
#6
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
No. 45
March 16, 2002
WHY RUSSIA NEEDS TO PURSUE PRO-WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY
The Need for New Values Is Recognised in Russia Only in Words
By Anatoly ADAMISHIN, ex-first deputy foreign minister of the Russian
Federation
We need to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy because, given present-day
historical conditions, it will be the best pro-Russian policy. But, like any
metaphor, it needs to be specified.
It would be more correct to speak of pro-Western orientation as a major
component of the Russian foreign-policy line. But I deliberately simplify things
- in the spirit of present-day tendencies - in order to emphasise the main idea:
despite the presence of many directions in Russia's foreign policy, which must
be preserved, despite the difference between Russian and Western interests and
the need to uphold Russia's interests - and very strongly, if necessary, and
despite numerous Russian peculiarities, which need not only to be supported but
deliberately cultivated - despite all these factors, Russia's place is in the
West.
What Determines This Choice
This is not only a civilised but also purely pragmatic choice. It is
determined by such a simple premise as national interests. Discussions about
what Russia's national interests are continue unabated. At the same time, it
seems to me that Russian society tends to agree on at least three points:
- it is vitally important to preserve Russia as a sovereign state within its
present-day borders;
- the country's current difficult position can be overcome by building an
efficient market economy and laying emphasis on the solution of social problems;
- a democratic civic society must be built in the country, with reliance on
national traditions.
These goals determine the main content of the foreign policy, however diverse
it may be.
One may say, it's all very well, but what does the West have to do with it?
The thing is that on the market of success it is the West that sells a model
that is in the highest demand, including in the East. Its main distinction is a
combination of the market and democracy. People may or may not like the West,
but the model it proposes is time-tested and has proven to be the most
effective.
Russia has an advantage, too - it can adapt this model to its own conditions,
i.e. build its home and foreign policies in such a way as to reduce damage done
by the model in countries where it was born. So there is at least something good
in Russia's being one of the last countries to build a market economy.
Many people in Russia agree with all these things - but rather in words. In
actual fact, views differ considerably. In words, the need to adopt Western
values is widely recognised, but in deed their "proponents" stipulate
such conditions for this adoption that make this goal almost unattainable.
Russia is in a dilemma - on the one hand, without the West Russia may fail to
extricate itself from the crisis and strengthen its economy, but on the other, a
large part of Russia's political, military and even economic Establishment has
no wish to have closer relations with the West.
I will not describe all diverse manifestations of this phobia - from ruined
hopes in the foreseeable future to challenge, at long last, the U.S.A.
(independently or in an alliance with China, India or some other country) to as
futile hopes that Iraq, Libya and other countries will return their debts to
Russia.
In many cases, enmity becomes clearly manifest in the form of the following
chain: extreme closeness with the West - the country's reform on the basis of
transparency and openness - an end to privileges received in the previous decade
of "wild capitalism." Of course, this does not rule out sincere
apprehensions for the country's future. People are concerned whether a
West-bound Russia will remain Russia, will not yield to anyone, will remain
independent on foreign-policy issues, and will not be made bankrupt by foreign
capital it seeks to attract.
The world is dominated by one country - the United States of America, and
often in a very aggressive way. In such cases self-possession and accurate
estimates are required. The latter show that there are no differences between
Russia and the U.S.A. that would inevitably lead to a conflict or Russia's
weakening. This was confirmed even by the aggravation of the situation in
various regions, the most serious of which was the bombing of Yugoslavia. I will
pass over in silence the fact that, given the present-day alignment of forces,
we stand to lose from serious confrontation.
We are divided not by our vital interests (as regards our interests we will
gain more from rapprochement with America than from its rejection) but rather by
our philosophy, our world outlook, by what we call ideology. Unlike really vital
interests, it lies on the surface and, as a rule, causes the greatest
irritation. From this point of view, Salt Lake City is more than characteristic.
By the way, letting steam out on such occasions is far from useless, which the
Russian president saw very well.
Unfortunately, the PR support for other strikes at Russians' national pride,
including the deployment of U.S. troops in Georgia, was not much success.
Naturally, one cannot think in advance of one's reaction to every possible turn
in international developments (although why not: by drawing their
"axes," making up their proscription lists, etc., Americans have
warned in advance where explosive developments can be expected). But one can and
must have a list of one's vital interests, for which one will not hesitate to
pay a high price. In present-day conditions, this list will hardly be long. But
we and others must know about it in advance.
Actually, it was with the advent of the new president that Russia began to
sort out its priorities. Judge for yourselves, despite pressure and blackmail,
we are not giving up our position on Chechnya. What lies beyond the list of
vital interests requires much less rigidity - it rather requires prudent
behavior, an ability to smooth over difficulties that we cannot resolve and to
minimise damage. One should better not speak aloud about this kind of
manoeuvring which our easily vulnerable consciousness regards as odious, but
ignoring it in practice would cost more.
What We Borrow From the West
Another way to resolve the aforementioned dilemma is to take different
approaches to different aspects of social life. We borrow from the West two main
components of its efficiency: the market and democracy, and borrow them in a way
that suits us best (say, the German, rather than U.S., economic model). As for
the third component - way of life, culture, traditions, philosophy, etc. - we
should be much more restrained in borrowing it.
Moreover, we must deliberately encourage our peculiarities, of which, thank
God, there are more than enough in our multiethnic country. By adapting the
first two components to Russian conditions, we can try to reduce their influence
on our national peculiarities, at least balance their spontaneity with conscious
activities.
Some may object that this task cannot be fulfilled. Suffice it to see how
easily McDonalds' restaurants, the Hollywood and third-rate culture remove all
"national" obstacles in their way. Nevertheless, the experience of
some countries shows that certain selection can be done. France and Britain
offer good examples of that for us. As we, they lost their empires but have
retained the best traits of imperial thinking.
Protection of civilisation's diversity and wealth, especially in conditions
of American domination, is a very topical mission in the present-day world.
Russia could undertake this mission in many respects.
So, to sum up, we come to the following conclusions:
a) a pro-Western policy is necessary because Western countries can give us
more assistance than any other countries in realising our national interests,
provided we take a prudent approach to this task;
b) a pro-Western policy is not easy to pursue in our country as several
powerful lobbies oppose it. London-based Economist magazine in one of its recent
issues even wrote about Putin's loneliness;
c) nevertheless, the fact that the president's rating remains high proves the
dependability of the results of public opinion polls showing that a majority of
Russians welcome their country's friendship with the West. It means that the
present-day policy is not only right but is also supported by the Russian
population.
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