CDI Headlines Hot Spots Research Topics CDI Publications Television Search
CDI Mission CDI Staff CDI Expertise Paid CDI Internships Support CDI
CDI Home
CDI Russia Weekly Home

RW 2003 Master Index   Iraq: RW 2003             


 
Johnson's Russia List
 
 
CDI Russia Weekly Home Page
 
 
CDI Russia Weekly 2003
 
 
CDI Russia Weekly Archives
 
 
Search the CDI Russia Weekly
 
 
Links
 
 
 

CDI Russia Weekly #191 Contents   Plain Text

#5
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
January 30, 2002
Big Brother Dumped for $1 Billion
In the rivalry for influence in Central Asia, Washington comes up with economic arguments while Moscow can offer nothing but sincere friendship
By Mikhail Khodaryonok
therussianissues.com

Despite statements that U.S. presence in Central Asia is temporary, Americans are not going to leave Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the near future.

No small role is played here by the economic and military expediency of U.S. presence in the region. The struggle against terrorists in Afghanistan is going to last quite a while. Although the U.S. has accomplished the greater part of its tasks in neutralizing the Taliban quickly enough, small air attacks will continue for a long time to come. It is not expedient to keep aircraft carrying multipurpose groups in the Arabian Sea for a few sorties. It would be far better to use the Central Asian republics' infrastructure and achieve a number of military and political goals at the same time.

The Americans have gained a foothold at the Central Asian airbases in Khanabad and Kokaida (Uzbekistan), in Dushanbe and Kulyab (Tajikistan) and in Manas (Kyrghyzstan). In strategic terms, these are very useful airfields, allowing you to keep the whole of the Central Asian region under control. Big sums have already been spent repairing and equipping the runways of the former Soviet airbases to U.S. standards. The modernization of each of them, with the exception of the Kyrgyzian Manas, cost the Pentagon 200 to 250 million dollars. A considerable amount of airdrome technical, navigational, intelligence and rescue equipment has been airlifted there. Although there are no attack planes at the air bases, they could be delivered in the near future. U.S. military transport aircraft, rescue service helicopters, and unmanned reconnaissance planes are in the Central Asian airdromes today. Current plans are to create reserves of aircraft fuel, arms and ammunition there.

The U.S. policy with regard to the military bases leased on the territory of other states is quite clear. As a rule, the Pentagon settles accounts without fail and on time. The money is a useful addition to the local budgets. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan will benefit from rent payment for the infrastructure if the entire base is rented or for parking military aircraft at dual-purpose airports. Separate payment will be made for take-off and landing and, finally, the Americans will have to pay for using the air corridors. The use of parking areas and takeoff/landing operations might cost the Pentagon several thousand dollars. In particular, when using the Manas airdrome in Kyrgyzstan the payment for each take-off and landing is $7,000 to $7,500; this payment concerns only the Manas airbase. Payment is decided at each airbase individually.

Of course, these figures may be revised in the future. Americans and their West European allies will have to pay much less, say, for using air corridors over Central Asia. On the whole, however, the U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will result in a big addition to the republics' budgets. The intensity of flights from the Central Asian airfields to the active zone of the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan was relatively small - 3 to 5 flights a week. This figure has been reduced as of late. So, at this stage of the operation the Central Asian republics could gain a few million dollars from U.S. and Western flights. If the spending on modernization were added, it would seem that U.S. input has exceeded one billion dollars.

Russia today can offer its Central Asian partners nothing but eternal friendship. Therefore, choosing long-term foreign policy priorities is no longer a problem for the Central Asian republics.

 

BACK TO THE TOP    #191 CONTENTS    NEXT SECTION


 
CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION
1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036-2109
Ph: (202) 332-0600 ยท Fax: (202) 462-4559
info@cdi.org