CDI Russia Weekly-#193 15 February 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. Interfax: Russians have not changed their attitude on U.S. over past months. 2. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Afghan Unity Serves Whom? 3. Itogi: Leonid Radzikhovsky, Voluntarily And Singing All the Way. A strong army is an army built upon honest principles that are fully accepted by society. 4. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: PUTIN WALKS CAREFUL LINE ON U.S. ANTITERROR POLICY. 5. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell on US-Russia relations. 6. US Department of State: Ambassador William Taylor on U.S. Assistance to Former Soviet Union. 7. Yezhenedelny Zhurnal: Lev Gudkov, HOW ARE WE ANY WORSE? Analysis of the roots of anti-Americanism in Russia. 8. RFE/RL: Kathleen Knox, Russia: Relations Deteriorate Further Between Orthodox, Catholic Churches. 9. UPI: Senate Dems attack Bush nuclear plan. 10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Alexei ARBATOV ON POTENTIAL OUTCOME OF PUTIN-BUSH SUMMIT IN MOSCOW. 11. Moskovsky Komsomolets: Irina Stepantseva, Will the Russian pairs skating champions be stripped of their medals? ******* #1 Russians have not changed their attitude on U.S. over past months MOSCOW. Feb 14 (Interfax) - The attitude of Russian citizens on the U.S. has not changed much over the past few months. The rapprochement between Russia and America after the September attacks on New York and Washington, other events of last year, and the recent relative cooling in interstate relations had no effect on their attitudes. 32% of Russians have good feelings about the United States (35% in September). 47% are indifferent (44% in September), and 15% have bad feelings (15%). 39% of respondents think the United States is a friendly country, and 47% think the opposite. The indices have almost not changed since September 2001. 29% say Russian-American relations have improved over the past month, and 10% hold the opposite idea. Half of Russians (49%) did not notice any changes in bilateral relations. This information is supplied by the Public Opinion Foundation, which polled 1,500 Russian citizens on September 30, 2001, and February 10, 2002. ******* #2 Moscow Times February 14, 2002 Afghan Unity Serves Whom? By Pavel Felgenhauer The joint war on terrorism in Afghanistan promoted better U.S.-Russian relations. Now the opposite may be happening: Traditional Afghan fractiousness is straining the international coalition. The head of the transitional Afghan government, Hamid Karzai, recently traveled to many world capitals seeking support, but he bypassed Moscow. Karzai represents a faction of anti-Taliban Pashtuns. Many of these Pashtuns fought against Russian forces in the 1980s and many genuinely hate Russia. Instead of Karzai, the new Afghan defense minister, General Muhammed Fahim, came to Moscow this week. Fahim was received very warmly and had a lengthy and friendly audience with President Vladimir Putin. In the 1980s, Fahim became a general while fighting Karzai's Pashtuns under Soviet command. After Soviet forces left Afghanistan, Fahim (an ethnic Tajik) served the Tajik warlord Ahmad Shah Massood as a military expert and soon became his chief of staff. In September, Massood was assassinated and Fahim was appointed the military chief of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces. Today, Fahim continues to control basically the same Tajik forces -- heavily armed by Russia -- as before. Russian officers have served Massood and then Fahim for years, helping the Afghans in using more sophisticated military equipment. The Russians are in essence running the small Afghan Tajik airforce, serving as pilots and mechanics. In Moscow this week, Fahim got pledges of continued military and technical support -- spare parts and expertise to keep the Northern Alliance's heavy equipment running. And it was announced that the Northern Alliance might get more Russian airplanes. During the campaign against the Taliban, Russia only provided assistance to the Northern Alliance Tajiks. Moscow does not trust other anti-Taliban factions, especially not the Pashtuns, who are believed to be turncoat Taliban allied with Pakistan. Afghanistan has an interim government, but no legitimate internal source of revenue and no defense budget. The only significant domestic source of income in Afghanistan is the production and trafficking of heroin. The Northern Alliance army that liberated Kabul last November was raised with and is still financed by narcodollars. There have been repeated and reliable reports that Afghan heroin produced by the Northern Alliance is transported through Tajikistan and Russia to consumers in Europe with the help of Tajik and Russian civilian and military officials. Geopolitically speaking, it would seem that Russia has a vested interest in seeing Afghanistan united, civilized and stable. But true stabilization could harm not only the heroin trade, but also more legitimate Russian interests. In the 1990s, Washington supported plans to build gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia and the Caspian area through Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean port of Karachi in Pakistan, bypassing traditional Russian export routes. These projects were postponed because of continued infighting in Afghanistan and because the Taliban authorities provided shelter to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida terrorists. Today the pipeline projects may go ahead, providing the Kabul government with legitimate revenue if, of course, real stability returns to the country. But the planned pipelines would not go through Tajik-controlled areas, and Russia would lose out politically and economically if a pipeline from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean becomes a reality. Karzai has been begging Western powers to send more troops to Afghanistan, to expand the British-led stabilization force and deploy it outside of Kabul. Russia's ally Fahim has indicated that he does not favor the deployment of large numbers of foreign soldiers, saying, "There is no reason for them to go to all parts of Afghanistan." Pashtun warlords are also busy establishing their own fiefdoms in the southeast, promoting heroin production and trade via Iran and Pakistan, to finance their private armies. Uzbek and Hazari factions have their own ambitious warlords, poppy fields and foreign patrons. It's hard to see who really needs or wants a united, successful Afghanistan, except perhaps Karzai and some of his Western supporters. This week Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told journalists that the bad times for Afghanistan are not over, that the forces of terrorism are lurking in the dark preparing to destabilize the country again. This may turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. ******** #3 Itogi February 12, 2002 Voluntarily And Singing All the Way A strong army is an army built upon honest principles that are fully accepted by society By Leonid Radzikhovsky (therussianissues.com) I remember a speech by an opponent of the alternative military service, which I heard while watching a televised discussion on that theme. He said okay, if this alternative service is to be allowed, at least it is necessary to introduce the same kind of hazing, it is necessary to send alternative servicemen thousands of kilometers away from home (for some reason, he specified where: to the north. Well then, the northerners should accordingly be sent to the south). In short: "I will teach you how you should love your Motherland!" The cynicism of this speech rather accurately expresses the psychological impasse at which the institution of military conscription finds itself in our day and age. The draft is a military duty, which the overwhelming majority of young men find hard to perform. Certainly, there was nothing like this kind of attitude towards military service some fifteen years ago. Understandably, conscripts did seek to avoid being drafted, but not on as massive a scale and as openly as they do now. Some needed to do a tour of duty in the Soviet Army since it gave them an advantage when trying to enroll in a university, some saw other career opportunities, and some were really serious about claims concerning military duty. On the whole, however, society saw obligatory military service as a hard and unpleasant, if generally inevitable and at least partially rewarding, affair. Now that the service gives no career advantages (the contrary is usually the case today), there is nothing left of the romantic army legend and the attitude towards it has changed. It looks like it has changed irreversibly. However, no one has abolished the draft. There are two nationwide referendums on attitudes towards conscription held each year. These are genuine referendums without voting slips, slogans or entertainers. People vote in earnest too, giving bribes, declaring themselves Baptists, and attempting at any cost to enroll in universities, which they need like they need a hole in the head, all in order to give the army the slip. All this means that further debates are unnecessary: the institution of compulsory military service is really dead in Russia, it is a relic of the past, and society sees it as such. Certainly, there are situations where the living, timeserving interests of selfish people are totally at variance with the interests of the country, to wit, their own long-term interests. If this is so, the state has to practice violence, justified violence, vis-?-vis its citizens. The draft situation is something from an absolutely different category. The military themselves know it full well. They are absolutely unprepared to oppose these public moods. They are in no hurry to abolish the draft. They are unable to improve the real state of things in the armed forces. They have no idea how to make military service attractive for most young men. In consequence, the military plays the same mutual deception game, walks the same vicious circle (the conscript runs, the draft officer is hot on his heels) that compulsory military service has generated. What consequences does all of this have for the state? The first consequence of the draft system is common knowledge. We have an army that does not measure up to 21st-century problems. Local conflicts and anti-terrorist operations involving the use of precision weapons require a compact professional army of voluntary enlistees. The modern army organism is all nerve and muscle, not a mound of cannon fodder. Alexander Suvorov said in the 18th century, "Not with number, but with skill." At that time, it was perhaps some ideal, unattainable wish. At that time, commanders sent big battalions in against enemy fire. In the 21st century, however, a huge unprofessional army is not only unable to defend the country, it actually is a threat to its own security. That is the military-technical aspect of the problem, which no one is contesting. The main obstacle is allegedly the lack of money and, therefore, it is necessary to wait. But here we are faced with the vicious circle of bureaucratic logic. Waiting will never bring money. If someone displays political will and says "We have nothing to choose from, the draft is dead, we are starting on a professional army right away," money will be found. The next consequence is political. The mutual deception known as "the draft" (we pretend we are ready to serve, generals pretend they believe us) is steadily widening the gap of alienation between society and the state. This is the same kind of alienation that killed the Soviets with their subbotniks ("voluntary" unpaid work on days off, usually on Saturday, in the USSR - RI), slogans, party meetings, and rotten vegetables. Civic duty to the state must be realistic, reasonable and feasible. This is the logic seen in Russia's recent tax reform in which exceedingly high taxes no one paid have been replaced by low and reasonable taxes, which people are ready to pay. The same should be done with the army: an end must be put to the well-organized chaos of the draft that is unfolding behind the smokescreen of the authorities' verbiage. A strong army is an army built on honest rules that society accepts in full. ******* #4 Jamestown Foundation Monitor February 14, 2002 PUTIN WALKS CAREFUL LINE ON U.S. ANTITERROR POLICY. After a period of relative silence, the Kremlin this week began to make clear its discomfort with some of the policies set out or implied in U.S. President George W. Bush's January 29 State-of-the Union speech. The biggest salvo from Moscow came in a two-hour interview President Vladimir Putin granted the Wall Street Journal on February 11. Other Russian officials have continued to trumpet the Kremlin's official line on the subject in public remarks made over the past several days. Russian discomfort with Bush's speech, however, is no surprise. In shifting the focus of the U.S. antiterror effort from Afghanistan to the three countries--Iraq, Iran and North Korea--which Bush labeled an "axis of evil," Washington was also ending a phase of the antiterror war in which it had partnered with Russia by announcing that it was moving on to target three countries with which Moscow has close relations. Differences between Moscow and Washington in this area, moreover, have been thrown into even sharper relief in the days following Putin's Wall Street Journal interview by fresh indications from Washington that the Bush administration is indeed seriously preparing for a campaign to topple Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from power. Press reports suggest that a military campaign against Saddam is unlikely to start in earnest before this autumn, however (New York Times, Reuters, The Guardian, February 13). This gives Moscow and Washington time to seek a mutually satisfactory diplomatic resolution to the Iraqi crisis--a resolution that might in fact be facilitated by the increasing pressure that Washington is exerting on Baghdad. It seems likely in the meantime, however, and the comments by Russian officials this week would seem to foreshadow the possibility, that the Kremlin will attempt to use the concerns expressed in a number of foreign capitals over the Bush administration's latest policy turn to rally international opposition to any U.S. military move against Iraq. Putin walked a careful line in his Wall Street Journal interview, repeatedly making his desire to preserve friendly relations with Washington clear but at the same time setting out Russia's disagreements with Bush's axis of evil speech. Thus, Putin played down the chances of any rupture occurring in Russian-U.S. ties, and repeated the now standard Russian claim--one that the Bush administration probably does not share--that cooperation between Washington and Moscow "is the most important factor for stability in the world." He also spoke of the "new level of trust, a very high level of trust" that he said had developed between Washington and Moscow in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Putin's critique of evolving U.S. antiterror policy, on the other hand, appeared to center on two interrelated concerns. One, expressed in terms of what Putin called Russia's opposition to any "drawing up of blacklists," implicitly challenges the efficacy and rationale of Washington's decision to target Iraq, Iran and North Korea in the antiterror war. Putin appears to be arguing, like other critics of the Bush administration's "axis of evil" approach in Russia and the West, that no direct link has been drawn between any of these three countries and the September 11 attacks in the United States, and that the effort to characterize them as terrorist states is also one that might be questioned. Washington, of course, is basing its new policy on the contention that the three countries constitute a threat because they are intent on developing weapons of mass destruction. But if Putin does not mention this argument directly he appears nonetheless to cover it in the second--and perhaps the more important--of the concerns he expressed in the interview. That is that the United States must work with the world community, via the United Nations, if it wishes to effectively continue its war against international terrorism. According to the Wall Street Journal, Putin indicated that while Russia and other nations had given the United States a pass in Afghanistan, they would not do so in Iraq or elsewhere where "there is no ground to violate internationally recognized procedures" or to sideline the UN Security Council. Putin, moreover, did not directly rule out UN-sanctioned military action against Iraq, but he described it as a last resort that could come only after the world community pushed for such practical measures as the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. Excerpts from Putin's interview with the Wall Street Journal were aired on Russian television on February 11, and some Russian commentators were quick to suggest that his remarks--in particular those reiterating the importance of a continuing Russian-U.S. partnership--were directed as much at his domestic audience as at the United States. Putin's call for continued friendly ties with Washington were said in this context to be directed at those who have questioned the Kremlin's pro-American policies, and who have argued more specifically that Russia's embrace of the U.S. antiterror campaign in Afghanistan brought Moscow few benefits while confronting it with new risks. Putin reportedly dismissed the importance of these critics in the Journal interview when he was quoted as saying that "Of course there are probably some [critics]--with and without epaulets--who for political purposes or because they don't know what is going on, make some critical comments" (Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Interfax, February 11; Strana.ru, February 12). Kremlin security and foreign policy officials, meanwhile, continued this week to emphasize Russian concerns over U.S. antiterror policy. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, for example, used a meeting with visiting Afghan Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim on February 11 to again warn against any expansion of the U.S. antiterror war to other nations without absolute proof of their involvement in terrorist activities and without the approval of the UN Security Council. Russia's Foreign Ministry followed up the Ivanov comments with the issuance yesterday of a document (entitled "International terrorism: Russia's position") which expressed concerns over what it said were signs of a weakening in the international antiterror coalition that was built to wage the war in Afghanistan. In what was clearly an indirect reference to Washington, the document complained that some were now trying to use the antiterrorist war to rekindle "Cold War ideas and geopolitical confrontation." The document also warned against the use of "double standards" in waging the antiterror war--Moscow's standard formulation for attacking those who question the manner in which Russia is waging its war in Chechnya--and once again tried to draw direct connections between Chechen rebels and al-Qaida groups in Afghanistan (AP, February 11; Interfax, February 13). Against this contentious background, negotiations between Russian and U.S. officials have nonetheless continued--and apparently with some success--on the question of reshaping the UN sanctions regime on Iraq. Washington's UN Ambassador, John Negroponte, said in Washington on February 11 that talks in Geneva earlier this month had brought Russia and the United States closer to an agreement on the so-called "smart sanctions" regime. That is a British-U.S. plan that would loosen UN restrictions on civilian imports into Iraq while straightening those related to the import of military and dual-use goods. Russian sources were less effusive in their description of the Geneva talks, but they too suggested that some progress had been made. The next round of negotiations on the smart sanctions is scheduled to take place in March. According to Negroponte, the U.S. side is hopeful that an agreement on the smart sanctions plan can be completed by June 1 (AP, Interfax, February 11). ******* #5 Excerpt Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Secretary Colin L. Powell Washington, DC February 13, 2002 Over the past year, Mr. Chairman, I believe the broader tapestry of our foreign policy has become clear: to encourage the spread of democracy and market economies and to bring more nations to the understanding that the power of the individual is the power that counts. And when evil appears to threaten this progress, America will confront that evil and defeat it -- as we are doing in the war on terrorism. In weaving this tapestry, we have achieved several successes in addition to the successes of the war on terrorism and the regional developments its skillful pursuit has made possible. Let me highlight several. With regard to Russia, President Bush has defied some of our critics and structured a very strong relationship. The meetings that he had with President Putin and the dialogue that has taken place between Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov and me and between Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his counterpart, and at a variety of other levels, have positioned the United States for a strengthened relationship with the land of eleven time zones. The way that Russia responded to the events of September 11 was reflective of this positive relationship. Russia has been a key member of the antiterrorist coalition. It has played a crucial role in our success in Afghanistan, by providing intelligence, bolstering the Northern Alliance, and assisting our entry into Central Asia. As a result, we have seriously eroded the capabilities of a terrorist network that posed a direct threat to both of our countries. Similarly, the way we agreed to disagree on the ABM Treaty reflects the intense dialogue we had over eleven months, a dialogue in which we told the Russians where we were headed and we made clear to them that we were serious and that nothing would deter us. And we asked them if there was a way that we could do what we had to do together, or a way that they could accept what we had to do in light of the threat to both of our countries from ballistic missiles. At the end of the day, we agreed to disagree and we notified Russia that we were going to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. I notified FM Ivanov -- we talked about our plans for two days. President Bush called President Putin. Then the two presidents arranged the way we would make our different announcements. And the world did not end. An arms race did not break out. There is no crisis in Russia-U.S. relations. In fact, our relations are very good. Both presidents pledged to reduce further the number of their offensive nuclear weapons and we are hard at work on an agreement to record these mutual commitments. This is all part of the new strategic framework with Russia. We even managed to come to an agreement on how we are going to work through NATO. We are now developing mechanisms for pursuing joint Russia-NATO consultations and actions "at 20" on a number of concrete issues. Our aim is to have these mechanisms in place for the Reykjavik ministerial in May. And as we head for the NATO Summit in Prague in November, I believe we will find the environment for the continued expansion of NATO a great deal calmer than we might have expected. I believe the way we handled the war on terrorism, the ABM Treaty, nuclear reductions, and NATO is reflective of the way we will be working together with Russia in the future. Building on the progress we have already made will require energy, good will, and creativity on both sides as we seek to resolve some of the tough issues on our agenda. We have not forgotten about Russian abuse of human rights in Chechnya, Moscow's nuclear proliferation to Iran, or Russian intransigence with respect to revision of Iraq sanctions. Neither have we neglected to consider what the situation in Afghanistan has made plain for all to see: how do we achieve a more stable security situation in Central Asia? We know that this is something we cannot do without the Russians and something that increasingly they realize can't be done without us, and without the full participation of the countries in the region. We are working these issues as well. In fact, the way we are approaching Central Asia is symbolic of the way we are approaching the relationship as a whole and of the growing trust between our two countries. We are taking issues that used to be problems between us and turning them into opportunities for more cooperation. Such an approach does not mean that differences have vanished or that tough negotiations are a thing of the past. What it means is that we believe there are no insurmountable obstacles to building on the improved relationship we have already constructed. It will take time. But we are on the road to a vastly changed relationship with Russia. That can only be for the good -- for America and the world. ******* #6 US Department of State 14 February 2002 Byliner: Ambassador Taylor on U.S. Assistance to Former Soviet Union (State Department coordinator of assistance to Europe, Eurasia) (770) OPERATION PROVIDE HOPE: TEN YEARS AND COUNTING By Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr. U.S. Department of State Ten years ago the world witnessed the implosion of the Soviet Union and collapse of most social infrastructures there: an immediate nightmare for ordinary citizens in the twelve new independent states. Donor nations met in Washington, D.C. in January 1992 and pledged emergency assistance, much like the recent Tokyo conference did for Afghanistan. A few days later, on February 12, 1992, then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker stood on the tarmac at Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany, alongside many other foreign ministers, watching an historic event, reminiscent of the Berlin Airlift of 1948 and 1949. That day, from Rhein-Main and from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, seventeen U.S. Air Force cargo jets departed for destinations deep inside the former Soviet Union. Twelve flights landed in the twelve capital cities; five others landed in cities inside Russia that were also deemed to be most in need. During the next two weeks, the U.S. Air Force flew 70 humanitarian sorties, taking in over two thousand tons of food, medicines, emergency supplies and clothing, much of it provided by Europeans and Japanese. Monitoring teams from the U.S. military's On Site Inspection Agency and from USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance had been inserted beforehand, under extraordinary conditions, at each location to ensure that the emergency supplies reached intended orphanages, soup kitchens, hospitals, and other care centers. Worldwide media were allowed on the flights to observe the airport deliveries. Local media were encouraged to monitor actual deliveries to the specific care-giving locations. Throughout the entire airlift phase, no serious diversions or losses were reported. Deliveries continue to this day by air, sea, and land. That airlift marked the tangible U.S. commitment and a symbolic effort to encourage other nations around the world. Multifaceted U.S. assistance programs are still helping the nations of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Americans remain committed to improving the lives of all those who braved Soviet-style communism and its variations, in cities like Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Chisinau, Zagreb, Tirana, Tbilisi, Baku, Kiev, Yerevan, Almaty, Tashkent, and other population centers across the Eurasian land mass. The United States continues to build on its nearly $3 billion [$3,000 million] worth of humanitarian assistance and commodities provided to countries of the former Soviet Union, including fifteen hospital projects with medical equipment declared excess to U.S. military needs in Europe. Planning is underway for a sixteenth such Defense Department hospital project later this year, for Uzbekistan. Over 450 private volunteer organizations have participated, and many continue, in donating medicines, food, clothing, and volunteer medical expertise in this effort. To cite one example, since 1997 the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. private voluntary organization CitiHope International, and the Meerim Fund of Kyrgyzstan have joined to provide millions of dollars worth of critical pharmaceuticals. These drugs support treatment protocols for leukemia, pneumonia, sepsis, and cancer in five hospitals in Bishkek, including a children's ward at the main oncological facility in the capital. U.S. technical assistance projects are helping in long-term transitions of societies. More than $14 billion [$14,000 million] in U.S. economic assistance has been committed since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. This wide array of programs is helping people in ways like: implementing legal and political reform; organizing issue-based political parties; engaging in open commerce; seeking business counseling and credit; bringing more nutritious crops to market; and improving hygiene, women's health, and the overall quality of lives throughout the various countries. Many U.S. government agencies and non-government organizations, and dozens upon dozens of foreign counterpart organizations and local governments, are involved. These assistance programs are aimed at improving the lives and fortunes of all recipients, be they Muslims, Orthodox Christians, or those with other religious beliefs. Secretary of State Colin Powell called this month for attacking poverty, despair and hopelessness. As our decade-long effort in Europe and Eurasia shows, the struggles to overcome years of domination and oppression will be generational. The sad legacies that still face the Eurasian landmass show that reconstruction of social infrastructures must by necessity be long term in nature. Americans are proud of their country's distinguished record of such long-term assistance, in a situation unlike any in modern times. (Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., is the coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage was the first coordnator of Operation Provide Hope in 1992 and 1993.) ******* #7 Yezhenedelny Zhurnal No. 5 February 2002 HOW ARE WE ANY WORSE? Analysis of the roots of anti-Americanism in Russia Author: Lev Gudkov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] DISLIKE OF AMERICA IS A TYPE OF WELL-KNOWN IRRITATION AN IMPOVERISHED PROVINCE EXPERIENCES TOWARD A WEALTHY AND POWERFUL CAPITAL OR CENTER. RUSSIA LOST THE 20TH CENTURY, AND THIS IS WHAT IT PERSISTENTLY REFUSES TO UNDERSTAND, MUCH LESS ADMIT. AS FOR CHECHNYA - MOST RUSSIANS SIMPLY DON'T CARE. The September 11 terrorist attacks drew attention to a problem which, though long known, had never been in the spotlight before. The problem is anti-Americanism. The terrorist attacks against deeply symbolic objects in America horrified observers by the modus operandi and many casualties; but, more importantly, by the sheer force of hatred directed at the United States. Needless to say, anti- Americanism is not restricted to the enmity of Islamic or Arab radicals alone. It is also to be found in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa - and Russia. The United States is the target of dislike much more profound than any dictatorial regime which kills many of its own citizens or those of another state. This dislike stems from two sources. On the one hand, the 20th century may be rightfully called the American century. The unimaginable and intolerable success of the United States made it the unquestioned leader of the world - but generated a lot of vague but all the more grating feelings of the "Why not us?" or "How are we any worse?" type. On the other hand, by denouncing the American way of life and denying the Americans the status of a cultured nation (to say nothing of ascribing numerous flaws to them), their critics directly or indirectly emphasize their own propriety and traits (real or mythical). In other words, cultivated hatred of America is an effective and cheap means of highlighting national or social self- importance. Dislike of America is a type of well-known irritation an impoverished province experiences toward a wealthy and powerful capital or center. This negativism appears in modern civilization as well. Not at the nucleus, but on the periphery. Camel-herders do not carry out terrorist attacks. Those who do so are people who were educated at European or American universities, who lived in the United States or Europe for years. Widespread anti-Americanism is a secondary phenomenon, the sum total of defensive reactions of weak societies or peripheral groups to the substantial attraction of America's image. That is why opinion (not necessarily negative) of the United States reveals more about the opinion-upholder than about America. From this point of view, Russia does not greatly differ from other states. There are certain differences of course, attributable to the remnants of totalitarian society and recent trauma - the collapse of the Soviet empire, the United States' major adversary in the Cold War. It is perhaps tactless to note that industrialization of the Soviet Union was possible only with the participation of foreigners (Americans and sometimes Germans) but it is prudent to remember it, all the same. Back in the 1930s, the Americans were building factories all over Russia (the GAZ car and truck plant in Nizhny Novgorod is only one of the better-known enterprises). All educated people, such as engineers and technicians, knew perfectly well that Russian-made GAZ, Pobeda, and even Stalin's ZIL cars were modifications of the American Fords and that LI-2, IL-12 and other Russian civil aviation planes resembled the Douglases too much. All this never hurt national pride, because not everybody was aware of the fact. For the average (mostly imagined) foreigner, however, all these machines were supposed to be symbols of industrial triumphs and successes of the first socialist state. Everything changed with the Cold War. Everything that took place was viewed throught the prism of a global confrontation of the two systems. Attitudes toward the United States became an element of the culture of the mobilizational and repressive Soviet society. Utopian notions of what life is like in "normal countries" existed side by side with revelations criticizing the bourgeois, with anti-Americanism in the newspapers. The country of money-worship, of the golden calf. Of racial discrimination and dumb consumerism. The country of war-mongers. The feeling of unity with allies dating back to the meeting on the Elbe made way several decades later to disregard - what kind of soldiers were they!? They fought cautiously at best, not at all like us. We are the people who carried the burden of the war (coupled with the almost perverse pride in the sufferings of the nation that lost more people than any other country). The Russians could not imagine the real ratio of the casualties - they would never have believed that the American commanders could have been so careful with their soldiers' lives. That is why the casualties Russians thought other countries sustained in World War II were exaggerated - about 15 million lost by Germany (the actual losses must have been about half of that) and about 10 million by the United States (this is about 35 times too many). Only for the Soviet Union were the figures less than the actual amount of deaths. Years passed and the figures began changing. In 1991, 61% of poll respondents claimed that the Soviet Union would have won the war even all on its own. In 2001, 71% were of the same opinion. The loss of leadership in space exploration and even in sports sparked a wave of bitter humor and jokes. The Afghanistan war and chronic shortages of every conceivable commodity in the 1980s only reinforced the inferiority complex and, at the same time, consolidated the importance of the dual American myth. America is the winning side, America is master of the world. No one wishes Russia any luck, Russia is the eternal victim. The Russians are the most enduring and suffering people in the world. No other people's history can match ours for hardships. It is typical that humanitarian aid in the early 1990s only reinforced the complex further. It generated the phenomenon of mass angst, the feeling of humiliation accompanied by dislike of the West - they are sending utter rubbish here, which they themselves do not need. The anguish was augmented by accusations flung at the new elite. (The reforms are a trick, democrats are traitors who sold off all the nation's wealth, and sold Russia to the West with the aim of turning it into a colony. How else can our poverty and aggressiveness be explained to us?) It should also be noted that no open hostility was apparent. Dependence and the eagerness to be liked, aggression and the inferiority complex - all this reveals the true attitude toward America, which is actually viewed as something exceptional, the fount of everything strong and wise. That is the center of the world, the zone of concentration of illusions - not something that generates aspirations and jolts one into action. Like any other traumatic experience, an inferiority complex can only be cured in one way - if the cause that generated it in the first place is recognized for what it is. With regard to America - or rather the Russians' attitude toward America - it would have meant recognition of American society's technical, civilizational, and cultural superiority, and the desire to learn the values and rules of social interaction that resulted in this global social success. The values are clear - unquestionable superiority of basic human rights (priority of individual over the state in politics, private property in the economy, liberty limited by the law in legislation, and so on) and the understanding that the individual's better nature is best revealed in wealth, not poverty. Impoverishment is not a recognition of a nation's exceptional spiritual worth, but an indication of its basic flaw, its inability to create a better life for itself. It is time we admitted that being poor and sick is to a certain extent a choice, not the fate, of the Russian people. Russia lost the 20th century, and this is what it persistently refuses to understand, much less admit. The competition of the two super-powers was not merely lost by the Soviet Union and Russia, which persists in calling itself the legal successor of the former empire. It was the system that was defeated - the repressive totalitarian system and with it the type of person defending this social order. The current cries over the lack of civic society, accusations of the presidential administration harassing NTV and TV-6, secret services organizing spy trials do not really count because the people viewed as "the public" cannot defend itself. The people do not trust themselves or others like them. Solidarity and consolidation requires a different, humanitarian foundation stipulating difficult cultural values like some form of idealism, readiness for participation and involvement, self-respect and dignity. And hard work, of course. These days, Russia can boast of almost the world's highest level of aggressiveness, the largest prison population (absolute and relative - as a proportion of the overall population), and the second highest rate of suicide (by the way, almost all of the top ten countries on that list are former soviet republics). Russia is not the only country waging a war on its own territory, but hardly any other country (at least among those usually referred to as civilized) can be found where everyone is so indifferent toward civilian casualties (45,000 in the two Chechnya campaigns is the most realistic estimate). Asked to explain the West's criticism of the Kremlin's policy in Chechnya, 65% of respondents invariably reply that "The West wants to maintain tension in the region" and only 14% refer to human rights abuses in Chechnya. It is wrong to assume that the public in Russia is completely unaware of the human rights violations, or that state censorship and Yastrzhembsky's demagoguery are so effective in setting up a smoke- screen concealing those abuses. No. Most Russians know that the federal troops in Chechnya behave like killers and looters (55% of respondents know of human rights abuses and violence against civilians in Chechnya). They just don't care. This attitude can be summed up as follows: Whether my country is right or wrong, it is my country. The Americans have interests. We have interests too, like any other state. We are in no way worse. We are like them! It is not exactly so. Following instincts of the past, the new democratic Russia has maintained contacts with the world's most despised regimes - North Korea, Cuba, Hussein, and Milosevic. This attachment to geopolitical rhetoric conceals - ineffectively - the old longing for brute force, which we no longer have. The Americans use bombs, and we do. There were casualties in Serbia, and there were casualties in Chechnya. And nobody cares that the numbers of casualties are entirely incomparable. This article uses the results of opinion polls conducted by the National Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM). (Translated by A. Ignatkin) ******* #8 Russia: Relations Deteriorate Further Between Orthodox, Catholic Churches By Kathleen Knox Relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Vatican took a turn for the worse yesterday, when the Russian church called off a planned visit by a Catholic cardinal. The move followed the Vatican's announcement on 11 February that it is raising the status of its presence in Russia, further fueling Russian Orthodox anger at what it sees as Catholic proselytizing on traditionally Orthodox territory. Prague, 14 February 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Cardinal Walter Kasper, the head of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, was meant to have visited Russia next week. Until, that is, the Vatican announced it is upgrading its presence in Russia, citing the need to improve pastoral care for the country's Catholics. The 11 February announcement means that the Vatican's four apostolic administrations -- in Moscow, Novossibirsk, Saratov and Irkutsk -- are upgraded to full dioceses under one "ecclesiastical province" with a metropolitan see in Moscow. The move did not go down well in the Russian Orthodox Church. Orthodox officials say it confirms what they've been saying all along -- the Catholic Church wants to encroach on Orthodox territory and lure away its faithful. Patriarch Aleksii II said the pope had "thrown down a challenge" to the Russian Orthodox Church. There was talk of cutting all contacts with the Vatican. Then yesterday, Metropolitan Kirill, who heads the church's external relations department, sent a letter canceling Cardinal Kasper's visit, saying it would no longer be possible. Joseph Werth is the Catholic bishop of what is now the diocese of Western Siberia. Speaking on the phone from Novossibirsk, he said he wasn't surprised at how the Russian Orthodox Church reacted to the Vatican's move: "I can just say that there weren't any [serious] relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in the first place. It's just been a kind of children's game. So nothing much will change. There were no ties, and there will be no ties." Werth said his diocese does carry out missionary work, but he denied charges his church is proselytizing with a view to converting Orthodox faithful. He said his church doesn't return the accusations, though it could. "Twenty or 30 years ago, when there were no Catholic churches, people went and baptized their children in Orthodox churches, and they became Orthodox. There are many thousands of these people -- our people with Catholic roots -- who were baptized in Orthodox churches. But we never accuse the Orthodox Church of proselytizing because of this. I even remember 11 years ago, when I became bishop of Novossibirsk, I thanked the Russian Orthodox Church [because] when there were no Catholic churches, the Orthodox Church baptized them. I thanked them for that," Werth said. Many people in Siberia are of Lithuanian, Polish or -- like Werth -- German origin. But relatively few now retain their Catholic heritage, he said. "Here in Siberia alone, there are more than one million people of Catholic origin -- Germans, Poles, Lithuanians, mixed families. Out of this million there are maybe 100,000 who say they still have some Catholic faith. The others have lost it all already. And out of that 100,000, there are maybe only 10,000 or 20,000 who regularly attend our churches on Sunday. Even out of our Catholics, only one [to] five percent really come to our churches. That's the modest position of the Catholic Church," Werth said. Britain's Keston Institute monitors religious freedom in postcommunist countries. Felix Corley is the editor of the Keston News Service. Corley notes that the war of words comes at a time when the Russian Orthodox Church is expanding into some traditionally Catholic countries -- as well as other distinctly non-Orthodox places, such as Vietnam and even Antarctica. "It's interesting that the Russian Orthodox are making it clear that their parishes -- for example, the one in Ireland, in Dublin -- are going to serve English speakers, i.e. local people, not just the Russian or Eastern European expatriate community that there is in Dublin. So really, the Russian Orthodox are doing exactly what the Catholics are doing and catering to anyone who wished to attend. They're opening up shop, so to speak, and anyone can attend. It's exactly what the Catholics have been doing in Russia," Corley said. The sharp exchange also comes just weeks after the Russian Orthodox Church sent a delegation to the pope's meeting of religious leaders in Assisi, Italy, which some observers took as a sign of slowly thawing relations. But Corley played down the significance of the Assisi visit and said ties remain as chilly as ever -- as shown by this week's spat. He said the Orthodox world seems to be lining up into two camps -- one in favor of putting relations with the Vatican on a friendlier footing, and one against. "The ecumenical patriarch in Istanbul, who has the position of primacy, he's more in favor of having good relations with the Vatican. But the Russian Orthodox Church is, by far, the largest Orthodox church in the world. It has more members than all the other Orthodox churches put together. So although it's not the most important or the most senior, it does have a powerful position in the Orthodox world," Corley said. Corley said what he calls the "anti-Catholic mood in Moscow" may affect the relations of other Orthodox churches with the Vatican. ******* #9 Senate Dems attack Bush nuclear plan By Pamela Hess Pentagon correspondent WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 (UPI) -- Senate Democrats Thursday said the Bush administration's plan to remove nearly two-thirds of the nuclear warheads from U.S. bombers, submarines and missiles is a thinly veiled attempt to hang on to as many warheads as possible. "That's your purpose," said Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Levin, D-Mich. "You want that flexibility. Why hide it?" Douglas Feith, under secretary of defense for policy, testified to the committee on the "nuclear posture review" plan to remove more than 3,700 nuclear warheads from submarines, bombers and long-range missiles over the next 10 years. The plan would bring the current force of 6,000 warheads down to between 1,700 and 2,300 in accordance with an informal agreement reached last year with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Many of the warheads would be kept in reserve -- "a responsive force" -- for reloading onto weapons if a war occurs. Dismantling nuclear warheads "is a brand new notion that was never applied over the decade of the Cold War when arms-control agreements were praised not withstanding their complete failure to address the destruction of warheads," Feith protested. "The last administration talked about making reductions and hedging by putting weapons into storage just as we are suggesting." Feith said one of the reasons the Pentagon must keep weapons in reserve instead of destroying them is because the United States does not have the ability to produce nuclear warheads anymore. Russia, which is dismantling warheads with financial help from the United States, still produces new weapons. "The United States hasn't produced a new nuke in a decade and it would take nearly a decade and a large investment of money before it would even be in a position to produce a new nuclear weapon," Feith said. The proposal to mothball but not destroy the weapons is not a novel one. The United States has between 2,000 and 4,000 nuclear warheads already on active reserve, according to Stephen Young, a senior analyst with the Washington-based Union of Concerned Scientists. The pace of U.S. reductions would be slow: The first major milestone, cutting the arsenal from 6,000 to 3,800, won't be reached until 2007, two years after President Bush's first term. That target would be reached by taking warheads off submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles; deactivating four Trident nuclear subs and refitting them with conventional cruise missiles; and retiring all 50 Peacekeeper missiles. For the past 50 years, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been keyed to the size of the Soviet Union's. The United States wanted to be able to destroy every single Soviet missile on the launch pad and vice versa, leading to a five-decade arms race that resulted in a stability theory known as "mutually assured destruction," which said because each side could destroy the other in a war, neither would resort to open conflict. Feith said this new nuclear force posture has nothing to do with Russia's arsenal, which is being drawn down to about 1,500 strategic warheads. "We want a force posture that is not premised on the incineration of Russia," he said. "That's not the way we are thinking about strategic stability, that's not the way we are thinking about Russia." ******* #10 Nezavisimaya Gazeta No. 22 2002 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] ARBATOV ON POTENTIAL OUTCOME OF PUTIN-BUSH SUMMIT IN MOSCOW The USA has proclaimed war on those countries that present certain interest for Russia. What should Russia do in this situation? What can be the results of the future Moscow meeting of Vladimir Putin and George Bush? Who is responsible for making rash and unwise decisions that diminished Russia's defence ability? Alexei ARBATOV, deputy chairman of the State Duma defence committee, answers these and other questions in an interview he granted to Lidia ANDRUSENKO. Question: In his recent address to the joint session of the Congress President Bush outlined the axis of evil - Iraq, Iran and North Korea - and repeated that those who are not with the USA are against it, a formula that is directed at other countries, including Russia. However, the countries that Bush denounced as an axis of evil are Russia's trade partners or debtors. Answer: First, we should remember that such speeches include a large measure of rhetoric designed to impress the people at home. Political pressure will be more likely. The designation of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as new targets after the successful military operation in Afghanistan was made to scare the leaders of their states who may possibly search for ways to come to an agreement now. For example, it is rumoured that Saddam Hussein is already looking for a way to avoid a military strike. He is negotiating with the UN and will possibly agree to allow international inspection groups into the country. The Americans believe that if China does not support North Korea, the latter will make a compromise, too. It is believed in the USA that mass dissatisfaction with the rule of ayatollahs and mullahs is growing in Iran and that this situation can be used to topple the fundamentalist Islamic regime. But it will not be so simple to deal with Iran in view of its domination in the region and contacts with Russia. Question: The Clinton administration tried to introduce sanctions against Russia for its military-technical cooperation with Iran. Answer: Moreover, it did introduce sanctions against several Russian research centres. But today the USA cannot openly threaten to do this because Russia is praised as a partner. This would undermine the foundations of the new US doctrine. Iran is a difficult problem for Russia, too. And not only because we sell vast amounts of conventional weapons and hardware to that country or are building a nuclear power station in Bushehr. Iran is Russia's silent ally as opposed to several countries that are our silent regional opponents (Turkey and Pakistan). If I could advise President Putin how we should behave in this situation, I would tell him this. We do not have special sympathy for the three "axis-of-evil countries" yet it is wrong and useless to force democracy on them. Besides, there are several other undemocratic countries, which are also suspected of involvement in the creation of mass destruction weapons and of sponsoring terrorism. Consequently, here is how we should act. First, we need proof of the accusations advanced by the Americans. And second, no exception must be made for those regimes that have better relations with the USA than Iran does if these regimes are suspected of misdeeds. Question: What states do you mean? Answer: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan and, to a degree, Turkey and Albania. If we supply the USA with proof of their guilt, we expect the entire package of measures to be taken against them. Moreover, I would tell the Americans, off record, that the Taliban was an exceptional case, a genuine rogue regime. And it found itself in complete isolation after it lost the support of your allies - Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. But this will not happen in the case of North Korea and Iran. Question: The Americans will hardly listen to reason today. They are euphoric with victory. Answer: Yes, this is true. The tragic defeat of the USA and the subsequent brilliant victory created an explosive mixture of super-arrogance compounded by super-nationalism. The USA may decide to disregard everyone, including Russia, China and India and even its allies, who fear this possibility very much. In this case we will simply stop collaborating with them as we did in Afghanistan. But challenging the USA to a fight over these states would be silly and useless; we should not stand up against the whole world. Politically, Russia and China could have refused to support the USA [in the case of Afghanistan] and in this case it should have acted contrary to the UN Security Council. This would have amounted to contempt of international law. I don't think the USA has lost all contact with reality and is prepared to resolve all problems with the use of military force. Question: What is the forthcoming Putin-Bush summit expected to achieve to strengthen Russia-US relationship? Answer: Nobody knows. It is not clear who is taking part in preparing it and on what grounds and who is advising what. In the past, we knew nearly everything but the process of decision- making was badly tuned. Today this mechanism is working well but its operation is concealed from everyone. I don't think the May summit will bring us "valuable presents." Judging by everything, we will calmly accept another declaration, another communique, another joint press conference and more statements by high-ranking officials about "another giant step forward." Question: And what about a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, which is being discussed now at all levels? Answer: I think there will be no treaty. Question: Maybe nobody needs it and Russia is pressing for its signing only to calm the public and satisfy its own ambitions? Answer: No, we need this treaty. It is another matter that the Americans agreed to discuss it for charity reasons. They don't need it at all. They know that we have made the decision to unilaterally reduce and overhaul our strategic forces. This is why there is no base for negotiations. They don't ask us for anything and prefer to keep their freedom of movement, too. Hence the idea that we should trust each other's word, just as gentlemen do. Question: But the USA has no such treaties with Britain or France. Answer: Britain and France are its allies. If the Americans told us: We invite you to join NATO; let's discuss the date and conditions, the situation would have been completely different. We have hinted that we would like to hear them say this, if only to please our ego. But they disregarded our hints. Even the NATO-20 formula, which is more than simply 19 + 1 but provides for equitable Russian involvement in the tackling of certain issues, is no longer discussed seriously. So, nobody invites us to become an ally, but they offer us to bury treaties. I think this is political demagoguery and hypocrisy. Question: Do you think Putin made a foreign policy mistake? Answer: Yes, in the sense that the president has the final say and hence bears the brunt of responsibility for everything. On the other hand, we should remember that the current policy and the constitution that stipulates the rights and powers are two different things. When Putin became president, he listened to the advice of different people and I would say that the brunt of responsibility should be borne by those who advised him to do this. Question: Do you know the "culprits"? Answer: It is above all Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, who was the main advocate of this idea. And several military leaders of lower rank from his entourage. They advised the president proceeding from considerations that have nothing to do with national security. They acted on the basis of narrow departmental and personal interests. Seeking to remove chief commander Yakovlev, who was the main candidate to the post of defence minister, they destroyed the Strategic Missile Forces, liquidating them as a service. They made a decision on incredible unilateral reductions and restructuring of our armed forces, modelling them after the US triad, but this is a triad for the poor. They are responsible for what is happening at the Russo-American talks. Two years ago the US administration seriously negotiated amendments to the ABM Treaty and a START-3 treaty with us. But the Americans lost any interest in these negotiations after we had made such radical decisions. ******* #11 Moskovsky Komsomolets February 14, 2002 Grabbing the Gold Will the Russian pairs skating champions be stripped of their medals? By Irina Stepantseva (therussianissues.com) It looks as if North America, as it were, has returned to the Cold War years with an inevitable witch-hunt. This time, the horrible creatures that deserve be burned at the stake are Russian figure skaters, the Olympic Pairs Figure Skating champions Yelena Berezhnaya and Anton Sikharulidze. The public is indignant that they have won by such a small margin: a single vote decided their fate. According to "eyewitnesses," the Canadian pair skated an impeccable free program. Under pressure from "public opinion," the International Skating Union has promised to hold an inquiry into the controversy to see whether there were any mistakes in the judging. In other words, a scandal can hardly be avoided. Local sports officials with grudges against the Russian delegation have got even more confirmation of backstage intrigue. The French judge has made a statement that the president of the French Figure Skating Federation forced her to give high marks to Berezhnaya and Sikharulidze. Canadian Richard Pound, a member of the International Olympic Committee, said, "I was there and saw a gold medal performance, but they were actually awarded silver medals. It was a shock to them. They skated an impeccable program and the Russians did not. I saw it, we all saw it. Can the International Skating Union change the results? It is within their power to do what they think necessary." Emotions are teeming. Rumors are buzzing around Salt Lake City that judges in other figure skating events have been bribed. "We saw the marks, the award ceremony and the greeting of the champions. What else can we talk about?" the Russian pair's coach, Tamara Moskvina, replied to a foreign journalist who asked her to comment on the performance. A news conference with the ISU President Ottavio Cinquanta is supposed to throw some light on the scandal. The sad question is whether the pressure from the Canadian-American public can deprive us of the only gold medal at the Olympic Games we have won so far… Other Skating News Russian figure skater Yevgeny Plyushchenko fell during his short program on a quadruple jump and is now in fourth place. He or his coach, Alexei Mishin, might explain what happened later. In the meantime, they are not available to journalists. Even the Olympic press service in charge of distributing athlete's personal commentaries after each performance got their firm: "no comment." Another Russian, Alexei Yagudin, skated brilliantly. The stadium gave him a standing ovation. "It's just the beginning," Yagudin said. "I am glad that I managed to skate at such a high level. I didn't worry about Plyushchenko and was focused only on myself. Now, I have to relax and brace myself for another fight," he added. But will there actually be a fight? There certainly will. Plyushchenko will do his best to return to the top three. It is theoretically possible if Plyushchenko wins the free program and Yagudin finishes third. The confrontation between the two brilliant figure skaters has had a shocking start. However, don't count the chickens before they've hatched. Experience shows that short program results are not always final. *******