CDI Russia Weekly-#196
8 March 2002
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036
phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, 
economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation,
CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense 
Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. 

CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/
Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org

Contents:
1. Moscow Times editorial: George Bush Has Laid an Iron Egg.
2. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: Steel and poultry: is a Russian-U.S.
trade war looming?
3. Vremya MN:  Leonid Radzikhovsky, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING. What does
the United States want from the Caucasus?
4. AFP:Sweeps in Chechen town continue despite grisly findings.
5. Kommersant: Natalia Pushkareva: "I tried to return "history to women and 
women to history." Unlike in the West, feminism in Russia emerged at a much 
later date.
6. RFE/RL: Don Hill, Orthodox Church Continues To Resist Roman Catholic 
Presence.
7. Asia Times: Ehsan Ahrari, Russia losing its strategic grip in
Afghanistan. 
8. pravda.ru: THE MAJOR PROBLEM OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IS ITS FUTURE.
9. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Igor Korotchenko, TWO CENTERS OF POWER IN THE 
MILITARY. Army generals attempting to adjust the Kremlin's foreign policy.
10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: SERGEI KARAGANOV: "RUSSIA SHOULD FORM A NORMAL
UNION WITH THE WEST"
11. eurasianet.org: Ariel Cohen, US POSTPONES CHECHEN BROADCASTS IN
GOODWILL GESTURE TOWARDS RUSSIA.
12. The Russia Journal: Ajay Goyal, Corruption is in the eye of the
beholder.  

********

#1
Moscow Times
March 7, 2002
Editorial
George Bush Has Laid an Iron Egg
 
Looking deeply into the eyes of Vladimir Putin, George W. Bush famously
concluded that Russia's president is "a man America can do business with."

That observation proved to be truer than most people predicted, especially
on issues dear to Bush's heart, such as oil and war. Putin, however, said
no such thing about Bush, preferring to take a more, shall we say, sober
approach to dealing with the leader of the world's sole remaining superpower. 

Putin was right to refrain from such a snap assessment. Bush, by deciding
Tuesday to impose punitive tariffs and quotas on steel imports from a host
of countries, including Russia, not only acted on the fringes of legality,
but also single-handedly pushed the world toward a potentially disastrous
trade war. 

Bush also exposed himself as a political panderer who will compromise his
"free trade" doctrine to protect ailing and inefficient companies just
because they helped pay for his election campaign and happen to employ
thousands of swing-state voters without whose support he would still be in
Texas.

This is hypocrisy, pure and simple, especially coming from a man whose
minions scour the Earth urging nations to open their markets to U.S. goods.
Under these circumstances Russia has every right to retaliate.

But without the legal mechanisms available to members of the W TO, which
Russia hopes to join by the end of 2003, there is little it can do. And
even if Russia were a member, it could take two years or more to resolve
the dispute, by which time Bush would be well into his reelection campaign
and the damage done to Russia's steel industry -- and its 750,000 employees
-- could be catastrophic.

In this light, Russia's decision to ban all U.S. poultry beginning Sunday
seems equitable. After all, some 70 percent of all chicken consumed in this
country is imported from America. Why should a major American industry have
a free ride here when a major Russian industry is discriminated against
there? It's not as if the standard of living in both countries is equal.

Both sides deny the linkage of the two issues, which might have been true a
few months ago. But not now. 

Even so, the Agriculture Ministry may have a point in questioning the
safety of U.S. chicken -- no one has ever produced a study that establishes
exactly what a lifetime of eating chemically altered steroid-pumped super
birds does to a person.

To use an Olympic analogy, Russia's steel team may be out of metal
contention, but its poultry team now looks like a contender, as the
favorite has just been disqualified for doping. Maybe it will get one of
those golds left behind in Salt Lake City.

*******

#2
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
March 7, 2002
Steel and poultry: is a Russian-U.S. trade war looming?
TRADE RECRIMINATIONS ROIL RUSSIAN-U.S. TIES.

Russia and the United States stood on the verge of a trade war
yesterday as government leaders in Moscow joined with their
counterparts in a host of other affected countries to condemn
the Bush administration's decision this week to impose tariffs
on steel imports. The steel dispute, moreover, has already
boiled over into another vital area of Russian-U.S. trade. In a
move that most Russian sources have interpreted as a preemptory
strike aimed at giving Moscow some leverage in the looming
faceoff over steel, Russia's Agricultural Ministry announced on
March 1 that it had stopped issuing import licenses for U.S.
poultry and that a total ban would be in effect as of March 10.
That decision elicited sharp criticism from U.S. officials, who
have gone so far as to suggest that a Russian ban on U.S.
poultry could ultimately complicate bilateral trade relations
and might also lead the United States to rethink its support for
Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The trade volumes involved are no small matter. Calculations
done by the U.S. government estimate that the tariffs being
imposed by the Bush administration will affect 33 percent of
Russia's steel exports (to the United States), a Russian trade
official said yesterday. And Economic Development and Trade
Minister German Gref told reporters that the U.S. tariffs would
cause annual losses of US$400-500 million for Russian steel
producers. The poultry figures are of a similar scale. Last
year, U.S. producers reportedly sold about 1 million tons--or
US$700 million worth--of poultry to Russia. The U.S. poultry
industry employs people in thirty-eight states, and half of all
its exports go to Russia. Russia itself produced only 564,000
tons of poultry last year, the Russian business daily Vedomosti
reports.

Despite its expectations that the United States might move
forward with the steel tariff announcement, official reactions
from Moscow yesterday were not entirely consistent. Prime
Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, for example, denied that a trade war
was imminent and also suggested that Russian authorities could
yet relent over the decision to block U.S. poultry imports.
Other officials, including representatives of Russia's steel
industry, took a harder line, however. A deputy agriculture
minister, for one, said that the poultry ban would indeed take
effect this weekend. And Gref said that he could not rule out
that Russia might take retaliatory measures.

According to one of Gref's deputies, the Russian government is
now awaiting a legal explanation from the United States for its
decision to impose the tariffs on Russian steel. Those same
Russian officials say that the U.S. move violates two existing
trade agreements between Russia and the United States. One is a
1990 accord that defines procedures and measures for market
protection, and the other is a 1999 Comprehensive Trade
Agreement that lays down quotas for a series of Russian steel
exports to the United States and serves, according to the same
trade official, "as a sort of guarantee of access to the U.S.
market." As proof that the United States is legally unjustified
in levying the new tariffs, Russian officials argue in part that
Russian imports could not be harming U.S. steel producers
because Russian exports last year totaled 1.9 million tons--or
less than the 2 million tons allowed by the bilateral
agreements. A Russian steel official was quoted as saying of the
U.S. move that "For a country that preaches free trade to follow
hypocritical policies, ...[and] that gets no small benefit from
the free trade system ... this is beyond our comprehension."

Russian agriculture and trade officials, meanwhile, have denied
in their public statements that there is any link between their
decision to ban U.S. poultry products and the dispute over
steel. Officially, they say that the poultry ban has been put
into effect because of alleged violations by the U.S. side of
various technical and quality requirements imposed by Russian
regulatory officials. But Russian media observers are having no
part of that explanation. A commentary posted by the
Kremlin-backed Strana.ru website, for example, argues that, in
effect--and with pun intended--the Russian poultry ban kills two
birds with one stone. It responds to the U.S. steel tariffs and
it helps to support Russia's domestic poultry producers. Indeed,
unlike many of the other governments angered by the U.S. tariffs
who intend to take their cases to the World Trade Organization,
Russia as a nonmember does not have that option. In this
context, the poultry ban, which is probably being used primarily
at this point as a bargaining chip, probably seemed like the
most effective counter-measure available to Russian government
officials.

It remains to be seen who will blink first in this game of
chicken, or whether the two sides will be able to find a
compromise that keeps diplomats--and steel and poultry
producers--in each country happy. In comments made on March 5,
the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, warned that
the Russian poultry ban could jeopardize broader economic ties
and create an unpleasant tone for U.S. President George W.
Bush's spring summit visit to Moscow. And if not brought under
control, that presumably means the trade dispute could have an
adverse impact on Russian-U.S. talks in other areas, including
strategic arms cuts and cooperation in the antiterror war.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Yakovenko,
meanwhile, offered a dour commentary of his own. On March 6 he
criticized the Bush administration for drawing a link between
the poultry ban and such fundamental bilateral issues as repeal
of the Soviet-era U.S. trade restrictions contained in the
Jackson-Vanik amendment and U.S. support for Russia's WTO
membership. He complained that such a linkage politicized the
issues involved and suggested that it also undermined trust and
predictability in Russian-U.S. ties more generally (Moscow
Times, March 5, 7; Reuters, March 5; AP, March 6-7; AFP,
Interfax, Strana.ru, March 6).

*******

#3
Vremya MN
March 5, 2002
THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING
What does the United States want from the Caucasus?
Author: Leonid Radzikhovsky
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
WHAT ARE THE AMERICANS GOING TO DO WITH THE CAUCASUS? THEY ARE 
FORMING A RING, A RING OF MILITARY BASES ALONG RUSSIA'S BORDERS IN THE 
SOUTH. BUT THIS IS NOT A RING AGAINST RUSSIA. THE RING IS POINTING IN 
THE DIRECTION OF THE SOUTH, TO MUSLIM STATES LIKE IRAN, IRAQ, AND SO 
ON.

     Why would the Americans land a force in Georgia? Needless to say, 
the benevolent American-Georgian-Russian explanations are hardly 
credible. On the other hand, the hysterical outcry in Russia is not 
convincing either. All right, so the Americans and Georgians are 
lying. Perhaps they are. But what is the truth?
     Eduard Shevardnadze is losing control and power; he fears for his 
life and the Americans are the last hope to which he is clinging. In 
principle, this may explain everything - but some details still don't 
fit. Are these Americans (and how many of them - four or 104?) going 
to personally defend Shevardnadze? Let's assume that the Americans are 
merely symbolic. Their actual numbers don't matter. What counts is 
that the Americans' arrival shows that the United States is not going 
to abandon Shevardnadze. This nuance alone calms Georgia down. Such 
scandals play into Shevardnadze's hands, since, given the 
circumstances, all Georgians are forced to defend him as a symbol of 
their nation attacked by "Russian imperialist media and politicians". 
In other words, patriotism is the last resort of any unlucky 
president.
     It is much less clear with the Americans. Why have they gone into 
Georgia?
     "Settling in the Caucasus." It has a nice ring to it; it is 
convincing, if not looked at too closely. Does the United States lack 
influence in this region? On whom do Shevardnadze and all of Georgia 
rely - Russia or America? America. (Which is strange, because in 
Moscow Georgian politicians and business leaders are received at a 
higher level than that on which they are received in the United 
States; because all money comes to Georgia from Russia, not from the 
United States; because the huge Georgian diaspora in Russia is many 
times more influential than the tiny one in the United States. All the 
same, it is the United States Georgia looks up to. Nothing to be done 
here. These are Soviet provincial psychological problems at play.) The 
same goes for Azerbaijan, by the way. Where does Aliyev get treatment 
- in the familiar Kremlin hospital in Moscow, or in Cleveland? If they 
wanted to, the Americans could easily join in any Azerbaijani oil 
project, elbowing the Russians out.
     It isn't hard to understand that the Caucasus is dreaming about 
American companies coming in (dreams are the only place it can see 
them, but that's the Americans' choice), and the Americans do not have 
to pave their way there with force of arms. What are the Americans 
going to do with the Caucasus? They will automatically get whatever 
they wish there, and they are unlikely to be eager to deal with the 
problems of the region, much less find themselves involved in 
Georgia's troubles.
     So only one answer is possible. The Americans are not acting for 
the sake of something. They are acting against someone. Against 
Russia, naturally. They are forming a ring around Russia: Central 
Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltic states.
     This assumption immediately kicks in the unconditional reflexes. 
Anti-Americanism is something Russians are good at. It seems Russians 
think that the United States responds in kind, and is always on the 
lookout for ways of doing something to spite Russia - to conquer, to 
encircle, to annex...
     I don't think this is what the United States is after. Encircling 
Russia in a ring of bases and so on - that is nonsense, worthy of the 
Zavtra newspaper. Why would the United States form any kind of 
geopolitical ring around Russia? It would have been logical if 
Washington had really intended:
     - to split Russia;
     - to colonize Russia piece by piece; or
     - to wage war on Russia if all these plans failed.
     Prokhanov, writing in Zavtra, says this is what the United States 
is really after. More level-headed Russians cannot and do not believe 
in the "theory of the ring".
     There is one other detail. Opinions about Putin can and do 
differ. But unless he is believed to be an agent of influence of the 
United States (this is what Prokhanov and Co. believe), we have to 
admit that he, the president of the Russian Federation, is not scared 
by the "American invasion". This means that he does not believe in 
rings either, and since he lacks any trump cards, he's choosing not to 
bluff in this particular game. Perhaps he is doing the right thing?
     And yet, what have the Americans come to Georgia for? In my view, 
the answer is simple. Yes, they are forming a ring, a ring of military 
bases along Russia's borders in the south. But this is not a ring 
against Russia, as Russians - with their manias and phobias - may 
believe. The ring is pointing in the direction of the south, to Muslim 
states like Iran, Iraq, and so on. They are the nations that the 
United States wants to control, the nations that it intends to put 
under pressure, both psychological and military. Given the situation, 
the southern borders of the CIS do become a zone of America's vital 
interests. Given the situation, America needs Russia's support, or at 
least its neutrality. I think this is the card Putin intends to play 
in this game. He also wants to join the American Fellowship of the 
Ring.

*******

#4
Sweeps in Chechen town continue despite grisly findings
AFP
March 7, 2002 
 
The Russian federal army has launched another sweeping operation in the
Chechen town of Argun, despite the discovery of bodies of civilians
arrested earlier there over the past week, a Russian rights group reported.

The sweep was launched Tuesday, a day after the bodies of four young men,
who were arrested in Argun last week, were returned to their relatives, the
Memorial group said.

According to the spokesman of Chechnya's rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov, the
four men, one of whom worked for local police, were murdered last week.

Another 24 bodies, which bore marks of violent deaths, were found in the
mass grave uncovered in Argun last week, and which mainly contained bodies
of people arrested in the sweeps and then reported missing.

Russian federal forces conducted a 10-day security sweep through Argun
around the New Year targeting separatist rebels but human rights groups
said that many civilians went missing during the operation.

Eighteen unidentified bodies have been discovered in Chechnya since the
beginning of the year and a total of 72 unidentified bodies have been found
since the start of the Russian crackdown in the separatist republic on
October 1, 1999.

Civil liberties observers have denounced Russian "clean-up" operations in
Chechnya, alleging widespread human rights abuses involving beatings,
kidnappings and summary executions.

Federal forces have become bogged down in a brutal guerrilla conflict in
the southern Russian republic, where more than 3,500 Russian soldiers have
died according to an official toll that observers say is far below the real
figure. 

*******

#5
Kommersant
March 7, 2002
Natalia Pushkareva: "I tried to return "history to women and women to
history."
Unlike in the West, feminism in Russia emerged at a much later date
By Liza Novikova
(therussianissues.com)

The "Ladomir" Publishing House in Moscow has just released Natalia
Pushkareva's book The Russian Woman: History and Modern Times. A History of
Studying the 'Woman Question' in Russian and foreign science. 1800-200 In
the interview, Natalia Pushkareva admits that she tried to return "history
to women and women to history."

In the past, the image of the Russian woman was formed by various
attributes - recklessness, aggressiveness, women's rebellions, striptease,
etc. Has the image of the Russian woman changed since then? How does the
woman of today differ from that of the "Soviet" woman or women of previous
historical epochs?

If there is anything that the Russian women of today have in common with
those of the past, it is traditional social activity. However, this
activity is in no way superficial nor was it "borrowed" from the West. This
social activity has deep historical roots: it is something that they have
endured throughout their entire history. Arbitrarily speaking, "the Russian
woman has always been considered chaste." But I think that this is
disputable. It would be erroneous to say that this was a national
characteristic and that those women who behaved otherwise were not worthy
of being considered the national ideal. There was a whole multitude of
different models of behavior.

I believe that the Russian woman was influenced by both Orthodox morals and
the peculiarities of our legal system. After all, beginning in the 10th
century, women in Russia had the right to divorce, something that women did
not have in the West. She also had the right to own her own property when
she was married. This was also typical of Russia and unusual in the West
(where everything was family property).

Then why did feminism not take root in Russia? They struggled and
struggled, and then gave up?

Unlike in other countries, the question of women in Russia was usually
brought up by men - Granovsky, Pirogov, Sechenov, and the journalist
Mikhailov, whose article "The Ideal Woman" was read to tatters. However,
the first women's organizations appeared in Russia only at the beginning of
the 19th century, whereas the roots of feminism in the West first became
visible back in the 16th century.

The Bolsheviks took a very prejudiced attitude towards women's
organizations: there could be no women's interests that differed from men's
interests! The peculiar feature of Russian feminism is seen precisely in
the fact that our feminists never placed themselves in opposition to men's
organizations.

Women don't only shape politics when they are speaking from the rostrum...

Personally, I have always been interested in the forms of how women
indirectly participate in politics, i.e., how women can influence politics
without actually standing at the helm. This is where we run into
considerably more intrigues and interesting twists.

On the whole, our society is very conservative. For example, nothing in
Russia has been "modernized" in respect to women. On the contrary, what we
can speak about here is a renaissance of the patriarchy. That is precisely
why our society took such a categorical attitude against Raisa Gorbachev.

In fact, our women themselves did not want to see such successful women
emerging in their ranks. For example, Raisa Gorbachev did not even make an
attempt to continue her professional activity, as for example, was done by
Hillary Clinton. The wife of the former American president managed to
achieve a great deal even after her husband left the White House precisely
because she remained independent. The contemporary women's movement in the
West gives the green light to people like this. Perhaps, we will also have
such brilliant personalities soon - and they will be able to speak out in
defense of our democratic interests without betraying their gender.

But the more we orient our girls to become cute Barbies for their husbands,
the fewer political "stars" and active women politicians we shall have. But
so far, our efforts in bringing up our young women follow traditional
interests. Unfortunately, the Church is also working in that direction: we
do not need active women; a woman should marry and give birth to children.
But what should women who don't marry and decide raise children alone do?
These women immediately find themselves outside society's framework.

Similarly, women who strive for professional success are condemned. They
are seen as the same kind of outsiders as men who are conscientious objectors.

Did you draw upon popular TV soap operas for material for your book?

Of course, but those programs also have their limits. For instance, those
soap operas don't really bring up the question concerning the insignificant
role of women in contemporary politics. They do not raise the question of
why women fail to break through the 5% barrier of votes received in elections.

Television prefers to construct a traditional female image: "whether her
husband has left her or not," that is what is discussed. When women get
together to say they disagree with the policy that men are pursuing,
nothing is shown on a single channel. They invite Zhirinovsky to programs
devoted to feminism, and instead of a serious discussion, the program turns
into a comedy hour.

*******

#6
Russia: Orthodox Church Continues To Resist Roman Catholic Presence
By Don Hill

The Vatican recently redesignated its five temporary administrative divisions 
in Russia as dioceses, a more long-term arrangement. And last weekend, Pope 
John Paul II included Moscow's Roman Catholics in a six-city pan-European 
video address. From one perspective, for the leader of the world's Roman 
Catholics to serve his Russian flock in this way seems an innocent activity. 
But RFE/RL correspondent Don Hill reports that the outraged reaction of 
Russia's Orthodox Church patriarchate was predictable. 

Prague, 6 March 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Pope John Paul II's message to Russian Roman 
Catholics in Moscow last weekend was routine enough. 

In a video sermon also beamed to five other European cities, the pope said, 
"In the name of the most holy Virgin Mary, always stay close to each other in 
faith and serve the Gospel."

The Gospel, or "truth," to Christians refers to Holy Scriptures. Christians 
declare a belief that the Virgin Mary is the human mother of Jesus Christ, 
the son of God who was born miraculously to a virgin.

The faithful of the Russian Orthodox and other Eastern Orthodox churches 
worship God in different ways with different liturgical customs, but share 
beliefs in Jesus, Mary, and God.

So a bystander might be tempted to wonder why Alexii II, patriarch of Moscow 
and all of Russia, appeared on Russian NTV after the pope's address and said, 
"We regard it as an invasion of Russia."

Moscow journalist Andrei Zolotov Jr., who covered the Roman Catholic 
gathering in Moscow's Cathedral of Immaculate Conception, says the pope's 
electronic visit to Moscow might not by itself have aroused such a strong 
reaction. Zolotov writes for the English-language daily "The Moscow Times."

"I think that the pope's virtual appearance in Moscow's [Roman Catholic] 
cathedral would not have been such an important event if it had not been 
timed soon after the elevation of the apostolic administrations to the rank 
of diocese."

And therein lies some tangled background to the story.

The Keston Institute is a London-based nongovernmental organization 
specializing in following religious developments around the world. Geraldine 
Fagan is a reporter for the Keston News Service. She describes the Roman 
Catholic organizational changes in Russia as hardly more than a name change.

"In general terms, basically what has happened is that the [Roman] Catholic 
Church has decided to rename its existing structures in Russia and call them 
diocese. So they have not changed in size and number and personnel. They are 
exactly the same as before." 

Fagan says the Orthodox Church is reacting as though any attempt by the Roman 
Catholic Church to preach to any Russian who is baptized in the Orthodox 
Church constitutes proselytism. In general, churches make a distinction 
between evangelism -- that is, the benign spreading of the good word to 
people who may not have any religion -- and proselytism, or trying to win 
adherents of one religion over to another.

"And now, certainly within the most recent statements, the patriarch has 
described the whole Russian people as being spiritually and culturally and 
historically the flock of the Russian Orthodox Church. So he is really 
including even atheist Russians as being part of the flock of the Russian 
Orthodox Church."

Gillian Evans is a member of the history faculty at the University of 
Cambridge in England. She describes herself as an ecumenist, that is, a 
person who studies interchurch relations and cooperation. She says the 
patriarch's position may be more understandable if one considers the history 
of Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox relations.

"The fundamental principle of the organization of the church from a very 
early date has been territorial, hasn't it? In a given place, there was -- in 
the united church, in a given place -- there was a diocese and a bishop and 
bishops grouped together under metropolitans."

Evans says the significance may lie less in what the Vatican has done in 
Russia and more in the fact that it unilaterally has altered what long had 
been a settled arrangement, a delicate shift in the perceived balance of 
power.

"It sounds to me as though [the Roman Catholic action] is a bid for control 
or power that is ecclesiastically a stronger claim than was being made 
before. And that must be so because if it has people very angry locally, that 
must be how they are perceiving it, isn't it?"

The "Moscow Times'" Zolotov concurs: "As for the institution of dioceses 
united in a metropolia [or group of bishops] in a church province, this 
elevation of the status of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia has really 
been a major setback in the relations between the Orthodox Church and the 
Vatican, because the Orthodox Church saw it as the establishment of a 
parallel church."

Zolotov says the very symbolism of what could be taken as merely a name 
change is the essence of the controversy: "The problem is that by setting up 
a higher-status church, which had not been the case in Russia before, the 
Roman Catholic Church has shown that it is here for a long time. It is here 
to expand its presence."

The Roman Catholic Church regards the Eastern Orthodox churches as being 
members of the same communion, whose ministers trace their ordination to the 
first disciples of Christ and whose sacraments are valid for all Catholics. 
Zolotov says this led the Russian Orthodox leadership to expect the Roman 
Catholics would not feel a need to increase their influence in Russia.

"And that is precisely what irritates the Orthodox, who had expected -- and 
are now very much disillusioned in that -- that on the basis of the 
ecumenical progress that had been made in the 1960s and '70s, that the 
[Roman] Catholic Church would indeed treat the Orthodox Church as a sister 
church and would help it rather than expand [the Roman Catholic] presence."

The question remaining is why the Vatican chose to make its two provocative 
moves in Russia now. The Keston Institute's Fagan says the pope and his 
advisers may have calculated that the Russian government had signaled it 
probably would not rise strongly to the Orthodox Church's defense.

From Oxford, ecumenist Evans suggests that the ailing and aging pope may have 
felt an urgency to act because his time is growing short.

*******

#7
Asia Times
March 6, 2002
Russia losing its strategic grip in Afghanistan 
By Ehsan Ahrari 

The United States military campaign against the Taliban (Operation Enduring 
Freedom) was initially a blessing in disguise for Russia, for two main 
reasons. 

First, given the heightened American concern regarding transnational 
terrorism, Russia concluded that it could solve its own "Chechen problem" in 
the name of fighting terrorism, and, in the process, might get away with 
using whatever level of force it deemed necessary. 

Second, it was the US military action - in which the American Special Forces 
pinpointed the positions of the Taliban fighters so that the American air 
force could pound them - that led to the collapse of the Taliban's 
resilience. 

Russia was indeed surprised with the pace of the dismantlement of Taliban 
rule. The awesome power of the American military was once again unambiguously 
proven. 

As the interim government of Prime Minister Hamid Karzai started to take 
political control of various regions of Afghanistan, Moscow decided to send 
in its own medical force. As benign as this Russian presence in Afghanistan 
might have been from the Kremlin viewpoint, it raised a lot of eyebrows, and 
also brought back painful memories of the brutalities related to the decade 
of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that ended in 1992. 

But Moscow did not show any sensitivity to these sentiments. The Pashtuns 
siding with Karzai (himself a Pashtun) did not forget that the Russians 
fought with the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated Northern Alliance, which was 
largely equipped by Russian military wherewithal. 

A potentially contentious aspect of this reality is that the Afghan "national 
military" is not at all national in its ethnic makeup. There are also reports 
that the Russians are essentially "running the small Afghan Tajik Air Force, 
serving as pilots or mechanics". 

From the Russian point of view, the military dominance of the Northern 
Alliance would guarantee against any sudden buildup of Pashtun forces. Russia 
will not forget that the Taliban were primarily Pashtun in ethnicity; thus 
they do not trust the Pashtun, even under the leadership of Karzai, 
especially when one considers that a large number of them are merely turncoat 
Taliban. Karzai has shown his own ill will toward Russia by pointedly keeping 
Moscow off the itinerary of his recent worldwide travel. 

It is also likely that Karzai remains wary of the Russian's potential 
divisive role in his country. In the meantime, the Defense Minister of the 
new Afghan government, General Mohammad Fahim - an ethnic Tajik - not only 
visited Russia, but was granted a lengthy meeting with President Vladimir 
Putin and was also promised additional Russian military and technical 
assistance. 

It is possible that Karzai's request for additional Western peace-keeping 
troops in his country might be related to the predominantly non-Pashtun 
ethnic makeup of the Afghan "national military". Undoubtedly, the presence of 
such forces would enhance the political clout and maneuverability of his 
government. 

Interestingly enough, Fahim has gone on the record with his opposition to the 
enhanced presence of Western peace-keeping forces in Afghanistan. If the 
ethnic tensions within the ranks of the interim government were somewhat 
submerged until recently, the assassination of the interim minister for air 
transport and tourism, Abdul Rahman, on February 14, surfaced them with a 
vengeance. 

Karzai accused five men for that act, two of whom were generals and members 
of the intelligence service of the intelligence ministry. What was most 
troubling was that all five of the alleged attackers belonged to a faction of 
the Northern Alliance. 

As the ethnic rivalry within the interim government begins to intensify, the 
United States and Russia are also manifesting their own growing differences. 
The very fact that the Bush administration has decided to have a long-term, 
if not a permanent military presence in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will lead 
to increased tensions between the two great powers. 

The Putin government considers Central Asia as its own backyard; any 
long-term American presence is seen as intrusive and hegemonic in 
orientation. In addition, Washington is also busy stating its preferences for 
the Caspian Sea oil and gas routes that are likely to go through Afghanistan, 
but would avoid the Tajik-controlled areas of that country. Given the large 
revenues that such pipelines promise, Russia and its Tajik and Uzbek allies 
of the Northern Alliance would not like such arrangements. 

Another source of Russia's concern in the evolving Afghan power game is the 
exchange of shrill rhetoric between the Bush administration and Iran. After 
all, both Russia and Iran were long supporters of the Northern Alliance's 
fight against the Taliban. 

As Iran watches the rising ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, it has escalated 
its own behind-the-scenes maneuvering. As a country that watched in 
frustration the complete dissipation of its political clout from Afghanistan 
during the Taliban rule, Iran is in no mood to experience similar 
frustrations in the post-Taliban era. 

Russia continues to value Iran's increased strategic influence in 
Afghanistan, since it is not likely to compete with its own interests. 

The United States, on its part, interprets the Iranian maneuvering as a 
manifestation of its predilection for the return of "warlordism" in 
Afghanistan, and sees it as being aimed at weakening the interim government. 

The unfortunate aspect of the US interpretation (or misinterpretation) of 
Iranian activism, inter alia, contributed to Bush's lumping of Iran (along 
with Iraq and North Korea) as an "axis of evil". However, given that it 
assigns high significance to having its own influence not completely wiped 
out from the areas contiguous to Afghanistan, Iran is not likely to cease its 
activities in Afghanistan, America's seeming misinterpretation of its 
activism and ensuing warnings notwithstanding. 

Thus emerges a portrait of Afghanistan that is still very unstable, divided 
and weak, and, consequently, very prone to being exploited by regional and 
great power rivalry. 

Moscow's chief concern is that the "wrong" groups might capture power in the 
country in the coming months, especially if the US diverts its attention to 
other parts of the world and pursues other strategic issues. Even with a 
powerful US presence in Afghanistan and its neighboring states, Russia sees a 
definite uphill struggle in its own attempts to reestablish its hegemony in 
Central Asia or in influencing the power politics of Afghanistan.  

*******

#8
pravda.ru
March 5, 2002
THE MAJOR PROBLEM OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY IS ITS FUTURE 

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov is touring the north of Russia now. 
The trip started on March 4; the minister will visit the towns of 
Severomorsk, the troops of the Leningrad northern district, and the 
settlement of Roslyakovo, where specialists work on the utilization of the 
Kursk submarine, which was retrieved from the bottom of the Barents Sea. The 
main goal of all these visits is to check the current state of the Northern 
Fleet. 

Before the minister set out on the tour, it became known that there was a 
critical situation at the docks of the Northern Fleet: the enterprises do not 
even have the money to pay wages to their employees. The situation is 
especially dangerous at the enterprises that deal with the utilization of the 
Kursk sub. The workers were ready to go on strike, since they had not seen 
their paychecks for three months already. However, a part of the salary debt 
was liquidated before the defense minister arrived. However, it was only a 
part. 

The Northern Fleet has not had any military exercises after the tragedy with 
the Kursk submarine. The submarines started going to sea only in February of 
the current year. Needless to say, this circumstance exerts a negative 
influence on the level of the battle training of the crews of Russia's most 
powerful fleet. However, this is not the only problem. At the end of the day, 
one can catch up with that gap. The major problem for the fleet and for other 
troops of the Russian Army is the gradual deterioration of defense 
technology. 

However, this problem is not new. Everybody knows about the difficult state 
of things in the field of military technology. The reason why is very simple: 
the government and the Defense Ministry simply do not have the money to spend 
on research. 

A program of a step by step re-equipment of the Russian army was passed in 
1996. However, it turned out that it was impossible to implement it, and the 
progress was only 19% after several years. Therefore, there was a strong need 
in the re-development of the program, and another document was passed in th 
2000. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the money to purchase new defense 
technology was found at that very moment. The state will be able to supply 
orders to the enterprises of the military and industrial complex at the level 
of 10-12% only within a period of five to seven years, but at least, the 
program says which percentage of the Russian budget is going to be assigned 
for the modernization of defense technology and for purchasing the new 
equipment. 

Another direction of the modernization is the reform of the military and 
industrial complex. The number of enterprises of the military and industrial 
complex is supposed to be decreased a lot, and the rest should be gradually 
united into holdings. However, this does not mean that everything will work 
out the way it was planned in the program. Ilya Klebanov, the main lobbyist 
of this idea in the Russian government, has recently been dismissed from the 
position of the vice premier, although he is still the minister in charge of 
the military and industrial complex. 

The most important role in the modernization of the Russian Army is taken by 
the development of the deliveries of the Russian weapons to foreign 
countries. It is envisaged that Russian enterprises are supposed to develop 
their links not only with the traditional partners in Asia and Africa and 
they should also enter the markets of the NATO countries as well as the 
countries of Latin America. However, this does not come that easy. Noone is 
waiting for the Russian enterprises over there. Even traditional partners 
like India are more drawn to cooperation with the USA. Russian companies can 
offer a very good, competitive products such as tanks, helicopters, and 
fighter planes, ones that are not even used in Chechnya. 

The Russian pilots still fly Mi-8 and Mi-24 choppers, which are very old now. 
What about the new Black Shark helicopters? The development of the new kinds 
of arms in Russia causes a lot of concern. It is an open secret that weapons 
of high technology and precision is the future of the army. The USA 
demonstrated it very well in Iraq and in Afghanistan. America is far ahead in 
that respect. There are rumors going around about the development of the new, 
non-nuclear kinds of weapons, which are going to be much more efficient in 
comparison with the ones that are currently used. 

The Russian leaders have to face a very difficult goal: to try to achieve the 
conformity of the technical equipment of the Russian army with the US and 
NATO armies. The problem of Russia's security is very topical nowadays, and 
one has to deal with it. Otherwise, our country will have a large but very 
weak army; let's face it. 
Vasily Bubnov 
PRAVDA.Ru 
Translated by Dmitry Sudakov 

*******

#9
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
March 6, 2002
TWO CENTERS OF POWER IN THE MILITARY
Army generals attempting to adjust the Kremlin's foreign policy
Author: Igor Korotchenko
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
VLADIMIR PUTIN RESEMBLES NIKITA KHRUSCHEV IN HIS CAUTIOUS TREATMENT 
OF THE TOP BRASS. TO ALL APPEARANCES, THE TOP RUSSIAN GENERALS ARE 
IRRITATED BY PRESIDENT PUTIN'S COURSE TOWARD A WARMING IN THE 
RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US AND 
NATO. 

     While Defense Minister Igor Ivanov spoke against dramatizing the 
fact that NATO is carrying out the Strong Resolve 2002 strategic 
exercise near Russia's northwest borders, General Anatoly Kvashnin, 
the chief of the General Staff, made unprecedented harsh statements 
when on business trip to troops of the Moscow Military District. 
According to him, the aforementioned NATO exercise prove the 
steadiness of the Alliance's Cold War-era views as to its probable 
adversary (Russia and Belarus). General Kvashnin called the 
Fundamental Russian-NATO Act an "information screen" and called upon 
the Russian Armed Forces to be prepared to repel an external military 
aggression.
     General Kvashnin's statement quoted by the Interfax-MNA agency 
contradicts the official position of the Russian Defense Ministry, the 
Foreign Ministry, and the Kremlin. At the same time, the theses voiced 
by the chief of the General Staff are to a large extent consonant with 
the current moods of Russian officers and are certain to be supported 
in troops. Army garrisons, exhausted by poverty, constant humiliation, 
state authorities' total indifference to their problems, and the 
government's inability to defend the national interests in the 
international arena, are gradually developing anti-president spirits. 
According to certain estimates, no more than one-third of career army 
officers support President Putin's foreign policy. Some believe 2002 
may become a turning-point year in the relationships between the army 
and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
     This is not the first time General Kvashnin dares oppose 
statements of his immediate superior Sergei Ivanov. But this time the 
chief of the General Staff surpassed himself. However, the defense 
minister cannot retort to his subordinate, the more so put him back 
into his place. He merely reiterates from time to time that there are 
no discords in the top military structures. A public scandal would be 
perilous for Mr. Ivanov, because all the authority in the army is de 
facto concentrated in the hands of General Kvashnin.
     Mr. Ivanov's appointment as defense minister (for which, as it 
now turns out, he was totally unprepared owing to lack of relevant 
experience) resulted in just another case of diarchy in the Defense 
Ministry and allowed General Kvashnin to dictate his conditions. (...)
     We should note that, despite last year's staff reshuffles in the 
Defense Ministry, General Kvashnin managed to keep his team intact. 
What's more, some of his subordinates were further promoted. Among 
General Kvashnin's proteges people in the know mention Lieutenant 
General Alexander Rukshin, chief of the Main Semistrategic Department, 
Colonel General Valentin Korabelnikov, chief of the Main Intelligence 
Department, chief of the Main Organizational and Mobilization 
Department Vladislav Putilin, Colonel General Ivan Efremov, Commander 
of the Moscow Military Distroct, Colonel General Vitaly Azarov, chief 
of the Main Disciplinary Department, Colonel General Igor Puzanov, 
Secretary of the Defense Ministry, and a number of lower-rank military 
officers, including the commanders of the elite Tamanskaya and 
Kantemirovskaya armor divisions. This segregation is certainly fairly 
conventional, for it may change depending on the situation. However, 
it is important to realize that General Kvashnin is backed by real 
forces, including the troops of the Moscow Military District and the 
army group in Chechnya (many officers serving in that group were 
appointed with personal approval of the chief of the General Staff).
     Our sources say General Kvashnin's authoritarian traits have been 
bothering the Kremlin since the middle of 2001. It is no coincidence 
that FSB military counterintelligence departments closely watches the 
layout of powers in the top military leadership and collects 
information characterizing key military officers in the framework of 
the monitoring of the general situation in the Armed Forces. (...) In 
a sense, Vladimir Putin may be compared to Nikita Khruschev, who paid 
special attention to the moods among top generals and performed a 
rapid staff reshuffle in 1957 under the pretext of Marshal Zhukov's 
excessive ambitions.
(Translated by Andrei Bystrov)

*******

#10
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
No. 38
March 6, 2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
SERGEI KARAGANOV: "RUSSIA SHOULD FORM A NORMAL UNION WITH THE WEST"
Sergei Karaganov believes that Russia needs NATO  
By Lidia ANDRUSENKO
     
     The subject of Russia-NATO rapprochement has been given a 
new lease on life in the past few days. Several respected 
Western newspapers recalled the idea voiced by British premier 
Tony Blair, which was seemingly buried last November. I mean 
the transformation of Russia-NATO relations from the 19 + 1 to 
NATO-20 formula. 
     
     On February 27 the issue was raised at the working session 
of the NATO Council held at the ambassadorial level. It was 
said once again at the session that Russia could be invited to 
participate in discussions with bloc members, but only 
discussions held in-between confidential meetings of decision- 
making NATO members and strictly limited to such issues as 
terrorism, non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and 
joint peacekeeping and rescue operations in emergency 
situations.
The project is to be presented at the May session of the NATO 
Council at the level of foreign ministers, to be held in 
Reykjavik. 
     The US press writes that actually Russia will be invited 
to sit at a round table, which underlines the unofficial nature 
of relations. In deed, these relations are absolutely unlike 
the carefully regulated NATO mechanisms of operation based on 
the multilateral Washington Treaty and a system of clear-cut 
mutual agreements and obligations. It is more like the G8, 
where Russia was a kind of a country "on call." 
     
     Sergei KARAGANOV, president of the Council of Foreign and 
Defence Policy, speaks about what Russia expects from NATO and 
if Russia-NATO relations will develop into genuine and not 
formal cooperation in the future. 
     
     Question: The other day the Western press wrote that NATO 
is ready to overhaul its relations with Russia, yet the 
articles on this issue are rather contradictory. In particular, 
The Financial Times announced the sensational NATO decision to 
upgrade the 19 + 1 formula into a full-fledged group of 20 and 
the possible transformation of the bloc into a political union. 
The International Herald Tribune only wrote about the need to 
improve relations with Russia in view of the admission of seven 
new members - East European countries - to the bloc. And the 
BBC claimed that the point at issue was not Russia's 
involvement in NATO but the creation of a parallel organisation 
where Russia would play a major role. Judging by everything, 
there is no unity on the issue in the West and Russia should 
not expect a clear-cut decision soon?
     Answer: Indeed, the West is not unanimous on the issue. 
The main reason for this is that the idea of Tony Blair was not 
welcomed by some of his Western colleagues. And although it had 
most probably been coordinated with the White House and the 
Pentagon, where conservative sentiments run strong, it provoked 
resistance. Second, work is underway to create a kind of an 
effective forum on outstanding issues in NATO without Russia, 
but not a forum that would serve to camouflage Russia's 
agreement or disagreement with the NATO enlargement. It is not 
clear if the idea is viable. The concept of Tony Blair is being 
translated into life at the talks inside NATO and at the 
NATO-Russia and Russia-US talks. 
     
     Question: A NATO official has stated that Russia should 
first learn to play the collective game by the Western rules. 
But do we need to do this if we keep saying that it would be 
humiliating for us to queue for NATO membership?
     Answer: We must not stand in the queue. If NATO decides to 
turn into a genuine international security organisation, it can 
invite us to join. The point at issue today is to develop 
genuine cooperation with NATO. Regrettably, the experience of 
the 19 + 1 formula was largely negative because the Russian and 
NATO bureaucracy hardly worked at all. It was a formal agency. 
     
     Question: Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said in Brussels 
that Russia and NATO would come to an agreement on "a new level 
of relations" by May 2002. But in his latest interview the 
minister said that Russia's joining NATO would be senseless 
from the military viewpoint. And that the question should be 
formulated differently: What is the purpose of NATO? So, it 
appears that Russia wants to collaborate with NATO yet regards 
it as absolutely useless? 
     Answer: If NATO accepts Russia as a member, it will amount 
to a fundamental transformation of the bloc. In this case it 
will turn into an organisation of international and not only 
European or Euro-Atlantic security. In this sense Ivanov is 
absolutely right. As for the possibility of collaboration, 
there is a number of issues on which we can collaborate. 
     For example, high-ranking officials unofficially offer 
collaboration in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation, which 
is a vital issue for us. It is possible to collaborate in the 
creation of a joint system of tracking air and space objects 
with a view to precluding mega-terrorism. There is a 
possibility, although vague, of jointly creating a European ABM 
system. And lastly, we can work jointly to prevent 
international conflicts. 
     But the question is, will NATO and Russia agree to such 
genuine collaboration? Do we have the financial and military- 
political capabilities for this? At the same time, Russia has 
to accept the inevitability of the NATO enlargement in the 
current situation. For while remaining de facto a universal 
organisation of European security, NATO is losing its 
usefulness in the eyes of the USA. In this situation we can be 
interested in the preservation of NATO despite our complaints 
to it. If only because it is an instrument that limits the US 
unilateralism.
     
     Question: That is, this is a delicate diplomatic game 
where we may play on the side of NATO?
     Answer: The current US administration believes that it 
actually does not need NATO. The Americans want to act single- 
handed. In this situation - although it may seem paradoxical - 
Russia needs NATO to preserve, at least for some time, its role 
of a restraint on the US actions that can lead to unpredictable 
decisions. At the same time, Russia does not want NATO to 
expand.
This is objective reality. But the main thing is that we should 
look behind the facade when a part of the US ruling group says 
that NATO is not necessary any more. For NATO is not only a 
military organisation, in particular an organisation 
spearheaded against Russia, but also a structure that 
streamlines relations within itself and is an instrument of 
European - and now also Russian - influence on the US policy. 
In other words, we should play a much more delicate diplomatic 
game than the one we have been playing. 
     
     Question: Can the creation of a new structure facilitate 
this? Or maybe it would be simpler to press for an equal NATO 
membership for Russia?
     Answer: It is apparent that since NATO membership is 
hardly a realistic prospect for Russia in the near future, we 
should not only develop collaboration with NATO in the spheres 
where this can benefit us but also think about a new security 
union designed to combat new threats. It can be a union of 
Russia and NATO members. 
     
     Question: Without the USA or with its active involvement?
     Answer: With its active involvement. But since the 
bureaucratic inertia is very strong in NATO, I think the best 
variant would be the creation of a new security union. Made up 
of G8 countries and such vital countries as China, possibly 
India and some other countries, such a union would be 
spearheaded against really new and much more dangerous and 
substantial threats. I mean nuclear non-proliferation and the 
deep destabilisation of the situation in Central Asia and the 
Middle East. In principle, this is a task for the near future, 
provided the pro-Western elite understands this and we press 
for it. This problem should be constantly on the agenda of 
Russian diplomacy. 
     
     Question: Do you think the West in general and the USA in 
particular are mounting pressure on Russia? 
     Answer: I don't detect serious pressure. There are only 
traditional words characteristic of US diplomacy. Western 
politicians are worried much more about such vital issues as 
resistance to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, growing 
instability in Asia and potential aggravation of the situation 
on the market of energy resources, because the Middle Eastern 
regimes are becoming more vulnerable. The role of Russia as a 
potential and reliable provider of energy resources to the 
world market is growing in this situation. Consequently, I 
think that given energetic diplomatic efforts, Russia is now in 
a better position than ever before - despite our internal 
problems. So, we must stop overestimating or underestimating 
statements.
Everything is in motion now and we must see if we can benefit 
in any way from this situation. 
     
     Question: That is, everything depends on us?
     Answer: Not quite. Much also depends on what our Western 
colleagues do. As far as I know, President Bush demands that 
Russia be given broader opportunities for collaboration with 
NATO. And not only on the issues on the old agenda but also on 
the issues that are on the new agenda. But this is not enough. 
We need a normal union, possibly even a formalised one, with 
the leading Western countries and with all leading countries to 
resist all these threats. 
     
     Question: Can the improvement of our relations with the 
West be affected by the union of Russia and Belarus?
     Answer: Yes, the West has a negative attitude to Belarus.
But Russia has a strategic interest in it and we should not 
only have a common monetary union but also force Belarus to 
modernise its economy and political life. Of course, we want 
this to be done with a major involvement of Russia so as to 
stop Belarus from disintegrating in 5 or 6 years. To do this we 
should have a special and very energetic Belarussian policy. It 
is a component but not a formal part of issues on the agenda. 

*******

#11
eurasianet.org
March 4, 2002
US POSTPONES CHECHEN BROADCASTS IN GOODWILL GESTURE TOWARDS RUSSIA
By Ariel Cohen 

There will be no Radio Free Chechnya, at least not in the near future. Less
than 48 hours before the Chechen service of Radio Liberty was supposed to
go on the air in late February, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG),
the governing body which supervises Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty,
decided to postpone the North Caucasus broadcasts indefinitely. The
broadcasting body acted after US diplomats expressed concern that the
Chechen-language broadcasts might be counter-productive in waging the
campaign against terrorism.

The postponement reflects the complexity of US-Russian relations, as well
as the pressures of the war on terrorism. Officials and non-governmental
organization representatives in the United States remain concerned about
Russia's conduct of the Chechen war. However, the Bush Administration does
not want to put Russia's support for the global anti-terrorism campaign in
jeopardy. 

Russia's foreign policy elite reportedly seethed over the US decision to
launch a north Caucasus service at the Radios. Broadcasting in Chechen was
seen as particularly offensive to Kremlin officials, who portray Chechen
separatists as Islamic terrorists with links to the al Qaeda network.

Moscow insiders also saw beginning of the North Caucasus broadcasts as a
strong signal that the United States supports the cause of the Chechen
independence, a perception that is not necessarily true, especially after
September 11. 

Some officials in Moscow viewed the broadcasting plan as a move to
undermine US-Russian relations. Since September 11, President Vladimir
Putin has been consistent in his support for the US-led anti-terrorism
campaign. [For more information, see the Eurasia Insight archives].

Broadcasts in the languages of the Northern Caucasus, such as Chechen, Avar
and Cirkassian, were mandated by the US Congress in 2000. But according to
a memo by Thomas A. Dine, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty's president,
full-time broadcasters and stringers will now provide coverage of the
region through Radio Liberty's Russian service. 

In informal conversations, conducted over the last several months, Russian
officials complained that influential "Russophobes" in the US governement
had influenced Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), the then-Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to support legislation to fund the broadcasts. 

To counter the US plans, the Russian officials embarked on a campaign of
pressure to link the Chechen broadcasts to the ability of Radio Liberty
Russian service to broadcast on AM and FM frequencies, which the
Prague-based Radio Liberty leases from dozens of independent Russian radio
stations. 

Russian legislation requires less than 50 percent of foreign ownership for
stations operating in Russia, a requirement that may jeopardize Radio
Liberty medium wave broadcasting. Some Russian officials even requested
that the United States provide "reciprocity," under which Washington would
allow Russian broadcasts on similar popular AM/FM frequencies in the United
States. The latter project is highly unlikely to materialize, as such
broadcasts will cost millions of dollars that the Russian budget simply
does not have.

Sergei Yastrzhembsky, a top Putin aide, claimed February 28 that the US
decision to postpone the Chechen-language broadcasts had "not aroused any
particular emotions among Moscow officials." However, the semi-official RIA
news agency reported that the Chechen broadcasts would have aggravated the
conflict and complicated efforts to find a political solution to the crisis. 

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov reportedly intervened with Secretary
of State Colin Powell, requesting that broadcasts be postponed. Meanwhile,
some offcials in the Bush Administration also pointed to an apparent
contradiction in authorizing the deployment of military advisors to
Georgia, ostensibly to help contain a building terrorist threat in the
Transcaucasus republic, while also turning the switch on the Chechen
broadcasting.

At a regular press briefing, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
explained that the decision to postpone the broadcasts began with a letter
written by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to the BBG, on which
the Secretary of State sits ex officio, asking to postpone the broadcasts.
The State Department asserted that the broadcasts were ill-timed, given the
post September 11 geopolitical environment. 

At the same time, Boucher said the US government was eager to see the
Chechnya peace process make progress. "We believe that the only way is to
solve the problems there is a political solution. We want to make sure that
everything we do contributes to that goal and doesn't detract from it,"
Boucher said. 

Despite the decision on Chechen broadcasts, human rights groups and US
officials continue to exert pressure on Russia to seek a negotiated
solution. For example, a bipartisan initiative launched in late February in
the Senate, - spearheaded by Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota), and Senator Sam
Brownback (R-Missouri) - seeks the adoption of a resolution on Chechnya
requiring President Bush to pressure Russia into a negotiated political
settlement. 

Whether the Bush Administration is willing to take action that complicates
its relatively cordial relationship with Putin, at a time when the campaign
against terrorism may expand, remains to be seen. Many administration
officials are wary of doing anything that creates an appearance of support
for the Chechens, who have allied themselves with a variety of radical
Islamic elements. 

Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Heritage
Foundation, and author of "Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis"
(Praeger/Greenwood, 1998).

*******

#12
The Russia Journal
March 1-7, 2002
Corruption is in the eye of the beholder
By AJAY GOYAL

If one were to believe the unrelenting blather in the Western media about
the Russian government over the past few years, one would think the country
were irreversibly mired in a Dark Age of corruption, while Western
corporations are the holy ark of morality that will save Russia from its
doomed destiny.

But between the two rotten systems that have characterized Russia in living
memory – Soviet Russia and former President Boris Yeltsin’s privatized
Russia – and the kind of treatment they have received from international
risk assessment and credit-rating agencies, one cannot help but spot an
irony: It was the corrupt Soviet Union – not the new Russia, trying to
overcome 70 years of ideological insolvency – that received first-class AAA
ratings from lenders and bankers. Based on these ratings, by 1991, the
"Evil Empire" had notched up some $100 billion in foreign debt from Western
bankers.

Once the mercurial Yeltsin threw the yoke of communism aside, the
confidence of the global business community in Russia started looking like
a dried prune. With the old system gone, the world business community
started imposing new strictures. They wanted audited accounts, transparent
companies, a stable political system, a sober president, a GAAP system of
accounting and a raft of other legal and accounting requirements. As
Western accounting, auditing and law firms moved into town, taking up the
finest office space and hanging out shingles advertising to portfolio
investors and other bargain hunters, capital moved in. As Russia moved
towards new depths of decay, Russian bonds and equity were the hottest buy
on Wall Street. By 1998, when the Western capital markets’ romance with
Russian bonds and equity ended in defaults by federal, regional and
corporate debtors, some $150 billion had fled Russia for offshore havens.

Not a day has gone by in the last 10 years in Russia without the blame for
the economy’s woes and lack of investment falling squarely on the lack of
corporate transparency and functioning capital-market regulation. But, with
time and effort, Russia’s government, legislators and businesses have now
built a most modern system of corporate transparency.

Some of the principal beneficiaries of this massive drive – which was also
funded by public-relations campaigns paid for by auditing and consulting
firms – have been these very auditing firms, particularly the Big 5, for
whom business has boomed. They employ hundreds of people and pay large
salaries. Partners in these firms earn millions in bonuses, yet their own
lack of corporate transparency make al-Qaida look like a publicly listed
company.

But surely, if 80 percent of the country’s businesses are now in private
hands and, after a decade of "Western-style" business, things have changed!
The West has exported the best of business through top consultants and
auditors, not just fly-by-night operators looking to make a fast buck!
Moscow, at least, has had thousands of foreign corporations open offices
within its borders. Millions of dollars have been spent in training courses
and seminars organized by auditing and law firms to offer guidance about
doing business free-market style.

Why, then, is capitalist Russia still so corrupt? Because Western capital
has not been able to bring one key ingredient of business to Russia – the
honor that comes with integrity.

For all its flaws, the Soviet Union had men and women of patriotic fervor
who would not cross certain lines out of a love of their land. The
post-1991 era brought the polyglot, young, brash and Western-educated
prodigy of the former communist functionaries. Western capital found a
common language with these men, who were without honor and self-esteem,
devoid of love for their own nation and willing to auction off for pennies
everything the country had spent 70 years building.

The market was thought to be a panacea, but little did Russians know of the
moral bankruptcy that greed and affluent decadence had brought to Western
market institutions themselves. Russians were awestruck by the opulence of
corporations like Enron. Little did they, like ordinary investors back in
the United States, know that the greed that lies at the heart of such
flashy success is no different from the lust of the extortionist communist
bureaucrat. For years, in the Russian media auditors would get respectful
bows from people, their opinions were headline news and Russians saw them
as agents who would bring positive change to their corrupt system. To ask
questions of the rabbi was not kosher.

Now, in the aftermath of the Enron scandal, Russians, as well as Americans,
are waking up with a disenchanted feeling about the market – the same
feeling of disillusionment they had developed for Yeltsin and his reformers.

Russia, in fact, was a fertile ground for many of these "aggressive and
creative accountants and lawyers." When they were making out like bandits,
laws were unformed and oversight by government institutions non-existent or
incompetent. Government officials frequently used strong-arm tactics to
stop capital flight and white-collar crime because they could not employ
expensive thugs to serve as lawyers for the state. It was easy to smear
them because they had no Ivy League neckties and could not redescribe theft
in fine-sounding terms. When cases were filed by Russian tax authorities
against holy cows of business like Johnson & Johnson, Independent Media and
even the big auditing firm of Ernst & Young, Western anger against Russian
"corruption" reached a fever pitch. Russia was threatened with loss of
"foreign investment" unless it stopped its "anti-market" activities.

In 1991, Russia rid itself of the dark legacy of communism. But it was a
rude awakening when it came face to face with the brute strength of
corruption that thrives within the market system as well. 

The first commission on a deal that was demanded of me after 1991 came from
a Swiss company’s executive in Moscow. I saw a deliberate breach of
legislation and customs regulations of two countries on the part of this
bluest of blue-chip companies as its $650-an-hour auditors and lawyers told
it its practices were merely exploiting loose laws but were "not illegal."
The company was literally smuggling in goods because its executives were
arrogantly certain they would not be caught. Over the last three years, in
media business, I have been coming across a most disturbing trend: Demands
for cash bribes are coming increasingly from employees of foreign
companies, and not always from Russian nationals. In unethical behavior,
foreign businesses are competing with their Russian counterparts. The first
manager to demand articles in return for advertisement was an auditing
firm’s European partner and the second an American general manager of a
five-star hotel.

It is not the auditor who is to blame for all the ills in the Enron debacle
or Russian capital flight. The collective vocal conscience of a group of
people is the best defender of morality and fairness in the conduct of
governments and businesses. Unfortunately, in the United States, the public
became complacent as big business bought government and media influence. In
Russia, people have yet to learn they are the front line of defense against
corruption – not laws passed by the Duma.

The public has a right to audit the Western holy cows that abetted the
fleecing of Russia. Russia went bankrupt like Enron in 1998. It is high
time to make public the high crimes committed by the "geniuses of business"
that brought it about.

And, meanwhile, businesses and investors do not have to wait for new laws
and accounting principles to be written. Auditors can not tell us what our
own consciences can.
 
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