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CDI Russia Weekly #199 Contents   Plain Text - Entire Issue

#13
From WPS Monitoring Agency
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POLITICAL FORECASTS [press review]
March 27, 2002
HALFWAY THROUGH PUTIN'S FIRST TERM: CLOSE TO STRANGERS, A STRANGER AMONG THOSE CLOSE TO HIM

Leonid Radzikhovsky has written an article in the "Itogi" weekly about the reaction of Russian society to the president's current foreign policy agenda. Radzikhovsky stresses that despite the present "disappointment with America", and all offences and grievances that have accumulated in Russia since the September 11 events, the government ought to consistently continue integrating with the west, no matter what the west is like. In these terms, the choice of President Putin is 100% correct: it is senseless for Russia to look to the east, while it is unable to restore itself independently without western investment. The only solution is to look west, consistently and stubbornly: "Although policies without any turnarounds are unpopular in Russia, this is the only thing that is likely to yield results," stresses the observer of "Itogi".

Sergey Karaganov, chairman of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, writes in the "Moskovskie Novosti" weekly: "The new role of the United Stated is a major psychological issue for all, not only for us. The US has become too strong for everybody."

Apparently, it is not unwise but suicidal to confront a clearly stronger partner. However, a defeat for the distasteful US policy in another escapade would be similarly dangerous for Russia: it is insane to increase the instability of an already dangerous and unsteady world. Karaganov emphasizes, "We are hardly likely to protect or promote any of our interests in a chaos, especially it take into account our decreasing economic and foreign policy resources."

Head of the Center for strategic analysis and forecast Dmitry Olshansky recollected in the "Rossia" paper, "For over two years the West has been perplexed, "Who is Mister Putin?" In September 2001, the West calmed down: it became obvious that Mr. Putin is a quite adequate leader of the former great power, who is ready to acquire the role of a junior partner of another, now the only in the world, great power."

However, in fact the situation is more complicated. Apparently, the west is not satisfied with the present state of Russia. For instance, a well-known American expert in Russia Zbignev Bezinsky insists that Russia should grow smaller and be deprived of its nuclear weapons. Olshansky concludes, "Having stopped being a super-power, we have found ourselves in the grip of exterior forces." Today, when Russia has no interior resources, it dependence of foreign decisions is inevitable. According to Olshansky, it is necessary to prepare the country for this, and Putin realizes it very well. However, he states, "We must not admit it. That is why we must stabilize all we can and wait for the country to understand it."

Meanwhile, despite all the attempts to preserve the country from a break-up, it is still a threat: "To be honest, the west is dreaming of this, and we are too open for its influence." On the other hand, the people do not want it at all, and the president cannot help taking this into consideration two years before the elections. Overall, according to Olshansky, Russia should not rely on Putin's stabilization, "It is a temporary stabilization, the upheavals are not over yet. It is not ruled out that the main shakes are still ahead."

The "Izvestia" paper wrote, "Vladimir Putin and the whole country enters the second half of his first presidency in stagnation." However, it is a "good" stagnation: as stagnation is an inevitable phase of development of any system, that is necessary for realizing the results and concentrating forces for further growth."

Besides, this stage is about to be over in Russia: it is time to determine further plans. There are no achievements to speak about, "We have lost competitiveness in all areas that allow to influence in today's world. In ten or twenty years of such "development", Russia will lose not only its influence, but also its sovereignty."

Today the country needs more than reforms, states "Izvestia". A breakthrough is necessary to cardinally change the situation. First, it is necessary to determine the priorities, as it is senseless to seek success in many directions at a time, "Too much has been lost, too little force is left." The president urgency needs a competent and initiative team, which is the major issue for him st present.

According to "Izvestia", it does not matter who surrounds the president. It is important whether the presidential surrounding is able to suggest adequate ways for resolving issues." Besides, it is also important whether the presidential milieu dares to point to the president's mistakes. According to the paper, there are just a few such people in the Kremlin, Mikhail Kasyanov and Alexander Voloshin are among them. At the same time, the team of "St. Petersburgers" cannot boast of efficient decisions. According to invited independent experts, "anonymous experts in KGB officers' psychology", "the profession of these people teaches them to create barriers", they are unable to generate bold economic ideas and strategies. Consequently, there are two options for the Russian future, both are sad: either Russia's domestic politics remains amorphous and unsystematic, or Russia can expect "authoritarianism with a vague program of creative activities, against punitive ones."

At the same time, "Izvestia" believes that over the two years of Putin's presidency, much has been done of what was impossible for earlier teams for a long period of time, with the help of "changing the psychological climate around the Kremlin". "There must not be a situation when it is impossible to pass through the parliament not a single, even the most necessary law, only because the Duma refused to accept any presidential initiative." At present, the situation is opposite, "All keep looking at the Kremlin leaders, are all eyes waiting for wise orders to get out of their mouths, along with abundant money showers."

On the other hand, "Izvestia" noted, the people, who are personally loyal to Putin "do not believe in what is being done and in what is to be done." According to the paper, this is the reason of slipping of the reforms and of loss of their sense.

Overall, it should be noted that the actions of the presidential team are raising more and more questions in Russian society, unlike the actions of the president. "Izvestia" cited results of polls, the ROMIR and the Public Opinion foundations held purposely on the threshold of the second anniversary of Putin's presidency.

According to ROMIR, over a third of Muscovites stated that over the past two years their attitude toward President Putin has improved, about a half of respondent said it has not changed. Answering the question "How has Putin changed over the past two years?" 49% of respondents of the Public Opinion foundation said he has not changed at all, 31% of people said he has changed for better.

At the same time, participants of poll were much sterner about the presidential team. Responding the question: "Do the activities of the presidential team improve or worsen the image of the president?" 33.4% of respondents stated "certainly worsen" or "rather worsen". The Public Opinion foundation found out that only 43% of Russians consider the president an independent figure, while 46% of respondents are convinced of the opposite. According to the participants of the poll, Boris Yeltsin, Anatoly Chubais, Alexander Voloshin, Yury Luzhkov, Yevgeny Primakov, and German Gref exert the most influence on the Russian president.

Rector of the Supreme Economics School Yaroslav Kuzminov wrote in the "Moskovskie Novosti" weekly, "So far the state can rely neither on its own procedures, nor on its own officials." According to Kuzminov, the resistance to reforms of Russian society is a normal phenomenon, "If all are satisfied with the reform it is no longer a reform." Besides, the author notes, prior experience taught the Russian population not to trust any actions of the authorities. In these terms, the best way out for the authorities is to reject all activities. While it is impossible to avoid actions, the authorities should disguised them as "a routine" but not announce a reform.

Kuzminov believes that the Russians are at present "allergic" at the word "reform", "Absence of public support of reforms has become a stereotype of their acceptance." According to the author, politicians and the media also greatly contributed to this, today it is possible to speak of "phantom fears" the population feels about any actions of the authorities.

On the other hand, there is no open resistance to the reforms, although the reformers are under a constant "informational pressure". It is hard to reveal the customers of such informational pressure, but, according to Kuzminov, in fact financial-industrial groupings have most of all reasons to be anxious, as they are losing influence in the government and in the presidential administration. First of all, it concerns those, who have "more skills in working on the political and informational markets and an experience in "resolving issues" according to a traditional for Russian 1990s pattern."

At the same time, the author thinks it is doubtful that such informational attacks are the major obstacle for the authorities, "The reason must be the uncertainly of the authorities how to carry the reforms out."

Denis Dragunsky wrote in the "Novoye Vremya" magazine, "At first it seemed that after Yeltsin the country needed Zyuganov." Indeed, after Yeltsin's radical reforms, after all social and economic upheavals of the "revolutionary decade", society needed time to come to its senses. However, although the present leader of the Communist Party of Russia would fit very well the Russian majority that have not put up with the declared course of liberal reforms, Russia would have to place the rest of the world behind another iron curtain. That is why Putin was elected the president: "They always elect the president the one who must be elected. The new president turned to be a "surprisingly opportunistic politician" in the good meaning of the world "able to adjust to the changing reality." According to the author, in these terms, Putin has no rivals. At least he is far ahead his supporters and electors in his evolving, "Putin has transformed from a vague security officer with a vague patriotic rhetoric into an undoubtedly foreign policy pro-westerner and an economic liberal."

Denis Dragunsky gave his own answer to many bitter, angry, and perplexed questions on Chechnya, and liberal economic views, and persuading NTV, and attempts to create a power hierarchy, a boring, tough, and realistic answer.

According to him, at present two simultaneous processes are on in Russia: "decay of the old Soviet totalitarian institutions and establishment of new, modern, and democratic ones." Unfortunately, these processes are impossible to merge together. Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried to do it for a long time, and both failed to turn the Soviet parliamentary system into a democratic one. It turned out to be impossible to transform the Soviet repressive system into a law enforcement system. That is why Russia "has to put up with stinking and cramps of the decaying Soviet system". The author is also convinced that Russia should not rely on self-development: "having decayed, old institutions easily self-reproduce in the form of nonviable mutants, for instance, the Federation Council". Politics and economy will be able to develop new approaches only through integration with developed democratic countries. Overall, the author states, main achievement of the first two years of Putin's presidency is that the country has made a colossal turn to a real political cooperation with the west. This is also a guarantee of irreversibility of the democratic reforms in Russia.

It is a rather important at the moment when the authorities have almost exhausted the people's "trust resource". "Novoye Vremya" cited the results of a poll, held by the Ekho Moskvy radio station. Answering the question "Do you expect your financial position to improve or to worsen", only 13% of respondents were optimistic, while 87% of people are expecting more hardships in their lives. Such figures are a disturbing discord at the background of high presidential popularity ratings.

Unfortunately, popularity rating of Russian politicians is far from being an analysis: as soon as Russians are asked direct questions on this or that action of the authorities, the rating breaks apart.

However, few Russians have determined what they expect from the president. As Dmitry Olshansky stated, the particularity of Putin's presidency are tightly connected with mental peculiarities of his personality, which, in turn, are mostly determined by the stages of his biography. As is known, there are two of them: an intelligence officer and an official.

As in known, the first and foremost demand to any intelligence officer is not to outstand. Putin meets this requirement perfectly, "he has always been like everyone else. Even now, his only difference from other people is his position." So Olshansky defines Putin- politician as an "outstanding artist of political mimicry."

As the author reflects, it may be this peculiarity of Putin's that did not allow the Russian president to become a real public politician as the president should be, "He keep silent too much." Moreover, he principally lacks an interior need to talk to people, not only to his voters, but also to his associates. For instance, in relations with the west, Putin fully "distanced even from his own Foreign Ministry, which sometimes is unaware how to react on certain events." Olshansky believes that the president has remained a stranger among those close to him, and this is no misfortune for him: "He has learned to work like this... He likes this, he feels at ease this way."

On the other hand, according to the author, this also explains the president's failure "to always defend the nation and the people, even if they are mistaken. This is the main danger, which he does not realize."

The "Vremya MN" paper states, "Putin has no drive in international support." First of all, it is because there is no drive in Putin himself, "There is a feeling that by the middle of his term, we see only half of Putin."

At the same time, according to the paper, formally the president is not to blame at all. It would be unfair to accuse the Kremlin of absence of personnel policy: there have been enough dismissals and appointments over the two years, from chair of the Federation Council to the head of the Central Bank. There is also an economic policy in Russia, as well as military reforms. Stagnation in foreign affairs since September 11 has been out of the question. Nonetheless, there is still an impression of Russia being at a stand-still, as well as an impression of "Putin's political intangibility".

Of course, the president is pursuing a consistent liberal agenda in the economy - however, this agenda is too quiet, boring, and apolitical. In fact, any Russian ruler always starts with accusations against his predecessor, with revolutionary reforms, and calls for great achievements. Meanwhile, according to observer Radzikhovsky, Putin seems to be carrying out an experiment, "Is it possible to run a country if you politically put to sleep its citizens and the elite?"

At the same time, it is unclear whether Russian society will manage to remain in its political half-dreaming in the future. As Andrei Fedorov, the head of the Foundation for political research and consulting, said in his interview with the "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" paper, the second half of Putin's presidency is to be much harder than the first one.

In the opinion of Fedorov, the major failure of the present host of the Kremlin is that he stopped reforms halfway. According to the expert, in the next two years, the president will try to maximally strengthen his power and to accomplish establishment of his regime, "So far, there is Putin, but there is no Putin's regime. While Putin's personal charisma is no longer enough for realization of reforms."

Nonetheless, "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" states that if Russians do have any complaints about the president, these are about his image, not his policies. According to the Public Opinion Foundation, the people consider the head of state not emotional enough, for instance, he was rather indifferent about protecting Russian sportsmen at the winter Salt-Lake City Olympic games.

Overall, according to the paper, people are little concerned about the sense of the present policy of the Kremlin, and the president feels it, "At least, we cannot see Putin's "crisis of the middle of political life" and he acts as if he can be a president forever."

Two years are a half of presidency, but this term is hardly likely to be the only one for Putin. This statement is very important as it is made by a Berezovsky's newspaper.

From the standpoint of the "Gazeta" paper, the main difference of the second Putin's presidency anniversary is wide spreading of the term "St. Petersburger", which usually accompanies the majority of the president's personnel appointments.

As analyst of the Moscow Carnegie foundation Andrei Ryabov said in his interview with "Gazeta", "personnel is a derivation of strategy". At the same time, Putin's interior political strategy is rather uncertain, which causes fluctuations in personnel appointments.

However, according to Andrei Ryabov, Putin achieved his famous stability with the help of maintaining a balance between the old Yeltsin's clans and those, who came to the power together with Putin. The newcomers are very different: some of them are security or KGB officers, others are liberals like Dmitry Kozak. Moreover, the president managed to maintain balance between them as well, "as he cannot understand where to go further". Besides, judging by everything, such a policy is to be continued, at least as long as there are no serious economic issues in the country.

Ryabov believes that Putin's main issue is his inability to make timely political decisions.

Meanwhile, the Russian political system can be effective only if the necessary decisions are made in time, as it is monocentrical: the most dangerous thing is not making any decisions at all, hoping that things will settle down by themselves.

As for the forthcoming presidential elections, "Gazeta" thinks, things are clear about them: in the situation when "there is no team, no strategy, but only an objective to be reelected" an alliance with the old elite is inevitable.

Judging by everything, Putin relies on the relations with the large businesses he formed, via the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Trade-Industrial Chamber.

On the one hand, the main results of the Kremlin's efforts in this area is moving the process of making decisions from "informal centers and all kinds of groups of Tanya Dyachenko's friends to official state instances." On the other hand, Russian tycoons, the economic almightiness of which has increased under the new power, resolve most of their issues informally.

Undoubtedly, during the 2004 presidential elections the large business will agree to support Putin under certain conditions, for instance, to limit activities of the Prosecutor General's Office, not to interfere with business, and so on. In exchange, Putin will receive the main prize - a second term in office.

It should be noted that such prospects resemble the notorious year of 1996; the only difference is that now the president is young, healthy, and athletic - that is why Russians like him so much.

Mavra Kosichkina

(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova)

 

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