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#14
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
No. 70.
April 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST: ANOTHER FLIRTATION OR LONG-TERM
ALLIANCE?
By Konstantin VORONOV, candidate of historical sciences, senior research
associate at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, the
Russian Academy of Sciences
Russia's foreign policy shift towards the West, that Vladimir Putin made in
the wake of the September 11th tragedy, has dazed the world and even been dubbed
"the Russian diplomatic revolution." The Russian president thereby
changed the framework of Russia's international policy - usually passive and
poorly expressed.
Today, six months later, the question of how long-lasting and effective
Russia's rapprochement with the USA/the West, prompted by the joint
anti-terrorist efforts, will be seems very topical. Is there any alternative to
Russia's present-day foreign policy line? The analysis of the leading
industrialised nations 'and their alliances' possible future actions allows one
to make some conclusions.
USA and Russia
Relations between the United States and Russia remained complicated
throughout the 1990s, despite the fairly close co-operation between America and
the Soviet Union in the years of Germany's re-unification and the formation of a
new regime to the east of Brest. On the face of it, the US policy with regard to
Russia was predicated on two competing prospects. The first one promoted the
priority of Russia ("Russia first" principle) in US foreign policy.
Washington continued to see Russia as the heir to and successor of the Soviet
Union. The US viewed close ties with Moscow as a means to boost its
transformation that would be beneficial for the US. Despite some political
cataclysms and economic failures, Russia has remained a nuclear power and an
important figure in Eurasian diplomacy, boasting the necessary resources, for
the United States. Another prospect emphasised the geopolitical advantages that
Russia as a new partner and former strategic antagonist could offer the United
States and its allies. Close contacts between the White House and the Kremlin
were equally significant for backing the development of the new Russia.
Membership in western organisations of the cold war period - NATO and the EU -
should have guaranteed security to the Central and East European countries.
These geopolitical changes were meant to become permanent.
After the USSR - Eurasia's power factor - broke up bringing about a decrease
in the military threat from Russia, the West lost interest in it and its policy.
When Moscow began talking about partnership and co-operation with the West in
the 1990s, it was not yet ready for this. It put forward some unrealistic
initiatives to replace the Yalta-Potsdam system in Europe with something
abstract and vague, and the West replied with simple NATO eastward expansion.
The internal problems Russia had in the 1990s gave the United States complete
freedom of action. And whenever steps which Moscow took as unfriendly, but which
were useful and favourable for the United States, had to be made, Washington
would do so with no consideration for the Kremlin's opinion. The war on
terrorism unexpectedly moved Russia to the centre of US diplomacy once again.
The United States became dependent on Russia's military and diplomatic support,
which is most likely to increase in view of the upcoming developments.
The Middle and Near East
This diplomatic revolution looks like a growing rapprochement of the sides'
interests in a broad regional context: from Central Asia to the Middle and Near
East, from the Western Mediterranean to India. In the short term, these
increasingly common interests are accounted for by the US military-political
needs in Afghanistan. It is still unclear, especially in the medium-term, if the
US is ready to change its alliance policy in the face of the complex
geopolitical situation and growing social stability in the region. The West has
often emphasised the essential role the Roman Catholic Church played in
undermining Soviet influence in Europe. The same processes were characteristic
of Central Asia and the Middle and Near East, with the most militant Islamic
followers playing a destabilising role. A long-term union between Russia and the
United States would indicate that the US will break off its formal and informal
ties with radical movements and Islamic fundamentalists and will have to support
modernisers, secularists and reformist political elites and social forces. Quite
a few present-day regimes in the Middle and Near East have ties and common roots
with the former Soviet social and economic structures, later inherited by
Russia. Despite the former alliances with the United States or the USSR, all of
them in this socially and religiously unstable region want to reduce social and
confessional threats to the minimum with a view to preserving their power. Even
a temporary failure on the part of the United States would be crammed with
disastrous consequences for the entire world, whereas for moderate and
pro-western regimes of the Middle and Near East this would be completely
ruinous.
Today, the Russian Federation is not an alternative social and ideological
system, as in Soviet times. Russia's influence in the region will not
automatically expand, even if US positions in the Middle and Near East become
less strong. The Russia-US latent union in the fight against the Taliban can
serve as a foretype for achieving common Russo-American goals in developing and
reforming the entire region. Moreover, it can become an acceptable form of
international influence in this geo-strategic region, for it will reduce the
purely American interference as "the great Satan" and activate the
pro-western regimes against internal and external "pan-Islamists."
Europe
It is often forgotten that the United States and the Soviet Union as global
superpowers were some kind of geo-political allies in Europe throughout the
post-war years. The Old World lived through the cold war years virtually within
the American-Soviet condominium. The leading European nations saw a way out of
this in making the United States and Russia marginals of the continent. The fact
that Russia got rid of the Soviet ideology and American stereotypes paved the
way for Russia's direct ties with West-European neighbours and its pragmatic
line in Europe. Our diplomats have even contrived to restrict US influence to
some extent there.
The new Russo-American alliance immediately brought back memories of the
former cold war alliances when the Soviet-American domination pushed other
Central and East European parties to the background. Now, West European partners
have become more united in upholding their common interests, especially economic
and monetary ones, against the United States. The introduction of euro has
become a land-mark event in this respect. Therefore, the political alliance
within the European Union will not remain on paper. Although the new
Russo-American rapprochement was hailed by a number of European nations, it
intensifies the activities of the European Union's integration advocates.
Washington will obviously have to resume its policy of alternately containing
the main powerful centres' attempts to dominate the continent.
NATO
The war on Osama bin Laden has doubtless involved NATO in the transatlantic
interconnections that the Americans dreamt of throughout the 1990s. The joint
declaration saying that after the September 11th events Article 5 of the
North-Atlantic Treaty begins working added new political force and legitimacy to
the Alliance. Paradoxically, the operation is being conducted outside NATO's
command structures. Though the Alliance ensures US diplomatic and military
interests in Europe and provides them with resources, it plays the same role for
Russia in some terms. The developments in Central Asia and the Middle and Near
East make the prospect of Russia's NATO membership real, which can help to: 1)
boost overall European security and set up a common military organisation while
preserving or replacing the OSCE; 2) reduce the chances of the EU's domination
in the region.
The Kremlin's line regarding NATO has been no less surprising at times, too.
When meeting NATO and the EU leadership in Brussels on October 3rd, 2001
President Putin signalled Russia's readiness for closer co-operation with them,
but added that Moscow's position on NATO's eastward expansion remained the same.
To all appearances, Russia has de facto lost its drive against NATO expansion.
In a bid to extend the scope of Russia- NATO co-operation and keep face, the
Kremlin is obviously ready to eat some humble pie, i.e. put up with NATO's
expansion. However, the West currently needs Russia no less than Russia needs
the West. If our country continues its democratic development and maintains
contacts with NATO through various mechanisms /within the Standing Consultative
Commission, the 19+1 and 20 format/, Brussels may start to view Russia as a
valuable and important partner.
On the other hand, Russo-US rapprochement will reduce the geopolitical
significance of both flanking and key nations of Europe. For many European
countries, members of NATO, the advantages of the Alliance as an ideological and
political reference frame and the former geopolitical structure are being
devalued and its resources reduced. Competition is expected to increase within
the Great European Three - Germany, Great Britain and France - for clout in the
EU and influence as the main advocate of the European interests in NATO. The
responsibility of each NATO and the EU member in determining policy with regard
to the United States and Russia is growing. Less room for diplomatic manoeuvre
and less mutual trust can boost Russia's ties with each of these nations.
Home Front
Although the diplomatic headway and the geopolitical blueprint seem to
inspire hopes, a lot will depend on the internal political forces' alignment.
The new foreign policy of President Putin was met with enthusiasm by the
liberal-democratic forces, which view it as an additional way of rapprochement
with the West. In this respect, the presidential centre and the ruling party
diverge together with the guiding policy line. Conservative and the left-wing
parties, especially the military establishment, are expressing scepticism. They
are obviously displeased with the US military presence in Central Asia.
Moreover, some experts find that there is a lot in common between the present
hushed up discontent among the Russian leadership and the current split within
the elite which could be seen in Gorbachev's time. Others, considering the close
interrelation between domestic and foreign policy, believe that Russia's policy
of rapprochement with the West is aimed at garnering support for radical
economic reform and the modernisation of Russian society by means of Western
capital and its technology. The implementation of these tasks is only possible
if the current elite groups are replaced or reshuffled.
The internal disposition in the United States is not plain either. Right-wing
conservative forces are warning President George Bush against making concessions
to Russians. On the contrary, neo-realists and trans-nationalists believe that
Moscow and Washington will need each other until international terrorism ceases
to threaten the United States. If the American President's visit to Moscow
scheduled for mid-May does not produce any tangible results due to the complex
and so far insoluble problems /NMD deployment, the future START Treaty, NATO
expansion/, this will slow down the rapprochement between the two nations. We
will come out a loser again, as some prominent Russian experts predict,
calculating the advance payments and debts; the more so that history offers
numerous examples to this effect. Insignificant diplomatic dividends of the
summit at issue may considerably weaken the presidents' internal political
positions. It should be some serious consideration as to what is more important
- that the summit meetings' schedule is fulfilled or that they are productive
for bilateral and international policy.
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