#6
Rossiiskie Vesti
April 17-23, 2002
RUSSIA WANTS TO WORK WITH NATO, BUT IN ITS OWN WAY
Why is the Kremlin striving for closer cooperation with NATO?
Author: Artem Ulunyan
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

THE IDEA OF CLOSER COOPERATION WITH NATO HAS BEEN MUCH DISCUSSED, THANKS TO NATO SECRETARY GENERAL GEORGE ROBERTSON AND BRITISH PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR. WHATEVER THE ORIGINAL INTENT, VARIOUS POLITICAL FORCES ARE INTERPRETING IT FOR THEIR OWN BENEFIT.

The Russian government and European leaders have been talking lately of Russia possibly joining NATO - in a very specific way, as "semi-observer" and "semi-participant". These ideas give rise to more questions than answers.

Judging by which countries speak in favor of strengthening the Russian presence at NATO, one can guess is pursuing what goals. Germany and Italy are ready to support Russia. There are reasons to believe that a few states that take a "special attitude " in NATO may in the near future come forward in support of this proposal.

George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, who once spoke of the idea of closer cooperation between NATO and Russia, is most likely to have meant somewhat different targets. As is known, however, every idea can be "creatively expanded". The expansion entails now the Kremlin's categorical appeals to "solve all problems together with Russia". Alliance members perceive these quite cautiously. They are coming to suspect that Moscow simply strives to use its conventional presence at NATO (in the 1+19 or 19+1 format) to split the alliance and to take the dominant position in relations between NATO partners. Moreover, the Kremlin's play on their very cautious, if not critical, approach to a number of US actions is currently getting apparent to European states. Connecting supplies of Russian gas to Europe with the strengthening of Russia's political positions in European structures also sets Europeans in NATO on their guard.

Time will tell how much seriously they are ready to consider the 19+1 scheme. However, it might already be said that there is a group of countries and politicians in Europe, ready to play their own part. For this country, this means the enhancing relevance of the so-called attendants points (the interest of some exact political forces and figures for the domination on the national and the European arenas; receiving Russia as a counterbalance to individual NATO member states, including the US).

The persistence of Vladimir Putin who is constantly "pushing" in conversations with his European interlocutors the idea of Russia's equal participation when solving strategic problems of international life is perceived as the wish of Moscow to "enter Europe". However, exactly this scares Europeans: the inward political situation in Russia and its foreign policy moves differ way too much from the European standard and forms of behavior. On the other hand, everyone understands: the Kremlin will be trying to demonstrate its importance and significance by the use of any means available.

The battle for the "great European chessboard" that Moscow is waging is commensurable with its analogous "great Asian one" or any other, drawn by other countries. In this connection, the 19+1 problem is getting an element of a play greater than relations between Russia and NATO or Russia and Western Europe. A particular feature about this combination is the interest of individual European quarters to enlist Russia's support for their domestic policy targets. At the same time, the Russian authorities are beginning to look for ideologically close political forces, suitable to gamble on in their own European game, many analysts believe.

(Translated by P. Pikhnovsky)

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