CDI Russia Weekly-#199 29 March 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. The Defense Monitor: The Center for Defense Information Moves to Russia and Washington ProFile and CDI. 2. Moscow Times: Gregory Feifer, Tallying Putin's Midterm Results. 3. RIA Novosti: HEARINGS ON RECOGNISING RUSSIA'S MARKET-ECONOMY STATUS BEGIN IN UNITED STATES. 4. Moscow News: Artur Blinov, U.S. Concessions Placate Russia. Still, Russia fears losing its niches in steel markets elsewhere in the world owing to the repercussions of U.S. protectionism. 5. Kennan Institute meeting report: Can the West Meet Putin's Challenge? Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community. (remarks of James Goodby) 6. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Narco-Feudalism Still Rules. 7. Interfax: Former Russian premier criticises US foreign policy.(Primakov) 8. The Russia Journal: Gordon Hahn, Of nukes, maneuvers and stubborn perceptions. 9. AFP: Russia planing to counter US missile shield: defence minister. 10. Foreign Policy: Jon Wolfsthal, Global Newsstand: Russian NGOs Go Nuclear. 11. Izvestia: Anatoli Diakov, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene Miasnikov and Pavel Podvig, Needless Obligations. Why Does Russia Want A Treaty With No Substance? 12. eurasianet.org: Alex Vatanka, RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN APPROACH A RECKONING POINT. 13. WPS Monitoring Agency: POLITICAL FORECASTS [press review]: HALFWAY THROUGH PUTIN'S FIRST TERM: CLOSE TO STRANGERS, A STRANGER AMONG THOSE CLOSE TO HIM. ******* #1 The Defense Monitor www.cdi.org February 2002 The Center for Defense Information Moves to Russia PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT is oten remembered for the phrase,“speak softly but carry a big stick.” What is often forgotten is the rest of the proverb:“…and you will go far.” Quietly,with the objective of going far along the road of breaking down the official “spin ” about the state of U..S.-Russian security relations, CDI opened a branch office in Moscow in July 2001. CDI Moscow,headed by Dr.Ivan Safranchuk,provides the Russian media and public with clear,unfiltered, and – above all – independent information on security issues ranging from nuclear policy to NATO to the environment.And given the state of the media in Russia today,CDI Moscow is proving an immense success because truly independent sources of information are becoming rare. Dr.Safranchuk is well-known in Russia as a nuclear analyst.He spent four years at the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center)that,like CDI,is a non-profit research and public education institute.He directed the center ’s project, “Nuclear Weapons and Their Future.” Writing in both Russian and English, Dr.Safranchuk continues to interpret security thinking in the United States for Russians by his frequent contributions to (among other outlets)two PIR publications:Arms Control Letters and Yaderny Kontrol Russia ’s leading journal on international security,arms control,and nonproliferation. With its Moscow office,CDI has indeed,literally and metaphorically, succeeded in “going far.” Excerpts from statements by Dr. Safranchuk: From a Dec.14,2001,news conference at the Moscow Press Development Institute on the announced U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: “Sept.11 generated the hope that those who inclined towards a more international approach in the U.S.administration were gaining the upper hand,and that they would be in the ascendant for at least some time....Everybody realized that a roll back would have to occur sooner or later,a roll back from international cooperation to greater unilateralism of action. But few people expected it to happen so early,in December.” From a Jan.10,2002,interview with the Associated Press in Moscow on U.S.plans to store,not destroy,nuclear warheads removed from operational deployment under President George W.Bush ’s Nuclear Posture Review: Safranchuk said Russia would continue protesting even if it lacks the power to prevent the United States from going its own way.“Russia wants to show the harm of unilateral approaches to nuclear disarmament.” ------ Washington ProFile and CDI NO.THIS IS NOT ABOUT biographies of politicians or a gossip column about events in the nation's capital. Washington ProFile is a Russian-language electronic publication whose purpose is to support freedom of the press -- an endangered species -- in Russia and other new countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union.CDI became Washington ProFile's home in September 2001. Twice weekly,Washington ProFile funnels unbiased,non-partisan news and information about the United States to more than 30,000 e-mail subscribers,including national and local media,nongovernmental organizations,and government officials in the former Soviet states. Moreover,Washington ProFile articles are known to be widely reprinted in national,re-gional, and local news media,thereby multiplying circulation into the millions every week.Nor is circulation limited to the states of the former Soviet Union:Washington ProFile is read in 100 other countries. Articles and other material are translated and assembled by Russian scholars and journalists.The prodigious work of producing this no-cost, 35-page electronic newsletter falls on three individuals:Editor-in-Chief Dr. Nikolai Zlobin (who is also a CDI Senior Fellow),Editor Aleksandr Grigoryev,and Database Manager Dr.Yuri Ruban. For the many Russian publishers who are strapped by limited resources and reliable,unbiased sources of information,Washington ProFile is proving to be a real lifeline. To view its contents, past publications are archived at www.washingtonprofile.org ****** #2 Moscow Times March 27, 2002 Tallying Putin's Midterm Results By Gregory Feifer Staff Writer President Vladimir Putin's term hit its halfway mark Tuesday, with politicians and pundits weighing in on the ups and downs of the unusually popular president's first two years in office. No one questions the obvious: Putin's second year has ended with warmer relations with Washington, a greater focus on domestic economic reform and a continuing concentration of political power in the Kremlin's hands. But interpretations and assessments of these policies vary as widely as a Russian version of "Rashemon." Andrei Ryabov of the Moscow Carnegie Center believes Putin's main achievement has been the gradual move toward "formalizing" political decision-making -- transferring it from informal groups of advisers and businessmen to formal institutions, such as the presidential administration and the federal legislature. "That's positive for Russia's future even if today the form of those actions seems undemocratic," Ryabov said. Over the past year, the Kremlin has finished implementing its plan for sidelining the once powerful governors -- many of whom had cozy personal relationships with Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin -- and has managed to form two overwhelmingly compliant chambers of parliament, which easily approve government-backed legislation. Vyacheslav Volodin, head of the State Duma's pro-Kremlin Fatherland-All Russia faction, lauded the moves to centralize power. The president's main achievement has been to stop Russia from disintegrating into "separate principalities and separate republics," Interfax quoted him as saying Tuesday. Kremlin-connected political analyst Sergei Markov agreed. He said, "Putin's chief goal has been to strengthen state institutions, which was his main promise to the electorate," and he has done so. But critics argue that, in trying to boost his own authority, Putin has trampled on democratic institutions and individual liberties. The Kremlin has pushed through an overhaul of the judicial system that failed to curtail the powers of prosecutors -- often criticized for a lack of impartiality and independence -- and played a key role in silencing the country's two privately owned national television stations, which had been controlled by businessmen critical of the Kremlin. Putin has also done little to end the bloody conflict in Chechnya, which has raged for 2 1/2 years, claiming thousands of lives -- soldiers' and civilians' alike. Grigory Yavlinsky, head of the liberal Yabloko party and one of Putin's most consistent critics, lamented the Kremlin's monopoly on power, adding that the Cabinet now fulfills technical functions and "chiefly represents the interests of monopolies and big business connected to the authorities," Interfax said. Carnegie's Ryabov acknowledged that fundamentally redefining the role of the existing political and economic elites would be Putin's greatest challenge in the years ahead. "Either he undertakes real modernization, in which he transforms his relations with the old elites, or the old clans will force their logic on him, in return for a promise to make sure he's re-elected," Ryabov said. "That's just what happened to Boris Yeltsin in 1996." Shortly after rising to power, Putin promised that the influential oligarchs -- businessmen who often held sway over political decision-making under Yeltsin -- would be kept "equally distant" from the Kremlin. Indeed, a number of legal cases and police raids were launched against major businesses suspected of withholding taxes or other violations. But while two of the country's most visible tycoons, media magnates Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, left Russia fearing legal prosecution, the fortunes of many who agreed to toe the Kremlin line have grown rosier. Putin's main failure has been his inability to rein in the oligarchs, Ryabov said. "Their economic power is growing and they will use their influence to facilitate reforms that benefit only them." "Under Yeltsin, the country was ungovernable," Vyacheslav Nikonov, head of the Politika think tank, said Monday. "The oligarchs opened any door in the Kremlin with their left foot." Putin's goal was to rein them in, he added, "but Putin's goal has not been realized." Nonetheless, Putin's second year in office was marked by important liberalizing economic reforms, most prominently a flat 13 percent income tax, loudly applauded by the West. But economists agree that the economy rebounded from its 1998 economic crisis mainly due to high oil prices and a ruble devaluation, and a growing number of experts have criticized the government for failing to push through fundamental structural reforms, saying a new crisis looms ahead. One surprise during Putin's second year was his unequivocally pro-Western foreign policy. Initial tension with Washington was replaced with a pragmatic detente following the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States, when Putin boosted cooperation with the West to unprecedented levels -- sharing intelligence and not opposing the stationing of U.S. troops in former Soviet states that Moscow has traditionally considered to be its domain. Yavlinsky praised this as Putin's chief achievement. "The vector of foreign policy can have strategic perspectives and serve as a prologue to Russia's becoming a European state in the widest sense of the word," he told Interfax on Tuesday. However, others worry that the Kremlin's pro-Western stance could ignite dangerous discontent at home. "It wasn't expected that the administration would be so successful in foreign policy," said Sergei Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. But he cautioned the pro-Western line could prove a liability due to a lack of support from the country's elite, especially the military, in part because Putin's ultimate goals were not clear. Meanwhile, Putin's public approval ratings remain high. Alexander Oslon, a Kremlin-connected pollster, said Monday that a survey conducted by his Public Opinion Foundation found that 61 percent of 1,500 respondents from around the country said Putin's term has been marked by more achievements than failures, compared to 13 percent who thought the opposite. State wage and pension increases topped the list of favored policies. Igor Bunin, head of the Political Technologies Center, said the president's ratings were likely to remain high until the next elections because most people have not given up hope that the president will lead the country out of a "dead-end situation," Interfax reported. "Putin's main achievement," Oslon said, "is that he changed the country's mental climate." ****** #3 HEARINGS ON RECOGNISING RUSSIA'S MARKET-ECONOMY STATUS BEGIN IN UNITED STATES WASHINGTON D.C., MARCH 27, RIA NOVOSTI - The presidential administration, government and parliament of Russia are very much open for dialogue with foreign investors, Andrew Summers, president of the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, said at hearings at the US Department of Trade. Consideration of the matter of recognising Russia as a free market economy has begun here. Summers stressed that the Russian authorities' approach to international business circles confirms Russia's adherence to the market economy idea. Summers said experience of 650 American Chamber member companies, which have worked in Russia, confirms that the Russian economy operates according to free market principles, which is the earnest of success of many foreign investors in Russia. In the opinion of Blake Marshall, Vice-President of the American-Russian Business Council, the objections which sound in the United States against recognising the Russian economy as a free market do not reflect reality. Time has come to officially recognise what is obvious to many -- Russia is no longer a country with a centralised economy, stressed Marshall. He invited the American government to fix the market status of the Russian economy. ****** #4 Moscow News March 27-April 2, 2002 U.S. Concessions Placate Russia Still, Russia fears losing its niches in steel markets elsewhere in the world owing to the repercussions of U.S. protectionism By Artur Blinov The Russian government now feels less disturbed over American protectionist duties on steel imports from this country. The U.S. position on steel imports has been mitigated through bilateral talks, Prime Minister Kasyanov said. Also, the U.S. quota for importing steel slabs from Russia might be increased to the 2000 level and remain on the rise over the next three years, Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref announced. The U.S. could also make concessions on some types of cold-rolled steel, which it either doesn't produce or produces in insufficient quantities. However, those U.S. promises merit a second look, for not all of them are as fair as they seem. For instance, Washington initially cancelled the prohibitive quotas of 5.4 million tonnes of steel slabs to offer this niche to Russia and Brazil. That's because American steel rollers themselves badly need the slabs, and not because the U.S wanted to do Russia a good turn. Meanwhile, there is increasing evidence that the United States' prohibitive tariffs could affect Russian producers' position on markets elsewhere. The dispute threatens to undermine steel markets globally, the Paris-based International Herald Tribune has commented. In addition to sanctions against the United States (extra duties imposed on American goods worth 2.5 billion euros), the paper added, the European Union plans to introduce still another set of duties to protect its industries against the cheap Asian and Latin American steel that has lost its U.S. outlet. The EU sanctions against the U.S. are supposed to take effect as of June 18, while the "duties to protect EU industries" are to be applied in a few days. It seems that our steel products, or part of them, threaten to fall into the category of "cheap Asian steel" against which the European Union intends to protect itself, as can be inferred from an interview granted by Swiss Trade Minister Leif Pagrotsky to Itar-Tass. He said that the EU would soon announce measures to protect its market, presumably on Monday. "Russia will not be subject to those measures in areas where it has agreements with the EU; but in other areas Russia will be affected, like other countries," the Swedish minister said in a feeble attempt to put us at ease. We can only hope that Russia had farsightedly included steel trade in its agreements with the EU. It has to be added that China has already launched an antidumping probe into its own imports of cold-rolled steel. The investigation could affect the products of such large Russian exporters as steel smelter Severstal, and the Magnitogorsky and Novolipetsky metallurgical combines, an Interfax report says. ***** #5 Kennan Institute meeting report Can the West Meet Putin's Challenge? Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community March 18, 2002 Summary of a Kennan Institute meeting at the Woodrow Wilson Center with Ambassador James Goodby, Senior Research Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution In a meeting at the Kennan Institute, Ambassador James Goodby called for a new organizing principle in U.S. policy towards Russia that would recognize it as a subject of policy rather than as a means of policy, such as in fighting terror or controlling proliferation. His presentation was based on his recent co-authored book A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community. Since taking office, Russian president Vladimir Putin has moved his country’s orientation from seeking to counter-balance the United States with the "multi-polar" foreign policies of the Primakov government to a Western orientation – first towards Europe, then, following September 11, towards the United States. Putin’s decision to join with the West, not just in the war on terror, but also in joining Western institutions, represents a strategic decision on Russia’s part. The question, Goodby stated, is now whether the U.S. and the West are ready to respond to this shift by creating a new organizing principle for Russia policy. A new organizing principle for Russia policy is important if we are to create a stable peace, one that could be reflected in a Euroatlantic Security Community. A stable peace is one in which war is not considered a contingency. A high convergence of values and identity are required for a stable peace, which is not likely in the short-term between Russia and the West. Indeed, the recently leaked position paper on the U.S. nuclear posture identifying Russia as a continued contingency is evidence that we are still in a conditional peace with Russia, Goodby noted. Goodby identified five possible scenarios for Euroatlantic relations to develop. U.S. Dominance – similar to today’s situation. Stable Triad – in which the U.S., EU, and Russia evolve to a relationship of political, if not economic or military, co-equals. Western Commonwealth – in which Russia declines, and the U.S. and EU grow closer. EU Dominance – in which Russia drops out, and the U.S. pulls back or refocuses on Asia. EU-Russia – in which the U.S. overreaches, the EU and Russia grow closer, and the U.S. and EU compete. According to Goodby, the second option would be most conducive to long-term stability. But such an arrangement cannot be invented. It must be built gradually through a targeted trilateral agenda to build cooperation, Goodby stated. For example, in the security sphere, Russia should be and probably will be included in a "NATO at 20" scheme before the next round of expansion. It would be politically advisable to hold a "NATO at 20" summit meeting prior to the NATO summit meeting in Prague in the fall where additional states will be invited to join the alliance. In economics, Russia’s membership in the WTO should be promoted with a target date of 2005. And in the humanitarian sphere, more should be done to help the Russian health care system. Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute, (202) 691-4239 ******* #6 Moscow Times March 28, 2002 Narco-Feudalism Still Rules By Pavel Felgenhauer General Tommy Franks, the U.S. commander of the war in Afghanistan, came to Moscow last week to pay a courtesy visit. Franks commands the war via satellite from his central command staff complex in Tampa, Florida, but he told reporters in Moscow that he and his wife were on the move for a week, going to Africa, visiting troops in Afghanistan and finally coming to Russia. Of course, Moscow is not directly involved in military operations in Afghanistan. Still, Moscow is the main sponsor of the Tajik faction of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance that is the backbone of the interim Afghan government's rag-tag army. Without basic Russian support, the allied mission would be that much harder to accomplish. Last fall, as the United States was pounding the Taliban to bits from the air, Iran also strongly supported the effort. But after the Taliban and al-Qaida fighters melted into the Afghan wilderness, the short-lived alliance ended and the Iranians are today, according to U.S. officials, trying to flush the Westerners down the same drain as the Taliban. Moscow is not yet turning its coat, and Franks got a warm reception. Contentious issues, like the planned U.S. military personnel arrival in Georgia or the coming invasion of Iraq, were not discussed. Iraq is a political matter, not fit for a general to elaborate on, while Washington has not made its final decision. Georgia, Franks told me, is the responsibility of the U.S. European command and nothing to do with him. In Moscow, the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan are still considered to be potentially deadly opponents. Officials mostly wish Franks good luck in rooting them out, though many generals that fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s truly believe that the United States is getting itself into the same quagmire they found themselves in. Franks came to Moscow after handing out medals to U.S. servicemen who had just finished a major operation against Taliban and al-Qaida fighters remaining in southeastern Afghanistan, along the border with Pakistan. Franks insists that Operation Anaconda was a resounding success: It was announced that up to 800 fighters were slain, and the Shah-i-Kot region was captured and cleared of opposing forces. However, less than 50 bodies were actually found. U.S. officers allege that Afghan allied soldiers told the Taliban and al-Qaida of the operation well beforehand. Afghan soldiers, led by General Zia Lodin, should have done the main job in Operation Anaconda, with U.S. forces in support. But the Afghans swiftly retreated after meeting resistance, and U.S. soldiers were rushed to the front, sustaining serious casualties. The weather in the Afghan mountains was bad during the 11 days of Operation Anaconda. Transport helicopters often could not land or evacuate troops on time. Strategically important hilltops were captured with losses, only to be soon abandoned. And in the end, apparently, the Taliban and al-Qaida fighters slipped away in large numbers. Such stories tend to elicit a smile from Russian veterans of the 1980s Afghan. They had exactly the same experiences. (The Afghan allies always slip away if their is any serious trouble, helicopters are never on time, enemy body counts are always falsified and so on.) After almost 10 years of combat in Afghanistan, the total number of enemy fighters killed, as reported by commanders over the years, exceeded the entire official population of the country -- a fact often joked about in Russian military and intelligence communities. Franks himself did a stint in Vietnam in 1967, where the body count became virtually the only measure of military success. The United States won the count, losing some 60,000 men, to Vietnam's estimated 2 million lives lost. But the war was lost. The Afghan economy and society is based on two pillars: tribal warlordism and the heroin trade. These two pillars are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. The Taliban and al-Qaida tried without much success to dismantle this narco-feudalist system, so when the United States attacked the heroin traders of the Northern Alliance and the Pashtun traditional tribal chiefs, all joined the fight for freedom. But now it's the U.S.-led coalition that is the main potential threat to narco-warlordism. Franks insists: "We will find and destroy the pockets of resistance." However, while Americans poke around and disrupt drug-trafficking, the Afghan two-pillar system will produce and support anti-Western rogues -- many more than Franks' men can ever hope to kill. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. ******* #7 Former Russian premier criticises US foreign policy Interfax Moscow, 23 March: A military operation against Iraq would become "a historic mistake for the United States", President of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry Yevgeniy Primakov has said. Speaking at the 10th assembly of the Russian Foreign and Defence Policy Council on Saturday [23 March], Primakov noted that in this case "the scale of support for the USA (by other members of the international antiterrorist coalition) would significantly shrink, and the world would be divided by another principle". The former Russian prime minister accused a team in the Bush administration that is directing the US foreign policy today of lack of professionalism. After the 11 September terror attacks, one could have expected the Americans "to try to get rid of the main basis for terrorism - the conflict in the Middle East - for instance, through expanding the number of mediators, especially bearing in mind that many European countries were prepared for this", Primakov said. "However, the United States did not follow this path," Primakov noted, adding that "they neither followed another path, failing to revise methods providing their national security and exclude those disapproved of by other states". As a result, "even the French foreign minister spoke against the US unilateral approach to foreign policy", he said. Primakov recommended that Russia in these circumstances should "follow the policy of converging with Western states despite all disagreements remaining, taking into account our own interests". Russian President Vladimir Putin sent his greetings to the participants in the forum, calling the council "an independent research floor" and wishing its members new creative success. ****** #8 The Russia Journal March 22-28, 2002 Of nukes, maneuvers and stubborn perceptions By GORDON M. HAHN (Dr. Gordon M. Hahn is The Russia Journal’s political analyst and a visiting research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.) With the next Russian-American summit two months away, the West has still failed to squarely face the fundamental and by now decade-old questions undermining its relationship with Russia. Which side has greater capabilities, the West or Russia? If the tables were turned, how would U.S. decision-makers, as "rational actors," respond to the overwhelming countervailing capabilities Russia "perceives" and encounters from the West? The news that the United States has included Russia on a list of countries to be targeted by American nuclear weapons – along with China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya – has sent shock waves through political elites here and across the Big Pond. On the one hand, this "news" is not surprising; on another, it is shocking, raising serious doubts about the ability of Western bureaucracies to overcome old habits. It has been known for a long time that Russia was not "de-targeted" by the United States after the Cold War. That Russia has preserved such status might be regarded an achievement of sorts: It has retained one trait that marked its superpower greatness. The cycle in which the United States annually rediscovers that the Cold War is over and promises to develop a "new relationship" with Russia is more striking. This is news because it spectacularly debunks a fashionable argument made by U.S. officials and analysts. Russia should not be so disturbed by America’s nuclear arsenal, the argument goes, because the United States is not unsettled by British or French nuclear warheads and vice versa. Friends do not begrudge friends’ "defense capabilities." Unfortunately, this formula leaves out the most important variables: U.S. weapons are not zeroed in on London or Paris, nor are British and French nuclear projectiles aimed at Washington. To understand Russian reaction to the West’s military posture, we should consider a concise statement made by George Shultz, who served as secretary of state during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. In regards to the fundamental principle that should inform national security decision-making, he noted that states design policy not on the basis of the intentions of other states, but on the basis of their capabilities. Repeat this to yourself, several times if need be, and then take a gander at the world through the security calculus of the Kremlin or, say, from Arbatskaya Ploshchad, where Russia’s General Staff divines defense policy. U.S. nuclear weapons target some 2,000 sites in Russia. Others are the targets of British and French nuclear arms. American troops are now being stationed across the C.I.S. – as of now "only" in four states: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. NATO member Turkey is ethnically close to Azerbaijan, and some leaders in Baku have called for a NATO presence in their country. A high-ranking delegation of U.S. officers recently visited Armenia to discuss stepping up military cooperation. The U.S.-Georgian operation in the Pankisi Gorge will target only Taliban and al-Qaida forces, giving Chechen terrorists a pass. Later this year, the three former Soviet Baltic republics, along with as many as four other countries near Russia’s western borders, will join NATO, already the most powerful military machine in history. All of this heightens the effect of another recent event. Last week, NATO conducted military maneuvers near Russia’s borders. Besides NATO members, the exercise, "Strong Resolve 2002," involved Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The scenario envisioned an enemy attack on NATO from the north and a simultaneous invasion of a Central European NATO member state. Unless Latvia – the only northern state besides Russia not included in the exercise – is regarded as a potential enemy of the very alliance it is about to join and, unless Belarus is considered a potential invader, the only possible enemy in this scenario is Russia. This is reminiscent of another NATO celebration held two years ago, which involved supporting Ukraine’s state integrity against an uprising by a national minority supported by a foreign compatriot state. Unless a Crimean Tatar state that I do not know about has materialized, the only possible enemy in that scenario also was our "partner" Russia. In short, it does not take much, if any, paranoia for a Russian, not to mention a Russian general, to feel threatened by the United States and NATO. Capabilities are always malignant. If Russian generals subscribe to the Shultz Principle, they are simply duty-bound to muster all resources to counter the hard facts of the potential Western threat. A general’s charge is not to protect an economic transition or the consolidation of democracy. He can rationally conclude that any capability is a potential threat, regardless of its improbability. Moreover, perceptions are stubborn things, especially when they have a history behind them. They can persist long after the reality they once reflected has changed. In the case of the end of the Cold War, the persistence of old perceptions has been evident on both sides. The policy of mutual threat reduction that used to define Soviet-American relations has not eliminated "mutual threat perception." Given the preponderance of Western power, Russian "perceptions" are a rational reaction to Western capabilities, prolonging the inertia of the Cold War legacy and traditional "zapadnophobia." Western and American perceptions reflect mostly the memory of Soviet capabilities on top of ancient European Russophobia. Irrational misperceptions should be more easily shed by the Cold War’s victors than by its vanquished. The historical lessons of Weimar, Versailles and the Marshall Plan counsel magnanimity in victorious hegemony and efforts to assuage the suspicions of beleaguered former foes. ******* #9 Russia planing to counter US missile shield: defence minister AFP March 28, 2002 Russia is preparing "technical and scientific" measures to counter a planned US missile defence shield, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said. "I want to underline that the US shield does not yet exist, and so it is difficult to speak of retaliatory measures," Ivanov was quoted as saying by ITAR-TASS during a visit to a military base. "But this is not to say that we are not thinking about or taking technical and scientific measures," he added. "We are going to do everything to counter these threats when they take shape, if they ever take shape, which is to say not before 2015-2020," Ivanov said. The defence minister said Russia's strategic forces were the "basis for the effectiveness of our army," which is due to undergo a thorough modernisation over the next 15 years. The United States has officially given notice of its intention to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which outlaws missile defence systems, citing the threat posed by so-called "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. The United States has so far carried out six tests, four of which have been successful, as part of its controversial plan to deploy an anti-missile system. ******* #10 Foreign Policy March-April 2002 Global Newsstand Russian NGOs Go Nuclear By Jon B. Wolfsthal Digest of the Russian Journal Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control), Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter 2002, Moscow In few areas does the characteristic pessimism of the average Russian seem more justified than in the outlook for a free press. The crackdown on independent television in Russia took a possibly final turn in January 2002 with the government’s decision to shut down the last nonstate-controlled broadcaster, TV6. The virtual disappearance of media freedom from the U.S.-Russian political agenda in the glow of the new post–September 11 Washington-Moscow relationship hasn’t exactly helped, either. As one Russian analyst recently observed, “It is not clear yet whether the principles of freedom of speech and expression which were laid down in the late 1980s and early 1990s will endure throughout this [current] transition, for nowadays some people consider them to be unnecessary.” But with constraints on the media still growing, Russia’s burgeoning nongovernmental organization (NGO) community is stepping into the breach, influencing Russian policy in arenas from environmental to security affairs and providing an increasing amount of information to the Russian public. Thus argues a recent article by Vladimir Orlov, founder of the Moscow-based Center for Policy Studies (PIR), a top nuclear affairs NGO. As striking as the essay’s content is its vehicle—the PIR Center’s own six-year-old publication Yaderny Kontrol, a bimonthly journal (with an English-language quarterly digest) that has become an important medium for Russian policymakers on nuclear issues. In his article “The Russian NGO Community: A New Player on the Russian Nonproliferation and Arms Control Scene,” Orlov highlights the “several hundreds of thousands” of NGOs already founded and incorporated in Russia and praises Russia’s 1996 Law on Non-Profit Organizations, which Orlov characterizes as “effective” and “fair.” Part history lesson, part how-to plan, and part pep talk, the article also explains how the PIR Center has successfully navigated rough political waters to influence sensitive national policy issues, including nuclear security and disarmament. And make no mistake, these waters are indeed dangerous—nuclear researchers have been jailed for extended periods, and one American Princeton-based researcher was forced to leave Russia by overzealous security officers. However, the PIR Center remains undeterred and continues to push for “Russia’s … unequivocal commitment to move toward general and complete nuclear disarmament.” Orlov acknowledges that NGOs are regarded with “a certain ambivalence, or even suspicion” by Russian authorities. Fueling this attitude is the fact that local NGOs are mostly financed by U.S. foundations. He laments that Russia’s new business elites have yet to embrace the cause or even the concept of philanthropy. Yet despite these concerns, Orlov remains optimistic about the current influence and future outlook for the Russian NGO community. The author outlines the keys to success for Russian NGOs. He argues that they should operate from Russian territory, remain fully independent of government (including financially), diversify their funding sources, combine high-quality technical and social science expertise, pursue a wide audience, obtain feedback from consumers on their products, strictly comply with Russian law, and cooperate with other research and advocacy organizations. The author also stresses the importance of attracting high-quality staffers, who “with their intellectual abilities, enthusiasm and devotion to the organization are more decisive to an organization’s success than other factors.” He favors an intergenerational approach and proposes creating fellowships and internships in non-proliferation to attract younger Russian experts to the NGO field. Orlov’s recommendations may seem obvious to the Western eye, but as the author explains, they must be understood in light of recent Russian history. “For a long time,” the author writes, “many Russian officials could not believe that any organization or institution that was not officially controlled would be allowed to address … sensitive issues.” Of course, not even large numbers of NGOs can compensate for the loss of an independent media. Both sectors are critical to the prospects for sustained development, democracy, and rule of law in Russia. But NGOs can and already do fulfill an important (if sometimes underappreciated) role. Unfortunately, their operations can easily fall victim to the same forces that have undermined the open press in Russia. Orlov’s good advice may help keep those forces at bay. Jon B. Wolfsthal is an associate with the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. ******* #11 Izvestia March 18, 2002 Needless Obligations Why Does Russia Want A Treaty With No Substance? by Anatoli Diakov, Timur Kadyshev, Eugene Miasnikov and Pavel Podvig [http://www.armscontrol.ru] The less time remains before the US president's visit to Moscow, the stranger is the situation at the consultations over an agreement on radical reductions of strategic arms. On the one hand, there is no shortage of optimistic statements on the prospects of signing a "legally binding" agreement; on the other hand, neither Russian, nor American side can give an intelligible explanation of how the agreement will solve concrete strategic arms reduction problems. A perfectly natural question comes to one's mind: what is the purpose of the future agreement and does Russia actually need today a "legally binding" document that would codify the intentions of both sides? Russia and the United States regard the future agreement differently. Russia does not try to conceal its interest in having the agreement. One of the major reasons for this is the intention to use this agreement to confirm a status of an equal partner to the United States, and - if possible - to save an appearance of keeping parity in strategic arms. Of no lesser importance is the hope to assert the concept of interrelation between strategic defensive and offensive arms. These are probably the reasons behind Moscow's persistent demand to give the future agreement a "legally binding" character. In Russian perception, no other kind of document would be able to cope with these problems. Washington's interest to this agreement is very limited at best. The United States makes no secret that it is not willing to impose any limitations on its strategic arms modernization and missile defenses development programs. Neither the United States is interested in control over reduction of Russian nuclear arsenal under any new treaty, the main reason being that Russian reductions will be carried out regardless of whether a new document is signed or not. The U.S. administration apparently believes that START I treaty (which will remain in force over the next eight years), together with the CTR program, will provide sufficient means to verify elimination of Russian weapons. Now - regarding possible contents of the document in question. Although both sides declared intentions to reduce their strategic offensive arms down to 1700-2200 warheads, the answer to the main question - what the "reductions" will actually mean - remains unclear. Nuclear Posture Review prepared by Pentagon in the end of the last year puts forward a new warheads counting rule - it suggests that only "operationally deployed nuclear warheads" should be taken into account. Under current conditions, should Russia insist on making a legally binding agreement, it would also have to accept American approach toward warhead counting. In this case, instead of an agreement that would impose limitations on deployment of strategic weapons, Russia would get a document that legitimizes the concept of "operationally deployed nuclear weapons", and therefore opens a way to circumvent these limitations. On the same grounds, of fundamental importance is the widely discussed issue of irreversibility of reductions. It is known that the United States will fulfill virtually all reductions by downloading their delivery vehicles and shifting them to non-nuclear roles. Most of the downloaded warheads will be kept in storage facilities, and the US will be able to re-deploy them should the need arise. Russia - not without a good reason - considers these reductions "virtual" and insists that re-deployment possibilities are eliminated. The complication here is that in the current situation it is impossible to ensure irreversibility of reductions in a way that would be acceptable for Russia. The most reliable way to do so would be elimination of delivery vehicles. However, in this case in order to reach the level of 2200 warheads, the United States would have to eliminate all 550 ICBMs, almost all bombers, and 7 out of 18 nuclear submarines - which is clearly unreal. Another option would be elimination of nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles. However, the problem here is that neither the United States nor Russia is prepared to take this route. Verifiable elimination of nuclear warheads requires much higher level of confidence than the countries have today. Currently, there is no satisfactory way to ensure irreversibility of the reductions. Any legally binding agreement signed today would have to confirm the status quo, an integral part of which is reversibility of the reductions rather than irreversibility. Thus, the need for a "legally binding" agreement does not appear to be all that obvious. Since under present circumstances Russia will not be able to secure this kind of agreement on acceptable conditions, it seems to be preferable that during the forthcoming meeting, Russia and United States would limit themselves to political statements confirming already declared measures to reduce nuclear arsenals. The history of US-Russian dialogue showed on more than one occasion, that signing a bad treaty is worse than signing no treaty at all. ****** #12 eurasianet.org March 26, 2002 RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN APPROACH A RECKONING POINT By Alex Vatanka Editor's Note: Alex Vatanka is a journalist specializing in Russian and Central Asian affairs. Iranian-Russian relations are approaching a reckoning point. In recent months, Moscow has striven to remain on good terms with both the United States and Iran, two countries whose own bilateral relations have been marked by growing hostility. Russian President Vladimir Putin may soon have to make difficult strategic choices, and he now appears reluctant to do anything that would disrupt the emerging US-Russian partnership. At the same time, the Russian leader seems intent on keeping his options open. The postponement of Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi's visit to Moscow, originally scheduled for mid February, was the first sign of discord in Iranian-Russian relations. Kharrazi cited an overcrowded schedule as the reason for the postponement, but some observers suggest the Iranian foreign minister put off the visit after Putin declined to schedule a tete-a-tete meeting. Putin's cagey approach towards Iran hints at the evolving nature of Russia's foreign policy. Putin's options are based on calculated risks. Iran has been a major purchaser of Russian military hardware for almost a decade. Yet, while Russia surely appreciates the income from Iranian arms sales, Putin evidently believes that the United States has more potentially to offer. The Russian leader has a number of reasons for not wanting to alienate the United States at present. For one, Washington could play a key role in securing Russian membership in the World Trade Organization. Putin also wants to retain as much Russian leverage as possible over the ongoing NATO expansion debate. Good bilateral relations would also improve the chances for stronger arms control treaties. Putin has offered unflagging support for the US-led anti-terrorism campaign, in the face of increasingly vocal domestic opposition. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The Russian president is now eager to see whether his support for the United States since September 11 will pay off with concrete American concessions. Putin's decisions may be influenced heavily by the outcome of his scheduled May summit with US President George W. Bush. While Russia is not prepared to surrender its Iranian ambitions entirely, bonding with Iran ranks lower on the Russian list of priorities than pleasing the United States. This dynamic reinforces others that are seriously limiting the bounds of Russo-Iranian alliance. The gradual improvement in bilateral relations between Iran and Russia over the last decade was largely the result of a complex mix of geopolitical developments. In part it came from Iran's international isolation in the 1980s, ongoing US-Iranian tension and a Russian desire to secure a larger share of global military trade. Iran, subject to US-led arms embargoes, needs a reliable source of weapons and technology. Meanwhile, Russian authorities candidly assert that arms exports are an economic priority. Putin has linked arms export revenue to the country's budget for scientific, engineering and manufacturing jobs and capacity. Indeed, Moscow wants to replace Britain as the world's second-largest arms exporter by the end of this decade. Iran remains a significant factor in Russian calculations in this regard. Accordingly, Iran has ordered an estimated US$4 billion in Russian hardware, technology and services since 1989 and may soon become the world's third-largest buyer (after China and India) of Russian military equipment. Despite this arms trade connection, experts believe Russia and Iran do not make natural diplomatic partners. The two states have interests that overlap in a few areas, including shared disdain for Afghanistan's deposed Taliban regime, and an inherent suspicion of American, Turkish and Pakistani ambitions in Central Asia. However, Russian and Iranian objectives are divergent in several key areas, including the development of energy resources and export routes. Russian and Iranian diplomats have argued for months over the territorial division of the Caspian Sea [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. In addition, the two countries have competed over proposed pipeline routes. While Russia and Iran might initially appear to have a mutual interest in counterbalancing America's rising power around the Caspian, their own competition for the same clients will probably block co-ordination of policy between them in the next several years. Russian geo-strategic aspirations in the Middle East will not necessarily encourage stronger ties. Moscow had stronger ties with Saddam Hussein's Iraq than with Iran during the Soviet era, and this dynamic still seems intact. Like its relationship with Iran, Russia's friendliness to Iraq plays out in economic terms. Witness the Iraqi government's extensive concessions to Russian energy and construction firms. In Iran, Russian participation in the energy sector is minimal and the presence of Russian technicians is mainly limited to those engaged at the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant. Russia and Iran also very often clash on crude oil price forecasts, even though both states are major oil exporters dependent on oil revenues. Russia has made it clear that it is interested in gaining more market share, while Iran - seemingly always hawkish in promoting production cuts to sustain prices - is looking to bring crude prices back up to the range of US$22-25 per barrel. Meanwhile, Russian officials have said the country can live with oil prices at US$18 per barrel or lower. (Iran's state machinery depends more on oil revenues than Russia's does.) Both states in essence envisage themselves as major global energy players, and to date there has been more rivalry between them than collaboration. So Moscow's relationship with Tehran looks opportunistic rather than geopolitical. While US-Iranian hostilities persist, Moscow can continue to pursue its lucrative business dealings with Tehran. However, the flow of Russian military hardware to Iran in exchange for cash constitutes pretty much the only natural symbiosis for the two states. Indeed, in the event that the US and Iran normalize relations, Tehran seems more naturally destined to confront Moscow than to court it. ****** #13 From WPS Monitoring Agency www.wps.ru/e_index.html POLITICAL FORECASTS [press review] March 27, 2002 HALFWAY THROUGH PUTIN'S FIRST TERM: CLOSE TO STRANGERS, A STRANGER AMONG THOSE CLOSE TO HIM Leonid Radzikhovsky has written an article in the "Itogi" weekly about the reaction of Russian society to the president's current foreign policy agenda. Radzikhovsky stresses that despite the present "disappointment with America", and all offences and grievances that have accumulated in Russia since the September 11 events, the government ought to consistently continue integrating with the west, no matter what the west is like. In these terms, the choice of President Putin is 100% correct: it is senseless for Russia to look to the east, while it is unable to restore itself independently without western investment. The only solution is to look west, consistently and stubbornly: "Although policies without any turnarounds are unpopular in Russia, this is the only thing that is likely to yield results," stresses the observer of "Itogi". Sergey Karaganov, chairman of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, writes in the "Moskovskie Novosti" weekly: "The new role of the United Stated is a major psychological issue for all, not only for us. The US has become too strong for everybody." Apparently, it is not unwise but suicidal to confront a clearly stronger partner. However, a defeat for the distasteful US policy in another escapade would be similarly dangerous for Russia: it is insane to increase the instability of an already dangerous and unsteady world. Karaganov emphasizes, "We are hardly likely to protect or promote any of our interests in a chaos, especially it take into account our decreasing economic and foreign policy resources." Head of the Center for strategic analysis and forecast Dmitry Olshansky recollected in the "Rossia" paper, "For over two years the West has been perplexed, "Who is Mister Putin?" In September 2001, the West calmed down: it became obvious that Mr. Putin is a quite adequate leader of the former great power, who is ready to acquire the role of a junior partner of another, now the only in the world, great power." However, in fact the situation is more complicated. Apparently, the west is not satisfied with the present state of Russia. For instance, a well-known American expert in Russia Zbignev Bezinsky insists that Russia should grow smaller and be deprived of its nuclear weapons. Olshansky concludes, "Having stopped being a super-power, we have found ourselves in the grip of exterior forces." Today, when Russia has no interior resources, it dependence of foreign decisions is inevitable. According to Olshansky, it is necessary to prepare the country for this, and Putin realizes it very well. However, he states, "We must not admit it. That is why we must stabilize all we can and wait for the country to understand it." Meanwhile, despite all the attempts to preserve the country from a break-up, it is still a threat: "To be honest, the west is dreaming of this, and we are too open for its influence." On the other hand, the people do not want it at all, and the president cannot help taking this into consideration two years before the elections. Overall, according to Olshansky, Russia should not rely on Putin's stabilization, "It is a temporary stabilization, the upheavals are not over yet. It is not ruled out that the main shakes are still ahead." The "Izvestia" paper wrote, "Vladimir Putin and the whole country enters the second half of his first presidency in stagnation." However, it is a "good" stagnation: as stagnation is an inevitable phase of development of any system, that is necessary for realizing the results and concentrating forces for further growth." Besides, this stage is about to be over in Russia: it is time to determine further plans. There are no achievements to speak about, "We have lost competitiveness in all areas that allow to influence in today's world. In ten or twenty years of such "development", Russia will lose not only its influence, but also its sovereignty." Today the country needs more than reforms, states "Izvestia". A breakthrough is necessary to cardinally change the situation. First, it is necessary to determine the priorities, as it is senseless to seek success in many directions at a time, "Too much has been lost, too little force is left." The president urgency needs a competent and initiative team, which is the major issue for him st present. According to "Izvestia", it does not matter who surrounds the president. It is important whether the presidential surrounding is able to suggest adequate ways for resolving issues." Besides, it is also important whether the presidential milieu dares to point to the president's mistakes. According to the paper, there are just a few such people in the Kremlin, Mikhail Kasyanov and Alexander Voloshin are among them. At the same time, the team of "St. Petersburgers" cannot boast of efficient decisions. According to invited independent experts, "anonymous experts in KGB officers' psychology", "the profession of these people teaches them to create barriers", they are unable to generate bold economic ideas and strategies. Consequently, there are two options for the Russian future, both are sad: either Russia's domestic politics remains amorphous and unsystematic, or Russia can expect "authoritarianism with a vague program of creative activities, against punitive ones." At the same time, "Izvestia" believes that over the two years of Putin's presidency, much has been done of what was impossible for earlier teams for a long period of time, with the help of "changing the psychological climate around the Kremlin". "There must not be a situation when it is impossible to pass through the parliament not a single, even the most necessary law, only because the Duma refused to accept any presidential initiative." At present, the situation is opposite, "All keep looking at the Kremlin leaders, are all eyes waiting for wise orders to get out of their mouths, along with abundant money showers." On the other hand, "Izvestia" noted, the people, who are personally loyal to Putin "do not believe in what is being done and in what is to be done." According to the paper, this is the reason of slipping of the reforms and of loss of their sense. Overall, it should be noted that the actions of the presidential team are raising more and more questions in Russian society, unlike the actions of the president. "Izvestia" cited results of polls, the ROMIR and the Public Opinion foundations held purposely on the threshold of the second anniversary of Putin's presidency. According to ROMIR, over a third of Muscovites stated that over the past two years their attitude toward President Putin has improved, about a half of respondent said it has not changed. Answering the question "How has Putin changed over the past two years?" 49% of respondents of the Public Opinion foundation said he has not changed at all, 31% of people said he has changed for better. At the same time, participants of poll were much sterner about the presidential team. Responding the question: "Do the activities of the presidential team improve or worsen the image of the president?" 33.4% of respondents stated "certainly worsen" or "rather worsen". The Public Opinion foundation found out that only 43% of Russians consider the president an independent figure, while 46% of respondents are convinced of the opposite. According to the participants of the poll, Boris Yeltsin, Anatoly Chubais, Alexander Voloshin, Yury Luzhkov, Yevgeny Primakov, and German Gref exert the most influence on the Russian president. Rector of the Supreme Economics School Yaroslav Kuzminov wrote in the "Moskovskie Novosti" weekly, "So far the state can rely neither on its own procedures, nor on its own officials." According to Kuzminov, the resistance to reforms of Russian society is a normal phenomenon, "If all are satisfied with the reform it is no longer a reform." Besides, the author notes, prior experience taught the Russian population not to trust any actions of the authorities. In these terms, the best way out for the authorities is to reject all activities. While it is impossible to avoid actions, the authorities should disguised them as "a routine" but not announce a reform. Kuzminov believes that the Russians are at present "allergic" at the word "reform", "Absence of public support of reforms has become a stereotype of their acceptance." According to the author, politicians and the media also greatly contributed to this, today it is possible to speak of "phantom fears" the population feels about any actions of the authorities. On the other hand, there is no open resistance to the reforms, although the reformers are under a constant "informational pressure". It is hard to reveal the customers of such informational pressure, but, according to Kuzminov, in fact financial-industrial groupings have most of all reasons to be anxious, as they are losing influence in the government and in the presidential administration. First of all, it concerns those, who have "more skills in working on the political and informational markets and an experience in "resolving issues" according to a traditional for Russian 1990s pattern." At the same time, the author thinks it is doubtful that such informational attacks are the major obstacle for the authorities, "The reason must be the uncertainly of the authorities how to carry the reforms out." Denis Dragunsky wrote in the "Novoye Vremya" magazine, "At first it seemed that after Yeltsin the country needed Zyuganov." Indeed, after Yeltsin's radical reforms, after all social and economic upheavals of the "revolutionary decade", society needed time to come to its senses. However, although the present leader of the Communist Party of Russia would fit very well the Russian majority that have not put up with the declared course of liberal reforms, Russia would have to place the rest of the world behind another iron curtain. That is why Putin was elected the president: "They always elect the president the one who must be elected. The new president turned to be a "surprisingly opportunistic politician" in the good meaning of the world "able to adjust to the changing reality." According to the author, in these terms, Putin has no rivals. At least he is far ahead his supporters and electors in his evolving, "Putin has transformed from a vague security officer with a vague patriotic rhetoric into an undoubtedly foreign policy pro-westerner and an economic liberal." Denis Dragunsky gave his own answer to many bitter, angry, and perplexed questions on Chechnya, and liberal economic views, and persuading NTV, and attempts to create a power hierarchy, a boring, tough, and realistic answer. According to him, at present two simultaneous processes are on in Russia: "decay of the old Soviet totalitarian institutions and establishment of new, modern, and democratic ones." Unfortunately, these processes are impossible to merge together. Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried to do it for a long time, and both failed to turn the Soviet parliamentary system into a democratic one. It turned out to be impossible to transform the Soviet repressive system into a law enforcement system. That is why Russia "has to put up with stinking and cramps of the decaying Soviet system". The author is also convinced that Russia should not rely on self-development: "having decayed, old institutions easily self-reproduce in the form of nonviable mutants, for instance, the Federation Council". Politics and economy will be able to develop new approaches only through integration with developed democratic countries. Overall, the author states, main achievement of the first two years of Putin's presidency is that the country has made a colossal turn to a real political cooperation with the west. This is also a guarantee of irreversibility of the democratic reforms in Russia. It is a rather important at the moment when the authorities have almost exhausted the people's "trust resource". "Novoye Vremya" cited the results of a poll, held by the Ekho Moskvy radio station. Answering the question "Do you expect your financial position to improve or to worsen", only 13% of respondents were optimistic, while 87% of people are expecting more hardships in their lives. Such figures are a disturbing discord at the background of high presidential popularity ratings. Unfortunately, popularity rating of Russian politicians is far from being an analysis: as soon as Russians are asked direct questions on this or that action of the authorities, the rating breaks apart. However, few Russians have determined what they expect from the president. As Dmitry Olshansky stated, the particularity of Putin's presidency are tightly connected with mental peculiarities of his personality, which, in turn, are mostly determined by the stages of his biography. As is known, there are two of them: an intelligence officer and an official. As in known, the first and foremost demand to any intelligence officer is not to outstand. Putin meets this requirement perfectly, "he has always been like everyone else. Even now, his only difference from other people is his position." So Olshansky defines Putin- politician as an "outstanding artist of political mimicry." As the author reflects, it may be this peculiarity of Putin's that did not allow the Russian president to become a real public politician as the president should be, "He keep silent too much." Moreover, he principally lacks an interior need to talk to people, not only to his voters, but also to his associates. For instance, in relations with the west, Putin fully "distanced even from his own Foreign Ministry, which sometimes is unaware how to react on certain events." Olshansky believes that the president has remained a stranger among those close to him, and this is no misfortune for him: "He has learned to work like this... He likes this, he feels at ease this way." On the other hand, according to the author, this also explains the president's failure "to always defend the nation and the people, even if they are mistaken. This is the main danger, which he does not realize." The "Vremya MN" paper states, "Putin has no drive in international support." First of all, it is because there is no drive in Putin himself, "There is a feeling that by the middle of his term, we see only half of Putin." At the same time, according to the paper, formally the president is not to blame at all. It would be unfair to accuse the Kremlin of absence of personnel policy: there have been enough dismissals and appointments over the two years, from chair of the Federation Council to the head of the Central Bank. There is also an economic policy in Russia, as well as military reforms. Stagnation in foreign affairs since September 11 has been out of the question. Nonetheless, there is still an impression of Russia being at a stand-still, as well as an impression of "Putin's political intangibility". Of course, the president is pursuing a consistent liberal agenda in the economy - however, this agenda is too quiet, boring, and apolitical. In fact, any Russian ruler always starts with accusations against his predecessor, with revolutionary reforms, and calls for great achievements. Meanwhile, according to observer Radzikhovsky, Putin seems to be carrying out an experiment, "Is it possible to run a country if you politically put to sleep its citizens and the elite?" At the same time, it is unclear whether Russian society will manage to remain in its political half-dreaming in the future. As Andrei Fedorov, the head of the Foundation for political research and consulting, said in his interview with the "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" paper, the second half of Putin's presidency is to be much harder than the first one. In the opinion of Fedorov, the major failure of the present host of the Kremlin is that he stopped reforms halfway. According to the expert, in the next two years, the president will try to maximally strengthen his power and to accomplish establishment of his regime, "So far, there is Putin, but there is no Putin's regime. While Putin's personal charisma is no longer enough for realization of reforms." Nonetheless, "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" states that if Russians do have any complaints about the president, these are about his image, not his policies. According to the Public Opinion Foundation, the people consider the head of state not emotional enough, for instance, he was rather indifferent about protecting Russian sportsmen at the winter Salt-Lake City Olympic games. Overall, according to the paper, people are little concerned about the sense of the present policy of the Kremlin, and the president feels it, "At least, we cannot see Putin's "crisis of the middle of political life" and he acts as if he can be a president forever." Two years are a half of presidency, but this term is hardly likely to be the only one for Putin. This statement is very important as it is made by a Berezovsky's newspaper. From the standpoint of the "Gazeta" paper, the main difference of the second Putin's presidency anniversary is wide spreading of the term "St. Petersburger", which usually accompanies the majority of the president's personnel appointments. As analyst of the Moscow Carnegie foundation Andrei Ryabov said in his interview with "Gazeta", "personnel is a derivation of strategy". At the same time, Putin's interior political strategy is rather uncertain, which causes fluctuations in personnel appointments. However, according to Andrei Ryabov, Putin achieved his famous stability with the help of maintaining a balance between the old Yeltsin's clans and those, who came to the power together with Putin. The newcomers are very different: some of them are security or KGB officers, others are liberals like Dmitry Kozak. Moreover, the president managed to maintain balance between them as well, "as he cannot understand where to go further". Besides, judging by everything, such a policy is to be continued, at least as long as there are no serious economic issues in the country. Ryabov believes that Putin's main issue is his inability to make timely political decisions. Meanwhile, the Russian political system can be effective only if the necessary decisions are made in time, as it is monocentrical: the most dangerous thing is not making any decisions at all, hoping that things will settle down by themselves. As for the forthcoming presidential elections, "Gazeta" thinks, things are clear about them: in the situation when "there is no team, no strategy, but only an objective to be reelected" an alliance with the old elite is inevitable. Judging by everything, Putin relies on the relations with the large businesses he formed, via the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Trade-Industrial Chamber. On the one hand, the main results of the Kremlin's efforts in this area is moving the process of making decisions from "informal centers and all kinds of groups of Tanya Dyachenko's friends to official state instances." On the other hand, Russian tycoons, the economic almightiness of which has increased under the new power, resolve most of their issues informally. Undoubtedly, during the 2004 presidential elections the large business will agree to support Putin under certain conditions, for instance, to limit activities of the Prosecutor General's Office, not to interfere with business, and so on. In exchange, Putin will receive the main prize - a second term in office. It should be noted that such prospects resemble the notorious year of 1996; the only difference is that now the president is young, healthy, and athletic - that is why Russians like him so much. Mavra Kosichkina (Translated by Arina Yevtikhova) *******