CDI Russia Weekly-#198
22 March 2002
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036
phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, 
economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation,
CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense 
Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. 

CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/

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Contents:
1. Interfax: Most Russians aren't disappointed in President Putin - Poll.
2. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Franks Praises Russia's Cooperation In
Antiterror Campaign.
3. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Army Pay, Same Old Story.
4. Vremya Novostei: Yuri Golotyuk, THE KREMLIN AND GENERALS VERSUS THE 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. Putin hands over the defense sector to the
military.
5. AFP: CIA chief cites Russia, China, North Korea as proliferators.
6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Anatoly Adamishin, WHY RUSSIA NEEDS TO PURSUE
PRO-WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY. The Need for New Values Is Recognised
in Russia Only in Words.
7. Itogi: Leonid Radzikhovsky, THIS IS THE ONLY WEST RUSSIA HAS. A strong
policy with regard to the USA and Europe entails consistent rapprochement,
rather than showy populist zigzags.
8. San Francisco Chronicle: Anna Badkhen, Georgia has its own agenda. 
U.S. trainers seen as allies against secessionists. 
9. Parlamentskaya Gazeta: Valery Gromak, BY NATO LOGIC, SUBVERSIVES ARE
BEST PEACEKEEPERS. The Strong Resolve 2002 NATO war games held close to Russia's 
borders over.
10. Moscow News: Sergei Putilov, U.S. Goes Back on Its Word.(re chemical
weapons)
11. The Russia Journal editorial: Still the status quo.(re US-Russia
relations)
12. Vedomosti:  Alexander Bekker and Vladimir Fedorin, Better Seen from a 
Distance. The IMF predicts that Russia will flourish.
13. RFE/RL: Kathleen Knox, NATO: Robertson Says Talks With Russia Are On 
Schedule.
14. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: KREMLIN, IZVESTIA QUESTION NEW YORK TIMES 
STORY ON CHECHNYA.
15. Kommersant-Vlast: Ilya Bulavinov, BEST REGARDS FROM A POTENTIAL ALLY.
It takes half a minute to re-target nuclear missiles.

*******

#1
Most Russians aren't disappointed in President Putin - Poll

MOSCOW. March 21 (Interfax) - A majority of Russians (61%) say that President 
Vladimir Putin has had more successes than failures, the Public Opinion 
Foundation reported on Thursday with reference to a poll of 1,500 town and 
country residents on March 16. 
   13% think the opposite. 
   79% of Putin's supporters think that he has had more successes, while 4% 
think the opposite. Supporters of Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov say 
that the Russian president has been mostly a failure (36% to 34% who think 
differently). 
   29% of the polled said that the president has had the most obvious 
successes in social policy, 10% named foreign policy and 5% named domestic 
policy. 3% said that Putin has been especially successful in economics, and 
3% named defense policy. 
   59% of the respondents said Putin has never given them a reason to be 
disappointed in him. 
   Yet 26% said that in some situations the president has been wrong. The 
most frequent example was the Kursk situation (7%). The events in Salt Lake 
City ranked second (4%). The respondents said they were disappointed that 
"the Olympic team was put at the mercy of America" and the reaction of the 
president was too restrained "as he did not stand up to protect the 
athletes." 
   3% of the polled blame Putin for the ongoing war in Chechnya. 

*******

#2
Russia: Franks Praises Russia's Cooperation In Antiterror Campaign
By Francesca Mereu

Moscow, 21 March 2002 (RFE/RL) -- During a visit to Moscow yesterday, U.S. 
General Tommy Franks, commander of American military operations in 
Afghanistan, praised Russia for its cooperation in the U.S.-led antiterrorist 
campaign in the country.

Speaking with reporters in Moscow, Franks said he appreciates the help Russia 
is providing to the antiterrorism operation in Afghanistan. In particular, 
Franks mentioned the work the Emergencies Ministry -- which is coordinating 
Russia's relief operations in Afghanistan -- has accomplished in the 
worn-torn country. 

Franks said Russia is an important part of the antiterrorism coalition: "In 
my meetings here in Moscow up to this point, I've been very much impressed 
with the fact that the Russian government remains a vital part of this 
coalition. And I think we all agree that we don't know how long the operation 
will continue."

Franks said Russia has helped in Afghanistan by, among other things, setting 
up a hospital, clearing a major tunnel and by granting prompt clearance for 
U.S. planes to fly over Russian territory. He said Russia also has liaison 
officers in the Florida headquarters of the U.S. Central Command. 

Franks was asked whether Russia's assistance will go beyond the humanitarian 
variety: "Russia has provided humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. That sort of 
coordination cooperation will continue. And I don't really think I'd go 
beyond what I really know in terms of speculating about what may happen in 
the future. Russia is very much a partner of this coalition, and we have 
discussions every day."

Franks arrived in Moscow for a three-day visit on 19 March for talks with top 
officials. After meeting with Franks yesterday, Russian Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov said Russian-U.S. cooperation in fighting terrorism "creates 
good conditions for opposing new threats and challenges not only in 
Afghanistan but also in other countries."

Franks told reporters that some Chechens are among the detainees of the 
antiterrorism campaign, but he did not say how many: "I think the number of 
nationalities represented in the detainee population that we have now between 
our Kandahar detention facility in Afghanistan and Guantanamo [Bay in Cuba] 
is about 35. And to be sure, the Chechnya nationality is represented among 
those 35 nations. And so I'm really not in the position to discuss the 
political level, but as I said, I do see this variety of nationalities 
represented in terrorist networks that we associate with Al-Qaeda. [But] 
these terrorist organizations and terrorism knows no religion, and it knows 
no nationality."

Some commentators in the Russian media see Frank's mission as an attempt by 
the U.S. to reassure Russia about the presence of coalition troops in the 
former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. But Franks 
said the U.S. is not competing with Russia in the region. He said he hopes 
Russia will continue to develop security ties with these states.

Franks said the Pentagon is concerned about the security situation in the 
Pankisi Gorge in neighboring Georgia, but he said no firm date has been fixed 
when U.S. special forces will arrive to train Georgian troops to fight 
terrorists believed to be hiding in the area.

Franks did not say whether he discussed with Russians defense officials a 
potential U.S. operation against Iraq, which Washington accuses of being part 
of an "axis of evil" and developing weapons of mass destruction. Russia has 
significant trade ties with Baghdad and has expressed concern about the 
wisdom of such an attack.

*******

#3
Moscow Times
March 21, 2002
Army Pay, Same Old Story
By Pavel Felgenhauer   

President Vladimir Putin has announced that military pay will be drastically 
increased this year in two stages and that by next January officers' pay 
should be almost doubled.

Of course, as always in Russia there are hidden drawbacks. Together with the 
pay hike, the military will lose nearly all of the benefits it previously 
enjoyed, such as zero income tax, a 50 percent discount on utilities payments 
and so on. Putin has ordered his government to create a system for adjusting 
military pay in accordance with inflation, but when indexing will actually 
kick in is anybody's guess. Russia has had double digit inflation (or more) 
since the demise of the Soviet Union and no previous military pay hikes have 
been indexed. 
 
But even if military pay truly increases twofold in real terms (which is 
highly unlikely), the result would not be as grand as it sounds. A 
lieutenant-colonel battalion commander who today takes home (all included) 
some $115 a month will make about $200, according to government plans. A 
company chief noncommissioned officer that today makes $100 a month will make 
some $130 -- assuming the government actually finds money in the budget to 
finance the planned hike.

Such a pay rise is unlikely to attract the nation's best and brightest into 
the ranks to risk their lives. Retailers at Moscow's outdoor markets, for 
example, reportedly make up to $1,000 a month.

Of course, Moscow is a special case and economically it's well ahead of the 
rest of the country. In the Russian provinces $200 a month is a very decent 
salary and many unemployed enlist to be contract soldiers for $60 to $70 a 
month.

As a result we have an army of paupers. It is increasingly difficult to move 
units or post them to war zones. Most contract soldiers who enlist for meager 
pay in the provinces immediately resign if their unit is moved into battle. 
Many officers also prefer to resign instead of going to Chechnya.

Legally, the war in Chechnya is not a war, and under Russian peacetime law 
any contract soldier or officer may resign from service at any time and leave 
his unit. By law, only conscripts can be deserters in peacetime and may be 
prosecuted. Contract soldiers and officers who resign to avoid war in 
Chechnya may later re-enlist in other units or in any other of Russia's many 
forces, such as the Interior Ministry troops or the Tax Police; or they can 
take up civilian, administrative positions.

There are well over 2 million people in active military service today, of 
which some 800,000 are conscripts; the rest are officers, contract soldiers 
and noncommissioned officers. In 1999-2000, the Kremlin managed to send a 
mere 120,000 men into Chechnya, including contingents from all regional 
police forces -- although they are not officially classed as men in active 
military service. Military chiefs told Putin that they couldn't possibly send 
more men. 

The armed forces today are not a standing but a sitting army that effectively 
rebuffs any attempt to make it fight in earnest.

With millions on the payroll and up to 100,000 lieutenant colonels and 
colonels in active service, it is impossible to give everyone a decent salary 
that will induce capable people to join and pursue a long-term military 
career. Even minute pay hikes bleed the budget dry because of the grotesque 
enormity of the armed forces, while professionalism and morale continue to 
plummet.

Military chiefs have been deliberately sabotaging all attempts at serious 
reform of the armed forces since 1992. They still think they are preparing to 
fight a major war in which the West is the main potential enemy. And given 
that this is the case, they will never cut back the size of their forces; 
they will only pretend.

The disintegration of the military directly threatens Russia's national 
security. Putin has over and again stated publicly that military reform is of 
paramount importance, but all "reforms" up to now have been as superficial as 
the new pay hike will most likely be.

It was recently announced that the 76th airborne division in Pskov will be 
made up entirely of volunteers by 2003-04 and serve as an "experiment" in 
preparation for reform of the army as a whole. Russian generals pretend that 
the recipe for a decent military is some dark secret that requires much 
research.

What they want and will get is a reprieve to do nothing for two more years.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.

*******

#4
Vremya Novostei
March 21, 2002
THE KREMLIN AND GENERALS VERSUS THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Putin hands over the defense sector to the military
Source: Yuri Golotyuk
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
PUTIN IS SEEKING THE MILITARY'S SUPPORT FOR HIS PROGRAM OF 
RESTRUCTURING THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX HAS LOST ITS POLITICAL WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE IN THE POST-SOVIET 
PERIOD, BUT THE KREMLIN IS TOO SMART TO UNDERESTIMATE IT, EVEN NOW.
Russia's military-industrial complex is in for some major changes 

     President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin met with 
his generals on Wednesday. Only a few of the elect merited an 
invitation to the conference - the defense minister and chief of the 
General Staff, their deputies, commanders-in-chief and commanders of 
branches of the armed forces, heads of main directorates of the 
Defense Ministry and General Staff. Virtually all of the conference 
took place behind closed doors, the only exception being the first 
five minutes: the president needed to say a few preliminary words. 
Actually, even these few phrases offered several surprises, the 
biggest of them being this: Putin was clearly looking for the 
military's support for his program of restructuring the military-
industrial complex.
     "The Defense Ministry is undoubtedly the central structure in 
defining objectives in the sphere of military development," the 
president said. "Meaning that you determine the strategy of 
development of the defense sector of the economy."
     The Russian military-industrial complex is facing some major 
changes, on a scale comparable with the period of Gorbachev's 
perestroika. The new plan of mobilization drafted by the economic bloc 
of the Cabinet will be set in motion next year. It considerably eases 
the stress of mobilization on enterprises. The number of enterprises 
that may be viewed by the state's arms procurement order as potential 
contractors is reduced, a detail spelling doom for many defense 
enterprises. The military-industrial complex has lost its political 
weight and influence in the post-Soviet period, but the Kremlin is too 
smart to underestimate it even now. Even banal demotion of Deputy 
Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov encountered so powerful a resistance that 
the president himself was forced to give the matter some serious 
thought. By the way, it seems that it is precisely the episode with 
Klebanov that made the president seek the military's support. The 
Defense Ministry had remained carefully neutral all through the battle 
that resulted in Klebanov's demotion.
     Well-informed and trustworthy sources from the Defense Ministry 
say that the military's point of view was presented to Putin in three 
reports, delivered by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Chief of the 
General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, and Deputy Defense Minister for 
Armaments Aleksei Moskovsky. Needless to say, the cast (politician, 
officer, technician) had an effect on contents of the reports, but all 
three proved their pro-Putin standing. Firstly, they did without 
public quarrels, something the president heartily dislikes. Secondly, 
they promised the president all sort of support and assistance in case 
the defense sector began muttering disconsolately in the course of the 
future reorganization. They did not mean of course that the army was 
going to take over all defense enterprises and have all workshops 
supervised by soldiers with automatic rifles. What was meant was that 
the Defense Ministry would establish stiff control over the finances 
set aside in the federal budget by the state defense order.
     The president and the military left the meeting quite satisfied 
with one another. The army's support his, Putin told the military that 
directors of the military-industrial complex might be invited for the 
next conference and told what was in store for them. Upper echelons of 
the uniformed power once again had their ego scratched by the 
president in public (he did emphasize their special status again). 
Unlike Boris Yeltsin who visited the Defense Ministry once a year 
only, during the traditional conference with senior officers in 
November, Putin is a regular visitor there. This was the president's 
third visit to the Defense Ministry over the last six months. Ivanov 
himself permitted himself some self-praise. According to Ivanov, "the 
plan of development of the Armed Forces adopted in 2002 is realistic 
and not to be radically amended." Ivanov is one of the authors of the 
plan indeed. It was drafted when Ivanov headed the national Security 
Council. The Kremlin made Ivanov the defense minister exactly in order 
to enable him to implement the plan. It will not do to rule out the 
possibility that Putin's visit to the Defense Ministry also aimed to 
support Ivanov as the defense minister.

******* 

#5
CIA chief cites Russia, China, North Korea as proliferators
AFP
March 20, 2002 
 
Russia has emerged as the top-of-the-line supplier of advanced technology
and training to countries seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction,
CIA director George Tenet said.

Tenet also Tuesday singled out China and North Korea as proliferators of
missile technology in wide-ranging testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee on threats facing the United States.

"Russia appears to be the first choice of proliferant states seeking the
most advanced technology and training," he said.

Russian entities are providing other countries with technology and
expertise applicable to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons as well as
to ballistic missile and cruise missile projects, he said.

"The sales are a major source of funds for Russian commercial and defense
industries and military research and development," he said.

Russia was supplying "significant assistance" to Iran on nearly all aspects
of its nuclear fuel cycle as well as on its long range ballistic missile
programs, he said.

China is a key supplier of missile technology to Pakistan, Iran and several
other countries, he said.

Most of its efforts involve development of solid propellant ballistic
missiles but it also has sold cruise missiles to Iran, he said.

"This is in spite of Beijing's November 2000 missile pledge not to assist
in any way countries seeking to develop nuclear capable ballistic
missiles," he said.

"We are closely watching Beijing's compliance with its bilateral commitment
in 1996 not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and its pledge in
1997 not to provide any new nuclear cooperation to Iran," he said.

North Korea continues to export complete ballistic missiles and production
capabilities, he said.

Tenet said North Korea has abided by the terms of a 1994 Framework agreement 
that sought to freeze its nuclear weapons program.

*******

#6
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
No. 45
March 16, 2002
WHY RUSSIA NEEDS TO PURSUE PRO-WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY
The Need for New Values Is Recognised in Russia Only in Words
By Anatoly ADAMISHIN, ex-first deputy foreign minister of the
   Russian Federation
     
     We need to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy because, 
given present-day historical conditions, it will be the best 
pro-Russian policy. But, like any metaphor, it needs to be 
specified.
     It would be more correct to speak of pro-Western 
orientation as a major component of the Russian foreign-policy 
line. But I deliberately simplify things - in the spirit of 
present-day tendencies - in order to emphasise the main idea: 
despite the presence of many directions in Russia's foreign 
policy, which must be preserved, despite the difference between 
Russian and Western interests and the need to uphold Russia's 
interests - and very strongly, if necessary, and despite 
numerous Russian peculiarities, which need not only to be 
supported but deliberately cultivated - despite all these 
factors, Russia's place is in the West.
     
            What Determines This Choice
     
     This is not only a civilised but also purely pragmatic 
choice. It is determined by such a simple premise as national 
interests. Discussions about what Russia's national interests 
are continue unabated. At the same time, it seems to me that 
Russian society tends to agree on at least three points:
     - it is vitally important to preserve Russia as a 
sovereign state within its present-day borders;
     - the country's current difficult position can be overcome 
by building an efficient market economy and laying emphasis on 
the solution of social problems;
     - a democratic civic society must be built in the country, 
with reliance on national traditions.
     These goals determine the main content of the foreign 
policy, however diverse it may be.
     One may say, it's all very well, but what does the West 
have to do with it? The thing is that on the market of success 
it is the West that sells a model that is in the highest 
demand, including in the East. Its main distinction is a 
combination of the market and democracy. People may or may not 
like the West, but the model it proposes is time-tested and has 
proven to be the most effective.
     Russia has an advantage, too - it can adapt this model to 
its own conditions, i.e. build its home and foreign policies in 
such a way as to reduce damage done by the model in countries 
where it was born. So there is at least something good in 
Russia's being one of the last countries to build a market 
economy.
     Many people in Russia agree with all these things - but 
rather in words. In actual fact, views differ considerably. In 
words, the need to adopt Western values is widely recognised, 
but in deed their "proponents" stipulate such conditions for 
this adoption that make this goal almost unattainable.
     Russia is in a dilemma - on the one hand, without the West 
Russia may fail to extricate itself from the crisis and 
strengthen its economy, but on the other, a large part of 
Russia's political, military and even economic Establishment 
has no wish to have closer relations with the West.
     I will not describe all diverse manifestations of this 
phobia - from ruined hopes in the foreseeable future to 
challenge, at long last, the U.S.A. (independently or in an 
alliance with China, India or some other country) to as futile 
hopes that Iraq, Libya and other countries will return their 
debts to Russia.
     In many cases, enmity becomes clearly manifest in the form 
of the following chain: extreme closeness with the West - the 
country's reform on the basis of transparency and openness - an 
end to privileges received in the previous decade of "wild 
capitalism." Of course, this does not rule out sincere 
apprehensions for the country's future. People are concerned 
whether a West-bound Russia will remain Russia, will not yield 
to anyone, will remain independent on foreign-policy issues, 
and will not be made bankrupt by foreign capital it seeks to 
attract.
     The world is dominated by one country - the United States 
of America, and often in a very aggressive way. In such cases 
self-possession and accurate estimates are required. The latter 
show that there are no differences between Russia and the U.S.A.
that would inevitably lead to a conflict or Russia's weakening.
This was confirmed even by the aggravation of the situation in 
various regions, the most serious of which was the bombing of 
Yugoslavia. I will pass over in silence the fact that, given 
the present-day alignment of forces, we stand to lose from 
serious confrontation.
     We are divided not by our vital interests (as regards our 
interests we will gain more from rapprochement with America 
than from its rejection) but rather by our philosophy, our 
world outlook, by what we call ideology. Unlike really vital 
interests, it lies on the surface and, as a rule, causes the 
greatest irritation. From this point of view, Salt Lake City is 
more than characteristic. By the way, letting steam out on such 
occasions is far from useless, which the Russian president saw 
very well.
     Unfortunately, the PR support for other strikes at 
Russians' national pride, including the deployment of U.S. 
troops in Georgia, was not much success. Naturally, one cannot 
think in advance of one's reaction to every possible turn in 
international developments (although why not: by drawing their 
"axes," making up their proscription lists, etc., Americans 
have warned in advance where explosive developments can be 
expected). But one can and must have a list of one's vital 
interests, for which one will not hesitate to pay a high price. 
In present-day conditions, this list will hardly be long. But 
we and others must know about it in advance.
     Actually, it was with the advent of the new president that 
Russia began to sort out its priorities. Judge for yourselves, 
despite pressure and blackmail, we are not giving up our 
position on Chechnya. What lies beyond the list of vital 
interests requires much less rigidity - it rather requires 
prudent behavior, an ability to smooth over difficulties that 
we cannot resolve and to minimise damage. One should better not 
speak aloud about this kind of manoeuvring which our easily 
vulnerable consciousness regards as odious, but ignoring it in 
practice would cost more.
     
          What We Borrow From the West
     
     Another way to resolve the aforementioned dilemma is to 
take different approaches to different aspects of social life. 
We borrow from the West two main components of its efficiency: 
the market and democracy, and borrow them in a way that suits 
us best (say, the German, rather than U.S., economic model). As 
for the third component - way of life, culture, traditions, 
philosophy, etc. - we should be much more restrained in 
borrowing it.
Moreover, we must deliberately encourage our peculiarities, of 
which, thank God, there are more than enough in our multiethnic 
country. By adapting the first two components to Russian 
conditions, we can try to reduce their influence on our 
national peculiarities, at least balance their spontaneity with 
conscious activities.
     Some may object that this task cannot be fulfilled. 
Suffice it to see how easily McDonalds' restaurants, the 
Hollywood and third-rate culture remove all "national" 
obstacles in their way.
Nevertheless, the experience of some countries shows that 
certain selection can be done. France and Britain offer good 
examples of that for us. As we, they lost their empires but 
have retained the best traits of imperial thinking.
     Protection of civilisation's diversity and wealth, 
especially in conditions of American domination, is a very 
topical mission in the present-day world. Russia could 
undertake this mission in many respects.
     So, to sum up, we come to the following conclusions:
     a) a pro-Western policy is necessary because Western 
countries can give us more assistance than any other countries 
in realising our national interests, provided we take a prudent 
approach to this task;
     b) a pro-Western policy is not easy to pursue in our 
country as several powerful lobbies oppose it. London-based 
Economist magazine in one of its recent issues even wrote about 
Putin's loneliness;
     c) nevertheless, the fact that the president's rating 
remains high proves the dependability of the results of public 
opinion polls showing that a majority of Russians welcome their 
country's friendship with the West. It means that the 
present-day policy is not only right but is also supported by 
the Russian population.
     
*******

#7
Itogi
No. 11
March 2002
THIS IS THE ONLY WEST RUSSIA HAS
A strong policy with regard to the USA and Europe entails consistent 
   rapprochement, rather than showy populist zigzags 
By Leonid RADZIKHOVSKY
     
     Russia is suffering from disillusionment in the USA. The 
short September wave of sympathy and hopes for "undying 
friendship" has long ebbed, giving way to irritation, 
resentment and criticism. Although it is not the whole of our 
foreign policy, but only parts of it that are criticised, the 
separate statements join to form a complete picture. Russia is 
pursuing a policy of unilateral concessions vis-a-vis the USA. 
And the more we back off, the more ruthlessly we are being 
pushed back. The examples are many, ranging from the "whipping" 
of our women skiers in Salt Lake City to the steel war, from 
the landing of US troops in Georgia to the list of nuclear 
targets that includes Russia. The conclusion is that we are 
repeating Gorbachev's policy of "new thinking," which ended 
ingloriously. 
     So, everything is clear with criticism. As for alternative 
suggestions, they are few - as usual. Or rather, there are none.
What policy should Russia pursue with regard to the USA in each 
particular case? Relations with the USA and the West in general 
are the key issue of both the foreign and, most important, the 
domestic and economic policy of Russia. In fact, it is the 
fundamental question of the Russian political philosophy. 
     It should be said that Europe and the USA are two 
different things; there are contradictions between them, the 
West is heterogeneous, and so on. But our traditional hope of 
playing on these contradictions and becoming closer with the 
beloved Europe to spite the rough and arrogant Yankees is 
completely illusory.
The USA is both the roof and the engine of the Western world. 
No matter how irritated Europe may be with the USA, it will 
never openly clash with it, in particular over Russia. And one 
more thing: To send our brim-full cart moving, we need not only 
European but also American investments. In other words, trying 
not to see the USA while looking at the West is a hopeless 
enterprise. 
     So, how should we develop relations with the West?
     In the past ten years these relations progressed and 
regressed, with a step made towards the West followed by the 
U-turn of Primakov's plane, after which another step was made 
towards the Wrest from the place where the premier ordered the 
plane turned back. There were more than enough things, 
adolescent-silly and serious ones, at which we took offence. In 
particular, no serious Western investments have been made in 
Russia in the past six months and ten years, while China and 
Brazil enjoyed their share. Russia has not been admitted to the 
WTO or invited to join NATO. 
     Instead, they are unceremoniously forcing Russia out of 
its traditional arms markets and pushing it back within the 
CIS. The Western liberals and democrats are tough guys. They 
can kick you under the table so hard - without spilling their 
cocktails or losing their smiles - that you will forget about 
new thinking. 
     All of this is true. But we must remember two things. 
First, this is the only West Russia has. And second, we will 
not rise to our feet without Western investments and a genuine 
integration into the Western economy. Or rather, we will be 
integrated into it as a raw materials appendage, with ruined 
science and technologies that are lagging further and further 
behind. Russia cannot pull itself out of the mire, even if it 
jerks at its hair with all its might. It can lose all its hair 
in the process but this will not help it get out of the bog. 
This is the bitter truth. It is for this reason, and not 
because of someone's ill will, that Russia had to turn back 
West after all of its U-turns - simply because there is nowhere 
to fly in the East. 
     So, what policy will be really strong? A policy that tries 
to please populist sentiments and makes senselessly threatening 
gestures at the USA, although we know that such gestures are 
ridiculous? Or a policy that accepts modern realities and moves 
West purposefully, trying not to make unnecessary zigzags? This 
policy without zigzags may be unpopular but it alone can yield 
good results. 

*******

#8
San Francisco Chronicle
March 21, 2002
Georgia has its own agenda 
U.S. trainers seen as allies against secessionists 
Anna Badkhen, Chronicle Staff Writer

Kojori Military Base, Georgia -- Special Forces Capt. Shalvab Badzhelidze
is one of 1,600 Georgian soldiers the United States has pledged to train in
the art of flushing out suspected al Qaeda fighters from a remote mountain
redoubt. 

Badzhelidze says he is happy to learn from the 200 U.S. military
instructors, who began arriving this week. But he doesn't think he'll see
action in the Pankisi Gorge anytime soon. 

"Pankisi is a minuscule problem. Regular troops and police can handle that,
" Badzhelidze said at this military base 16 miles north of Tbilisi,
Georgia's capital. "We are doing something much more serious. We are
training for an operation in Abkhazia." 

Badzhelidze is not the only one who believes President Eduard Shevardnadze
might use his army's improved skills to win back Abkhazia, a subtropical
province of 300,000 inhabitants sandwiched between the Caucasus Mountains
and the Black Sea that was lost to secessionist rebels in 1993. 

The conflict, a humiliating defeat for the government, killed an estimated
10,000 people and forced 300,000 ethnic Georgians from their homes in
Abkhazia, once a favorite summer resort of the Soviet elite. 

Everyone from government ministers to guerrillas fighting to regain
Abkhazia believe the American trainers will be used to help restore control
over the unruly region, which enjoys de facto independence. That would
constitute a severe departure from the U.S. troops' stated objective of
fighting international terrorists. 

"Let Americans come and help us," said Gia Lomia, a leader of Georgian
guerrilla forces who mount armed raids into Abkhazia with the Shevardnadze
government's tacit approval. "But tell the American government that 200
advisers are not enough. We need them to send at least 2,000 troops." 

In an indication of how blurred the lines of political allegiances are
here, the anti-separatist guerrillas readily acknowledge being aided by
Chechen and Arab fighters -- the designated targets of the U.S. war on
terrorism. 

Zurab Lipartia, a member of a guerrilla organization called the Forest
Brotherhood, said about 500 Chechens and Arabs and 80 Georgian rebels had
fought Abkhazi soldiers last October in a failed attempt to invade the
region. 

"They offered to help us, and we accepted," he said. "Why not?" 

COMPLEX CROSSCURRENTS

The association between the Georgian rebels and Muslim militants is one of
many complex issues for the U.S. mission, analysts say. Washington's claim
that Chechen rebels in Pankisi may be linked to al Qaeda risks being
misconstrued as support of Russia's brutal campaign in Chechnya, which the
State Department recently criticized for its numerous human rights abuses. 

The U.S. program to train Georgian soldiers in anti-terrorism and counter-
insurgency operations also moves the Bush administration closer to the
unpopular Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister who has been
widely criticized for the corruption and poverty that has shackled this
nation of 4.5 million inhabitants. 

And then there is the issue of Russia. 

The separatist Abkhazian government, which is not recognized
internationally, is unofficially protected by Russia, whose peacekeeping
troops patrol the region's 80-mile border with Georgia. Just this month,
Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzhinba wrote to President Vladimir Putin, asking
for "associated status." Some Russian politicians have urged Moscow to
recognize Abkhazia's independence or even annex the region. 

KREMLIN OFFENDED

Russia, which is fighting its second war in Chechnya in eight years, feels
snubbed by Washington's program to train the Georgians. Despite strong
anti- Russian sentiment in Georgia, the Kremlin had hoped to deploy its own
soldiers to hunt down Chechen rebels who are reportedly hiding in the
Pankisi Gorge. 

In recent weeks, Georgian officials have put their spin on events. Although
Shevardnadze has never said that he would send U.S.-trained special forces
into Abkhazia, Cabinet members such as Interior Minister Mamuka Nachkebia
and Security Minister Valeri Khaburdzania charged that at least 45 al Qaeda
members had left the Pankisi Gorge for refuge in Abkhazia. 

The deputy foreign minister of the Abkhazian separatist government denied
the allegation last week. "There are no Chechen fighters, no al Qaeda in
Abkhazia -- it's a complete fabrication," Daour Arshba told reporters. 

To be sure, the White House has said U.S. military advisers will limit
their mission to training Georgian soldiers for operations against al Qaeda
in Pankisi. U.S. officials have said that they do not expect U.S.-trained
troops to fight in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, another breakaway province. 

Shevardnadze's government does not officially support rebel groups like the
Forest Brotherhood, whose members are mostly Georgian refugees who left
Abkhazia in 1993. Although Shevardnadze insists that the conflict be solved
peacefully, his government has yet to disarm the guerrillas or keep them
from making frequent armed incursions. 

In Zugdidi, a town on the border with Abkhazia, Georgian rebels openly
carry weapons. This week, they proudly fired several rounds into the air
while a U.S. journalist took photographs. 

Guerrilla fighter Lipartia, who posed for a photograph holding a
Kalashnikov automatic rifle in one hand and a shoulder-mounted
anti-aircraft weapon in the other, said the U.S. military presence was a
sign that the United States had come to support their cause. 

"Now that we have U.S. backing, we will return Abkhazia to Georgia," he said. 

Nearby, Gigo Parlava, a rebel leader in Zugdidi, hung a homemade U.S. flag
in his office. 

"When a powerful nation extends its hand from across the ocean, why should
we refuse its help?" he asked. "When I return to Abkhazia, I will hang up
two American flags in my house." 

*******

#9
Parlamentskaya Gazeta
No. 52
2002
BY NATO LOGIC, SUBVERSIVES ARE BEST PEACEKEEPERS
The Strong Resolve 2002 NATO war games held close to Russia's borders over
By Valery GROMAK
     
     The Strong Resolve 2002 war games of NATO, the largest in 
the past decade, were held on the northwestern borders of 
Russia for two weeks in March. They involved over 26,000 troops 
from 15 NATO countries, up to 50 warships and auxiliary 
vessels, and over 70 aircraft. The area of the exercise 
included a part of Norway and Poland (it was for the first time 
that NATO exercises were held in Poland), as well as the 
Norwegian, Northern and Baltic seas. The main goal of the games 
was to check the plans and possibilities of the multinational 
group of forces in simultaneous settlement of two crisis 
situations in different parts of the world.  
     The scenario of the war games stipulated two crisis 
regions:
the Northern (Norway) and the Southern (Poland, Germany, the 
Czech republic, Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine and the Kaliningrad 
Region of Russia). In the northern area NATO troops trained in 
repelling an aggression launched by a conventional adversary 
against a member country. In the southern area an international 
peacekeeping operation was held on the territory of 
conventional states, where the situation included a basic 
package of crisis problems. 
     Here is the essence of the scenario. A crisis develops on 
the ruins of a formerly integral state, leading to a sanguinary 
conflict between subjects of democratic changes. One of the 
sides (in this case the proponent of "correct" democracy), 
suffering defeat in an armed conflict, seeks the assistance of 
the UN. The UN Secretary General asks NATO to launch an 
operation to settle the crisis there. And NATO resorts to the 
Yugoslav experience of "appeasing" the warring sides and 
punishing the guilty parties, using the tried and tested 
standards and procedures.  
     The Russian General Staff believes that Russia and Belarus 
were given the role of "aggressors" in these war games. The 
position of Minsk is even harsher, as the Polish part of the 
war games envisaged the operation of NATO troops directly on 
the territory of Belarus, where according to NATO generals the 
people revolted against the regime. The Belarussian military 
acquired information according to which the first day of the 
NATO war games provided for NATO peacekeeping actions directly 
in Minsk. 
     A careful analysis of the composition of the troops 
involved in the games shows that it consisted mostly of rapid 
deployment forces (commandos, frogmen, reconnaissance and 
subversive groups), units that were to covertly deliver these 
forces to the site of operation and give them fire support from 
the sea and the air. Even a layman will see that such special 
task groups are designed above all for offensive operations. 
"It is shocking that these NATO war games, the largest in the 
past decade staged on the border of Russia, were held to train 
in exclusively offensive operations," says Admiral Vladimir 
Valuyev, commander of the Baltic Fleet. 
     The Baltic part of the NATO exercise stipulated a series 
of tasks which the joint group of NATO forces may have to 
fulfil in an armed conflict with a country that has powerful 
armed forces.
These tasks included naval control of navigation, a mine war, 
tactical aviation strikes at naval targets, the use of missile 
strike boats, a comprehensive combat training of minesweepers, 
and broad use of special operations and psychological warfare 
units. By NATO logic, subversives are the best peacekeepers. 
     The US generals may try to camouflage the genuine goal of 
their exercises as a peacekeeping operation, but even a cursory 
analysis of the games shows that in the Baltic and Poland NATO, 
and above all the USA, trained in military interference in 
interstate and internal political problems of sovereign 
European countries under the pretext of peacekeeping 
operations. 
     The Strong Resolve 2002 war games are over. Both the NATO 
headquarters and the Russian General Staff will evaluate their 
results. But it is clear that this NATO exercise was yet 
another example of US policy of maintaining US domination in 
Europe and reviving the Cold War. 

******

#10
Moscow News
March 22-26, 2002
U.S. Goes Back on Its Word
By Sergei Putilov, Vremya MN

The United States has backed away from its commitment to help Russia get rid 
of its chemical weapons - the world's largest stocks consisting of some 
40,000 tonnes of lethal substances

The second elimination stage - designed to destroy at least one-fifth (8,000 
tonnes) of Russia's chemical poison stocks by 2007 - will have to be 
suspended for lack of funding to build a plant for this purpose in the city 
of Shchuchye (Kurgan region, west-central Russia), the general director of 
the Russian Ammunition Agency, Zinovy Pak, has announced. Funding was 
supposed to have been resumed by the United States under accords previously 
reached, but it failed to pull off its side of the deal. The Americans had 
promised to complete the facility's industrial section by a specified 
deadline.
Under the arrangements between Russia and the United States, construction of 
the plant should have started last year, but that did not happen. It will 
therefore be impossible to put the plant into operation by 2004 as planned. 
Consequently, we cannot start slashing our chemical-weapon arsenal within the 
stated time, Pak noted.

Characteristically, Washington suspended funding just when Moscow had met all 
the preconditions imposed by U.S. Congress for the disbursement of further 
aid. The Americans had demanded, among other things, that Russia allocate 
from its state budget no less than $25 million a year toward the facility's 
construction. That was their toughest stipulation, Pak said.

On top of that, the Americans wanted Russia to accept 32,000 tonnes of 
organophosphorous war gas and destroy it at the Shchuchye facility.

Russia agreed to those two stringent terms, yet no progress whatever has been 
achieved. It is most unfortunate that U.S. aid has lately taken on a hard 
political edge, Pak said.

One problem is that the elimination of chemical weapons involves formidable 
technological and financial challenges. It would cost $15 billion to $20 
billion to destroy the U.S. arsenals, and only $6 billion to $7 billion to 
get rid of Russia's, experts say.

As your correspondent was told at the Central Analytical Laboratory, such 
huge costs are due to the mind-boggling complexity of recycling chemical 
weapons. For comparison, take, for example, a missile that has been removed 
from military service. Once removed, it can be used to launch a satellite 
into orbit, while its solid fuel can be converted into ordinary explosives. 
But chemical weapons are tougher nuts to crack. It will take extremely 
complex technologies to render harmless for humans and the environment the 
substances from which these weapons are made. These technologies cost a 
fortune, and Russia cannot afford more than 4.5 billion rubles a year for 
these purposes. So naturally, cash-strapped Russia cannot cope with the 
elimination program single-handed, without Western aid.

Under a previous program of its own, the United States was to pour a total of 
$800 million or so into the elimination of our chemical weapons. But it has 
been increasingly close-fisted, overburdened by its war in Afghanistan, its 
increased defense spending, and its plans to develop an anti-missile defense 
system. In fact, the House Armed Forces Committee is seeking cancellation of 
all aid to Russia. Beginning 1992, U.S. aid to Russia, plus outlays on 
dismantling and safekeeping some of its nuclear missiles, has cost American 
taxpayers $2.5 billion.

If the United States has reneged on its commitments to Russia for good, 
Russia will have no alternative but to turn to Europe, which is already 
helping us build two plants to destroy our lethal chemicals.

*******

#11
The Russia Journal
March 15-21, 2002
Editorial
Still the status quo
 
Recently the United States announced it would impose controversial tariffs
on imports of steel, something sure to do damage to that sector of Russia’s
economy. Soon after, Russia, in what may or may not be a tit-for-tat
response, followed through on its threat to ban "Bush legs," the cheap
American poultry imports that have been a part of many poorer people’s diet
for years. Then, the Los Angeles Times reported that the U.S. government
has contingency plans to use nuclear weapons on a number of countries –
including Russia. For many people in Russia, these events serve as an
indication of the United States’ refusal to take Russian interests into
account. This impression is made sharper in the context of talk by
Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin of a "partnership" in the "war
on terrorism."

With all this talk of war – trade and otherwise – in the air, it is
worthwhile to consider a few things. A sober consideration of the situation
shows talk of betrayal and suddenly chilling relations between the two
countries is unfounded and hyperbolic. In fact, what we are seeing is
nothing more than business as usual.

First, Russia’s ban on U.S. chicken. The government claims that poultry
bred in the United States does not meet health standards and may contain
salmonella bacteria. Admittedly, American animal products are by and large
packed with chemicals that many countries, including members of the
European Union, have expressed concerns over. For example, turkeys bred on
U.S. factory farms are so pumped full of hormones and so obese that they
cannot mate on their own, making artificial insemination the only
reproductive option. Salmonella, however, is another story, especially
since Russia to date is the only country to seem terribly concerned about a
possible epidemic brought about through diseased U.S. poultry – although,
who knows, perhaps recent Russian claims to have detected the bacteria in
U.S. poultry shipments may turn out to be true. But these claims smack of a
justification for old-fashioned protectionism.

In fact, there is nothing especially noteworthy about the recent actions
and reactions. Rhetoric aside, when major industries in a country are
threatened, they defend themselves. Anything less would be surprising.
Expecting the United States not to attempt to insulate its steel industry
from competition when it is under threat would be naive in the extreme,
especially considering that U.S. economic history is littered with a trail
of strong protectionist measures – as anyone who was in the United States
during its automobile wars with West Germany and Japan in the 1980s can
attest. (Whether this jibes with Bush’s free-market rhetoric is another
matter.)

As to the seemingly more serious matter of contingency plans, even the ones
involving nuclear weapons, they are just that – contingencies. Every
country has plans for military action in all sorts of locales and
scenarios, even the most unlikely ones. Drawing up such plans is what
military planners are paid to do. The United States probably has strategies
gathering dust on some Pentagon shelf detailing hypothetical tank invasions
of France and a marine assault on New Zealand. It would also be
disingenuous in the extreme to argue that Russia has no corresponding set
of plans.

The best thing to do in situations like the ones at hand is to calm down.
Trade wars may be brewing, but this is a normal part of economic relations
between states, not part of a concerted hostile foreign-policy effort on
the part of the United States. As to some hypothetical U.S. military plans
against Russia – the United States may be rattling sabers at a lot of
countries at present, but Russia is not one of them.
 
*******

#12
Vedomosti
March 21, 2002
Better Seen from a Distance 
The IMF predicts that Russia will flourish
By Alexander Bekker, Vladimir Fedorin
(therussianissues.com)
 
IMF First Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger has brought good news to 
Moscow: the International Monetary Fund expects the Russian economy to 
demonstrate an increased economic growth in 2003. Analysts trust the IMF more 
than Presidential Adviser Andrei Illarionov, who had hastened to say that the 
Russian economy was sliding into depression.

According to Alexei Mozhin, who represents Russia at the IMF as its executive 
director, a report presented to the IMF board of directors in early March 
showed a more favorable picture of the Russian economy than at any time 
during the ten years of Russia's IMF membership. Addressing a conference at a 
research institute led by Yegor Gaidar yesterday, Krueger quoted an IMF 
forecast as saying Russia's GDP would grow 3.5% this year, with 4% expected 
in 2003.

Mozhin maintains that America and Europe are overcoming recession, a factor 
that will have an increasingly favorable effect on the price situation. 
Accordingly, as Russia's is an economy based on raw materials, it will get a 
new stimulus for growth.

The IMF's forecast is more optimistic than that of Russia's Ministry for 
Economic Development and Trade. Experts there say that, according to the 
optimistic scenario, the GDP should grow 3.8% in 2002, and, according to the 
pessimistic scenario, it should amount to 3.2%.

Yevgeny Yasin, former economics minister and now vice president of the Higher 
School for Economics, shares the more cautious view of official Russian 
financiers. "We'll be able to diagnose the state of the economy after March 
to see whether there is a deep slump or not." He says he does not see any 
grounds for pessimism if the mood of entrepreneurs and consumers is anything 
to go by. However, he believes 3-3.5% are more realistic figures than 4%.

Other analysts share this view. Twenty-five analysts polled in February by 
the Development Center agreed that the GDP might grow by an average of 3.5% 
in 2002 and 2003. Thirteen "optimists" felt economic performance in 2003 
would be somewhat better than in 2002, but twelve "pessimists" said the 
opposite would be the case. The "optimists" forecast a 4.1% increase in 
economic growth in 2003. The "pessimists" said it would amount to 3%.

Illarionov expressed the views of the "pessimists" in a nutshell yesterday. 
He said he was disappointed with the government's decision to leave the 
restrictions on Russia's oil export in force and declared Russia was entering 
a period of depression marked by "a periodic economic growth of 0-2% a year." 
He drew a parallel with Japan, which, he said, had not been able to extricate 
itself from depression for ten years.

In late January of this year, Alexei Vorobyov of the Aton company published a 
forecast for Russia's GDP for the next two years, which coincided with IMF 
figures. However, now he believes it may grow by 4% this year. He thinks the 
world economy will rebound sooner than expected, and this factor will jack up 
oil prices. "The external factor will determine growth rates in Russia in the 
next two or three years," he maintains.

*******

#13
NATO: Robertson Says Talks With Russia Are On Schedule
By Kathleen Knox

Prague, 21 March 2002 (RFE/RL) -- NATO Secretary-General Lord George 
Robertson says talks on giving Russia a greater say in NATO affairs are on 
schedule, and that Moscow is not pushing for too much influence in the 
alliance.

Robertson made the comments during a visit to Prague to check the status of 
the Czech capital's preparations for the NATO summit to be held there in 
November.

NATO and Russia have been holding talks on creating a new forum at which 
Russia will sit as a partner with the alliance's other 19 members and have a 
say on a range of issues.

The plan is to give Russia a seat on a joint council that would make 
decisions on a number of subjects, such as peacekeeping, search-and-rescue 
operations, and weapons proliferation. 

Robertson, speaking at Prague's Charles University, said this would mark a 
significant break from past practice, when decisions were "precooked" by 
alliance members before Russia was consulted.

Recent reports say Russia has been pushing for too much say in the new forum, 
but Robertson said neither side is "asking for too much." 

"I don't take the view that Moscow is asking too much, nor do I believe that 
NATO is asking too much. The project is important because there is a moment 
here, a moment in history where the West and Russia have got a common enemy 
[and] a series of common challenges, and we must rise to the opportunities 
given to us at this time."

Later, at a press conference with Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman, Robertson 
said the details of the new NATO-Russia council are still being worked out. 
But he said the talks are on track to meet the alliance's deadline of its 
foreign ministers' meeting in Reykjavik in May. 

"The next two or three months will be difficult as we get the modalities and 
the agendas worked out, and I don't underestimate the problems that will be 
involved in doing that. But I'm optimistic that we will meet the timetable we 
established in December and we'll have an agreement by the meeting that will 
take place in Iceland in mid-May."

Robertson was asked at each of his public appearances in Prague about 
Slovakia's prospects for NATO membership if former Prime Minister Vladimir 
Meciar returns to power in September. Slovakia under Meciar came under 
criticism for backsliding on democratic reforms.

Robertson reiterated his position that he does not comment on any candidate 
country's domestic politics. But he added, "Only countries that are 
committed, dedicated to democracy, and where 19 presidents and prime 
ministers believe there is a commitment to democracy, will [join] an alliance 
of free and democratic nations. So I simply say to people that if they want 
to be members of NATO, then vote for parties that will take them into 
membership of NATO and vote with their eyes open, because everyone will be 
watching."

Slovakia is one of nine Central and Eastern European countries hoping to 
receive an invitation to join NATO at the November summit. Robertson said all 
have an equal chance of entering and still have a lot of work to do before 
November. His message to Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia is: "Modernize or miss out."

*******

#14
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
March 21, 2002

KREMLIN, IZVESTIA QUESTION NEW YORK TIMES STORY ON CHECHNYA.
An article recently published in the New York Times has created
something of a stir in Russia. The article concerned Andrei
Samorodov, a former Russian army airborne communications
specialist, who claims that in November 1999, at the start of
the ongoing military campaign in Chechnya, he deserted his post
in the breakaway republic because of threats from neo-fascist
members of his unit who had encouraged soldiers to murder
Chechen civilians. Samorodov eventually left Russia with his
wife and two children, made his way to Mexico and then crossed
the border into Texas, where he asked for political asylum,
claiming he feared for his life from neo-fascist members of his
airborne unit, whom he had confronted. Samorodov and his family
were granted asylum in the United States and currently reside in
Texas.

Samorodov claimed that the neo-fascists within his airborne unit
belonged to a group called "Russian Knights," a group of
teenagers trained and indoctrinated in the southern Russian
region of Stavropol by the ultranationalist organization Russian
National Unity (RNE). According to Samorodov, 400 members of the
Russian Knights group joined his unit, the 21st Airborne
Brigade, and its sister unit, the 101st Brigade of Interior
Ministry forces, in 1999. RNE, which was formed in 1990 by
Aleksandr Barkashov, a former KGB martial arts instructor, was
banned in Moscow because of its openly fascist and anti-Semitic
views. According to Samorodov, many of its members have joined
the military and ended up with units stationed in Chechnya.
Samorodov told the New York Times that he had ripped swastikas
off the uniforms of some members of his unit and tried to
intervene in an execution of Chechen civilians. Samorodov said
that while he tried to inform his superiors about their attempts
to incite the murder of civilians, he was rebuffed, beaten up
and threatened with death. Finally, in November 1999, he
deserted his post.

The New York Times quoted a Kremlin spokesman, Aleksandr
Machevsky, as saying that he had no knowledge of Samorodov's
defection, but asked why he had not done "the right thing" and
gone "to the prosecutors." He strongly suggested that Samorodov
cooked up the story as a way to win political asylum in the
United States (New York Times, March 17).

What is more, following the publication of the New York Times
article, Izvestia.ru, the Izvestia newspaper's website, quoted a
spokesman from the command of the Russian army's airborne troops
as saying that Samorodov had indeed served as a communications
officer in the 21st Airborne Brigade, but had been kicked out of
the unit in 1993, and that the brigade had long ago been merged
with others. The website quoted one of Samorodov's former fellow
servicemen as confirming the airborne spokesman's version of
events. It also quoted the author of the New York Times story,
Moscow correspondent Patrick E. Tyler, as saying that U.S.
intelligence agencies had carefully looked at the information
supplied to them by Samorodov after his defection--which
included such things as the location of specific military units
deployed to Chechnya in 1999--and found it credible. Izvestia.ru
claimed that Samorodov himself refused to comment on the
controversy when the papers asked him to do so through his
American lawyer, and that Samorodov turned off his mobile phone
to avoid calls on the subject (Izvestia.ru, March 18).

It is difficult to assess the validity of Samorodov's story. On
the one hand, it is indeed possible, as alleged, that he
concocted it to win political asylum in the United States. The
Monitor's correspondent traveled to Chechnya numerous times
during both military campaigns and never ran into Russian
National Unity members within the ranks of the federal forces
located there. On the other hand, it is certainly true that many
Russian servicemen regard all Chechens, regardless of age or
sex, as rebel fighters and openly say they should be shown no
mercy. On more than one occasion the Monitor's correspondent
heard Russian servicemen tell stories about 10-year-old Chechen
children who purportedly played soccer with the severed head of
a Russian serviceman. Whatever the truth of such stories, they
show that Russian soldiers view even Chechen children as
potential enemies.

It also cannot be ruled out that individual RNE members have
joined the Russian army to fight in Chechnya. The Monitor's
correspondent can, for example, attest to the fact that a
special Cossack battalion named after General Yermolov, the
Russian general known for his cruelty during the Caucasus War of
the 19th century, operated in Chechnya during the first military
campaign there (1994-1996). The unit was set up under the
patronage of Russian Cossack organizations and made up of
persons calling themselves Cossacks, who wore regular Russian
military uniforms but had a special insignia indicating their
membership in the Cossack forces. Chechens told the Monitor's
correspondent during that period that members of the Yermolov
battalion behaved with particular cruelty toward Chechen
civilians.

*******

#15
Kommersant-Vlast
No. 19
March 19, 2002 
BEST REGARDS FROM A POTENTIAL ALLY
It takes half a minute to re-target nuclear missiles
Author: Ilya Bulavinov
from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE LA TIMES ARTICLE ABOUT RUSSIA BEING AMONG THE PENTAGON'S NUCLEAR 
TARGETS HAS CAUSED A SCANDAL. HOWEVER, THIS ARTICLE ONLY REVEALED THE 
OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WHICH NEVER DISAPPEARED WITH THE 
END OF THE COLD WAR.

     The report in "The Los Angeles Times" that Russia is on the 
Pentagon's list of countries against which the US may use nuclear 
weapons has caused a scandal. 
     Of course, it is impossible to avoid a scandal after such a 
publication, since over the past few years - especially in the past 
few months - much has been said about the Russia-US relationship being 
an alliance. And now, all of a sudden, it turns out that Washington 
views Russia as virtually its main adversary. Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov has said that if such plans do exist, this would be a concern 
and would destabilize the situation. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov 
has visited the US, where he demanded some explanations.
     Secretary of State Colin Powell stated on behalf of the US that 
Russia has not been included on any such lists, and is not viewed as 
an enemy. He also said that American nuclear weapons are not targeted 
at any particular country. Russian officials have expressed their 
moderate satisfaction with the explanation given. 
     However, these are only words. In reality, the incident of the 
Pentagon's report has revealed that despite the end of the Cold War, 
both Russia and the US view each other as potential adversaries.
      
     The US is mentioned in Russia's military doctrine only twice. It 
is stated that Moscow stands by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
treaty of 1972 and is prepared for the "further cuts to its nuclear 
weapons on a bilateral basis together with the US, and also on a 
multi-lateral basis." Nevertheless, there are also a few passages 
unambiguously implying that US actions threaten Russia's national 
security. 
     "The state and prospects of development of the contemporary 
military-political situation are determined by the opposition of two 
trends. One of these trends is the creation of a unipolar world based 
on the dominance of one superpower, and military solutions to key 
problems in global politics. The second trend is formation of a 
multipolar world. The Russian Federation holds that social progress, 
stability, and international security may be gained only within the 
framework of a multipolar world..."
     "The practice of carrying out military operations despite 
generally-acknowledged principles and standards of international law, 
and without the approval of the UN Security Council" is viewed as "one 
of the main destabilizing factors in the military-political situation" 
by the doctrine. According to the doctrine, the main foreign threats 
include "formation of a group of armed forces leading to destruction 
of the current balance of forces along the borders of the Russian 
Federation, its allies, and seas surrounding Russia; expansion of 
military blocs that endanger military security of the Russian 
Federation and its allies; deploying foreign troops without permission 
from the UN Security Council in countries which are allies of the 
Russian Federation." 
     It is not necessary to point out who is obstructing social 
progress and international security, forming groups of forces and 
violating the current balance, expanding military blocs, and sending 
troops into countries bordering with Russia without the UN's 
permission. If Russia took its own military doctrine more seriously, 
the US and Russia would not be exchanging official visits and summits 
now - they would be preparing for war.
     Fortunately, in this rapidly changing world, doctrines have 
become merely declarative papers. Politicians and state officials 
rarely think of their correspondence to real life, and when they do 
think of it, they change the doctrines rather than policies. 
     However, regardless of the development of the situation, Russia 
and America are likely to view each other as potential adversaries for 
some years. Even if the relations between the two countries become 
unprecedentedly close, suspicions and mistrust will be forgotten only 
after several generations of politicians change. So far, the two 
countries' possession of nuclear weapons is a considerable factor in 
bilateral relations, and neither Moscow nor Washington intends to 
refuse to declare the possibility of using them against each other. It 
is noteworthy that the clock at the central command point of the 
Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) shows the time in Moscow, 
Vladimir, Chita, Omsk, Orenburg (there are headquarters of armies of 
the SMF in the four latter cities), and Washington. 
     As for announcements that Russian and American missiles are aimed 
at Antarctica, any specialist in missile technologies will tell you 
that it only takes about half a minute to re-target them.
(Translated by Kirill Frolov)

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