#4
Vremya MN
April 3, 2002
HOW WILL THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AFFECT RUSSIA?
Russia should look to its internal resources for defense
Author: Yury Maslyukov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

RECENT EVENTS ARE MAKING US THINK ONCE AGAIN ABOUT WHETHER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE ABM TREATY OF 1972 MIGHT THREATEN RUSSIA IN ANY WAY. THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF RUSSIA REMAIN QUITE POWERFUL AS A SYSTEM, BUT THEY ARE GRADUALLY DECREASING.

Recent events are making us think once again about whether the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty of 1972 might threaten Russia in any way. The strategic nuclear forces of Russia remain quite powerful as a system, possessing the necessary resources to deliver a retaliatory strike in any set of circumstances. However, these resources are gradually decreasing, with quality invariably sinking. Over the next 10 to 12 years the lifespans of nearly all Soviet-made systems will be exhausted, and we will have to remove them from our arsenals. There are few options for updating Soviet strategic arms, since only one missile system - the ground-based Topol-M - is currently in production. With the existing production rate, 100-120 such system will be delivered to our troops by 2010.

The naval part of the strategic forces of Russia is likely to decrease its combat strength in the near future. In the coming decade, only two to three nuclear powered submarines will be produced for our Navy, with a maximum of 200 to 250 nuclear warheads. The Air Force can count on keeping around 100 to 200 missiles on Tu-160 strategic bombers. All in all, the realistic number of nuclear warheads in Russia will fall eight- to ten-fold over 10-12 years. And Russia will enter the second decade of the 21st century with a nuclear arsenal equal to that of France, Britain or China, much smaller that that of the United States.

We can draw the following conclusion from this: after 2010 Russia will lag far behind the United States in the number of nuclear warheads. Besides, we should keep in mind that defense systems cannot function without corresponding communications systems, combat control, early detection, etc. The situation in this respect is also rather difficult, and we cannot be sure that in a decade our early detection system will warn us beforehand; that orders issued by the military- political leaders will reach the lower levels in time; or that our strategic nuclear forces will be able to deliver an adequate counter- strike.

Moreover, we can affirm that in the second decade of the 21st century our country will be able to respond to a nuclear attack only if it consists of single missiles. This inadequate response seems most probable if the situation in the defense sector and the armed forces does not change radically.

Of course, we would like to stress that the fact that the United States federal budget provides huge sums of money for developing the national missile defense system does not necessarily imply that the US is going to deliver a nuclear strike on Russia. However, if the United States acquires indisputable military superiority over our country, it may mean that firstly, the global system of strategic stability would collapse, and, secondly, Russia would lose its super-power status.

As for the existing global system of containment and counterbalances, here is a possible variant of how events may develop in future. At present, China has much weaker strategic forces than Russia and the United States, and is not planning to increase them. However, if the United States builds its national missile defense, China may want to increase its nuclear arsenals.

Since the economy of China can endure a considerable increase in military spending - which, by the way, has already started - we can assume that in the near future China may surpass Russia greatly. And this may provoke India to boost its strategic nuclear forces, which, in its turn, may generate the same reaction from Pakistan, and then Israel. That means that all nuclear powers of the Asian continent will get a powerful impulse toward an arms race.

All this proves that the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM treaty generates fundamental military-technical and financial problems for Russia in its relations with the United States, as well as with other states. We cannot count on the United States providing selfless aid to us, or taking Russia's interests into account. And this means that we should look to our internal resources for maintaining the level of our strategic nuclear forces.

In meeting this challenge, our nation's leaders should determine their military-technical policy and set a definite system of priorities in financing and implementing defense programs.

(The author is head of the Duma committee on industry, construction and high technology.)

(Translated by Daria Brunova )

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