CDI Russia Weekly-#191 1 February 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly Home Page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. AFP: Putin takes tough line on Iraq, nuclear arms cuts. 2. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Battle for Choice Heats Up. 3. DPA: Russian Generals Defend Conscript Army to the Last. 4. Chicago Tribune: Sam Roe, Trafficking in stolen nuclear material on the rise. Experts cite cases since mid-1990s as cause for concern. 5. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Mikhail Khodaryonok, Big Brother Dumped for $1 Billion. In the rivalry for influence in Central Asia, Washington comes up with economic arguments while Moscow can offer nothing but sincere friendship. 6. strana.ru: Viktor Supyan: "The U.S. Could Set a Serious Precedent in Solving the Problem of Russia's debts." The abrogation of the Jackson-Vanick amendment would be a major step forward. 7. Vek: Andrei Ryabov, RUSSIA TO SET TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES. 8. Literaturnaya Gazeta: LOBBYISTS FOR THEIR FATHERLAND. An interview with Eduard Lozinsky about prospects of Russia-US cooperation. 9. Jamestown Foundation; RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXTOLS U.S.-RUSSIA ANTITERROR ALLIANCE. 10. Rossiiskaya Gazeta: Sergei Shishkarve, HOW SHOULD RUSSIA REACT TO US WITHDRAWAL FROM ABM TREATY? ******** #1 Putin takes tough line on Iraq, nuclear arms cuts February 1, 2002 AFP President Vladimir Putin issued a thinly-veiled warning to Washington against using strong-arm tactics in global diplomacy while confirming that Moscow demanded nuclear arms cuts be enshrined in a formal treaty. Putin's tough message came amid signs that Moscow and Washington were making only limited progress in their ongoing negotiations over arms cuts and missile defense. It also followed the firmest indication yet that US President George W. Bush was willing to strike against Russia's Middle East ally Iraq after describing Baghdad as part of "an axis of evil" in his State of the Union address Tuesday. Receiving the credentials of five new ambassadors to Russia, Putin described as hopeless a pattern of international relations "based on the domination of one center of force." Instead Putin said he favored the creation of "a truly fair international system, based on law and respect for the interests of each state, and capable of ensuring equal security for all nations." He failed to address Iraq specifically in his remarks, but they appeared aimed directly at Bush's vow to strike -- on his own if need be -- against so-called rogue states that have been befriended by Moscow in the past years, and who stand in heavy financial debt to Russia as a result. Bush's address threw a wrench into Moscow's bid to mediate an end to the stalemate between Baghdad and Washington over Iraq's refusal to comply with international inspections of its weapons program. Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz, who had been expected to hold a new round of talks on the issue with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, cut short his Moscow stay Thursday and flew to Baghdad in what Russian news reports was a fit of pique over Bush's message. Turning to another dispute that has cooled Moscow's warm embrace of Washington that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks, Putin told his Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov that he was dissatisfied with the US approach to arms cuts. Ivanov agreed that Russia was prepared for "real, radical, verifiable and transparent arms reductions," insinuating that the United States -- which wants a loose framework agreement but no binding treaty -- does not want the same. Putin's comments came one day after the Russian foreign ministry called for "a binding legal document" to be agreed by Washington and Moscow that would establish a ceiling of 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads 10 years from now. Ivanov is likely to voice Moscow's anger at suggestion that the United States might keep some of its decommissioned warheads in reserve -- rather than simply destroying them like Russia -- during a meeting with an official US delegation expected to be led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz at this weekend's security conference in Munich. The disarmament issue has shaken relations between Moscow and Washington, with Putin calling "a mistake" Bush's unilateral decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty to pursue the development a missile defense system. The United States on Wednesday declined to comment on Moscow's demand for cuts within the context of a binding legal treaty saying only that it had held "productive" and "substantive" arms control talks this week with Russia. The talks are expected to resume in Moscow on February 19. The two sides are hopeful that the disarmament issue can be resolved before Bush makes an official visit to Russia, which diplomatic sources in Washington said has been scheduled for May 23-25. ******** #2 Moscow Times January 31, 2002 Battle for Choice Heats Up By Pavel Felgenhauer After many years of fruitless discussions, lawmakers seem to be ready to approve a law on alternative service in accordance with the country's Constitution that permits draft-age youth the option of choosing a civilian alternative to military service. There are three bills on alternative military service that have been prepared, and this week the government discussed a Defense Ministry draft. The government returned the Defense Ministry proposal for redrafting, so a legal alternative to military service seems to be a possibility once again. The Defense Ministry has opposed alternative military service for almost a decade and has been the main reason for the delay in making it an option. Generals believe that alternative national service is the same as legal draft dodging. The military has for years opposed the passage of such a bill, and it is now trying as a last resort to ensure that any alternative community service will exist mainly on paper. The Defense Ministry proposed a three- to four-year term of service for alternative draftees and as well as envisioning sending some portion of them to work in regions where they are not resident. The Defense Ministry also demands that those seeking alternative status should provide sufficient proof -- including the testimony of witnesses -- to demonstrate that they are unable to perform military service for reasons of health, religious conviction or special family circumstances. The generals clearly hope that a highly unattractive alternative service -- in conditions not dissimilar to those of prison inmates -- will be unpopular with draftees. The demand that draftees first prove to the military authorities that they are eligible to be granted an exemption means in effect that the Defense Ministry can annually set a quota on alternative service positions. At a meeting of the government this week, General Anatoly Kvashnin, the first deputy defense minister, was reported as saying that he expects only some 2,000 alternative service applications a year. If there are more the military could reject them on the grounds that draftees did not manage to prove their pacifist convictions beyond reasonable doubt. The Defense Ministry drafts some 400,000 individuals per year for a two-year term of service. Of the 800,000 conscripts in regular service today, some 600,000 serve with Defense Ministry forces, while the rest are in the Interior Ministry, work as border guards or with other armies. Compulsory military service is highly unpopular in Russia. Living conditions in the barracks are appalling; thousands of conscripts each year die of accidents, commit suicide or are killed as a result of hazing. Conscripted soldiers are sent to fight in Chechnya, and each year thousands are killed or wounded in action. Since the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999, draft dodging has become extremely widespread. In 2000, the police began to carry out special operations together with the military to round up dodgers and send them to barracks. Liberal State Duma deputies believe that a reasonable alternative-service bill could help up to 50 percent of potential draftees avoid the military, providing much needed manpower to run-down hospitals and other social services. But for the military this would be a manpower catastrophe. Putin has announced plans to make the army a fully voluntary force by 2010, with conscripts replaced by professional soldiers. The military does not oppose this plan openly but is still deeply unhappy. Conscripts are not only cheaper, but they are also easier to discipline than the bums and social outcasts that the military manages to gather as volunteers. There are also strategic considerations that fuel the military opposition to reform. If the drafting system collapses and the army becomes fully voluntary, the military will no longer have a large reserve force and will not be able to mobilize a multimillion-man army. Most generals believe this would be a full and final departure from Soviet military traditions, an acknowledgment of second tier status vis-a-vis the United States. The essence of the argument on alternative service is not money or manpower recruitment schemes per se. It is the strategic future of Russia. Putin will have to make a decision that could reveal his true long-term strategic goals: If the Soviet draft system survives, the Soviet militaristic past will live on, effectively hampering all attempts to reform and Westernize Russia. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. ******* #3 Russian Generals Defend Conscript Army to the Last MOSCOW, Jan 31, 2002 -- (dpa) No longer in command of a superpower army in a global ideological struggle, Russia's generals now fight a far less glorious rearguard action on the homefront against plans to cut the military down to size. The defense ministry has orders from President Vladimir Putin to trim the armed forces to one million men over the next three years. They now have 1.2 million personnel after cuts last year shed 100,000 men, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told the president Thursday. Starting 2004, Ivanov's ministry is also expected to build a professional force in place of the oversized, ragged but cheaply maintained conscript-based army. And dealing another stinging blow to the conservatively-minded military establishment, parliament looks ready to approve a law on alternative service in accordance with the country's Constitution, which permits civilian work instead of two years in uniform. Liberal politicians predict that a reasonable alternative service bill could see up to 50 percent of potential draftees becoming available for work in hospitals and other social services. It's a red rag to the proud bulls of the top brass, experts say. "If the drafting system collapses and the army becomes fully voluntary, the military will no longer have a large reserve force and will no longer be able to mobilize a multimillion-man army," commented Russian defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer. "Most generals believe this would be a full and final departure from Soviet military traditions, an acknowledgement of second-tier status vis-a-vis the United States." No-one in the military leadership is foolish enough to revolt openly against the changes. But some cunning arguments have appeared in favor of retaining a large army. "Russia occupies a seventh of the world's land and covers a vast territory and an enormous length of borders," the chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, said in discussions of the reforms. "But it has the least number of soldiers manning each kilometer of border - 16 instead of no less than 50 in other countries," he said, overlooking the fact that thousands of miles of Russia's remote Arctic coastline may be considered safe from aggression. Other commanders like Georgy Shpak, the head of the airborne forces, say a war involving major clashes of tanks, armies and divisions is unlikely. "But the likelihood of various operations like in Chechnya and Kosovo is now growing," he warned. Careful not to stir up too much dissent in the ranks, Minister Ivanov has given repeated assurances that the reforms will not be rushed. He points out that in the United States a smooth transfer to a professional army took ten years. Meanwhile, the hated conscription goes on, no doubt also to the vast relief of many state farm directors, since armies of conscripts are used to bring in the harvest each year. Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, pledged in his 1996-reelection campaign to do away with the draft by 2000 in a clear bid to win votes. Today, despite 150,000 professional soldiers serving under contract, the Russian army is still dependent on conscription. The Defense Ministry calls up some 400,000 youths annually to serve in notoriously brutal conditions. Tens of thousands more are drafted to the Interior Ministry forces and other paramilitary formations. Soldiers mothers' organizations estimate that as many as 2,000 conscripts die a year as a result of accidents, beatings by older soldiers or suicide, while thousands more are killed and wounded in Chechnya. Deputy prime minister Valentina Matviyenko this week said that alternative service when it becomes available will last three to four years - admittedly twice as long as military service, as is the practice in many countries, but it "should not be treated as punishment", she said. Observers expect conditions for those who pass requirements for draft exemption - health problems, religious conviction, family circumstances - will be not dissimilar to those of prison inmates. Kvashnin himself reportedly said he expects only 2,000 alternative service applications a year. And so the battle of Russia's bulging army goes on. ******* #4 Chicago Tribune January 31, 2002 Trafficking in stolen nuclear material on the rise Experts cite cases since mid-1990s as cause for concern By Sam Roe Tribune staff reporter VIENNA -- As fears rise over terrorists trying to possess nuclear bombs, a disturbing trend is emerging in the shadowy world of weapons smuggling: More thieves are trafficking in plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the essential materials for a nuclear device. The number of confirmed incidents remains small--eight in the last three years. But that has risen since the mid-1990s, when some analysts thought the nuclear smuggling threat might be easing. Experts point to the recent cases as evidence that too little is being done to safeguard nuclear facilities, particularly in Russia. "It's a very good reason to accelerate programs to enhance the physical security of these sites," said Rose Gottemoeller, who served in the Clinton administration as assistant energy secretary for non-proliferation and national security. All the trafficking cases since 1999 have occurred in Europe or the countries of the former Soviet Union. In Paris, police arrested three men and seized 5 grams of highly enriched uranium inside a lead cylinder. In Germany, a worker stole a vial containing a small amount of plutonium. And at the Bulgarian-Romanian border, customs officers discovered uranium hidden in the trunk of a car. Experts said they were unsure why they were seeing more such trafficking cases. Improved police work might be leading to more arrests. But one theory is that trafficking is on the rise because terrorists and hostile nations are more interested in nuclear materials. Since 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, a United Nations watchdog, has documented 411 incidents of trafficking in nuclear material and industrial and medical radioactive sources. But not one of these incidents has been linked to terrorists, and only 18 involve even small amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium--the fissionable material needed for a nuclear weapon. Nuclear junk Most smuggling cases involve what is essentially nuclear junk, including low-enriched uranium, natural uranium and radioactive isotopes--material of little use to terrorists. Most of it, experts said, could not even make a significant "dirty bomb," radioactive material packaged with conventional explosives to contaminate a large area. But experts said it is likely that many traffickers escape attention, especially those moving through Central Asia, where centuries-old trade routes are poorly policed. "We have very little idea what fraction of the total traffic is being intercepted," said John Holdren, a Harvard professor who in 1995 led a classified study for President Bill Clinton on the security of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. Those caught smuggling appear to be amateurs. Many are low-paid nuclear workers in the former Soviet states who steal small amounts of material hoping to make some quick money. Instead, they search in vain for buyers and eventually stumble into the police. The first documented theft of highly enriched uranium from a nuclear facility in the former Soviet Union occurred in Russia in 1992. Leonid Smirnov, an engineer at a nuclear research facility outside Moscow, stole about 3 pounds of highly enriched uranium powder. "He built up his stock for a long time, and nobody had any idea that anything was amiss," said Matthew Bunn, an expert on nuclear theft and a White House adviser in the mid-1990s. But Smirnov became nervous, Bunn said. So he put the uranium in a suitcase and went to the train station in search of a buyer. There, he bumped into several neighbors who were being followed by police for stealing batteries from their factory. The neighbors were arrested, and Smirnov was taken in for questioning. "So he gets swept up," Bunn said, "and he's in jail, and police are questioning him, and they said, `What's in the suitcase?' And he said: `Uranium.'" Difficult and expensive So far, there is no conclusive evidence that terrorists have acquired a nuclear weapon or the materials to build one. While opinions vary, experts generally say that building a nuclear weapon from scratch is difficult and expensive. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein tried for years, they note, apparently without success. Even if terrorists had the proper materials--not an easy undertaking given the quantity and quality required--they would need a team of highly technical specialists to design, construct and detonate the bomb, experts say. Osama bin Laden has repeatedly stated his desire to obtain nuclear weapons, and President Bush has said that bin Laden's terrorist group, Al Qaeda, is seeking such devices. A likely place for terrorists to obtain nuclear material is Russia, where there is enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make about 40,000 nuclear weapons, according to U.S. government studies. Some of this material, the studies state, is inadequately protected. Over the last decade, the United States has created numerous programs and spent hundreds of millions of dollars to help secure the Russian material. Significant improvements have been made, but experts said security gaps, poor inventory records and excess plutonium production still are not being fully addressed. ******* #5 Nezavisimaya Gazeta January 30, 2002 Big Brother Dumped for $1 Billion In the rivalry for influence in Central Asia, Washington comes up with economic arguments while Moscow can offer nothing but sincere friendship By Mikhail Khodaryonok therussianissues.com Despite statements that U.S. presence in Central Asia is temporary, Americans are not going to leave Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the near future. No small role is played here by the economic and military expediency of U.S. presence in the region. The struggle against terrorists in Afghanistan is going to last quite a while. Although the U.S. has accomplished the greater part of its tasks in neutralizing the Taliban quickly enough, small air attacks will continue for a long time to come. It is not expedient to keep aircraft carrying multipurpose groups in the Arabian Sea for a few sorties. It would be far better to use the Central Asian republics' infrastructure and achieve a number of military and political goals at the same time. The Americans have gained a foothold at the Central Asian airbases in Khanabad and Kokaida (Uzbekistan), in Dushanbe and Kulyab (Tajikistan) and in Manas (Kyrghyzstan). In strategic terms, these are very useful airfields, allowing you to keep the whole of the Central Asian region under control. Big sums have already been spent repairing and equipping the runways of the former Soviet airbases to U.S. standards. The modernization of each of them, with the exception of the Kyrgyzian Manas, cost the Pentagon 200 to 250 million dollars. A considerable amount of airdrome technical, navigational, intelligence and rescue equipment has been airlifted there. Although there are no attack planes at the air bases, they could be delivered in the near future. U.S. military transport aircraft, rescue service helicopters, and unmanned reconnaissance planes are in the Central Asian airdromes today. Current plans are to create reserves of aircraft fuel, arms and ammunition there. The U.S. policy with regard to the military bases leased on the territory of other states is quite clear. As a rule, the Pentagon settles accounts without fail and on time. The money is a useful addition to the local budgets. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will benefit from rent payment for the infrastructure if the entire base is rented or for parking military aircraft at dual-purpose airports. Separate payment will be made for take-off and landing and, finally, the Americans will have to pay for using the air corridors. The use of parking areas and takeoff/landing operations might cost the Pentagon several thousand dollars. In particular, when using the Manas airdrome in Kyrgyzstan the payment for each take-off and landing is $7,000 to $7,500; this payment concerns only the Manas airbase. Payment is decided at each airbase individually. Of course, these figures may be revised in the future. Americans and their West European allies will have to pay much less, say, for using air corridors over Central Asia. On the whole, however, the U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will result in a big addition to the republics' budgets. The intensity of flights from the Central Asian airfields to the active zone of the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan was relatively small - 3 to 5 flights a week. This figure has been reduced as of late. So, at this stage of the operation the Central Asian republics could gain a few million dollars from U.S. and Western flights. If the spending on modernization were added, it would seem that U.S. input has exceeded one billion dollars. Russia today can offer its Central Asian partners nothing but eternal friendship. Therefore, choosing long-term foreign policy priorities is no longer a problem for the Central Asian republics. ******* #6 strana.ru January 31, 2002 Viktor Supyan: "The U.S. Could Set a Serious Precedent in Solving the Problem of Russia's debts" The abrogation of the Jackson-Vanick amendment would be a major step forward: Supyan By Viktor Sokolov In a Strana.Ru interview, the Deputy Director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Viktor Supyan, analyzes problems in Russian-American economic relations in connection with Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's current visit to the United States. Q: The media today are singling out several main economic subjects that are likely to be brought up during the visit of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to the United States. Obviously, this includes participation in the World Economic Forum, as well as bilateral relations. The Russian prime minister will also raise the question concerning the notorious Jackson-Vanick amendment, and the matter of granting Russia the status of a country with a market economy. Do you anticipate any problems arising during discussions of these subjects? For instance, do you think any progress will be made in the matter of lifting the Jackson-Vanick amendment? A: First, I think it would be proper to specify Kasyanov's intentions on his visit to the USA. At the top of his agenda, we can see two main subjects: bilateral relations, and participation in the Davos Forum that this time is being held in New York. These are the two main components of his visit. I think Kasyanov intends to convince the representatives of the American administration and business circles, especially at the World Economic Forum, that Russia's economy is in better shape than before, and that it is possible to consider it a market economy. Consequently, this will make it possible to attract investments to Russia's economy on a good, sound basis. This is the traditional set of approaches. This time, I believe such approaches are more well-founded than previously, since Russia's economy is now in better condition than before. In fact, Russia is counting on economic growth, even though the situation on the world oil market is not changing in its favor. At the same time, we must concede that Russia is importing more commodities than it did in the past, and this, of course, has a negative impact on domestic production. All these are quite negative factors influencing the present state of our economy. But even so, one has to admit that Russia's economy today is in better condition than previously. The federal budget indicates a surplus. We are paying our debts on time. Our "risk" ratings have improved. That is why there are all grounds to say the situation is improving. I believe the prime minister will refer to approximately the same types of arguments during his meetings with U.S. officials. As for the Jackson-Vanick amendment, last fall the U.S. administration really did announce its intention to petition Congress to have it lifted. I consider there are grounds to believe that the amendment will be abandoned, since it no longer makes any practical sense. The set of circumstances that prompted the amendment no longer exists. If you remember, it was adopted due to limited emigration from the Soviet Union. Today, there are no such restrictions, and the amendment does not actually function, since the U.S. administration suspends it on an annual basis. But so far, the amendment has not been abrogated. I would say there are grounds to hope that this will be done. Q: In this case, will Russia be able to receive "most favored nation" treatment in trade with the U.S.? A: That's exactly what it means - we will receive most favored nation treatment in trade. What does "most favored nation" treatment mean? This does not at all imply any kind of privileges in trade relations. It simply means that the two sides agree upon mutually equitable conditions of trading. It has nothing to do with privileges. It implies the absence of discrimination - nothing more. To make it quite clear, this status does not imply any special preferences. Q: Can the abrogation of the amendment be seen as a step forward? A: Of course, it would be a big step forward. This is very import for Russia's exports, since they were restricted by that amendment, especially in regards to dual-purpose technologies that could be used for military applications. Granting Russia the status of a country with a market economy is another important question. There is a specific technical procedure for adopting a decision on this matter. Such a decision is made by the U.S. Department of Commerce. This procedure has also been started, but it usually takes several months - half a year or more. Q: What does this really mean for us? A: This means that if Russia acquires the status of a country with a market economy, no anti-dumping procedures can be taken against it. This too is very important for us, first of all, for the steel industry since such procedures were instituted precisely against this branch. Q: To what extent does this question dovetail with the problem of Russia joining the WTO? A: The connection here is direct. Russia's accession to the WTO implies a special range of problems that Russia must hammer out directly with that organization, although, of course, America has a very large say in the WTO. That is why a great deal depends on America's stance. But what we are talking about here is not so much about that, since there seems to be a consensus to adopt Russia into the WTO. The question stands this way: on what terms and conditions are we ourselves prepared to acquire WTO membership? Because if we proceed according to the formal rules, then we must give up the policy of protectionism in respect to many branches of our processing industries. What does this mean? It means that we will have to sharply reduce customs duties on the import of many commodities, and this will simply spell finis to many branches of our industries. Our domestic producers and manufacturers have not taken a unanimous stand on this matter. The essence of the question is not whether or not to join the WTO. As I see it, the Economic Development and Trade Ministry that is negotiating this question is adhering to what I would call a "classification" approach to the problem. What I mean by this is the following: it is necessary within the framework of the WTO to hold special, separate talks on each group of commodities, on each branch of industry. And, as a matter of fact, there are precisely such provisions in WTO procedures. Here too, of course, a great deal depends on what stand America takes. In this sense, Kasyanov's talks in America could be very important. Q: Do you anticipate a tough stance on the problem of Russia's debts? A: This is a problem not so much of Russia's debt to the United States. It is a much broader problem. According to various estimates, our overall debt to America stands at around $8 billion, which, against the background of all our debts is not such a big sum after all. This question may be brought up in a much broader context: the possible need to reschedule our debt, first of all, to the Paris Club of creditor states to whom we owe a great deal more - tens of billions of dollars. And the stand of the U.S. in this Club is very important. Even now, the burden on our budget for servicing these debts is extremely heavy. It amounts to practically a third of our budget. The crucial year for payments - 2003 - will be very indicative in the sense of proving our ability to honor all our debts. This question may be discussed from the following angle: if Russia, due to its internal economic situation, is unable to successfully service its debts as it has been during the past two years, then Russia may ask for support from the world community and the U.S. to restructure that debt in some way. There is yet one other circumstance: in the U.S. Senator Biden has tabled an initiative to write off part of Russia's debt (the matter here, of course, concerns the debt to the U.S.) in exchange for scrapping mass destruction weapons. Not all the weapons, of course, but only that part that is to be reduced on the basis of bilateral treaties and agreements. What is meant here is that Russia would not be paying off the debt, but rather using these sums instead for utilizing chemical, bacteriological and other weapons. In fact, the corresponding proposals for the coming two years have already been placed on the table: the sum of the debt to be written off in this manner is not very large - something around $150 million. However, if this proposal materializes, this may set a serious precedent that could be used in respect to Russia's other debts. And this too, in my opinion, is a very important aspect of solving Russia's debt problem. ******* #7 Vek No. 4 2002 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] RUSSIA TO SET TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES By Andrei RYABOV Following the recent improvement in relations between Russia and the West resulting from the joint fight against terrorism, Russian foreign policy seems to be once again returning to its traditional priorities. Contacts with China have become more frequent. Moscow is attempting to stir up the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at the time when the Central Asian countries, members of the SCO, are seriously considering the possibility of deploying American military bases on their territories for the long term. Moscow has also remembered that it has special relations with Iraq. There might be important causes for all of this. Following the successful completion of the military operation in Afghanistan, the West has got noticeably colder towards Russia. The American administration does not want to tie its hands with serious obligations on strategic weapons cuts. The Chechen question and the need to negotiate with Maskhadov have been raised once again in the U.S. and EU countries. Influential overseas politicians are speaking increasingly louder, urging the U.S. to stay in Central Asia for the long term. The West has once again accused Russia of violating democratic freedoms in relation to the closure of TV-6 and the Pasko case. The opponents of rapprochement between Russia and the West have come to the forefront. With malicious pleasure, they say that they warned the Kremlin that as soon as the Americans and their allies had attained their goals, they would stop taking Russia's interests into account. In this situation, official Moscow should show both international and domestic public opinion that the sudden changes in Western policies are of no concern for it. Russia is ready to respond to them with its own changes, changes that would not be welcomed in the West. You want to establish military bases in the Central Asia, then on our initiative, Central Asian countries' foreign ministers will sign a declaration in support of the fight against international terrorism exclusively under the aegis of the UN. Your relations with the Arab world are deteriorating, but we are ready to start establishing contacts even with the Persian Gulf monarchist regimes. Note that the main financial assistance to Chechen separatists is coming from there, and Chechen rebel commanders find asylum there. You consider the possibility of a military operation against Iraq, so we receive the Iraqi foreign minister. Even Russia's attitude to neutral Turkmenistan is changing as we speak. Turkmenistan was viewed as a certain obstacle to Russia's domination in Central Asia. Today, its neutrality is a stumbling block to the establishment of American control over the region. Superficially, this is quite logical. You treat us with no respect, and we respond in kind. The problem is that this will hardly frighten anyone. However, this can definitely intensify negative attitudes to Russia in the West, which we want to avoid now with world oil prices - the core factor in the success of the Russian economy - remaining unstable. In addition, our major partners in the East - China and India - are not eager to ruin their relations with the U.S. and the West. The Chinese, for instance, cooperate with Russia within the SCO and sign calls to fight international terrorism only within the UN framework and under the auspices of the UN. But simultaneously they forcefully lobby their interests in the U.S. without consulting Moscow. During the latest Indian-Pakistani crisis, the Indians showed their might so soundly that this convinced the U.S. to lift bans on delivering certain kinds of weapons to this country. Even Iran in a certain situation can potentially sway toward the West. Thus, no real confrontation with the West is a possibility and an imitation of confrontation is likely to impress no one. A policy based on the premise "we will do it to spite you" was used on several occasions in the last decade and did not result in anything serious. One lesson though can be learned from this policy. Unlike in chess, in politics, especially in foreign policy, one should never play black, which means only to reply to the other side's moves. In politics, one needs to first set one's own priorities and decide who one wants to be. Do we want to be part of the West? If so, we will have to get used to the role of a "younger brother." Do we want to be the "New East"? Then we should think about how to attract to our side the elites in the Eastern countries, the majority of which also want a piece of the globalisation pie. Do we want to be the bridge between the West and East? It is an option, but it does not allow full independence. To become an independent powerful centre we need to upgrade the economy and relieve the country from its dependency on oil prices and clear the enormous foreign debt. Only after Russia determines its fundamental priorities will it be able to develop various long-term foreign policy strategies. ******* #8 Literaturnaya Gazeta No. 4 January 31-February 5, 2002 LOBBYISTS FOR THEIR FATHERLAND An interview with Eduard Lozinsky about prospects of Russia-US cooperation Author: Interviewed by Nadezhda Gorlova THE LOBBYISTS IN FAVOR OF RUSSIA WANT RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES TO CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY, BUT THERE ARE MANY ENCUMBERING FACTORS. EDUARD LOZINSKY, FORMER SOVIET DISSIDENT, SAYS HE HAS ALWAYS HELD TO THE CREED THAT RUSSIA MUST BECOME A PART OF THE FREE WORLD. Eduard Lozansky heads the American University in Moscow, the Russia House in Washington and the Continent Media Group. All his adult life, he has been fighting the Soviet regime; and over the past few years he has been lobbying for Russia's interests in the US Congress. Question: What was the start of your problems in Russia? Lozansky: In 1974 Vladimir Maksimov founded Continent. It was brought to Russia illegally and all those involved, including me, got into the deep trouble. In 1976 I was asked to leave the USSR. Question: That's it? Were you advised to recover your nerves? Lozansky: I was the son-in-law of a powerful general, one of those who sent troops into Czechoslovakia. Therefore, I couldn't be sent to prison or a mental asylum; and senior officials decided that it would be better to exile me. I am a physicist by education, I was engaged in serious scientific research, and the dissident activities were not the main cause in my life. Question: What did you do in the West? Lozansky: Together with my associates, we founded the Andrei Sakharov Institute and annually held congresses in various cities around the world in order to draw public attention to violations of human rights in the Soviet Union. Question: Who funded you? Lozansky: Various organizations, for instance the Adenauer Foundation. From the very beginning, Springer was financing Continent. Now we do not receive financial backing from other organizations. When communism collapsed, we were thanked and told: "It's all right, guys. You can do whatever you want now." Now we have learned to work on a business basis. Question: What was your response to the changes which took place in Russia a decade ago? Lozansky: We were criticizing the Soviet regime from abroad, calling on people not to believe in the USSR's promises of peace. Then perestroika broke out. The so-called "Letter of the Ten" was published in Moskovskiye Novosti. Bukovsky wrote it in my kitchen. Then we called Aksenov, Lyubimov, Zinovyev and others. Permission to publish this letter, obtained from the Soviet authorities, marked the start of a very significant process in Russia. The letter caused a great stir. It started a debate, and a devastating article was published in Literaturnaya Gazeta. After that we began to invite people from the Soviet Union to our "meetings." It was sheer impudence, but people started to come to us. Perestroika and its after-effects were extremely unexpected for the United States. We have had a policy of gradual closing in since that time. However, both parties made many errors; America even made more mistakes, since Russia was an inexperienced student taking its first steps in the world of democracy, while the US was a venerable professor. If a student fails an examination, the professor is also responsible for that. Question: Do you admit that the movement of dissidents made the system keep constantly on the alert, perfect itself, resist - and thus hampered the natural transition to democracy? Lozansky: It is hard to say. There was no way to stop us, other than executing us. However, execution by firing squad was out of fashion by that time. Quite naturally, the West was using us to suit its own ends. We were fully aware of this, but did not object to it sharply. We had our own ties with the Soviet regime. I started to dislike it when I was about 15 or 16. The lack of freedom to travel was the main aversion for me. The Soviet regime made me its implacable enemy when I started my scientific studies and had to attend conferences and meet with my colleagues as part of my job. Question: Has the West been using you now for its own sake? Not you, probably, but the structures you constitute? Lozansky: I don't know. In my opinion, our present work, aimed at closer links between Russia and the US, suits the interests of the United States. However, many people in Russia and abroad both do not recognize us. We have always been hard-to-deal-with people. I can say at least that I have never faltered. The conviction that Russia must become a part of the free world has always been my creed. It must stand up for its interests, but in negotiations with friends - not enemies. These are the principles of a different color. Question: What have you been doing for this now? Lozansky: We are Russia's lobbyists in the United States. Russia underestimates the significance of having its own lobby group. Poland was looking forward to jointing NATO, and the Polish community in the US rose to that task. They were writing letters to members of congress and senators and kept saying that if you don't support this initiative we will never vote for you, etc. Poland used its own migrant community and also hired lobbying professionals. Once a year we hold a Worldwide Russian forum; and this year submitted "The Ten Commandments of the Russian forum" for consideration to the US Congress and the world community. One-third of the Congress signed this document, which was drawn up in accordance with these "commandments." Should everything the document stated took place, Russia and the United States would become allies. The document was adopted on November 7 and we sent copies of it to Bush and Putin. Question: What kind of commandments are these? Lozansky: The first commandment is devoted to a close alliance between Russia and NATO, aimed at Russia's full-fledged membership of this military-political structure. However, NATO has become obsolete. It was aimed at defending the West from communism. But communism no longer exists, and the enmity was mechanically carried over to Russia. This approach is wrong. I understand NATO officials - this is a huge bureaucratic mechanism, high stakes, mansions in Brussels. Of course they do not want to lose their jobs! If one could convince them of a need to change NATO into a different structure and make them understand that they would lose nothing, but Russia would join NATO... Joint work by Russia, the US and other NATO member states in the installation of a strategic missile defense system is the second commandment. Question: However, the US has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, hasn't it? Lozansky: I think the United States made the right move. The ABM Treaty is a treaty between enemies, a policy of mutual deterrence. The communists were not prepared to cause an apocalypse for the ideas of Marx and Lenin; and therefore it was effective. Now, any state other than Russia may strike first. Thus, missile defense systems are needed, but Russia and the US should develop them together. Russia's ideas in exchange for US funding. The ABM Treaty should be replaced with a treaty providing for mutual security. The third commandment concerned unfolding a powerful military and reconnaissance grouping for combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The fourth commandment was related to joint projects and scientific research in space, medicine, ecology and other spheres. The fifth commandment was about foundation of a full-scale American University in Moscow in compliance with an agreement dated 1992 with President George H. W. Bush. The sixth commandment has to do with establishing Internet contacts between schools and universities in the US and Russia and researching joint distance education programs. The seventh is linked with a considerable increase in the scale of cultural and educational exchanges. The eighth regards support for democratic parties, movements, non-government organizations and mass media. The ninth commandment is devoted to normalizing the process of issuing U.S. visas for Russia's citizens, since now people are humiliated in the US embassy in Moscow. Finally, the tenth commandment concerned abolition of laws, discriminating Russia and impeding on bilateral business and trade relations. Moreover, we have been struggling for restructuring Russia's debt to the West into investments. We think that the USSR's debt hovering over Russia should be reinvested in the business. The fact that Russia's debt to the US - $6 billion will be invested in the projects supposed to provide security of nuclear installations is our first victory. We need to push on Germany, the UK and France in order they do the same. Question: Could rapprochement between Russia and the US make Russia simply a political appendage and a source of raw materials? Lozansky: Nobody is calling on Russia to become a "younger brother." We are speaking about equal partnership in specific projects. It is true that the volume of production of Russia's economy is some 5-7% of the US economy, but Russia avails itself with huge potentials of manpower and other kinds of resources. Do the French or the British feel insulted by the fact that the United States has a more powerful economy? Jointly with the US, Russia can resolve serious problems. Now the US has almost accomplished the job - instead of the Russians, since a year ago the Talibs increased their activity in Tajikistan and Chechnya. An attack on extremists should have been made earlier, but Russia would not have coped with it. America has helped Russia to protect its southern borders. Osama bin Laden gave great impetus to rapprochement between our states. We cannot permit ourselves to miss this opportunity. Question: What further plans do you have? Lozansky: A large forum will be held in America in April. We want to have a debate about the ABM Treaty there. By the way, presidential adviser Igor Sergeyev supported us - but said that he would not want the Americans to deal in high technologies while Russians are given a hammer and nails because the US does not trust us. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that they needed guarantees that Russia would not be selling joint developments to Iran or any other states via the back door. These issues are complicated and we need to hear the opinions of experts. Question: Do you visit Russia often? Lozansky: Regularly. We have an apartment here, and my wife does not want to leave Russia at all. I would rather move to Russia also, but my occupation requires my presence in the United States. My work is there, while my soul is here in Russia. (Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin) ******** #9 Jamestown Foundation January 30, 2002 RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXTOLS U.S.-RUSSIA ANTITERROR ALLIANCE. An op-ed piece written by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and published in the January 27 edition of the New York Times appeared to mark one more effort by Moscow to stem a slow erosion in relations between the two countries that has developed since U.S. military operations in Afghanistan began to wind down last month and the Bush administration moved to distance itself from the Kremlin. The Ivanov piece is, at the same time, a plaintive call for the United States to recognize what Moscow claims are the many benefits that might accrue from a commitment by both sides to maintain the close partnership that developed between Washington and Moscow in the months that immediately followed the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Ivanov's opinion piece comes at an important time. Strategic arms reduction talks, which have grown increasingly problematic, were set to resume between the two sides in Washington yesterday. At the same time, Russian and NATO officials met in Brussels this week to continue negotiations aimed at formulating the parameters of a new, post-September 11 NATO-Russia relationship. Both sides hope to reach agreement on the new relationship by this spring, but talks have been complicated by the fact that Washington has recently distanced itself from a British plan that would give Moscow a greater voice in alliance affairs. At the same time, Moscow and Washington are gearing up for the next summit meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush, which is expected to take place in May or June. The two sides hope at that time to finalize a strategic arms reduction agreement, but a number of other important international and bilateral issues will also undoubtedly be on the discussion agenda. Those are likely to include not only NATO-Russia relations, but as well the ongoing war against terrorism, the revision of UN policy toward Iraq and, possibly, continuing U.S. annoyance over Iranian-Russian defense ties. All these issues are potentially problematic, and the next several months are likely to determine whether the spring summit cements a Russian-U.S. relationship that, as was the case when the two presidents last met, is based largely on partnership and cooperation, or whether reemerging tensions will return bilateral ties closer to the adversarial relationship that existed in the early months of the Bush presidency. In his January 27 piece Ivanov is clearly urging that the Bush administration choose the partnership option. Indeed, while the Russian foreign minister appears to break little new ground in his opinion piece, the Kremlin-connected Strana.ru website suggested on January 28 that Ivanov had in fact exceeded earlier Kremlin proposals by outlining a grand strategic framework for future Russian-U.S. cooperation. At the heart of the new Ivanov proposal, the Strana.ru commentary said, is a call for the entire international security system to be rebuilt on the basis of the existing U.S.-led antiterror coalition. Indeed, in his piece Ivanov does compare the current international security environment to the one which existed in the aftermath of World War II. And just as (in Ivanov's view) "the victorious countries deliberated [at that time] on creating mechanisms of international cooperation that would prevent another such catastrophe," so today "one of the most urgent tasks is the strengthening of the world antiterrorist coalition." Ivanov goes on to write both that "the present solidarity against terrorism provides a unique chance to begin constructing a system of international security adequate to address the 21st-century threats," and that "Russian-American cooperation can play the decisive role in creating such a system." Ivanov's proposal is, of course, not quite what it seems. Although Strana.ru insinuates that Ivanov's ideas represent a tribute to the United States and an acknowledgement by Moscow of the leading role that the U.S.-constructed antiterrorist coalition should play in world politics, the Russian minister's real goal appears to be aimed at reining in what Moscow believes to be the Bush administration's increasingly unilateralist tendencies. That is, the features of the antiterror coalition which Ivanov is advocating are those by which the United States bound itself to act with the world community on a multilateral basis. Moscow's fear is that the United States, having declared a victory in Afghanistan, will now go its own way in pursuing a wider war against international terrorism. This could lead to both a further enhancement of U.S. independence and global dominance, and an obvious diminution not only in Russia's role within the antiterrorist grouping, but on the world stage more generally. Thus, Ivanov reprises long-standing Russian calls for authority over the antiterrorist war to be vested in the UN: "Common sense suggests that work in this direction would be better conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and on the basis of strengthening international law." He also tries to make the case that a Russian-U.S. partnership would constitute one of the pillars of the new international security system he is proposing. "It is widely recognized," he writes, "that Russian-American relations have been and remain one of the main factors determining the state of world politics, especially on security issues." Ivanov appears even to acknowledge that the NATO military alliance has a key role to play in this new world order, but he balances that seeming concession to Washington with the qualification that this would be a NATO which cooperates closely with Russia. Not surprisingly, Ivanov links his call for making Russian-U.S. cooperation the basis of an enduring antiterrorist coalition with a plea for Washington to meet Moscow half way in the two countries' ongoing strategic arms talks. Ivanov lightly criticizes the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and goes on to suggest that "far-reaching understandings on disarmament with the United States, based on principles of mutual trust, predictability and transparency" could become another of the pillars of international strategic stability and the new world order that he has just outlined. Here, Ivanov is making the case, of course, for the proposals that Russian negotiators have brought to their strategic arms talks with the United States. Those include continued observance of the ABM Treaty, deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons which are formalized in a bilateral treaty, and a U.S. commitment both to destroy rather than store nuclear warheads scheduled for decommissioning and to forego any resumption of nuclear weapons testing (New York Times, January 27; Strana.ru, January 28). That Moscow is prepared, at least rhetorically, to dig in its heels on these issues was suggested in a document published this week that adopted a notably more strident tone than Ivanov's January 27 op-ed. That document was a statement, released by Ivanov's own Foreign Ministry on the evening of January 28, which strongly criticized U.S. strategic disarmament policies. It charged, among other things, that Washington's approach on these issues "objectively makes the situation more complicated and deals a blow to the international order in this field." The contrasting tones used in Ivanov's op-ed and the Foreign Ministry statement suggest that Moscow remains hopeful of cementing a partnership with the United States, but that it is simultaneously growing increasingly uncomfortable with what it perceives to be the Bush Administration's hard-line stance on a host of arms control and other international security issues (Interfax, AFP, January 29). ****** #10 Rossiiskaya Gazeta No. 18 January 30, 2002 [translation for personal use only] HOW SHOULD RUSSIA REACT TO US WITHDRAWAL FROM ABM TREATY? By Sergei SHISHKAREV, deputy chairman of the State Duma committee on international affairs The numerous experts in Moscow are demonstrating their usual, skin-deep and "down-to-earth" reaction to the official US notification of withdrawal from the ABM treaty. They mostly describe the decision as a slap or kick at Russia. The Americans used our friendship at the initial stage of the counter-terror operation but have decided to show the new ally his place now, they say. And suggest that we should react by mounting new warheads on our missiles, and so on. They also hope other countries, above all China, will react forcefully to the US decision. However, these "wise men" overlook the tectonic processes in the USA that make the task of NMD deployment unavoidable and imminent, a question of life and death for the Bush administration. I don't mean military matters at all. The US administration has a realistic view of the defence abilities of the NMD system and the military-technical problems accompanying its deployment. But these aspects are not the key ones for the implementation of the project now and will hardly be so in the future. The US administration is using NMD to resolve quite different problems. To begin with, NMD is the only thing Bush can offer to the people within the framework of the programme of strengthening US security. It is apparent that the public is waiting for the president to take large-scale and inordinate measures to strengthen the security of the nation and the people after September 11. And George Bush more than once pledged to take such measures in an attempt to calm down public convulsions, but NMD was mentioned as only a part of a comprehensive national security programme. The military operation in Afghanistan was a great propaganda boon but it proved a bad substitution for a comprehensive counter-terror programme of protecting the national US territory. This is how NMD was made the focus of the national idea of the protection of Americans from international challenges and risks. The public sees the immediate launching of the project as the solution to the security problem in the country as such. This is why the public will not accept any delay in the implementation of the NMD project. Because the people badly want security. Since there are no other ways of ensuring it, the US administration could do nothing other than make the decision on withdrawal despite Russian and Chinese protests. The ideological element of that decision is complemented with an even more important aspect - economic considerations. Allocations on the NMD project have been well nigh divided between the leading US military-industrial corporations. This major injection of state funds will brace up the withering US economy and is reasonably regarded by the US elite as the mainline of US development in the next few decades. This method of stimulating economic development in the USA has been successfully used more than once. Take Reagan's Star Wars, which the administration financed in the 1980s. It entailed mind-boggling budgetary injections into corporate economy and the research and technological results scored in the process were subsequently used to create a new economy for the country, which is now described as hi-tech. Budgetary allocations to the SDI programme ensured many years of economic growth and the US technological leadership in science-intensive industries in the 1990s. The US big business expects even greater kudos from NMD grants. The dwindling economic indices and the powerful pressure mounted by the national centres of power faced the Bush administration with a hard decision that buried the soft variant of withdrawing from the treaty. The US president must clearly show to the establishment that "the ball is rolling." The foreign policy consequences of the harsh withdrawal from the treaty, including the potential reply measures of Russia and China, are of secondary importance in this case. This explains the restrained reaction of the Russian leaders, including President Vladimir Putin, to that unilateral US step. The reply measures to the NMD project should not be military. We must admit at long last that the ensurance of national strategic security is no longer linked with mathematical diplomacy, meaning a simple calculation of missiles, warheads and so on. Russia's reply to the NMD challenge should be sought in the economic sphere. It should be based on the need to bridge the growing intellectual and technological gap between Russia and the USA by effectively using state resources for the development of Russian economy. ******