CDI Russia Weekly-#200 5 April 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Russia: Roundtable Discusses Benefits, Drawbacks Of U.S. Cooperation. 2. Interfax: 150,000 experience harassment in Soviet, Russian armies since 1945 - Nemtsov. 3. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Civilized Approach Is Best. 4. Vremya MN: Yuri Maslyukov, HOW WILL THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AFFECT RUSSIA? Russia should look to its internal resources for defense. 5. Moscow News: Borislav Mikhailichenko, Europe's and CIS MPs Disagree on Terrorism. St. Petersburg's four-day international forum revealed nothing new in the fight against terrorism. 6. gazeta.ru: Putin’s Guru Slams Russian Economy in 1990s. 7. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Ukraine: A land divided. 8. San Francisco Chronicle: Anna Badkhen, Kremlin angry as Radio Liberty airs. After delay, U.S.-financed broadcasts begin in Chechnya today. 9. strana.ru: Michael Stedman, Alarm Bells Ring as Experts Point to Demographic Upheaval. Population to shrink "30 percent by mid-century" 10. Izvestia: Natalia Babasian, Russia Benefits from "Smart Sanctions." The U.S. unfreezes $200 million in Russian contracts in the "oil for food" humanitarian program to Iraq. 11. Novye Izvestia: Vladimir Urban, CAM RAHN BASE WILL BECOME GREEN. Russia used Cam Ranh Bay for free, but the Pentagon is prepared to pay. 12. Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye: Mikhail Khodarenok, RUSSIA SURROUNDED WITH US MILITARY BASES. Moscow still doesn't know whether this is good or bad. ******* #1 Russia: Roundtable Discusses Benefits, Drawbacks Of U.S. Cooperation By Francesca Mereu A roundtable discussion this week in Moscow brought together Russian lawmakers and political analysts to discuss how -- in the six months since Russia joined the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition -- Moscow has benefited from the new partnership. Participants also questioned where President Vladimir Putin's pro-Western policy will lead the country next. Moscow, 4 April 2002 (RFE/RL) -- In the days following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States Russian President Vladimir Putin surprised many by joining the U.S.-led fight against terrorism, offering to share intelligence and open air corridors for humanitarian flights to Afghanistan. Now, a month and a half before Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush meet in Moscow for a Russia-U.S summit, Russian political analysts and lawmakers are asking whether the seemingly warmer relations between the two countries have in fact improved. They are also questioning where the Kremlin's pro-Western line is leading the country. Both topics were discussed this week in Moscow at a roundtable devoted to post-11 September Russian-U.S. cooperation. Among the participants was General Leonid Ivashov, a former Defense Ministry director of international military cooperation and now deputy director of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. Ivashov says both the Soviet Union before, and Russia now, have always wished for a strategic partnership with the U.S. But Ivashov says that what came after 11 September cannot be called a real partnership between Russia and the U.S. "In my opinion, there wasn't and there couldn't be any partnership. It was just an emotional reaction to the September 11 tragedy. [At the time,] there just was some irrational hope that [Russian-U.S.] relations would improve radically. But in attempting to adjust Russian policy to U.S. policy, we just wanted to solve a series of Russian problems. And maybe in some way, the Russian political elite naively hoped to improve its personal image [abroad]." Ivashov says the U.S. and Russia cannot be good partners because their economic, military, and geopolitical interests differ too much. He says the two countries look at the world, both in terms of its present and its future, in entirely different ways. He describes Russia's view as more "multipolar," and willing to consider cooperation with countries like China and India to balance U.S. influence. Aleksandr Shabanov is the deputy chairman of the Duma's (lower house of parliament) Foreign Affairs Committee. He says the U.S. has always followed its own political course and won't change track to meet Russia's needs. He also says Russia will never be able to achieve an equal footing with the U.S., which he says has grown too powerful. "[The U.S.] has such a dominant position in the world in every way. How can you have equal relations with such a supreme power? Of course it's impossible. We shouldn't have illusions and even think about it. Present-day Russia and its elite have to accept it." Aleksandr Livshits is a former finance minister and deputy premier. He resigned after the 1998 financial crisis and the following year founded an economic policy think-tank. Livshits says many hoped the new relations between Russia and the United States in the wake of 11 September would bring economic benefits. But he says the U.S., which recently passed new steel tariffs aimed at protecting its domestic industry, is trying to destroy the Russian steel market. Moreover, he says, Washington has not yet lifted the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanick trade barrier, which is a major obstacle to Russia's hopes of joining the World Trade Organization. Livshits says Moscow and Washington have discussed the issue for many years, but without results. "[Russia's] status as a market [economy] is an issue that has been discussed for some seven or eight years. I've witnessed, on several occasions, our first president [Boris Yeltsin] looking at [former U.S. president Bill] Clinton and saying, 'Bill, where's our status?' We were verbally promised that the issue about our economic status would be considered, but instead, Kazakhstan [got Jackson-Vanick lifted]. Now the U.S. and the European Union are preparing plans whereby the status will be given to Russia but not extended to Russian enterprises. Do you understand what that means? [It means] Russia without its factories." Vyacheslav Nikonov is a former political adviser to the foreign intelligence wing of the Soviet-era KGB and currently runs the Politika Foundation think-tank, which has close ties to the Kremlin. In contrast to many speakers at the roundtable, he says good relations with the United States and the West may work to Russia's advantage. "If you have good relations with the U.S. and the West, you don't have to waste all your energy defending yourself against the West; you don't have to waste your energy fighting against international terrorism. It is prestigious to have good relations [with the U.S. and the West], and, what's more, it gives you the chance to be a member of some clubs [like the Paris Club of foreign lenders]. Of course [the West] won't allow us to get into some [of its] exclusive clubs, but we are allowed to take part in the G-8 meetings. [Good relations with the West] give you the advantage of taking part in the international economy. Moreover, you can count on investments, even if at the same time you need to build up a good climate for investments in the country. This is a domestic task, but also a foreign policy task." Nikonov, however, criticizes Russian foreign policy. He says Russian policy lacks a cohesive strategy for developing relations with the West. Moreover, he says, Russia still does not understand what it wants from the United States and the West in general. "Our political elite, with their incessant ambitions, are continually getting all huffy with the Americans even in matters that the Americans don't have anything to do with. One example is the defeat of our team at the [Winter] Olympic Games." Aleksei Arbatov is a lawmaker from the liberal Yabloko faction and the deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. He says he does not approve of the way the United States has behaved since 11 September, but he says Russian analysts and lawmakers should put themselves in America's shoes before casting final judgment. "A good way to fight against such [anti-U.S.] emotions is to imagine how we would have behaved if what happened in the U.S. had happened in Russia. I believe that we would have behaved in a tougher way and that we would respect less [than the U.S.] the interests of other countries." In addition, Arbatov says, Russia -- while often criticizing U.S. and EU policy -- has never offered a tangible alternative. "We are rightly against NATO enlargement, but what can we offer in exchange to the Europeans for their security? Absolutely nothing. The same situation concerns the Balkans. Did we at the time offer some real alternatives to that terrible crisis that disturbed us so much? No, we didn't offer anything. Where we don't offer a convincing alternative, there will be an alternative [offered] that is not ours." Arbatov believes that it would be against Russia's interests to create bad relations with the United States. But he says Russia should steer clear of what he calls the "America-centric" nature of Russia's domestic and foreign policy since 11 September. He says, instead, "Russia has to orient its relations toward those countries that have good relationships with the U.S. but are sometimes critical of U.S. policy" -- like South Korea, Japan, India, and EU countries. But Arbatov says Russia must think carefully about its own policy. "We'd like to be at the same level as the U.S. and the West, but inside our country we are not behaving according to Western standards," he says, citing the lack of press freedom and human-rights violations in Russia's war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya. ******* #2 150,000 experience harassment in Soviet, Russian armies since 1945 - Nemtsov MOSCOW. April 4 (Interfax) - One hundred and fifty thousand servicemen have experienced harassment in the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces since the end of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, leader of the Union of Right Forces parliament faction Boris Nemtsov said at a press conference at the Interfax main office on Thursday. He called for reducing the period of active military service to six months in order to solve the harassment problem. A program of the Union of Right Forces proposes that soldiers wishing to continue their active military service do so under contract. Nemtsov said he doubts that President Vladimir Putin will agree with the proposal of the Union of Right Forces. "I suggest with a high degree of probability that the president will describe the reduction of the active military service term from two to 1.5 years as a great achievement in his message to the parliament. Sure, that is better than two years, but it is not enough," he said. A rally and a concert in support of the military reform proposal of the Union of Right Forces will take place on Moscow's Revolyutsii Square on Saturday, April 6, Nemtsov said. Popular singers will take part in the concert. ******* #3 Moscow Times April 4, 2002 Civilized Approach Is Best By Pavel Felgenhauer The unthinkable brutality of the armed conflict in the Middle East generates moral outrage and a feeling of hopelessness, since apparently nothing can put a stop to the vicious circle of violence. However, the problem is not specific to the region: In recent years, wars have tended to become increasingly barbaric. There have been numerous attempts by the international community to uphold civilized rules of military engagement, such as the Hague and Geneva conventions. In response to mass slaughter and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, two international war crimes tribunals were created. But the track record of these tribunals has been checkered. The Rwanda rebels, after they took power and stopped the genocide, invaded the neighboring Congo and have been fighting a dirty war of their own for years. Serious war crimes are constantly reported from the Congo, but the international community and the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are looking the other way. Today the arch war criminal of the Balkans, former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic, is at last facing justice. Serbia has been cooperating with the tribunal, but many Serbs claim, not without reason, that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was created to punish only Serbs. Of course, not only Serbs have been indicted, but international justice as practiced by the ICTY is still clearly lopsided. Not a single Albanian has been indicted, though terrible crimes were also committed against innocent Serb civilians in Kosovo. Today, some of the Albanian mass murderers are part of the new Kosovo parliament and local administration, closely cooperating with official representatives of the international community in the region. NATO peacekeepers in many cases turned a blind eye or even supported the ethnic cleansing by forming convoys to grant the Serbs one-way passage out of Kosovo. During the NATO air campaign in the Balkans in 1999, more than 600 civilians were killed. In some instances, like the bombing of the Serb state television center in Belgrade, NATO commanders deliberately attacked civilian targets in brazen and intentional violation of international conventions. Well-respected international human rights organizations have repeatedly called on the chief prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte, to indict the NATO military for war crimes, but she has refused, although the crimes are obvious and clearly in the tribunal's jurisdiction. A situation in which some criminals are punished while others are perceived to be immune is in some respects much worse than no justice at all. In its present war on terrorism in Afghanistan, the U.S. military has committed a string of much worse crimes than in 1999: deliberately and repeatedly attacking International Red Cross compounds, bombing villages into oblivion together with their populations, severely mistreating prisoners of war, taking part in mass killings of prisoners, and so on. When presented with facts of flagrant war crimes, U.S. officials have simply shrugged them off without much comment. The U.S. military is above the law and, not surprisingly, others are ready to follow their example. Today, in Chechnya and Palestine, Russian and Israeli soldiers are constantly committing atrocious war crimes -- slaughtering scores of innocent people, applying the harshest collective punishment to entire nations in the name of fighting terrorism. Some time ago a three-star Russian general told me: "Yes, we are committing war crimes in Chechnya, and so what? War in itself is a crime, and the Geneva Convention is never observed by anyone in real armed conflict." This week was the 20th anniversary of the Falklands' war between Britain and Argentina. An old-fashioned war, it began and ended without leaving a trail of hatred sufficient to fuel fighting indefinitely. This was a war in which the Hague and Geneva conventions were more or less observed by both sides. When soldiers maraud in Chechnya or shoot civilians and journalists in Palestine, their crimes inevitably bounce back on them and the countries they represent. The Geneva Convention is not the paperwork of misinformed pacifists. The best way to a clean and fast military victory is civilized, even-handed ethical conduct -- a notion that has apparently been forgotten by the military of the "civilized" world. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. ******* #4 Vremya MN April 3, 2002 HOW WILL THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AFFECT RUSSIA? Russia should look to its internal resources for defense Author: Yury Maslyukov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] RECENT EVENTS ARE MAKING US THINK ONCE AGAIN ABOUT WHETHER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE ABM TREATY OF 1972 MIGHT THREATEN RUSSIA IN ANY WAY. THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF RUSSIA REMAIN QUITE POWERFUL AS A SYSTEM, BUT THEY ARE GRADUALLY DECREASING. Recent events are making us think once again about whether the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty of 1972 might threaten Russia in any way. The strategic nuclear forces of Russia remain quite powerful as a system, possessing the necessary resources to deliver a retaliatory strike in any set of circumstances. However, these resources are gradually decreasing, with quality invariably sinking. Over the next 10 to 12 years the lifespans of nearly all Soviet-made systems will be exhausted, and we will have to remove them from our arsenals. There are few options for updating Soviet strategic arms, since only one missile system - the ground-based Topol-M - is currently in production. With the existing production rate, 100-120 such system will be delivered to our troops by 2010. The naval part of the strategic forces of Russia is likely to decrease its combat strength in the near future. In the coming decade, only two to three nuclear powered submarines will be produced for our Navy, with a maximum of 200 to 250 nuclear warheads. The Air Force can count on keeping around 100 to 200 missiles on Tu-160 strategic bombers. All in all, the realistic number of nuclear warheads in Russia will fall eight- to ten-fold over 10-12 years. And Russia will enter the second decade of the 21st century with a nuclear arsenal equal to that of France, Britain or China, much smaller that that of the United States. We can draw the following conclusion from this: after 2010 Russia will lag far behind the United States in the number of nuclear warheads. Besides, we should keep in mind that defense systems cannot function without corresponding communications systems, combat control, early detection, etc. The situation in this respect is also rather difficult, and we cannot be sure that in a decade our early detection system will warn us beforehand; that orders issued by the military- political leaders will reach the lower levels in time; or that our strategic nuclear forces will be able to deliver an adequate counter- strike. Moreover, we can affirm that in the second decade of the 21st century our country will be able to respond to a nuclear attack only if it consists of single missiles. This inadequate response seems most probable if the situation in the defense sector and the armed forces does not change radically. Of course, we would like to stress that the fact that the United States federal budget provides huge sums of money for developing the national missile defense system does not necessarily imply that the US is going to deliver a nuclear strike on Russia. However, if the United States acquires indisputable military superiority over our country, it may mean that firstly, the global system of strategic stability would collapse, and, secondly, Russia would lose its super-power status. As for the existing global system of containment and counterbalances, here is a possible variant of how events may develop in future. At present, China has much weaker strategic forces than Russia and the United States, and is not planning to increase them. However, if the United States builds its national missile defense, China may want to increase its nuclear arsenals. Since the economy of China can endure a considerable increase in military spending - which, by the way, has already started - we can assume that in the near future China may surpass Russia greatly. And this may provoke India to boost its strategic nuclear forces, which, in its turn, may generate the same reaction from Pakistan, and then Israel. That means that all nuclear powers of the Asian continent will get a powerful impulse toward an arms race. All this proves that the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty generates fundamental military-technical and financial problems for Russia in its relations with the United States, as well as with other states. We cannot count on the United States providing selfless aid to us, or taking Russia's interests into account. And this means that we should look to our internal resources for maintaining the level of our strategic nuclear forces. In meeting this challenge, our nation's leaders should determine their military-technical policy and set a definite system of priorities in financing and implementing defense programs. (The author is head of the Duma committee on industry, construction and high technology.) (Translated by Daria Brunova ) ******* #5 Moscow News April 3-9, 2002 Europe's and CIS MPs Disagree on Terrorism St. Petersburg's four-day international forum revealed nothing new in the fight against terrorism By Borislav Mikhailichenko The leading Russian television channels either purposely pushed their footage of the St. Petersburg antiterrorist forum to the end of their reviews of the week's major events, or did not mention the forum at all. If the forum was meant to be a publicity stunt to draw attention to the upcoming 300th anniversary of the northern capital, it evidently succeeded, for it drew to the city over 700 parliamentarians from more than 50 nations. But as a "generator of practical recommendations on one of the most acute global problems" (which State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev, among others, was hoping to hear), the forum was a flop. It couldn't have been otherwise in the cradle of Russian anti-state (remember the assassination of Alexander II) and state (recall the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution) terrorism. Besides, the forum's sponsors made a mess of its program too. What would eventually be called the Interparliamentary Forum on Combating Terrorism actually looked like jigsaw pieces that did not fit together to form an integral picture. First, the heads and representatives of 39 of the 49 special services officially invited to the forum conferred behind closed doors at the Baltic Hotel for a couple of days. Then the forum sponsors held their own sessions in Tavrichesky Palace: The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) held a special session of its Standing Commission, while the Interparliamenary Assembly of the CIS Countries (IA CIS) held a jubilee session in honor of its 10th anniversary. (The true reason why St. Petersburg had been chosen as the forum's venue was revealed when the IA CIS and the PACE Council issued a joint statement officially inviting the European delegates to attend the city's 300th anniversary celebrations). Only after these important functions were over did the forum attend to its antiterrorist work, on which it spent a total of two days. Though disappointing to Seleznev, the forum lived up to the expectations of PACE President Peter Schieder. Two of Schieder's theses, i.e. that parliaments must give governments political backing in their drive against terrorism, and that they must ensure conformity of the laws they adopt to international human rights and rule-of-law state standards, were later variously cited by the debaters, and set the tone for the forum's 37-point Final Declaration. But the "joint work" that Schieder called for was conspicuously absent. The antiterrorist zeal that united the delegates diminished during the PACE Commission's sessions, when the Georgian parliament's spokesperson, Nino Burzhanadze, and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov clashed over the Pankisi Gorge and Georgia's invitation of American military instructors. Then the representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan had words over Nagorny Karabakh. Finally, the Chechnya issue brought the debates to boiling point. Commander of Russia's Combined Group of Forces in Chechnya Lt.Gen. Moltenskoy ordered his soldiers to ease up on the mop-up operations just when the St. Pete forum was in progress. But his order did not deter the European delegates from saying some unpleasant things about Russia. Thus, the Council of Europe Secretary General Walter Schwimmer expressed hope that Russia would demonstrate that, rather than feeling free to act as it pleased after September 11, it was increasingly determined to behave in accordance with generally accepted standards, pave the way for a political settlement, and start the essential process of healing and reconciliation. After that pronouncement, it was strange to hear some Russian politicians assert that the West's attitude toward Chechnya had radically changed after the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York. One got the impression that every orator spoke about his own feelings, paying little heed to what others said. That's probably because different speakers attached different meanings to the word "terrorism," which had not been defined prior to the debates. In its Final Declaration, the forum merely called on the United Nations to work out and adopt without delay a comprehensive convention that would contain a universally accepted definition of "international terrorism." Incidentally, lack of an agreed definition of the phrase also prevented the special services' heads from doing a better job at the forum. All they did was to agree on the creation of a permanent working group to be headed by Alexei Kuzyura, chief of the international relations department of Russia's Federal Security Service. Another speaker to complain about the lack of unambiguous definitions of essential terms was Dick Marty, PACE's chief expert on economic affairs. He spoke on a specific subject - how to prevent the funding of organized crime and terrorism. He said that before taking counter measures, everyone present should first agree that illegal mechanisms for funding terrorism do exist; only after that would it be logical to declare the funding of terrorists to be a criminal act. The same snags also constrained participants in other round tables organized within the forum's framework - Enhancement and Harmonization of Existing Legislation Relevant to the Fight against Terrorism, and Observance of Human Rights, Russia and NATO: Common Interests in Combating Terrorism, to mention but two of the round table topics. Nor was there consensus on the concept of "double standards," whose impermissibility is emphasized in a separate clause in the forum's Final Declaration. PACE President Schieder called on Russia to abandon its "double standards." But when, at the final press conference, he was asked why the United States had not included the Chechen terrorist groups in its official list of terrorist organizations, he retorted: "That clause is our amicable and clear answer." On the morning of the forum's last day, the speaker of Russia's Federation Council Sergei Mironov, who is also head of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS Countries, took the floor out of turn. He asked the forum's permission to send in its behalf a telegram of condolence to France and Israel, where acts of terrorism had been perpetrated the day before. The forum gave its consent, after which the discussion on the nature and essence of the "plague of the 20th century" resumed its normal course. The Council of Europe's Secretary General Walter Schwimmer said that convening the forum in Russia was "a timely and encouraging event." No one claimed the forum was anything more than that. ******* #6 gazeta.ru April 4, 2002 Putin’s Guru Slams Russian Economy in 1990s By Olga Proskournina Presidential economic adviser Andrei Illarionov has carried out a profound statistical analysis of the history of economic development in Russia over the past 117 years in order to establish the reasons why the latest economic recession that the country faced in the 1990s proved so long and dramatic. Mr Illarionov shared his conclusions with the Gazeta.Ru correspondent. Andrei Illarionov presented the results of his study at the 3rd International Scientific Conference, “The Modernization of the Russian economy: results and prospects”, held in Moscow on April 3rd under the aegis of the Higher School of Economics. The event, hosted by the chairman of the Higher School of Economics Yevgeniy Yasin, was attended by many prominent economists and bankers, including, among others, the former deputy chief of the International Monetary Fund Stanley Fisher, the Minister for Economic Development and Trade German Gref, and vice-president of the World Bank Johanness Linn. In his address to the conference Andrei Illarionov warned the state authorities against using the “recipes of economic growth” devised by Anatoly Chubais and Sergei Dubinin between 1995 and 1998. “If not for that irresponsible populist policy that led to further economic decline,” charged the adviser bitterly, “economic, and subsequently, demographic growth would have begun in Russia four years earlier!” Gazeta.Ru asked Mr Illarionov to tell our readers about the results of his research. Andrei Illarionov: Actually, this study is the result of a lot of research, whereby the time-limits of each decline and growth, and the number of recessions were determined. And so, out of the 10 most dramatic slumps which Russia experienced in the past 117 years, the crisis that we lived through in the 1990s was the second deepest (the cumulative decline in GDP amounted to 45 per cent) and the longest of all. It lasted for a whole nine years, whereas, the deepest slump in the time span analyzed lasted only six years, namely the period from 1917 to 1922, when the cumulative recession in Russia amounted to 57 per cent of GDP. But this, you must note, was against the backdrop of World War I, two revolutions, foreign intervention, famine, military communism and civil war. Does that mean that after World War II the economic situation in Russia was better than in the 1990s? During the Second World War, Russian history faced two economic crises. The first broke out in 1941-1942, and was caused by the loss of a considerable amount of territory, as well as industrial and demographic potential. The second crisis was the after-war shock of 1945-1946, brought about by the transition of the economy from a war footing to the demands of peacetime. Still, both those shocks were lesser than the one we survived recently. The economic crisis we have just lived through (in 1990s) was, beyond a shadow of a doubt, one of the most serious upheavals experienced by the state, not only during the past century, but throughout our whole recorded history. It can be ranked up there with such catastrophes as, for instance, the Time of Troubles (1598-1613: a period in Russian history fraught with public disturbances and unstable rule) – the disintegration of the economy at that time was quite considerable – and, of course, the period of world wars and revolution in the 20th century. And can it be compared with the Tatar yoke? We simply do not have access to any credible statistical data that could have helped us to come to any substantial conclusions. Even gleaning information about the Time of Troubles and discussing it, is not easy from the economic standpoint. Nevertheless, we did make use of quite a few written sources dating back to the Time of Troubles, allowing us to make some conclusions on the state of the economy at that time. Given that you place a rather considerable part of the blame for the length of the crisis of the 1990s on the economic bloc of the Russian government of 1995-1998 and on the International Monetary Fund, it sounds somewhat strange: your conclusions in many aspects coincide with what the “leftists” have reiterated throughout the past decade. Does that not scare you? I think that we all need to gradually distance ourselves from the political polarization, from all those “what the left says”, “what the right says”, especially since those definitions fail to give a clear view of economic policy conducted in Russia in recent years. For instance, the so-called “leftist” government of Yevgeniy Primakov, if to judge by its economic initiatives, was the most “right-wing” of all throughout the last 15 years in Russia. There’s no doubt, that it leaned more to the right than the governments of (Boris) Nemtsov and (Anatoly) Chubais. Why? Primakov’s was the government that conducted a firm and consistent fiscal policy, without making any huge or stupid mistakes in the structural policy. It pursued a very restrained monetary policy, and, in fact, it established the rules, which secured the economic growth of later years. That is why it is a big question as to who is really on the left and who is on the right. It is not so important what one calls oneself, but what one actually does. And now, when we abandon political antitheses (as I would like to hope) we have a chance to analyse more impartially what was happening in the course of the past decade. We need to learn lessons, in order not to make the same mistakes again. The price of an economic mistake committed by the state authorities is extremely high, and it is paid by an entire society, an entire nation. ****** #7 Asia Times April 3, 2002 Ukraine: A land divided By Sergei Blagov MOSCOW - Parliamentary elections in Ukraine have shown up deep divisions between east and west and between left and right. Ukraine's 37 million voters did not produce a clear winner. The results indicated not just divisions within the country but differences with Russia. The votes were cast on Sunday with an estimated voter turnout of 60 percent. Ukraine - which used to be the Soviet Union's wheat basket and produced up to a third of Soviet weapons - has long been experiencing a division between its Russian-speaking east and the nationalistic west. Industrialized eastern Ukraine, which suffered the most from the Soviet collapse, tends to be more pro-left and supports greater integration with Russia. Western Ukraine, which has been a part of Austro-Hungary and Poland, is dominated by nationalists who want closer ties with Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In a clear electoral expression of this split, Our Ukraine, the party of pro-Western ex-premier Viktor Yushchenko, led the race in 14 western regions, while the Communist Party won in 10 eastern regions. Our Ukraine got 22 percent of the vote, and the Communist Party 20 percent. The For United Ukraine Party, backed by President Leonid Kuchma, got 13 percent, according to the election commission's preliminary data announced on Tuesday. The opposition Socialist Party of ex-parliament Speaker Alexander Moroz and the party of ex-deputy premier Julia Tymoshenko had about 7 percent each. The remaining votes went to 27 small parties. Parties that get less than 5 percent of the vote do not get a share of the seats in the Verkhovna Rada (parliament). Under the complicated election system, 225 members are elected through a vote for party lists and another 225 as individual candidates. These individual candidates can also represent parties, and members later can band together into factions in parliament. Kuchma's For United Ukraine Party describes itself as centrist but that stand did not win it the success it expected. The vote was seen as a test of Kuchma's popularity after eight years in power. The campaign of the pro-Kuchma For United Ukraine Party, created just a few months ago, was seen also as a measure of support it can expect for a successor to Kuchma. Vladimir Litvin, leader of For United Ukraine, said on the eve of the elections that Kuchma will not seek re-election in 2004. Lytvyn, who is also head oftion, had forecast a 40 percent vote for his party - but failed to deliver. Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko says he will push for impeachment of Kuchma, according to the Russian RTR television. Symonenko also spoke against Yushchenko for what he called his divisive policies and pronouncements. The east-west dispute became a part of the campaign. In one instance, municipal authorities in the eastern city of Kharkov held a simultaneous local referendum where 80 percent of the voters favored use of Russian as the city's official language along with Ukrainian. Central authorities declared the referendum illegal. Moscow has been keen to appear neutral in the Ukrainian elections. But some of Moscow's unease has been showing through. On Monday, the official Russian Information Agency (RIA) quoted Kremlin sources as saying that Moscow had expressed disagreement with some statements of Yushchenko's pro-Western party. But Russia is looking forward to developing ties with Ukraine, the sources were quoted as saying. Senior official Alexey Volin told RIA on Monday that Russia respects the choice of the Ukrainian people. Some Russian politicians have been more blunt. Lyubov Sliska, deputy head of the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, said anti-Russian moves had failed in the course of the campaign. Pro-Russian forces in Ukraine should unite "to safeguard Ukraine's stability and unity", she said. Mikhail Margelov, head of the international relations committee of the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, warned against the attempts "to risk Ukraine's unity". Margelov told RIA that "plans to elect an anti-Russian parliament have failed". Anti-Russian declarations by some nationalist groups were remote from "real politics", he said. Relations between the neighboring countries have been marred by disagreements since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. They have differed over the division of Soviet assets, over Ukraine's wish to join NATO, and over the Black Sea Fleet based in the mainly Russian-inhabited Sevastopol in Ukraine's Crimea peninsula. (Inter Press Service) ******* #8 San Francisco Chronicle April 3, 002 Kremlin angry as Radio Liberty airs After delay, U.S.-financed broadcasts begin in Chechnya today Anna Badkhen, Chronicle Staff Writer Moscow -- Today's premiere of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in the volatile North Caucasus region -- including breakaway Chechnya -- may sour U.S.-Russia relations, the Kremlin says. "The launch of the service is likely to fuel extremism not only in Russia but elsewhere in the world, given the ties between Chechen terrorists and international terrorist groups," said Alexei Volin, the Putin administration's deputy chief of staff. The U.S.-financed broadcast in local North Caucasus languages had been scheduled to begin in late February but was delayed at the request of the State Department on the ground that it could set back efforts to start a dialogue with Moscow on ending the Chechnya war, according to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher. Some analysts, however, said Washington was more afraid of upsetting its budding partnership with Russia in the war against terrorism. Russia, which is fighting its second war in separatist Chechnya since 1994, portrays Chechen rebels as terrorists who deserve no media coverage. Russian journalists generally accept the Kremlin's spin on the war -- that the army is fighting the good fight to rid the region of Islamic rebels. "This move (by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) is incompatible with the common fight against terror and with the spirit of budding relations of partnership between Russia and the United States," read a Foreign Ministry statement handed to a senior U.S. diplomat yesterday. "Launching specific propaganda broadcasts in the region, including Chechnya, could seriously complicate efforts by the (Russian) government to stabilize the situation in the area." The Russian military force has been accused of random detentions of Chechen civilians, arbitrary killings and demanding bribes for the release of imprisoned Chechens and even for dead bodies. These actions have been reported by Western journalists but have never been broadcast on Russian television. The Kremlin says the U.S. view of the campaign, reflected by previous Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports, inflates the brutality of Russian troops and diminishes the atrocities committed by the rebels in the name of independence. The few Chechens who have television sets are allowed to see only Russian reports based on information provided by the army. Moscow has set up a radio station that broadcasts in Chechen, but local citizens say the coverage is biased. As a result, many Chechens who speak Russian have turned to the Russian services of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty or the BBC as their main source of news. Tom Dine, president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, said the new service will provide "perspectives that you cannot get elsewhere" in Chechen, Avar and Circassian -- the languages spoken by ethnic groups in Chechnya and the republics of Dagestan and Karachayevo-Cherkessia. "Our news will be of the region, produced by correspondents who are in the region," Dine said. "We'll be able to let people think things through in their own language." Dine said the station plans to use correspondents based in Brussels, Grozny, Chechnya's capital; Nazran, the capital of the republic of Ingushetia; and Dagestan's capital, Makhachkala. The two-hour broadcasts will be put together in Prague and transmitted from Istanbul. The Kremlin's Volin, however, fears that some programming in Chechen will be done by "members of Chechen radical groups," an allegation Dine vehemently denies. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is a private, nonprofit corporation that receives funds from the U.S. government. It was established in 1949 to spread pro-Western news to Eastern European countries and to promote democratic values and institutions. In 1975, it merged with Radio Liberty, which had been broadcasting in the Soviet Union. The station became a symbol of democracy and free speech in the Soviet Union, where millions of people secretly listened to its broadcasts that were banned and jammed by the KGB. When former President Boris Yeltsin came to power after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, he embraced the radio station and even signed a decree to create its Moscow-based Russian service. The honeymoon ended after Russia sent troops into Chechnya for the second time more than two years ago. In 2000, Russian troops arrested and held for several weeks a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter named Andrei Babitsky, who had angered Moscow by frequently interviewing Chechen rebels. When the U.S. Congress first opted last year to finance broadcasts to the North Caucasus region, the Kremlin called the decision "interference into Russia's internal affairs" and threatened to shut down the station's Russia service. ****** #9 strana.ru April 2, 2002 Alarm Bells Ring as Experts Point to Demographic Upheaval Population to shrink "30 percent by mid-century" By Michael Stedman A flood of figures in recent weeks puts new focus on Russian authorities' concerns over the rate of population decline and the state of the nation's health. Mounting cause for concern has generated the alarming estimate that consistent and continuing decline will have cut population numbers by 30 percent in the year 2050, leaving Russia with a reported 101.9 million people compared with 144 million now. But it could be even more dramatic, say demographers ringing alarm bells in the corridors of power. The worst-case scenario could shrink numbers by up to 47 percent, leaving the nation with just 77.2 million souls in 2050. And the trend is delivering Russia a steadily-ageing population, the experts say. All the forecasts tell the same story, warning that pensioners will represent 35.2 percent of citizens 50 years hence, compared with 20.6 percent today. The worries of those experts found recent resonance in a United Nations Development Program analysis pointing to the wide-ranging consequences. High mortality rates are a major factor behind the trend, Russian media reports indicate. Averaged across the nation, deaths were outpacing births by 170 percent, one news agency said. In 27 regions of Russia, that figure had soared to between 200 percent and 290 percent. Cardiovascular diseases are major killers, observers say. One economist writing in a Russian newspaper earlier this year said these were the cause of more than 55 percent of deaths, 13 percent up in the first 10 months of last year compared with 12 months before. But whatever the cause, Russia's menfolk are falling victim in droves, the figures show. They're dying earlier, at 58.6 years, compared to 72.1 for women. Now, Russia has the largest gender gap for life expectancy in the world, according to reports quoting the Russian State Statistics Committee. Rising incidence of HIV-Aids and TB are trends of key concern to the authorities, as demonstrated in figures cited by Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko at a national conference focused on social development. Her data showed that the number of HIV-infected people in Russia shot from 18,000 to 85,500 between 1999 and 2001. Some 90 percent were intravenous drug users. Official statistics showed 270,000 addicts on record last year and only one in five received medical treatment, she told the conference. There's scant evidence to suggest migrants to Russia will help address a ticking demographic timebomb. Head of state Vladimir Putin put some faith last year in immigration tackling the numbers game. But demographers are said to be working on figures showing in-bound arrivals matching a mere 8.3 percent of population loss during most of last year. Russia's national population census due later this year will chart some challenging issues. ****** #10 Izvestia April 4, 2002 Russia Benefits from "Smart Sanctions" The U.S. unfreezes $200 million in Russian contracts in the "oil for food" humanitarian program to Iraq By Natalia Babasian (therussianissues.com) The United States has unfrozen $200 million in major contracts Russia signed with Iraq under the "oil for food" humanitarian program. Washington will soon okay more Russian contracts to the tune of $550 million. In this way, the White House is attempting to persuade Russia to support the American plan for "smart sanctions" against Iraq. The Russian Tekhnopromeksport Company supplied electrical equipment for Iraqi thermal power plants before its $105 million contract was blocked by the United States. This deal is the largest of the "rehabilitated" contracts. Other unfrozen contracts include contracts for the supply of equipment for the food industry, agriculture, the oil industry, hydropower stations and telecommunications. A few days before Washington decided to accommodate Russian economic interests, the two countries agreed on a list of goods that could be supplied to Iraq under the new regime of sanctions. Baghdad was clearly dismayed by this course of events. Earlier this week Iraq's Vice Prime Minister Tariq Aziz called on "our Russian friends" to oppose the revision of UN sanctions against Iraq. Otherwise, he said, the contracts Moscow had signed with Baghdad would be seriously harmed. Izvestia notes that Moscow's general stand remains unchanged: it maintains that all sanctions should be lifted from Iraq, but a recent meeting with the Americans produced a compromise. The paper has learned from its sources that Moscow agreed to a revision of the list of humanitarian supplies to Iraq and submitted it to the UN Security Council for approval. What the list contains is unknown - both the Russian Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow have refrained from commenting on it, but according to Izvestia, Washington and Moscow agreed not to disclose the list's content until the UN Security Council's meeting in June. Another debate on the sanctions will be held at that time. The list's final version will enumerate items barred from Iraq. Washington, for example, is convinced that the ban should cover dual-purpose items, such as trucks, helicopters and optical fiber. It says they can be used both in medicine and for the production of advanced weapons. Deputy Chairman of the State Duma's International Committee Sergei Shishkarev said in an interview with Izvestia that the UN Security Council's approval of the list will make the implementation of the "oil for food" program much easier. He points out that Iraq has only been allowed to import only medicines and foodstuffs so far, but now it will be free to import furniture, clothes and toys as well. The list of banned imports will include only weapons and dual-purpose items. Both Russia and Iraq stand to benefit from the lifting of import restrictions. Tariq Aziz maintains that "smart sanctions" will undermine Russia's economic cooperation with Iraq. The paper quotes officials of the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow as saying no American initiatives could be beneficial to Iraq. According to Mikhail Perfilov, a spokesman at the Russian Petroleum Argus Agency, Iraq is worried by the state of its oil industry. It is suffering from a severe shortage of spare parts, but much of the oil equipment is regarded as dual-purpose items. Perfilov told Izvestia that Iraq will be allowed to export more oil, but oil exports cannot be boosted without new equipment. Russian oil companies export the bulk of Iraqi oil. They account for 40% of "the black gold" coming from Iraq. LUKoil's press service (the company is regarded as Iraq's leading partner in the implementation of the "oil for food" program) told Izvestia that the company has drawn up a plan for the development of the Western Kurna-2 oil field, but it will not launch it as long as the sanctions remain in force. Georgy Mirsky, a top researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, sees Saddam Hussein's unwillingness to allow the UN disarmament experts who were expelled from Iraq in 1998 to enter the country as the main obstacle in lifting the sanctions. He commented: "Tariq Aziz is resorting to blackmail because he knows that Russia has many interests in Iraq. Iraq is being offered an extremely favorable option, which provides for a softening on the regime of trade and supplies, but its government will not hear of it because even 'the smartest sanctions' provide for the return of international inspectors to Iraq, something Hussein does not want to allow. On the other hand, Iraq has got accustomed to dealing with Moscow in the belief that the Russians regard expected benefits from cooperation with Iraq as more important than matters concerning weapons of mass annihilation. But they are mistaken. Whether or not Iraq will have such weapons is a matter of paramount importance to Russia, especially now that the world has become aware of the great threat posed by international terrorism." ******* #11 Novye Izvestia April 4, 2002 CAM RAHN BASE WILL BECOME GREEN Russia used Cam Ranh Bay for free, but the Pentagon is prepared to pay Author: Vladimir Urban [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] PRIME MINISTER MIKHAIL KASIANOV VISITED VIETNAM LAST WEEK AND ANNOUNCED THAT CAM RANH WOULD BE FREE OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE BY JULY 1. The United States is likely to use the naval base in Vietnam when the Russian Navy withdraws from it. A dismantlement commission chaired by Rear Admiral Alexander Ivliev of the Pacific Fleet has been sent to the Cam Ranh naval base. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov visited Vietnam last week and announced that Cam Ranh would be free of the Russian military presence by July 1. Two landing ships will be assigned to ferry "military equipment" from Cam Ranh to Primorie (Maritime territory, Russian Far East). Actually, Russia is not going to end up with a great deal. According to sources at the Pacific Fleet headquarters, the base was leased by the Soviet Union for 25 years on the condition that everything Russia built there would eventually be left to the Vietnamese, and that the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would be allowed to do as it thinks fit with the base. Hanoi may get some benefits in the near future. Admiral Dennis Blair of the US Pacific Command visited Vietnam in February and suggested the use of Cam Ranh airfield and port to support American operation in Asia. Russia used Cam Ranh for free, but the Pentagon is prepared to pay for the return to Vietnam. It is prepared to pay $5-7,000 for every landing/takeoff and $10- 15,000 for every day an American ship spends at Cam Ranh. Hanoi demanded from Moscow $200 million of annual rent. It was its persistence and eagerness to get the Russian military to pay for Cam Ranh that eventually persuaded President Putin to withdraw from Vietnam. This is Vietnam's chance to replenish its state treasury depleted by three years of an economic crisis. Beijing was particularly worried by Blair's visit to Vietnam and his sensational announcement. So far, the leadership of China has failed to elicit from Vietnam a coherent answer on the future of the Russian base which will cease being Russian soon. The problem is, Washington doesn't intend to sign any long-term treaties on Cam Ranh with Hanoi. It hopes to make use of the scenario already tested in Central Asia where NATO troops settled "for the duration of the counter-terrorism operation". The American presence in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has been gradually evolving into permanent military bases. Analysis of the Russian General Staff say that the Pentagon plans to make Vietnam a transit point in operations in the Indian Ocean and the Philippines. Official Hanoi was already invited into the American- Indian program of joint patrols in the strategically important strait between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. In return for Vietnam's consent, US Administration promises it at least $500 million to build an international port at Cam Ranh Bay. It isn't hard to predict that Vietnam will welcome its former enemy. ****** #12 Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye No. 10 2002 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] RUSSIA SURROUNDED WITH US MILITARY BASES Moscow still doesn't know whether this is good or bad By Mikhail KHODARENOK In spite of Moscow's really emotional protests, the United States and NATO, which have now established a bridge-head in Central Asia, continue to expand their military presence on former Soviet territory. The geo-political importance of some CIS countries is too great during the forthcoming re-alignment of the South-West Asian and Mideastern balance of forces. That's why the concerned parties are in no mood to heed the objections of Russia, which has seriously depleted its military-economic potential over the last decade. Central Asia -- The Intermediate Result The Central Asian heart-land has never seen such a multi- national US-European troop contingent ever since the epic expeditions of Alexander the Great. A tactical group of the third British mechanized division (400 soldiers, all told) is now stationed in Kabul. A tactical group of a German airborne brigade numbering 200 soldiers is also located there. Add to this units of an Italian infantry regiment (100 soldiers), a 300-strong French armored-cavalry regiment, a Spanish military unit numbering 50 soldiers, a joint 150-strong German-Dutch unit, as well as up to 300 US Marines. Apart from that, US and NATO military units are stationed in Kandahar. The US Army's 101-st air-assault division has contributed 1,000 soldiers. A 1,500-strong expeditionary USMC (United States Marine Corps) battalion is also staying there. Moreover, 100 British and 300 Canadian soldiers are stationed in Kandahar. 100 soldiers serving with US special forces have settled down in Herat; yet another 200-strong American SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) unit is based in Shindand. Meanwhile 400 soldiers from the US Army's 10-th light-infantry division, as well as a 600-strong battalion of British Marines, are stationed in Baghram. All in all, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan comprises the following national troop contingents -- Great Britain, 2,000 soldiers; France, 500 soldiers; Germany, 900 soldiers; Norway, 100 soldiers; Italy, 100 soldiers; Turkey, 200 soldiers; Denmark, 200 soldiers; Jordan, 500 soldiers. As of today, about 12,000 soldiers, including 8,000 Americans and about 1,000 Canadians, are involved in the Afghan counter-terrorist operation. US and NATO military installations on the territory of former Soviet Central Asian republics are instrumental in providing logistics support for multi-national forces and their operations. As is known, the United States and NATO have reliably asserted themselves at Uzbek, Kirghiz and Tajik bases, i.e. Manas (Bishkek), Karshi, Kulyab, Kokaidy and Termez. All these airfields were to have been used for re-supply missions, for transporting humanitarian relief aid and for deploying search- and-rescue units. However, the first few French Mirage-2000 fighters have landed in Manas not so long ago. Until then, reconnaissance aircraft, including Predator drones, used to operate rather actively from all bases in the interests of the US-NATO air-force formation being used against Al-Qaeda units. Moreover, ranger units, AWACS-type aircraft, psychological- warfare and reconnaissance planes were deployed there. The appearance of Mirage-2000 fighters is seen as yet another US-NATO military build-up phase in this region. One has every reason to believe that this move is not some isolated occurrence, and that it highlights a certain trend instead. Few obstacles impede now the conversion of former Soviet military bases into full-fledged Western outposts. Among other things, the stockpiling of aircraft fuel and weapons is seen as the most labor-consuming process, which requires more time to complete than all other processes. Nonetheless, all local airfields could be used for sustaining the most determined attacks, once this process is complete. It should be emphasized that Central Asian countries themselves consider US military presence quite profitable. The configuration of their borders, which had been arbitrarily drawn by the Bolsheviks, is always fraught with the danger of bloody inter-ethnic wars, which would inevitably entail the uncontrollable massacre of civilians, causing a multitude of people to flee their native parts. The latter would lead to absolutely unpredictable consequences. Besides, not a single post-Soviet republic has sufficiently powerful armed forces capable of rectifying the hypothetically unfavorable regional situation. Even Uzbekistan, which has weighty reasons to aspire for regional leadership, has a rudimentary army, which, at best, can accomplish only a limited range of objectives. Consequently, Central Asia simply can't do today without a powerful "sergeant of the relief," or "neighborhood cop." Therefore one can safely say that US-NATO military presence is perceived as a regional blessing and a guarantee of sorts against terrible blood-baths in the struggle to control land, water and other natural resources. By the way, such terrifying clashes had already taken place in the early 1990s. The Second Asian Wave Quite possibly, after gaining a foot-hold in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizia, the United States will be sorely tempted to spread its military presence over Kazakhstan, which looms over the whole of Central Asia like some kind of a tremendous horse-shoe. The US side will, most likely, establish control over former Soviet air-force bases in Taldy-Kurgan, Zhangiz-Tobe, Semipalatinsk, Zhana-Semei and the Alma-Ata airfield junction (i.e. the south-eastern axis), for openers. The Americans will most likely be acting in line with time-tested methods; if necessary, US specialists will upgrade the local tarmac, subsequently improving radio-technical landing aids and beacons in line with NATO standards. Kazakh airfields will then be used by NATO cargo aircraft, with military planes arriving later on. A paradoxical and hitherto unthinkable situation can shape up, when Russian military installations in Kazakhstan, i.e. an early-warning radio-technical facility on cape Gulshad (Lake Balkhash), the Saryshagan ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) testing range, as well as state-run testing range No. 5 in Baikonur, find themselves surrounded with NATO military bases. Moreover, it can't be excluded that Russia might have to coordinate all military shipments to these facilities with both local authorities, as well as US and NATO representatives. Some people may think this forecast is too fantastic and pessimistic. However, it should be reminded that some Kremlin high-placed officials had also perceived any possible US military presence in Central Asia as an non-viable hypothesis not so long ago. A Scenario for Tbilisi Right now, a relatively small US troop contingent is stationed in Georgia. Technically speaking, US servicemen would be expected to render military-technical assistance in organizing several Georgian SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) battalions. Tbilisi subsequently intends to use such units for fighting terrorist groups and in order to enhance Georgia's territorial integrity. How feasible is this task? Our article doesn't aim to discuss this issue; however, several world-class units boasting state-of-the-art weaponry might eventually constitute the new Georgian army's nucleus. One should also keep in mind that Georgian society aims to restore the country's territorial integrity, regarding this as a top-priority national goal. As is known, the end justifies the means. Georgia could even forsake part of its sovereignty in favour of a powerful ally that would help it suppress the separatist movement. Given these realities, one should say that the Georgian leadership is acting in a well thought-out manner, expressing priority national interests; such actions can also be long-term. By all looks, official Tbilisi intends to radically solve the problem of its rebellious territories, before their self-determination process goes too far, and before it becomes irreversible. It's therefore hardly surprising that the Georgian infrastructure will be used by the United States and NATO, which continue their crusade against international terrorism at this stage. Geo-politically Georgia plays the part of a bridge for the transit of Central Asian crude oil and other mineral resources. Consequently, the leadership of this young independent republic can obtain numerous advantages as a result of its foreign- political maneuvers. Moreover, one should not under-estimate Georgia's territory as a convenient bridge-head for waging a war against Iran and Iraq. Incidentally, the United States has already announced its decision to fight such a war rather loudly. Therefore possible US control over this Trans-Caucasian republic would apparently benefit Tbilisi and Washington alike. The Georgian leadership's aspirations therefore tally with the US diversification theory, which implies that Kazakh and Central Asian natural resources should be delivered along different routes. Georgia is therefore becoming a natural US ally. Consequently, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that US Air Force and NATO bases will be deployed in Georgian territory soon after the arrival of first several hundred US servicemen. Such bases might well appear at former Soviet airfields, which had belonged to the former Soviet 34-th air army and the USSR's air-defense force -- Marneuli, Vaziani, Senaki (Mikha Tskhakaya) and Gudauta. After that, Turkish military units might well be deployed there; by the way, Ankara has already hinted that this is theoretically possible. There is no doubting the fact that the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be predetermined, after this happens. In that case, Moscow, which has repeatedly advocated Georgian territorial integrity, and which boasts a limited military potential, would merely be able to observe the outcome of a brief conflict. Baku and Counter-Terrorist Plans Azerbaijan, which borders on Iran, is regarded as a convenient air-force base for tactical US and NATO warplanes, that is, if Washington and Brussels decide to go ahead with a possible counter-terrorist operation, attacking Iran in the process. As of today, Washington considers Iran to be the bulwark of international terrorism. In this case former Soviet first-category air-force bases in Kyurdamir and Nasosnaya (Pumping Station) will prove to be a highly valuable asset for the United States. Surely enough, their current state leaves a lot to be desired. However, the US side, which boasts tremendous resources, can upgrade these two bases in no time at all. If necessary, the United States and NATO could also use the international airport in Baku. However, all these airfields can accommodate no more than 90-100 tactical aircraft, reconnaissance planes and flying tankers. Nonetheless, even this number is enough to conduct limited air strikes and to seriously threaten theoretical enemies from the northern axis. The distance between Azeri bases and vital Iranian facilities is negligible; moreover, one should keep in mind that warplane pilots have every chance of ejecting to safety over the Caspian Sea, if their aircraft are damaged during combat missions. Search-and-rescue teams would fish them out from international waters with almost 100-percent chances of success just because the Caspian Sea lacks any hostile and fanatical population. The US side perceives this as a highly important factor. As a reward for possible collaboration Azerbaijan may be offered substantial US and NATO support in settling the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. It's an established fact that the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) is unable to deblock this conflict. Official Baku links any possible withdrawal from the Karabakh impasse with Washington and Brussels. This implies coinciding interests, and only such consensus provides real-life allies. Any project aiming to transport Caspian, Central Asian and Kazakh hydro-carbon resources elsewhere would seem a bit far-fetched, unless Azerbaijan takes part in such projects. The Results On the one hand, Russia stands to gain a lot from that US blitzkrieg on Afghan territory. The Talib "thorn," which could have entailed "sepsis" and even "death" for the entire Central Asia, as well as utterly unpredictable consequences for the Russian Federation's southern flank, has now been almost pulled out. Analysts are inclined to think that extremist groups are highly unlikely to re-assert themselves in Afghanistan and newly independent Central Asian countries in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, though, there can be no power vacuum in regional politics. Moscow perceives Russia's withdrawal from the geo- political scene in the obtaining situation as a painful inevitability. Meanwhile the appearance of a new Central Asian leader is perceived as an objective necessity because regional countries might otherwise plunge into bloody small wars. It's becoming absolutely clear nowadays that many of the Russian leadership's extremely costly and painstaking projects had been false from the very outset, thereby leading us into a blind alley. Frankly speaking, the most far-sighted Russian analysts had warned about this back in the early 1990s. Quite possibly, the list of such projects includes the collective CIS peace-keeping forces, which have virtually become redundant today, as well as the protection of the CIS external perimeter. Russian society apparently doesn't know that the latter idea has also lost its topicality; nonetheless, it had been the subject of heated debates, with the Russian treasury spending a lot of money on this project. The epoch of open borders within the CIS is also nearing its completion, upon benefiting most of our neighbors, rather than Russia itself. In fact, Russia is engulfed by millions upon millions of illegal migrants. In the obtaining situation, the United States has obtained more benefits than all other countries, virtually gaining access to the immense regional natural resources. And, most importantly, for today Moscow stands to gain from NATO's Central Asian military presence after the successful operation against the Taliban. However, such military presence would provide some dubious advantages in the foreseeable future. Washington acquires powerful leverage for influencing subsequent Russian political aspirations in line with any possible scenario, thus reducing Moscow's maneuvering room on the global political scene still further. Quite possibly, this constitutes the main result of America's penetration into this hitherto walled-in strategic region. The second stage of expanded NATO military presence on former Soviet territory couldn't but evoke serious irritation on the Kremlin's part from the very outset. Washington then made some soothing statements. However, Moscow lacks any real-life military-economic leverage for influencing the situation. Consequently, one has every reason to believe that the Kremlin's persisting imperial moods won't be enhanced. Naturally enough, Russia opposes the second stage of expanded US and NATO military presence in post-Soviet republics; the same can be said about a hypothetical third stage. Nonetheless, Moscow is so far unable to clearly formulate the relevant political goal of countering expanded US and NATO influence on CIS countries. The Kremlin merely says that it opposes such a policy. Any arguments in favour of this position don't sound convincing enough; meanwhile it's an open secret that the subordination of strategic goals and tasks to political goals constitutes a highly important military- strategy principle. It would be well-nigh impossible to implement specific Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian policies in line with long-term national interests, unless such political goals are explained to all strata of Russian society in an easy-to- understand language. ******