CDI Russia Weekly-#192 8 February 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly Home Page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Russia/U.S.: Improving Relations More Complicated Under The Surface. 2. RIA Novosti: MOSCOW HAILS US RELATIONSHIP MESSAGE. 3. Newsday editorial: Nuclear Deal. Bush sensibly agrees to Russia's plea for a binding agreement on cuts in nuclear arms. 4. Vremya Novostei: Yury Golotyuk, THE PENTAGON WILL SAVE THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE SECTOR. Increase in US defense spending will yield $416 million for Russia. 5. Vremya Novostei: Vassily Videnko, RETURN FEAR OF WAR TO THE WORLD. 6. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Money in Exchange for Security. The U.S. may write off part of Russia's debt if we increase protection of our nuclear and chemical arsenals. 7. BBC: Millions of Chernobyl victims still suffering. 8. gazeta.ru: Kursk sunk by own torpedo. 9. Yezhenedelny Zhurnal: Alexander Golts, POTENTIAL FOR RESTORATION. Seeking new directions for cooperation between Russia and the United States. 10. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Russia: Military Divided On Formal Weapons-Reductions Treaty With US. 11. strana.ru: Tolkien Fans Prepare to Rush Moscow's Cinemas. Special Premiere arranged for Tolkien enthusiasts but few are expected to attended. 12. Moscow Times: Ana Uzelac, Village Boys Not Dodging The Draft. ****** #1 Russia/U.S.: Improving Relations More Complicated Under The Surface By Francesca Mereu It's a commonly held assumption that the 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States ushered in a new era in relations between Moscow and Washington. For the first time since the end of World War II, Russia and America have a common enemy: international terrorism. But some Russian analysts believe that, under the surface, the relationship between the two nations is more complicated than this simple assessment. Moscow, 6 February 2002 (RFE/RL) -- After the events of September, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared his decisive support for the U.S.-led fight against terrorism and changed the course of Russia's foreign policy, shifting its priorities toward the United States. Vyacheslav Nikonov is the president of the Politika (Policy) Foundation, a Kremlin-connected think tank. He says that at the beginning of his presidency, Putin's foreign policy focus was quite different from what it is today. "From the very beginning of Putin's presidency, Russian foreign policy priorities were quite different. The first [priority] was the former Soviet republics: Belarus, Ukraine, the Central Asia republics. Western Europe was priority number two," Nikonov says. "As for the third priority, there was some competition between the Eastern orientation and the relationship with big Asian countries like Japan, China, India, and the United States." Sergei Markov is the director of the Moscow-based Institute of Political Studies. He says that, in addition to the fight against terrorism, Russia and the United States also share a desire for seeing stable governments in Central Asia and in the former Soviet republics. But Markov and other Russian analysts believe relations between the two nations are more complicated than what the surface might suggest. Markov believes relations have improved only at the presidential level but not at the diplomatic level, where he says the presence of people with what he calls a "Cold War heritage" is still very strong. "In this moment, Russian-American relations are pretty good, but they are good on the presidential level. They have the same goals in international policy," Markov says. "But at the same time, [Russia and the U.S.] don't have good relations on the level of diplomatic agencies, where a lot of people still have the heritage of fighting against each other, of struggle." Dmitry Trenin is the deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Trenin says many diplomats and bureaucrats inside the Kremlin still think it is self-defeating for Russia to build good relations with the U.S. "There are a lot of disagreements [inside the Kremlin]. There's a lack of enthusiasm. I would say that the bulk of the Russian policy community is still very much thinking geopolitically. For these people, the loss of Russian power, the loss of Russian prestige, and the growth of American power, American prestige, and hegemony are just too difficult to take," Trenin says. "These people will point to Central Asia, to NATO enlargement, to the [U.S.] withdrawal from the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, to the new military budget of the United States, as proof that you cannot have a friendly relationship with the United States, because [they think] the United States is only interested in grabbing what used to be [theirs]." But Trenin notes that disagreement does not mean opposition. Today, he says, no one inside the Kremlin wants to oppose Putin since -- as he put it -- "if you find yourself in opposition to Mr. Putin today, you'll find yourself very far from your place tomorrow." As far as the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Markov says the move is unlikely to influence Russian-American relations since, at the moment, Russia doesn't believe the U.S. will actually succeed in building a missile-defense shield to protect it from attacks by terrorists or so-called rogue states, such as Iraq or North Korea. According to Markov, the main reason Putin decided to reorient Russia's foreign policy was not in solidarity with the U.S. but because he wants Moscow to play an important global role on major security issues. "Russia wants to take part in the decision-making process on the major security issues. Russia was really dissatisfied [with] the [NATO] military operation [that] began in the former Yugoslavia [in 1999], without any real [Russian] cooperation in the decision-making process. A second task of Russia's foreign policy is [to get] better conditions [in] economic relations [among Russia and the Western countries]. The next Russian goal is Russia's interest in the so-called 'near abroad' [former Soviet republics]," Markov says. "And Russia is, of course, interested on having much better relations with these newly independent countries. The fourth topic is a security issue. [Russia wants] foreign support of the terrorists groups in Chechnya [to stop]." Markov says Russia considers NATO a danger not because of any real military threat but because the alliance constitutes an influential political mechanism that can take decisions on important issues without consulting Russia. Trenin also says Russia changed its foreign policy course not because of solidarity with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism but because Putin took into account more practical domestic considerations. In order to modernize Russia, Trenin says, Putin can't afford for the U.S. to become its old enemy again. "I hope Russia's foreign policy priority number one is Russia. I guess Mr. Putin has changed the course of Russian foreign policy based on his reading -- I would say correct reading -- of Russia's domestic needs. Mr. Putin is modernizing his country along liberal economic reform lines," Trenin says. "Now you cannot modernize Russia and eventually turn it into a modern European country if you still have this old conflict that you inherited from the Soviet Union on your hands. So this conflict must stop. And this is the item, as I understand, of Putin's change of the foreign policy course. He doesn't need America as an enemy. The price for that is, of course, Russia's withdrawal from geopolitical and geostrategic competition with the United States." ******* #2 MOSCOW HAILS US RELATIONSHIP MESSAGE MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 7, RIA NOVOSTI - Moscow welcomes the latest series of US administration officials' pronouncements on the US-Russian relationship, the Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department said in a statement. The document highlights the latest series of public pronouncements of senior US administration officials over the past few days, including those of Secretary of State Colin Powell and US Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick, among others. These, the Foreign Ministry says, contain a positive assessment of the current state and prospects of US-Russian relations. The remarks in question, noted the Foreign Ministry, emphasize Washington's intention to forge closer ties with Russia in all areas to make considerable progress ahead of the US-Russian summit in Moscow next May. The Foreign Ministry then lauded what it saw as constructive elements in CIA Director George Tenet's testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 6. Tenet, among other things, singled out the stepped-up cooperation between the two countries "as the most impressive development of the year." In the same statement, he stressed the importance of US-Russian cooperation in the campaign against terrorism and other global threats. This state of mind in the US administration fully fits with Russia's own approaches to developing relations with the US, the Foreign Ministry said. Moscow expects the upcoming meeting between the two presidents in Russia to solidify the bilateral shift toward mutually beneficial cooperation, making major deals, such as a legally binding agreement on sweeping cuts in strategic weapons, possible, the Foreign Ministry communique announced. ******* #3 Newsday February 7, 2002 Editorial Nuclear Deal Bush sensibly agrees to Russia's plea for a binding agreement on cuts in nuclear arms. The White House is making the right decision in agreeing to meet Russia's demand for a legally binding agreement on steep mutual reductions in the two nations' nuclear arsenals. Now President George W. Bush should follow this positive policy shift with assurances that the nuclear warheads targeted for reduction will be destroyed and not simply stored away. Until now, the White House had rejected Russia's insistence that the cuts pledged by Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin last November be put in a signed form - either an executive agreement with congressional consent or a formal treaty. Bush's preference was for both sides to decide on the exact extent of the cuts and disposition of the warheads, leaving open the option Bush favored: detaching the warheads from the missile and storing them separately, rather than destroying them. Instead Putin insisted that the agreement be legally binding, spelling out the exact cuts and ensuring that the reductions be deep and irreversible, which would preclude the storage option. Putin's position always made more sense. And Putin needs to show his own constituency that he's getting a significant concession from Washington. In turn, Bush will need Moscow's cooperation to step up the containment of Iraq and to ensure that Iran doesn't develop nuclear weapons - for which Russia is selling Tehran the necessary technology. It's good to see the White House begin to shift its own stance on this key issue, a move disclosed by Secretary of State Colin Powell in testimony Tuesday before the Senate. The details of the actual agreement - to be signed when Bush and Putin meet again in Moscow this spring - are still being worked out, though the goals set by Bush and Putin are clear: Each side is to reduce its arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,000 warheads. That's a steep drop from the current levels of about 7,000 for the United States and 5,500 for Russia. What would be left is still more than enough to ensure a mutual nuclear deterrent or, for that matter, to ward off nuclear retaliation from any other power. Whether the pact takes the form of a treaty or an executive agreement is irrelevant, so long as it's legally binding. But a key detail to be worked out is the physical disposition of the warheads set for reduction. To make those cuts irreversible, as Russia properly demands, would mean destroying the warheads, not simply storing them apart from their missiles as Bush proposed. It's a crucial detail that would make a shabby mockery of the agreement if it's not spelled out in the binding document. Bush must do the right thing and consent to their destruction. ******* #4 Vremya Novostei February 6, 2002 THE PENTAGON WILL SAVE THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE SECTOR Increase in US defense spending will yield $416 million for Russia Author: Yury Golotyuk [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE SECTOR STANDS TO BENEFIT IF THE US CONGRESS CONFIRMS THE DRAFT BUDGET FOR 2003, WHICH INCLUDES $379 BILLION IN DEFENSE SPENDING. RUSSIA WOULD THEN RECEIVE $416 MILLION, ACCORDING TO THE NUNN-LUGAR PROGRAM. Russian defense officials are impatiently waiting for the US budget for 2003 to be confirmed. This time the matter concerns not only the usual desire to get additional money from the Russian government for re-arming our own military forces, citing the unprecedented growth in the Pentagon's spending. Even though the draft budget submitted to Congress by President Bush this week does provide for a $48 billion increase in defense spending, bringing it to a record $379 billion. Nevertheless, the Russian defense establishment is not so much concerned about the fate of this huge sum, as about the successful confirmation of just a small part of it - $416 million, allocated to the so-called Nunn-Lugar program. This money is meant for helping Russia to destroy excess stockpiles of nuclear weapons. And this sum is quite considerable for the Russian military establishment, though it's only a fraction of one percent of US defense spending. It is equivalent to around 20% of the Russian defense budget. The Nunn-Lugar program was launched as far back as 1992, and in summer 1999 both the parties agreed to extend it for another seven years. According to the Foreign Ministry, US funding amounted to around $1.7 billion over the first seven years. However, the US Defense Department announced an even more impressive figure - according to them, the total sum of financial aid to Russia from 1992 to 2001 was $4 billion. But that included not only the Nunn-Lugar program, but also around thirty other joint programs, within the framework of which Americans helped us to dismantle ICBMs, destroy their launch pads, dismantle strategic bombers and nuclear-powered submarines, secure safe transportation of nuclear warheads and their storage, eliminate our chemical weapons arsenals, and so on. At a meeting of the International Conference on Disarmament in Geneva at the end of January, the official representative of Russia,Leonid Skotnikov, proudly announced that Moscow had carried out its obligations on schedule - by December 31, 2001 - and, moreover, reduced the number of "deployed strategic carriers" and "weapons for them" by much more than stated in the agreement: the Russian military retained only 5,518 warheads, instead of 6,500. However, President Bush has now become a threat to the honeymoon in Russian-US relations. The new president announced his intention to reconsider the programs for funding Russia's disarmament. Of course, Americans were satisfied with the fact that Moscow is cutting its nuclear arsenals; however, they were concerned about whether the Russians might be "fooling" them, using American money to build up Russia's military forces. But the strict accounting system introduced at the demand of the United States seemed to confirm that the money was indeed being used for disarmament purposes. However, Moscow did not let American monitors check everything, everywhere. Help came from a totally expected sources: the CIA spoke out in favor of the Nunn-Lugar program. Last week the CIA submitted a report to Congress on danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, expressing concern about "leaks of Russian technologies to Iran, India, China and Libya." The CIA promised Congress to spy on Russia even more: "a great deal of attention will be given to watching Russia in the sphere of distribution". At the same time, they advised continuing with the aid programs, since the Russian "defense, biological and nuclear sectors are short of money"; so it would be better for the United States to help Russia, rather than having Russia seek "clients" elsewhere. (Translated by Daria Brunova) ******* #5 Vremya Novostei No. 21 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] RETURN FEAR OF WAR TO THE WORLD By Vassily VIDENKO, Cand. Sc. (History) The world no longer fears even a possibility of a nuclear war. As for conventional warfare, even nations from the developed part of civilisation, who have much to lose, do not fear it. Not to mention nations from the underdeveloped part. And this is really alarming. Unfortunately, this is the result of not so much the disarmament policy or the construction of an international security system as of the end of the once great East-West confrontation and its positive essence - mutual deterrence, which worked throughout the world. In the former world, divided into two zones of influence, the deterrence not only permeated states, governments and other established life-support systems of nations. Actually, their very development - political, social, religious, ethnic and other - was controlled. Otherwise, a global, almost total deterrence would have been fiction. In this sense, billions of dollars were not spent in vain. Vicious in its antagonistic essence and really dangerous because of the level of military confrontation, the system of international relations nevertheless unfailingly ensured peace in the world for half a century after World War II, maintaining the entire web of the international balance of forces and interests. Conflicts that arose now and then in the Third World were free of the main "virus" - nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This purity was guaranteed by the great confrontation and the treaties it produced, above all the basic treaties on ABM defence, strategic offensive armaments, and others. The breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the U.S.S.R. deprived the world of the usual balance in views as to "whence the threat to peace comes." Perhaps, this is why now it may come from anywhere and, more often, it comes without a warning. Unlike the Cold War years, this threat is not hypothetical but a real one, shown on TV. The first omen came much earlier than September 11, 2001, ten years before, during Operation Desert Storm. At that time, the world still had the ability to react, although rather mechanically already, by expressing its concern - first in general and then on a concrete occasion: the use of weapons of mass destruction by Americans. The only consolation was that the "desert" hit by the "Storm" was located far from the developed part of civilisation. Another omen came from much nearer - the Balkans. The revival of an ideology of military arbitrariness by the strong and the rich and of an "international right" to bomb populated areas to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe marked the end of the epoch of deterrence with its salutary fear of war. In the Third World, void of the superpowers' patronage, perplexity caused by the loss of former ideological beacons began to quickly mutate. The lack of a clearcut political line in underdeveloped countries, especially in the Middle East, has brought to the foreground the religious factor, which is quickly turning into fanaticism. During the decade of the degradation of the deterrence system, the West believed it was even safer than behind the Iron Curtain, especially as its loss was compensated for by NATO's enlargement and the extension of a new trade and economic "defence line" with outposts of the European Union, the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and other "elite" organisations. However, the West, just as countries of the former U.S.S.R., proved unprepared to counter head-on attacks by militant pseudo-religious fanaticism. There is an impression that highly developed Christian countries, fearing to hurt the feelings of the ever growing numbers of Moslems, are afraid to raise before Islamic hierarchs issues that would help solve this problem. Since the world is a single whole, suicide through a terrorist act must be anathematised by all religions that claim to play the role of modern ones, i.e. those that keep up with the general and mandatory humanisation of life in the world. Self-sacrifice cannot be justified by any religious canons if it leads to the death of innocent people. Irrespective of creed, actions by kamikazes and their inspirers, which threaten the lives of other people, are a horrible crime. The understanding of this thesis and adoption of a universal "code of behaviour" are, most likely, a matter of the distant future. Until it comes, it is probably necessary to maintain people's fear of death and, consequently, fear of war - at least, at a level that will not allow anyone to yawn while watching the TV news about the Middle East conflict approaching the scope of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, or about the confrontation between India and Pakistan "on the nuclear threshold." ******* #6 Nezavisimaya Gazeta February 6, 2002 Money in Exchange for Security The U.S. may write off part of Russia's debt if we increase protection of our nuclear and chemical arsenals By Varvara Aglamishyan (therussianissues.com) It looks like the U.S. authorities are beginning to think about what makes people associate Russia with world terrorism. "There are many sources for weapons and it takes years to get or build them. But there's a shortcut, a place that has it all. It's "the candy store.' Other people call it "Russia,'" said Joseph R. Biden, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To distract us from this kind of business, the U.S. is likely to help us by providing funds. The senator called for reducing "Russia's Soviet-era debt" and increasing the spending on securing Russian nuclear and chemical weapons. In his view, increased spending for these purposes would prevent these weapons from appearing in Iran, Iraq or other countries. Biden believes that poor security in keeping weapons of mass destruction in Russia makes them easy prey for Iran or Iraq. Last year the Bush administration ignored similar recommendations given by the Foreign Relations Committee, although Russian nuclear and chemical arsenals presented a direct threat to U.S. national security at that time. Now it looks like the U.S. is inclined to approach the matter in a different way. Incidentally, the view that Russia, which in recent years has had insufficient funds for maintaining its military bases and arsenals, may become a supermarket for terrorists is shared also in the Middle East. Israeli Vice Prime Minister Natan Shcharansky said the other day that Russia should revise its policy with regard to Iran. There is a close link, he said, between the war against terrorism and the policy of countries like Iran and Iraq, which are trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction. "Iraq even is prepared to risk its own existence, but it will not give up the idea of having these kind of weapons," the Israeli Vice Prime Minister said. According to Shcharansky, "there is an understanding [in Israel and Russia] of this danger and of the need to take actions against technology leaks," but Russia can do much more to that end. Expressed in figures, "much more" looks frightening. It has been estimated by Senator Biden that $45 billion will have to be spent in the coming decade on reducing Russia's nuclear arsenal, destroying its chemical weapons, creating a system of tracking down and securing its missing radioactive materials, and taking other actions to that end. However, Russia's debt to the U.S. exceeds $3 billion and other creditor countries hold several times that much. Biden believes that debt reduction will help Russia secure its strategic materials and technologies and avoid the expected debt repayment crunch in 2003. It turns out that Russia still benefits from what was produced in the Soviet era. Some time ago, Russia was granted loans for restructuring its economy and now its debts may be written off so that it could secure its arms. Unfortunately, Russia's political dividends come in only to prevent a disaster ******* #7 BBC 7 February 2002 Millions of Chernobyl victims still suffering Sixteen years after the Chernobyl nuclear accident thousands of people are still living in contaminated areas and millions of people are still in need of international assistance, according to a United Nations report. The study by four UN agencies calls for "an entirely new approach" to help those in a state of "chronic dependency" in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. According to the report those most affected by the disaster have difficulty getting jobs, cannot support themselves financially and suffer drastic health problems - with many developing thyroid cancer. The explosion and fire at Chernobyl's No 4 reactor in April 1986 was the world's worst nuclear accident - it contaminated vast areas of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia and sent a radioactive cloud across Europe. Danger zone The UN report says that while much has been done to reduce the contamination more than seven million people in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are still suffering the effects. Nuclear contamination remains in 23% of Belarus, 5% of Ukraine and 1.5% of Russia, according to the study which was carried out in 2001. Despite the danger, between 100,000 and 200,000 people either remained near Chernobyl or have returned to live inside the 30-kilometre (19-mile) zone that is still highly radioactive. In theory, people are banned from being in the area. Psychological damage At least 8,000 people have died, most from radiation-related diseases. About 2,000 people have been diagnosed with thyroid cancer and between 8,000 and 10,000 cases are expected to develop over the next 10 years, the report said. The most highly contaminated areas were evacuated, but according to the report this too took its toll - causing psychological problems for those moved. "The psycho-social welfare of people who stayed in their homes is better than that of those who were relocated," the study found. The report calls for a complete change in how aid is delivered to the area - shifting the emphasis from short term relief to long term recovery. Kenzo Oshima, head of the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, said: "We must not turn our back on the government and people of the most affected countries after a decade and a half of assistance. We must not leave the job half done." Taking control The report calls for help in finding people jobs, fostering small businesses and reviving agriculture in the areas most affected by the disaster. "Populations in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine would continue to experience general decline unless significant new measures are adopted to address health, the environment and unemployment," it said. "Focusing on their needs and helping them take control of their destinies must be a priority," the report added. Four and a half million people are still receiving government relief which is putting an enormous strain on national budgets, especially in Belarus and Ukraine. Over the past 10 years Belarus has spent more than $1bn on victims of the accident, while last year alone Ukraine spent $100m. ******** #8 gazeta.ru February 7, 2002 Kursk sunk by own torpedo By Viktoria Maliutina Representatives of the Chief Military Prosecutor have announced that they now know exactly which torpedo on the Kursk exploded first, causing “at least four other torpedoes” to detonate. The investigators have also announced that they do not expect to find any other bodies on board the salvaged wreckage of the submarine that sank in the Barents Sea on August 12th 2000 during a naval exercise. Investigators of the chief military prosecutor announced on Thursday that they have established exactly which torpedo in the first section of the nuclear submarine exploded first. According to the head of the military prosecutor’s investigation department Viktor Shein, at least four torpedoes detonated on board the Kursk, but said it was too early to say exactly how many. The investigators say they managed to establish exactly which torpedo exploded by studying the data retrieved from the first section of the submarine, which remains on the bed of the Barents Sea having been cut off from the rest of the sub, along with the wreckage which was raised and towed to land in September. Shein also said that “a fragment with a number” had been located near the wreckage of the first section, obviously meaning fragment of a torpedo. How this helped the investigation establish which torpedo exploded first he did not explain. Shein also announced that the investigators would only be able to give a final verdict on the cause of the disaster once “all that remains on the seabed has been salvaged.” The military announced a few months ago that they plan to raise the first section of the Kursk this August. The military investigators have repeatedly refused to give any preliminary versions about the cause of the Kursk disaster. When the tragedy was unfolding they were adamant that the sub had been struck by “a foreign vessel” which was probably a U.S. submarine which was known to be in the vicinity of the exercise area. This version has not officially been deleted from the government commission set up to oversee the investigation into the disaster. However, several Russian naval sources have said on condition of anonymity that the Kursk was carrying new torpedoes that had not been previously tested and one of these was faulty or got jammed and detonated. The investigators have now inspected almost all sections of the Kursk and are currently working on the fourth and lowest deck of the third section. On Thursday the military prosecutor of the Northern Fleet, Vladimir Mulov announced, “the chances of finding anyone else have been exhausted. Later he told Gazeta.Ru “We are not saying that it’s sure we won’t find another body, but the chances of that are minimal.” 94 bodies have been found of which 90 have been identified. 118 crewmembers perished aboard the Kursk. Before investigators set to work sifting through the wreckage, they announced that they expected to find about 60 bodies. According to the first deputy military prosecutor of the Northern Fleet, Pavel Vodinsky, work upon the wreckage of the Kursk is coming to an end and could be completed this week. All that remains to be done is to clean out debris and drift from the bilges and to complete inspections of the fourth deck in the third and fourth sections, he said. Once the investigators complete their tasks, the submarine will be prepared for scrapping. ******* #9 Yezhenedelny Zhurnal No. 4 February 2002, POTENTIAL FOR RESTORATION Seeking new directions for cooperation between Russia and the United States Author: Alexander Golts [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE UNITED STATES IS REVISING ITS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE. IT IS TIME MOSCOW REVISED ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THE OLD SYSTEM OF RELATIONS BASED ON CONFRONTATION AND MUTUAL CHECKS AND BALANCES HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS: BUT THE POINT OF NO RETURN TO THE COLD WAR HAS NOT BEEN PASSED YET. The latest Russian-American honeymoon was even shorter than all previous ones. It certainly seemed for a time that September 11 dramatically improved bilateral relations. Moscow made a number of moves clearly indicating that it viewed Washington as at least a trusted partner, if not an ally. The Kremlin gave it consent for deployment of the US troops in Central Asian states of the Commonwealth, turned down its ELINT-gathering center in Cuba, expressed its readiness to facilitate relations with NATO, and even accepted its expansion. Last but not the least, President Vladimir Putin took America's withdrawal from the ABM treaty in his stride. Washington also took steps in the spirit of new relations of partnership at first. While announcing its withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the United States immediately announced its intention to cut nuclear arsenals from 6,000 warheads to 1,700 - 2,200. It isn't hard to see that the decision was made in order to placate the Russian military. It is common knowledge, after all, that Russian nuclear arsenals are ageing and will be down to 1,500 or so warheads by the end of the decade. If the Americans left their nuclear arsenals intact and deployed a national missile defense at the same time, even what relative nuclear parity there currently is would have been irreparably wrecked. The Kremlin also expected the Americans to stop criticizing it over Chechnya after September 11, particularly in the light of evidence showing that Khattab's guerrillas had contacts with Osama bin Laden. The Americans did indeed stop criticizing the Kremlin. This situation lasted several months. As soon as the Taliban's resistance in Afghanistan was broken, however, Moscow got a dose of reality. Washington made it clear during bilateral military consultations that it would not sign any new treaty on bilateral nuclear arms cuts, something like START I or START II. At best, Washington may agree to release some vague and not legally binding joint statement on mutual cuts in nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the report on development of American nuclear forces drawn up by the Pentagon and forwarded to the US Congress on January 9 makes it absolutely clear that dismantling the warheads removed from ICBMs is out of the question. The Americans intend to store them - in order to be able to arm their ICBMs again whenever they consider it necessary. The unofficial American moratorium on discussion of the Chechnya problem is over too. In mid-January the US Department of State accused Moscow of excessive use of force and human rights abuses in Chechnya several times in a row. Last week, head of the Russian Department of the US Department of State met with Iljas Akhmadov, "Foreign Minister" in Maskhadov's government. So far, Moscow has been rather reserved in official expression of its disappointment. The Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry openly give vent to their disillusionment in Washington's treacherous behavior. When victory in Afghanistan was still in future, the Americans labored to create the illusion of cooperation and immediately turned their backs on Moscow as soon as the victory became indisputable. At first sight, this construction of the developments is quite adequate. It is apparent at least that the victories in Afghanistan have seriously solidified the positions of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his followers who do not think that the United States should devote too much time and effort to establishment of relations of partnership with Russia. Particularly since this partnership may generate - and is actually generating - certain problems for the US Administration. Never missing a chance to whip George W. Bush and CO, The Washington Post does not criticize the fact of a meeting between a high ranking official of the US Department of State and Maskhadov's emissary. It criticizes the clandestine nature of the meeting. According to the newspaper, "Chechen and Afghani campaigns are not one and the same thing. The word "genocide" is misused too often but it is precisely this word that should be used to describe what has been happening in Chechnya." Even assuming that Russia and the United States deal one and the same enemy, it is all too clear that they fight their wars differently. The Americans did not need sweeping operations to destroy the enemy. The latest informational technologies and high-precision weapons can be effectively used against guerrillas, as it turned out. Wars like that last mere weeks. The country's losses are minimal and the locals are mostly spared. The American victories in Afghanistan are another confirmation of the assumption that radical changes are taking place in the methods of waging a war and in military strategy. It is these changes that Moscow persists in neglecting. The Russian military persists in thinking that a 100% guarantee of national security is maintained by preservation of nuclear parity with the United States. In the meantime, the Pentagon is out to drastically change the military-strategic situation in the world. From this point of view, the already mentioned report on development of the American nuclear forces is truly a revolutionary document, according to some experts. The Pentagon intends to abandon the old concept of the traditional nuclear triad comprising ground-based ICBMs, nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers. The future triad will include the strike force (along with the "traditional" nuclear forces, it will include high-precision weapons whose effectiveness is comparable to nuclear arms), strategic defense systems, and "fast response infrastructure" (as the Pentagon sees it, the matter concerns scientific-technical and industrial potential which will allow organization of nuclear arms production whenever necessary). All three components of the future nuclear triad will be incorporated into a single informational, intelligence, and command system. Implementation of this plan will guarantee the United States global military superiority for decades to come. Viewed from this angle, the question of where the warheads removed from ICBMs will be sent is certainly of secondary importance. Some experts are convinced that this whole potential for restoration game is but a deceptive maneuver on the Pentagon's part. On the one hand, it has to convince the US Congress that America will retain the capacity to respond to nuclear threats in the traditional manner - all through the decade the radical reorganization of the nuclear forces is going to take. On the other hand, this whole scheme will serve to send any nations intent on challenging America's military superiority along the wrong track entirely: toward a steady buildup of nuclear arsenals. At least from official Washington's point of view, the new American strategy has little to do with Russia. Rumsfeld's letter to the US Congress states that as of now, America in its nuclear planning should not view the threat posed by Russia adequate to the one posed by the Soviet Union once. According to Rumsfeld, the new relations of partnership with Russia are the major precondition for a revision of the whole nuclear policy of the United States. Essentially, the plan of development of the American nuclear forces is the first military- strategic document specifying partnership with Russia as a fact. This way Washington officially calls Russia not an enemy anymore. Official Moscow should rejoice. The Americans do mean to dismantle the material foundation of the Cold War. Neither the military nor diplomats are, however, overjoyed. The change is too much for them. Logic of partnership the United States offers makes pointless all long-winded speculations on military-strategic parity, nuclear balance, and new treaties with devious systems of verification and control. Redtape would not have that. Had the supreme political leadership really viewed strategic deterrent as the top priority in the sphere of national security, the Kremlin should have transformed the country into "a vast military camp" now that the potential enemy is after absolute military superiority and nullification of the Russian nuclear potential (the Kremlin's last trump card). As a matter of fact, the Kremlin does not view the United States as a source of military threat. The new and unusual position of the sides opens a vista of prospects, but the fragile trend is in jeopardy. Four decades of the Cold War concentrated relations between Moscow and Washington on a single issue vital for both countries - the need to prevent mutual deterrence from resulting in mutual destruction. These relations took the form of a whole framework of arms limitation and reduction treaties and agreements. Contacts between Moscow and Washington were restricted almost exclusively to these consultations. Even when the Soviet Union collapsed and became history, Moscow went on thinking by inertia that the nuclear arsenals comparable to the American made Russia and the United States equals. No one wanted to see the plain fact that preservation of organizational structures of the Cold War inevitably led to restoration of a confrontation. Now that the Americans mean to dismantle the system, there are fears that neither Washington nor Moscow know yet what shall be used to replace it. Washington regularly mentions some relations of strategic partnership but cannot explain what it means. Dismantlement of the antique Cold War infrastructure is the first step on the road to reliable peace. This infrastructure is not restricted to Russia alone. It also exists in the United States. The Jackson-Vanick amendment still applying to Russia is an atavism like that. Everyone is free to emigrate whenever he or she decides to - has been able to emigrate for over a decade already - but the amendment has not been cancelled yet. The Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe is another Cold War relic. It was drawn in the first place as an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to prevent a dangerous concentration of troops on what might have become the front line. The Warsaw Pact is history, former socialist states and former republics of the Soviet Union are queueing for NATO membership, but Russia is still subject to flanking limitations that make troops movement on its own territory difficult. It is high time Moscow discussed the matter with the United States, which has been steadily losing interest in Europe for some time already. The American military presence in Central Asian states of the CIS remains an important military-strategic matter. Russian generals and diplomats say that Moscow is prepared to put up with US military bases there for the duration of the counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan. Neither are the Americans themselves eager to settle in the post-Soviet Asia for long. General Thomas Franks, commander of the operation in Afghanistan, has just reiterated the absence of plans to quarter the American troops in the region on a permanent basis. Is it good for Russia or is it not? Aleksei Arbatov, military expert and Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Duma, ventured the opinion when the operation in Afghanistan was just beginning that the Americans would disturb the Central Asian anthill only in order to withdraw afterwards leaving Moscow to face the music. The Americans will surely destroy the Taliban and weaken Al- Qaida. Yet, there is nothing to stop extremists deprived of their bases in Afghanistan from moving to Central Asian states of the Commonwealth. Russia cannot build a wall to safeguard itself from this states. It does not have the money nowadays - nor will have it in the foreseeable future - to offer economic assistance to these states or assist them in state construction and development of fully fledged national armies. The Russian 201st Motorized Infantry Division alone cannot hope to maintain stability all over Central Asia. American military presence in the region might have facilitated economic development and gradual evolution of the native regimes toward civilization. In other words, maintenance of stability in Central Asia is a task that may initiate productive Russian-American interaction on a new basis. Some analysts also consider that nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and missile technologies might become another important sphere of Russian-American cooperation. Moscow and Washington should only refrain from reducing it to mutual accusations and threats of sanctions. Last but not least, the war on terrorism should not be restricted to information exchange between Russian and American secret services. Arbatov believes it would be much more helpful to set up joint working groups to evaluate the degree of vulnerability of industrial and defense facilities. These are just a few potential aspects of Russian-American cooperation. It is hard to say at this point exactly where joint efforts will be needed. It is important, however, to realize that the old system of relations based on confrontation and mutual checks and balances has outlived its usefulness: but the point of no return to the Cold War has not been passed yet. ******* #10 Russia: Military Divided On Formal Weapons-Reductions Treaty With US By Francesca Mereu In Russia, a number of military officials are welcoming the U.S. government's newfound readiness -- signaled in remarks by Secretary of State Colin Powell on 5 February -- to work out a legally binding document on reducing weapons stockpiles. But others say it is still early to speak about a real accord being struck between Russia and the U.S. Moscow, 7 February 2002 (RFE/RL) -- In an unexpected policy reversal, the United States has signaled it is willing to sign a formal agreement with Russian on reducing nuclear weapons. The U.S. had previously indicated it was willing to cut its stockpiles but was prepared to strike only a verbal agreement with Russia on the issue. But speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 5 February, Secretary of State Colin Powell indicated the U.S. was ready to seal a reduction deal with more than a handshake. "We do expect that as we codify this framework it will be something that will be legally binding and we're examining different ways in which this can happen. It can be an executive agreement that both Houses of Congress might wish to speak on, or it might be a treaty." Officials in Russia -- which had said it would not begin a reduction program without a formal agreement -- welcomed Powell's statement. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called Washington's reversal "an important signal that indicates the two major nuclear powers are continuing to seek understanding on arms control." Colonel General Yurii Baluev, first deputy chief of Russia's General Staff, yesterday told Russia's Interfax news agency it is possible to reach an agreement that "will satisfy both countries" and be welcomed by world community, "which expects precisely such a decision from the two top nuclear powers." Baluev, who is heading a group of Russian experts in Washington for consultations, says reduction documents will likely be prepared before U.S. President George W. Bush visits Moscow in late May. Alexander Golts is a Moscow-based journalist specializing in defense issues. He told RFE/RL that Powell's announcement, while welcome, did not come as a surprise for Russian politicians and military officials. "[Powell's statement] wasn't unexpected [in Russia]. Just a few days earlier, some high-ranking American diplomats -- in particular the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow -- said the United States was ready to sign a legally binding agreement. This is a very important event and, I think, it will meet with a positive response in Moscow." General Valeri Cheban is an adviser to Andrei Nikolaev, the chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, Russia's lower house of parliament. Cheban told RFE/RL why a formal agreement on strategic arms control is so important. "I think the Russian Federation's request to officially codify the [strategic arms control] agreement are well grounded. Not having a document of this kind gives rise to manipulation and loose interpretation of previous commitments. In short, it releases you from any responsibility concerning important military-political and diplomatic decisions." Late last year Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin pledged to cut strategic offensive weapons from currents levels of 6,000 warheads each to between 1,500 and 2,000 warheads, but the two leaders split on the issue of a written agreement. Washington's reversal appears to be a victory of sorts for Putin, who had refused to back down from his request for a binding document. Cheban says that by signing a formal agreement, Russia and the U.S. will be cooperating in the spirit of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and setting a positive example for other countries likely to deal with nuclear issues in the future. "Those [countries] that today or tomorrow will join the 'nuclear club' sooner or later will encounter problems, and will need to reach a [legally binding] agreement. They will look around to see who has experience in these matters. They will look at the United States and at Russia -- then the Soviet Union -- [as examples of] how they worked on the basis of [legally binding] agreements, even if it was sometimes difficult and hard. The bases of the agreements were formal. That is, people took responsibility for the decisions being made." Golts adds that the U.S. decision also comes as a welcome signal to Russian military officials who worried the U.S. had permanently backtracked from making any formal agreements. "Our military and diplomats are used to working under [formally] signed and respected agreements. When the United States announced their decision to leave the ABM Treaty, and when they refused to sign the [Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention], people in Moscow were distrustful. [They thought] America didn't want to sign any agreements. Now the decision of the American administration has put an end to these concerns." But Leonid Ivashov, deputy chairman of the Geopolitical Problems Academy and a former Defense Ministry senior official, said on Russian television yesterday that he opposes the signing of any treaty with the U.S. Ivashov said that since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed to respect a number of previously-signed documents, most notably the ABM Treaty. In an interview published in today's "Nezavisimaya gazeta" daily, Aleksei Arbatov, the deputy head of the Duma Defense Committee, says a formal treaty on arms reductions is a necessity for Russia but not for the U.S. He says any U.S. decision to formalize the arms agreement is being done "out of charity, because they know we had already decided to unilaterally cut our strategic arms." ******* #11 strana.ru February 7, 2002 Tolkien Fans Prepare to Rush Moscow's Cinemas Special Premiere arranged for Tolkien enthusiasts but few are expected to attended By Victoria Whall The film of the first book of J.R.R. Tolkien's "Lord of the Rings" trilogy premieres in cinemas across Moscow this Thursday. The three-hour film of "The Fellowship of the Ring" made the culture section of three national daily newspapers Thursday morning and "Afisha" - a popular entertainment guide to going out in Moscow - dedicated a whole 26 pages to coverage of the film in its latest issue. Tolkien's tales of middle earth are no less popular in Russia than elsewhere, it seems. Indeed, only fourteen years after the Hobbit first arrived in Russia, "Hobbit (role-play) Games" were arranged in a town on the Man River in Siberia. The event was arranged by the science fiction lovers' group of Krasnoyarsk and it was an indisputable success, approximately 150 people participated, a Russian enthusiasts' website says. Group numbers have since mushroomed to such an extent that Tolkienists are a recognized phenomenon in Russia. According to a Russian employee at "Russia Today",in Moscow some Tolkienists gather at "Iskuchnyi Garden" on Leninsky Prospect. One of her friends, a crazy fan, she says,often meets fellow Tolkienists there to talk about the books and act out variations of the story. Only a very few copies of the first Russian translation of Tolkien's first book, "The Hobbit" arrived in Russia in 1976. Due to the difficulty of getting hold of books at the time, the books were copied and re-copied in the 1980's and before long they came to the attention of science fiction lovers and developed a solid fan base very quicky. At the Central House of Literature situated near Gorky Park a special screening of the film is being offered to Tolkien fanatics this Thursday. The showing is open to visitors of the website www.tolkien.ru and their friends, and with attendees expected to turn up in costume - the organizers have everyone to dress up in the style of Tolkien's books - it promises to be quite an event. According to Izvestya, with tickets are priced at 150-200 rubles ($5 -$6)however, most Tolkienists will be too poor to afford tickets to the special showing. Ironic since the point was presumably to provide special fans with an affordable way of seeing the "Fellowship of the Ring" at the first opportunity i.e. at a premiere. Braving the premiere at Puhskinskaya cinema, for example, is likely to be extortionately expensive. Regardless of whether Tolkienists get to see the film in advance or have to wait along with the rest of the city until the film comes out on general release, one thing is for sure, there will be a lot of Russian Tolkien fans visiting the cinema to give their verdict of "The Fellowship of the Rings" in the coming weeks. ******* #12 Moscow Times February 8, 2002 Village Boys Not Dodging The Draft By Ana Uzelac Special to The Moscow Times PUTINO, Ural Mountains -- In the three weeks that passed since he came home from the army, Kostya Shisterov tried everything possible to keep himself busy. He did some logging for an uncle, slaughtered a pig his family would eat during the winter and helped every neighbor who knocked on the door of their wooden house to ask for an extra pair of strong hands. He visited friends, went to the disco and even came back drunk a few times. And still he was bored. He also looked for a job. But the search was all too simple. In the village of Putino, there is but one company that could employ a strong young driver with a good head on his shoulders and few other qualifications. And it was not hiring. So Shisterov, a tall, dark and handsome 20-year-old, decided there was only one thing to do with the rest of his life. "I'm going back to the army and signing up on contract," he shrugged, sitting on the steps of the village school's gym. "At least they feed you there and give you clothes and boots. Hell, they even pay you a salary!" Like in thousands of other Russian villages, in Putino, a small picturesque settlement on the slopes of the western Ural mountains, there is not much for a young man to do. A quarter of the working-age population is jobless, and there are no openings for the dozens of new job-seekers graduating from schools each year. The once-a-week disco, the gym and occasional drinking bouts with friends are hardly enough to fill Shisterov's time and consume his energy. The fears of thousands of Shisterov's peers in big cities around the country -- brutal hazing and human-rights abuses in the army -- are far away from here. For many young men in villages like Putino, where poverty is the norm and prospects worse than bleak, the army is a way out -- a ticket to a new life where everything is possible, including a regular salary. "I would love to stay in the army on a contract for several years," said Sergei Popov, a 20-year-old computer programmer who has just been drafted. "Maybe I could save some money, buy myself a small apartment somewhere in the city." For Popov, finding a job and having a career in programming at home was hardly an option. The village has no need for a computer programmer and in the nearest large city, Perm, where he studied, potential employers were more interested in his residency permit, or propiska, than in his qualifications. "You cannot get a job without residency registration, cannot have registration without having at least a small apartment in Perm, cannot have an apartment without money, cannot have money without a job," said Popov, an air of resignation on his intelligent, boyish face. "It's a vicious cycle. And the only way I see of breaking it is going on contract and saving enough for an apartment." Popov considers hazing a sort of calculated risk, something he is willing to put up with in exchange for a chance in life. "Of course I'll get beaten up there. It's the norm," he said. "But most people live through it easily, so I'm not too worried." When it comes to their attitude toward the army, the young village men are much closer to their parents' generation than to their peers in the city, said Yury Levada, head of the Moscow-based All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research, or VTsIOM. "For them, much like in Soviet times, the army is one of the escape routes from the villages," Levada said in an interview in Moscow. "Most young men serve in big cities and hardly any of them return permanently to their villages after they've served their term. ... It's a one-way street." Old Soviet traditions live on in the village in more ways than one. Young men leaving for the army throw big farewell parties in Putino, feasts that last for several days and end only when the recruits get handed over to the sergeants who escort them on their train rides to the big recruiting center in Perm. And serving in the army is still considered an initiation into manhood. "A guy becomes a real man only after he's served in the army," said Anton Durnovtsev, 16. "Otherwise ... well, otherwise you're a sissy and nobody wants to hang around with you." According to the Defense Ministry, there are just over 140,000 contract soldiers, or kontraktniki, in the 1.2 million-strong army. This figure, which does not include professional officers, makes up as much as 20 percent of rank-and-file soldiers, a ministry spokesman said in a telephone interview. Half of the kontraktniki are women, working mainly in communications and medical facilities. President Vladimir Putin has pledged to reform the outdated, cumbersome army by 2004, in large part by ending its traditional dependence on the draft and significantly raising the number of contract soldiers -- a move that would require "significant allocations." According to the Defense Ministry spokesman, the financial and social status of contract soldiers is still "far from satisfactory." An average kontraktnik earns 1,500 rubles to 2,000 rubles ($50 to $65) a month, and the army is obliged to provide him with shelter, food and compensation for medical and social insurance. In warring Chechnya, a contract soldier is supposed to earn 5,000 rubles to 8,000 rubles if he does not participate in armed conflict and 25,000 rubles to 28,000 rubles if he does, the spokesman said, adding that pay arrears to Chechnya kontraktniki have caused the number of applicants to "drop significantly." However, even the lowest of these salaries, together with the social benefits, makes an attractive package for the young men of Putino, where the average salary is 800 rubles to 900 rubles. It is also a great cure for the all-pervasive boredom and a way to keep off the bottle -- as common a pastime here as in any of the country's rural areas. "I had a friend who used to be the local champion in cross-country skiing," Shisterov said. "He came back from the army and couldn't find any work, so he started drinking. Later he left for Perm, but he kept on drinking. He's a wreck now. "People become drunkards out of boredom, because there is nothing else here to do," he said. "There is no work here, nothing to do but play volleyball at the school gym. And you can't play it all the time, can you? If I stay I'll also become a drunkard." The teens of Putino, like teens of many other villages, are leaving en masse for the cities. According to the school director, Sergei Reshetnikov, only one or two young people out of each generation stay in the village. The majority try to find jobs in nearby towns or in Perm. "Most of them leave," he said. "And they are right to do so -- their chances of realizing themselves here are next to none." But for the village boys the army has one big advantage over bustling, chaotic and often rough cities where one also has to fight for jobs and money. "You see, the army is the only place where they are actually happy to see you," Shisterov said. "You come to the military enlistment office, and say: 'Take me.' And they do." *******