#7
Asia Times
March 6, 2002
Russia losing its strategic grip in Afghanistan
By Ehsan Ahrari

The United States military campaign against the Taliban (Operation Enduring Freedom) was initially a blessing in disguise for Russia, for two main reasons.

First, given the heightened American concern regarding transnational terrorism, Russia concluded that it could solve its own "Chechen problem" in the name of fighting terrorism, and, in the process, might get away with using whatever level of force it deemed necessary.

Second, it was the US military action - in which the American Special Forces pinpointed the positions of the Taliban fighters so that the American air force could pound them - that led to the collapse of the Taliban's resilience.

Russia was indeed surprised with the pace of the dismantlement of Taliban rule. The awesome power of the American military was once again unambiguously proven.

As the interim government of Prime Minister Hamid Karzai started to take political control of various regions of Afghanistan, Moscow decided to send in its own medical force. As benign as this Russian presence in Afghanistan might have been from the Kremlin viewpoint, it raised a lot of eyebrows, and also brought back painful memories of the brutalities related to the decade of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that ended in 1992.

But Moscow did not show any sensitivity to these sentiments. The Pashtuns siding with Karzai (himself a Pashtun) did not forget that the Russians fought with the Tajik and Uzbek-dominated Northern Alliance, which was largely equipped by Russian military wherewithal.

A potentially contentious aspect of this reality is that the Afghan "national military" is not at all national in its ethnic makeup. There are also reports that the Russians are essentially "running the small Afghan Tajik Air Force, serving as pilots or mechanics".

From the Russian point of view, the military dominance of the Northern Alliance would guarantee against any sudden buildup of Pashtun forces. Russia will not forget that the Taliban were primarily Pashtun in ethnicity; thus they do not trust the Pashtun, even under the leadership of Karzai, especially when one considers that a large number of them are merely turncoat Taliban. Karzai has shown his own ill will toward Russia by pointedly keeping Moscow off the itinerary of his recent worldwide travel.

It is also likely that Karzai remains wary of the Russian's potential divisive role in his country. In the meantime, the Defense Minister of the new Afghan government, General Mohammad Fahim - an ethnic Tajik - not only visited Russia, but was granted a lengthy meeting with President Vladimir Putin and was also promised additional Russian military and technical assistance.

It is possible that Karzai's request for additional Western peace-keeping troops in his country might be related to the predominantly non-Pashtun ethnic makeup of the Afghan "national military". Undoubtedly, the presence of such forces would enhance the political clout and maneuverability of his government.

Interestingly enough, Fahim has gone on the record with his opposition to the enhanced presence of Western peace-keeping forces in Afghanistan. If the ethnic tensions within the ranks of the interim government were somewhat submerged until recently, the assassination of the interim minister for air transport and tourism, Abdul Rahman, on February 14, surfaced them with a vengeance.

Karzai accused five men for that act, two of whom were generals and members of the intelligence service of the intelligence ministry. What was most troubling was that all five of the alleged attackers belonged to a faction of the Northern Alliance.

As the ethnic rivalry within the interim government begins to intensify, the United States and Russia are also manifesting their own growing differences. The very fact that the Bush administration has decided to have a long-term, if not a permanent military presence in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan will lead to increased tensions between the two great powers.

The Putin government considers Central Asia as its own backyard; any long-term American presence is seen as intrusive and hegemonic in orientation. In addition, Washington is also busy stating its preferences for the Caspian Sea oil and gas routes that are likely to go through Afghanistan, but would avoid the Tajik-controlled areas of that country. Given the large revenues that such pipelines promise, Russia and its Tajik and Uzbek allies of the Northern Alliance would not like such arrangements.

Another source of Russia's concern in the evolving Afghan power game is the exchange of shrill rhetoric between the Bush administration and Iran. After all, both Russia and Iran were long supporters of the Northern Alliance's fight against the Taliban.

As Iran watches the rising ethnic tensions in Afghanistan, it has escalated its own behind-the-scenes maneuvering. As a country that watched in frustration the complete dissipation of its political clout from Afghanistan during the Taliban rule, Iran is in no mood to experience similar frustrations in the post-Taliban era.

Russia continues to value Iran's increased strategic influence in Afghanistan, since it is not likely to compete with its own interests.

The United States, on its part, interprets the Iranian maneuvering as a manifestation of its predilection for the return of "warlordism" in Afghanistan, and sees it as being aimed at weakening the interim government.

The unfortunate aspect of the US interpretation (or misinterpretation) of Iranian activism, inter alia, contributed to Bush's lumping of Iran (along with Iraq and North Korea) as an "axis of evil". However, given that it assigns high significance to having its own influence not completely wiped out from the areas contiguous to Afghanistan, Iran is not likely to cease its activities in Afghanistan, America's seeming misinterpretation of its activism and ensuing warnings notwithstanding.

Thus emerges a portrait of Afghanistan that is still very unstable, divided and weak, and, consequently, very prone to being exploited by regional and great power rivalry.

Moscow's chief concern is that the "wrong" groups might capture power in the country in the coming months, especially if the US diverts its attention to other parts of the world and pursues other strategic issues. Even with a powerful US presence in Afghanistan and its neighboring states, Russia sees a definite uphill struggle in its own attempts to reestablish its hegemony in Central Asia or in influencing the power politics of Afghanistan.

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