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CDI Russia Weekly #191 Contents   Plain Text

#7
Vek
No. 4
2002
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA TO SET TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
By Andrei RYABOV

Following the recent improvement in relations between Russia and the West resulting from the joint fight against terrorism, Russian foreign policy seems to be once again returning to its traditional priorities. Contacts with China have become more frequent. Moscow is attempting to stir up the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) at the time when the Central Asian countries, members of the SCO, are seriously considering the possibility of deploying American military bases on their territories for the long term. Moscow has also remembered that it has special relations with Iraq.

There might be important causes for all of this. Following the successful completion of the military operation in Afghanistan, the West has got noticeably colder towards Russia. The American administration does not want to tie its hands with serious obligations on strategic weapons cuts. The Chechen question and the need to negotiate with Maskhadov have been raised once again in the U.S. and EU countries. Influential overseas politicians are speaking increasingly louder, urging the U.S. to stay in Central Asia for the long term. The West has once again accused Russia of violating democratic freedoms in relation to the closure of TV-6 and the Pasko case. The opponents of rapprochement between Russia and the West have come to the forefront. With malicious pleasure, they say that they warned the Kremlin that as soon as the Americans and their allies had attained their goals, they would stop taking Russia's interests into account. In this situation, official Moscow should show both international and domestic public opinion that the sudden changes in Western policies are of no concern for it. Russia is ready to respond to them with its own changes, changes that would not be welcomed in the West. You want to establish military bases in the Central Asia, then on our initiative, Central Asian countries' foreign ministers will sign a declaration in support of the fight against international terrorism exclusively under the aegis of the UN. Your relations with the Arab world are deteriorating, but we are ready to start establishing contacts even with the Persian Gulf monarchist regimes. Note that the main financial assistance to Chechen separatists is coming from there, and Chechen rebel commanders find asylum there. You consider the possibility of a military operation against Iraq, so we receive the Iraqi foreign minister. Even Russia's attitude to neutral Turkmenistan is changing as we speak. Turkmenistan was viewed as a certain obstacle to Russia's domination in Central Asia. Today, its neutrality is a stumbling block to the establishment of American control over the region.

Superficially, this is quite logical. You treat us with no respect, and we respond in kind. The problem is that this will hardly frighten anyone. However, this can definitely intensify negative attitudes to Russia in the West, which we want to avoid now with world oil prices - the core factor in the success of the Russian economy - remaining unstable. In addition, our major partners in the East - China and India - are not eager to ruin their relations with the U.S. and the West. The Chinese, for instance, cooperate with Russia within the SCO and sign calls to fight international terrorism only within the UN framework and under the auspices of the UN. But simultaneously they forcefully lobby their interests in the U.S. without consulting Moscow. During the latest Indian-Pakistani crisis, the Indians showed their might so soundly that this convinced the U.S. to lift bans on delivering certain kinds of weapons to this country. Even Iran in a certain situation can potentially sway toward the West. Thus, no real confrontation with the West is a possibility and an imitation of confrontation is likely to impress no one.

A policy based on the premise "we will do it to spite you" was used on several occasions in the last decade and did not result in anything serious. One lesson though can be learned from this policy. Unlike in chess, in politics, especially in foreign policy, one should never play black, which means only to reply to the other side's moves. In politics, one needs to first set one's own priorities and decide who one wants to be. Do we want to be part of the West? If so, we will have to get used to the role of a "younger brother." Do we want to be the "New East"? Then we should think about how to attract to our side the elites in the Eastern countries, the majority of which also want a piece of the globalisation pie. Do we want to be the bridge between the West and East? It is an option, but it does not allow full independence. To become an independent powerful centre we need to upgrade the economy and relieve the country from its dependency on oil prices and clear the enormous foreign debt. Only after Russia determines its fundamental priorities will it be able to develop various long-term foreign policy strategies.

 

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