
 
"Here you can feel the real pain, can't you?"
 
*******