#8
The Russia Journal
March 22-28, 2002
Of nukes, maneuvers and stubborn perceptions
By GORDON M. HAHN
(Dr. Gordon M. Hahn is The Russia Journal’s political analyst and a
visiting research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.)
With the next Russian-American summit two months away, the West has still
failed to squarely face the fundamental and by now decade-old questions
undermining its relationship with Russia. Which side has greater capabilities,
the West or Russia? If the tables were turned, how would U.S. decision-makers,
as "rational actors," respond to the overwhelming countervailing
capabilities Russia "perceives" and encounters from the West?
The news that the United States has included Russia on a list of countries to
be targeted by American nuclear weapons – along with China, North Korea, Iraq,
Iran, Syria and Libya – has sent shock waves through political elites here and
across the Big Pond. On the one hand, this "news" is not surprising;
on another, it is shocking, raising serious doubts about the ability of Western
bureaucracies to overcome old habits.
It has been known for a long time that Russia was not "de-targeted"
by the United States after the Cold War. That Russia has preserved such status
might be regarded an achievement of sorts: It has retained one trait that marked
its superpower greatness. The cycle in which the United States annually
rediscovers that the Cold War is over and promises to develop a "new
relationship" with Russia is more striking.
This is news because it spectacularly debunks a fashionable argument made by
U.S. officials and analysts. Russia should not be so disturbed by America’s
nuclear arsenal, the argument goes, because the United States is not unsettled
by British or French nuclear warheads and vice versa. Friends do not begrudge
friends’ "defense capabilities." Unfortunately, this formula leaves
out the most important variables: U.S. weapons are not zeroed in on London or
Paris, nor are British and French nuclear projectiles aimed at Washington.
To understand Russian reaction to the West’s military posture, we should
consider a concise statement made by George Shultz, who served as secretary of
state during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. In regards to the fundamental
principle that should inform national security decision-making, he noted that
states design policy not on the basis of the intentions of other states, but on
the basis of their capabilities. Repeat this to yourself, several times if need
be, and then take a gander at the world through the security calculus of the
Kremlin or, say, from Arbatskaya Ploshchad, where Russia’s General Staff
divines defense policy.
U.S. nuclear weapons target some 2,000 sites in Russia. Others are the
targets of British and French nuclear arms. American troops are now being
stationed across the C.I.S. – as of now "only" in four states:
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. NATO member Turkey is ethnically
close to Azerbaijan, and some leaders in Baku have called for a NATO presence in
their country.
A high-ranking delegation of U.S. officers recently visited Armenia to
discuss stepping up military cooperation. The U.S.-Georgian operation in the
Pankisi Gorge will target only Taliban and al-Qaida forces, giving Chechen
terrorists a pass. Later this year, the three former Soviet Baltic republics,
along with as many as four other countries near Russia’s western borders, will
join NATO, already the most powerful military machine in history.
All of this heightens the effect of another recent event. Last week, NATO
conducted military maneuvers near Russia’s borders. Besides NATO members, the
exercise, "Strong Resolve 2002," involved Estonia, Lithuania, Finland,
Sweden, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
The scenario envisioned an enemy attack on NATO from the north and a
simultaneous invasion of a Central European NATO member state. Unless Latvia –
the only northern state besides Russia not included in the exercise – is
regarded as a potential enemy of the very alliance it is about to join and,
unless Belarus is considered a potential invader, the only possible enemy in
this scenario is Russia.
This is reminiscent of another NATO celebration held two years ago, which
involved supporting Ukraine’s state integrity against an uprising by a
national minority supported by a foreign compatriot state. Unless a Crimean
Tatar state that I do not know about has materialized, the only possible enemy
in that scenario also was our "partner" Russia.
In short, it does not take much, if any, paranoia for a Russian, not to
mention a Russian general, to feel threatened by the United States and NATO.
Capabilities are always malignant. If Russian generals subscribe to the
Shultz Principle, they are simply duty-bound to muster all resources to counter
the hard facts of the potential Western threat. A general’s charge is not to
protect an economic transition or the consolidation of democracy. He can
rationally conclude that any capability is a potential threat, regardless of its
improbability.
Moreover, perceptions are stubborn things, especially when they have a
history behind them. They can persist long after the reality they once reflected
has changed. In the case of the end of the Cold War, the persistence of old
perceptions has been evident on both sides. The policy of mutual threat
reduction that used to define Soviet-American relations has not eliminated
"mutual threat perception."
Given the preponderance of Western power, Russian "perceptions" are
a rational reaction to Western capabilities, prolonging the inertia of the Cold
War legacy and traditional "zapadnophobia." Western and American
perceptions reflect mostly the memory of Soviet capabilities on top of ancient
European Russophobia.
Irrational misperceptions should be more easily shed by the Cold War’s
victors than by its vanquished. The historical lessons of Weimar, Versailles and
the Marshall Plan counsel magnanimity in victorious hegemony and efforts to
assuage the suspicions of beleaguered former foes.
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