CDI Russia Weekly-#190 25 January 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Press freedom a non-issue for Russians. 2. Interfax: Experts positively assess President Bush's first year in office. 3. Moscow Times: Alla Startseva, Stats Say 2001 Good But Growth Slacking. 4. Versty: Evgeny Mikhilov, THE ART OF WIPING THINGS OUT. Russia feels deceived by the United States. 5. RIA Novosti: MOSCOW ON WASHINGTON'S STATEMENTS ABOUT TEMPORARY PRESENCE OF US MILITARY UNITS IN CENTRAL ASIA. 6. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Sergey Ptichkin and Aleksey Chichkin, From Where Russia is Clearly Visible. (Russia 'Encircled' by US, NATO When Afghan Operation Over) 7. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Old treaties or wages? The Russian Army’s real priorities. 8. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: NO BIG CHANGES PLANNED IN SIZE OF RUSSIAN ARMS BUDGET. 9. RIA Novosti: UNFRIENDLY TOWARD RUSSIA, SAYS FOREIGN MINISTRY AS U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVES CHECHEN SEPARATIST. 10. RFE/RL: Jean-Christophe Peuch, Council Of Europe Calls On Moscow To Improve Conduct In Chechnya. 11. US Department of State Foreign Media Reaction: U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY: SLEIGHT OF HAND' DOESN'T ESCAPE FOREIGN NOTICE. (Russian press) ******* #1 Asia Times January 24, 2002 Press freedom a non-issue for Russians By Sergei Blagov MOSCOW - When Russia's last remaining independent national television station, TV6, abruptly went off the air recently, the event was met by a somewhat muted public response. Thanks to a court order, Russia's Press Ministry abruptly shut down TV6. At midnight, a talk-show host on TV6 was interrupted in mid-sentence and replaced with multi-colored test-pattern stripes. Power was shut off at the studio and telephones and Internet links were cut, TV6 general director Yevgeny Kiselyov said. The order called for the Press Ministry to suspend TV6's license immediately, as required under a court ruling on January 11 liquidating the station. The end of TV6 marks the first time all news agencies have been under Kremlin control since the fall of the Soviet Union. Kiselyov said TV6 will contest the court order. "Lawyers are already working on it," he said. In recent days, President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and Press Minister Mikhail Lesin have all publicly stated their support for the TV6 channel and its staff. The demise of TV6 was also criticized by the United States and German governments. Kiselyov continued to argue that the Kremlin was behind TV6's demise. But the Russian government does not see any political agenda in the TV6 closure. Alexey Volin, the cabinet deputy chief of stuff, was quoted as saying, "It was just an accomplishment of a court order." Lesin, who gave the order to switch off TV6, said that a tender for the channel will be held on March 27. A failure on the part of TV6's existing team to secure a broadcasting license under the tender will bode ill for the rebirth of the channel. Meanwhile, speculation continues that the government-imposed shutdown was politically motivated. Guennady Seleznyov, Speaker of the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, says TV6's shutdown was caused by the badly thought-out confrontational moves of the company's management. A pension fund for Russia's biggest oil company, LUKOIL, held a 15 percent stake in the station and, under an obscure and now-rescinded law allowing a minority shareholder to ask for liquidation in the event of bankruptcy, won a court case to close the station. By pulling the plug, authorities silenced a team that, first at NTV and then at TV6, dared to criticize military tactics in Chechnya and expose alleged corruption scandals in the Kremlin. NTV journalists refused to accept government pressure to tone down its high-profile protests against the government, arguing it was illegal and had the ulterior motive of establishing political censorship over the station. Consequently, the NTV logo in the left corner of the TV screen was stamped by the word "protest" in red letters. Early last year, NTV journalists seemingly enjoyed broad public support. A sanctioned rally in downtown Moscow to support NTV attracted 10,000-15,000 people, and thousands came to Ostankino, Russia's main television headquarters, to support NTV. However, public protests failed to change the fate of NTV. After NTV's takeover by state-controlled natural-gas monopoly Gazprom, most NTV staff moved to TV6. But TV6's owner, billionaire and former Kremlin insider Boris Berezovsky, is unpopular among ordinary Russians, and many consider him a relic left over from the days of former president Boris Yeltsin. Indeed, many blame the now-exiled Berezovsky as the reason the Kremlin's unwanted attention fell on the station in the first place, citing him as an example of the "oligarchs" that Putin declared had to be removed from media control. As a result, it's no big wonder that many Russians tend to shrug off the TV6 shutdown. According to an opinion poll by ROMIR-Gallup International, 26 percent of the Muscovites polled said they viewed the conflict over TV6 as an economic dispute. Only 15 percent of those polled regarded the conflict as the Kremlin's onslaught on press freedom. Therefore, in the eyes of many Russians the media-freedom agenda may have become less important and relevant. Thus, while the fate of the only independent national television station has been decided, it is unclear whether the other media outlets that dared to challenge the Kremlin's policies can survive in Russia. (Inter Press Service) ******* #2 Experts positively assess President Bush's first year in office MOSCOW. Jan 20 (Interfax) - Leading Russian political scientists have positively assessed the results of U.S. President George W. Bush's first year in office. Chairman of the Presidium of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy Sergei Karaganov told Interfax on Sunday that "no one could predict a year ago, that Bush could turn out to be such a successful politician." "The U.S. president has demonstrated resolve and is acting consistently in the struggle against terrorism, which has brought him popularity. He managed to display the same rigorous consistency on the domestic scene, as well," Karaganov said. Among Bush's main achievements in foreign affairs Karaganov named the development of the United States' relations with Western Europe. "U.S. allies in Europe have calmed down. At first they were afraid of this Texas cowboy," he said. The United States' relations with China did not deteriorate "despite the wish of individual Republicans to view China as an enemy," he said, adding that a warming in relations with Russia is in fact a "superficial friendship," although it was also an achievement of his first year in office. This year Bush demonstrated "unexpected flexibility," Karaganov said. He noted, however, that "the first year cannot guarantee that this will continue in the future." Today, the Bush administration is the strongest in U.S. history. But the conditions in which Bush is forced to work are also the most difficult," Karaganov said in conclusion. Director of the Institute of Political Studies Sergei Markov's opinion of Bush's first year in office is also positive. He said Bush came to power "without clear legitimacy, following a humiliating vote counting derided by the whole world." "Whereas a year ago, most Americans still preferred Albert Gore, a Democratic candidate, a year later, we can see unconditional support for Bush as a strong leader," Markov said. Unlike Karaganov, Markov described relations between Russia and the U.S. as "warm relations, raised to a radically new level." He agreed that the terrorist attack against the U.S. on September 11 put Bush in a difficult position and practically plunged him into a state of shock. "But he has coped with the situation with honor, making and implementing appropriate decisions. The U.S. has won the first round of the war against international terrorism," Markov said. ****** #3 Moscow Times January 24, 2002 Stats Say 2001 Good But Growth Slacking By Alla Startseva Staff Writer The State Statistics Committee on Wednesday issued a slew of final statistics for last year that largely confirmed what was already known -- 2001 was a good year for the economy. But it wasn't as good as the year before, and some worrying trends emerged, analysts said. Figures released by the committee showed that economic growth slowed in five core sectors -- industry, construction, agriculture, transport and retail -- to 5.7 percent, compared to 10.2 percent in 2000. Industrial output grew 4.9 percent to 5.88 trillion rubles ($192 billion), missing the official target of 5.2 percent, but still one of the highest rates in the world. The second quarter showed the greatest gain over the same period in 2000, when industrial production grew 5.9 percent. However, production growth slowed continuously in the last quarter, with the December figure just 2.6 percent above the previous year. "We can see here some negative trends as industrial growth slowed sharply at the end of the year. This trend might continue in January and slow economic growth as a whole," said Vladimir Tikhomirov, an economist at NIKoil. The government forecasted gross domestic product growth of 4 percent at the start of 2001 but eventually raised that estimate to 5 percent to 5.5 percent. The committee is expected to release final GDP data for 2001 in March. Another worrying trend is the sharp reduction in export volumes, Tikhomirov said. The visible foreign trade surplus in the first 11 months grew 5.4 percent to $47.101 billion, compared to $55.367 billion a year ago. Exports declined 0.5 percent to $94.886 billion while imports rose 19.5 percent to $47.785 billion in January-November. "Even if exports stay on the same level while imports continue growing it will lead to a reduction of the trade balance and the balance of payments," he said. However, Alexei Moiseyev, an economist at Renaissance Capital, said such an increase in imports and decrease in exports is good for the economy. "Exports will exceed imports for a while more, so the import growth will put healthy pressure on local producers, if it is not too sharp," said Moiseyev. "The Russian economy showed that it reacts rather flexibly to international situations," Moiseyev added. Real disposable incomes rose by an estimated 5.9 percent in 2001, and real wages were up 19.8 percent. Excluding inflation, wages rose 45.5 percent. Another bright spot was in agriculture, where production grew 6.8 percent in monetary terms to 1 trillion rubles ($32.7 billion). Russia harvested 85 million tons of grain in clean weight last year, or 29.7 percent more than in 2000, although it harvested less corn, millet, buckwheat and rice. Other statistics released include: Capital investment grew 8.7 percent to 1.6 trillion rubles. Freight turnover grew 3.1 percent (4.9 percent by rail). Retail sales rose 10.8 percent. Consumer price inflation was 18.6 percent. Producer price inflation was 10.7 percent. Unemployment shrank 9.1 percent to 6.4 million, 9 percent of the workforce. ***** #4 Versty January 24, 2002 THE ART OF WIPING THINGS OUT Russia feels deceived by the United States Author: Evgeny Mikhilov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS APPARENTLY DRAWING TO A CLOSE. NOW IT LOOKS LIKE THE FRIENDSHIP PRESIDENT BUSH PROMISED RUSSIA JUST A SHORT TIME AGO IS CHANGING TO ANOTHER CHILL IN RELATIONS; THE US NO LONGER NEEDS RUSSIA'S HELP, AND IS REVERTING TO ITS PREVIOUS ATTITUDES. According to many analysts, the operation the United States started in Afghanistan is drawing to a close; although the declared goals remained unfulfilled. The fighters against terrorism have only captured a tenth of Al-Qaeda guerillas, while the rest have departed for destinations unknown or gone into hiding, closely monitoring further developments in the country. Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar Muhammad, with their inner circles of fighters, are also hiding somewhere - most probably beyond the borders of Afghanistan. So now, when the US has gained all it could from Russia, American "hawks" have decided that any closer relations between our countries would only impede the realization of long-term plans for expansion of US influence around the world. For example, Russia is absolutely opposed to any missile strikes on Iraq or Iran; a position which cannot get much support in the US. This problem is quite likely to become the touchstone in our relations in the near future. The fact that its usually obedient NATO partners have supported Moscow has been a very unpleasant surprise for the US. The active development of Central Asia by the Americans is quite likely to create a stumbling block too, for this is the Russia's traditional zone of influence. In spite of previous agreements about a troop presence here being temporary, Washington is settling into the military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan seriously and for the long term. The present situation somewhat resembles the post-World War II events, when the Americans turned from our allies into enemies very quickly. "Blocking" the Russian initiative for a transition to a qualitatively new level in relations between Russia and NATO appears quite symptomatic. It was the US delegation that spoke out against creating a new Russia-NATO body at the meeing of NATO foreign ministers. The Russian party's proposal was to give Russia a vote in questions of counteracting international terrorism and peacekeeping operations beyond the NATO responsibility zone. As a result, Russia only received a consulting vote, which carries no obligations. Not that long ago, President George Bush officially announced that the United States will withdraw from the ABM Treaty signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1972. After the September terrorist acts, the U.S. initiative for a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was pushed into the background - there was more important business on the agenda. Washington even seemed to be revising its position on this issue. Now, when the peak of the anti-terrorist operation has passed and dependence on Russia's assistance is declining, Bush has decided to carry out his plans as previously intended. Even though this move by the United States is being condemned in Europe, as well as in Russia. Recent revelations about the Pentagon's plans for dismantled nuclear warheads could lead to additional strain in Russian-American relations. The US is not going to destroy all of the warheads it cuts. In the words of James Crouch, the U.S. Defense Secretary's aide on international security, some of them will be stored "in case of a drastic change in the international situation". The lack of scruples in the US administration is seen in the very approach to the calculation of nuclear weapons subject to cuts. In the view of Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey of the Brooklyn Institute, President Bush only speaks about the warheads that are deployed; he is keeping quiet about those in the process of being inspected or repaired. Thus, about 300 nuclear warheads remain entirely unregistered, which completely contradicts the commonly accepted standards of registration of existing arsenals. Well, fine words about strategic alliances are one thing, while the actual struggle for spheres of influence - that's another matter. (Translated by P. Pikhnovsky) ******* #5 MOSCOW ON WASHINGTON'S STATEMENTS ABOUT TEMPORARY PRESENCE OF US MILITARY UNITS IN CENTRAL ASIA MOSCOW, January 24. /RIA Novosti correspondent/. Moscow has "no reasons to doubt repeated statements by American representatives, including high-ranking ones, that presence of US units in Central Asia will be temporary and transparent", said Alexander Yakovenko, an official Foreign Ministry spokesman, commenting on remarks by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. The other day, Armitage, in an interview with a group of European journalists, said that the US does not seek a long military presence in that region and openly discusses this question with the Russian side. According to Yakovenko, these remarks "follow the spirit of the understanding existing between the Russian and US leaderships". Moscow firmly believes that Russia and the US are no longer opponents. "What is more, we are now jointly deciding a common problem - how to put an end to the threat of terrorism and extremism, stemming from the territory of Afghanistan," the official spokesman emphasised. It is in this context, according to him, that Moscow views the temporary American military presence in the Central Asian region. "Naturally, these problems are the subject of dialogue at various levels, " Yakovenko concluded. ******* #6 Russia 'Encircled' by US, NATO When Afghan Operation Over Rossiyskaya Gazeta 22 January 2002 [translation for personal use only] Report by Sergey Ptichkin and Aleksey Chichkin: "From Where Russia is Clearly Visible" It seems that Moscow has decided to delay its departure from the Cuban signals intelligence station at Lourdes. In any event, the West European and Latin American media are literally overflowing with reports on the subject. Furthermore, in their opinion the main reason for this decision is a decision of the Pentagon and NATO to set up base almost indefinitely in Central Asia including Kazakhstan. One way or another Russia, like the entire former USSR, remains encircled by a dense ring of military and intelligence-gathering installations belonging to the North Atlantic alliance. And could it be that the Russian military will again be able to "get back" the Vietnamese naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in this connection?... As Rossiyskaya Gazeta has reported, the main reason for the evacuation from Lourdes and Cam Ranh Bay is that the financial costs of these bases, amounting in total to $400 million-$450 million a year, are beyond the reach of the Russian Defense Ministry. Bear in mind that our defense department's entire budget for the year, and we stress the word entire, barely amounts to $250 million. The money factor is very much in evidence therefore. But there is another aspect too. "When closing down the Russian military base in Cuba Russia is entitled to expect similar moves in response from the United States," -- this opinion was expressed at the end of last year by Vladimir Kulakov, deputy chairman of the Federation Council Defense Committee. He recalled that since 1998 the US Globus-2 anti-missile defense system radar station has been in operation in Northern Norway, in other words, close to the Norwegian-Russian border, and has an operational range of 35,000 km. This easily covers the territory not only of Russia but of the entire former USSR and Mongolia and... almost the whole of China! "By closing down our military base in Cuba we are removing one of the weapons of the Cold War. And we are entitled to expect that the US Globus-2 radar station in Norway, for example, could also be scrapped," V. Kulakov suggested. Almost with one voice the Western leaders welcomed the "evacuation" of Lourdes and Cam Ranh Bay. But at the same time there was not a word about counter moves. However, these moves were not long in coming, it has to be said, they are part of the same plot, so to speak: Since December last year the US and NATO troops, first and foremost the air force, have been making full use of the former Soviet military bases in Central Asia leaving aside Turkmenistan (Manas, Kulyab, Khanabad, Qarshi, Chirchik, and a number of others) -- the terrorist acts in New York happened "just in the nick of time." In this region, according to the recent estimates of Russian, Iranian, and Chinese military experts, 8,000-10,000 US and NATO officers and men have already set up base leaving aside what we could call the "dual-purpose" advisers. As the Pentagon claims, this is temporary and will last for the period of the operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, Elizabeth Jones, the US assistant Secretary of State, in a recent address on Capitol Hill revealed what might be called a completely different set of cards -- that of a long term if not indefinite US policy in the south and southeast of the former USSR: "When the Afghan conflict is over we will not leave Central Asia. We have long-term plans and interests in this region and... its countries will be given assistance not only in exchange for concrete steps aimed at the acceleration of reforms." This assistance, which is designed to last at least 10 years, will exceed $11 billion according to the official US figures. But what is there to be surprised that in this? After all, back in the mid-1990s Central Asia was officially declared to be a sphere of US vital interests and since 1999 has been included in the zone of responsibility of the US troops in the Persian Gulf.... Current US policy in the region, it seems, baffles not only Russia but also China. In addition, it could also wreck the CIS Collective Security Treaty and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is not hard to see the kind of strategic situation that could develop for our country and for the Russia-Belarus Union if a similar process begins from the Western outskirts of the former USSR, that is, after the Baltic countries join NATO... In addition to this the strikes against Afghanistan have developed into mass landings by US and British troops in Turkey, Cyprus, the Arabian peninsula, Japan, and South Korea. According to information from the London and Delhi strategic studies institutes the NATO member countries' naval presence in the aforementioned areas between March and December last year increased by 50 percent while the air force presence was approximately doubled. The number of NATO special operation troops in these regions and countries has more than doubled. But what about the other ends of the earth? According to the latest estimates from foreign sources there are more than 50 US and other NATO member countries' military and intelligence-gathering facilities in the Arctic and Northern Europe. Most of these facilities are based in Northern Norway and Iceland, which are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, Danish-owned Greenland (Denmark is also a NATO member), and on the Norwegian islands to adjacent to Spitsbergen. In addition the US and British radar and other systems in the region of the North Sea and the Sea of Norway "light up" the entire former USSR from one end to the other linking with a similar network in Alaska, Northern Canada, and Japan. From south to north similar monitoring functions have been entrusted to the US installations in Turkey which is also a NATO participant. Incidentally around 10 US military bases, mainly air force and intelligence-gathering bases, are located there with the greatest number concentrated in eastern and southeast Turkey, in other words close to the border with the former USSR. More than any other country, Japan is "stuffed" with a great many US military installations: According to the latest figures there are 65 of them here, over 30 of them on Okinawa. Around 80 percent of them are air force bases but the closer you get to the Kuril islands and Sakhalin the greater the number of US naval and intelligence-gathering facilities that there are on the neighboring Japanese soil. The total number of US servicemen in the Land of the Rising Sun now exceeds 70,000. There are quite a few US bases with intelligence-gathering facilities in South Korea too -- around 30 bases serviced by 25,000 US officers and men. Washington has similar facilities in Taiwan and the Philippines too and they also being set up in Eastern Europe and the Balkans -- on the eve of the entry into NATO of the countries there. Is it likely that the Transcaucasus is next in line?... In short, Russia and the entire former USSR are not only encircled by a ring of US and NATO military and intelligence-gathering bases, just like 50 years ago. These bases have also "taken root" in Central Asia. Clearly in case of eventualities, is it not?... ****** #7 The Russia Journal January 18-24, 2002 Old treaties or wages? The Russian Army’s real priorities By ALEXANDER GOLTS How will relations develop between President Vladimir Putin and the Army? The question came up repeatedly at the end of last year when analysts were busy discussing the consequences of the Russian decision to abandon its spying base at Lourdes in Cuba and the Kremlin’s calm reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But the reality is that these foreign-policy issues can throw shadows over Putin’s relations with a certain part of the military elite, whose advice he has taken to ignoring lately. The soldiers who shoulder the burden in Chechnya and across the country from Kaliningrad to Sakhalin are indifferent to the fate of the ABM Treaty. It’s not the Kremlin’s defense and foreign policy that shape the president’s image for the army’s rank and file. As in the days of the ancient Roman emperors, officers’ concerns are for matters closer to their hearts – how long the war in rebellious Chechnya will continue? Will there be enough money to feed the soldiers and teach them the art of war? The amount of money servicemen receive does more than anything else to determine how they view the president. In this respect, the situation isn’t promising. Although the defense budget increased last year, servicemen haven’t seen their wages rise. Defense Ministry officials have announced that servicemen will get raises in January. But it’s already evident that there hasn’t been any real increase at all. Deputy Defense Minister Lyubov Kudelina told journalists that the increase concerned not wages themselves, but "premiums." A new premium has been introduced for officers commanding subdivisions, from regiment commanders down to platoon commanders. The premium for difficult and intensive military service is also to be increased by 20 percent. But the amounts in question are miserly. The "commander’s premium," for example, comes to 200 rubles to 500 rubles a month. Even going by Kudelina’s optimistic forecasts, servicemen’s wages will rise by 15 percent, which is less than last year’s inflation level. By Russian law, servicemen’s wages are supposed to be indexed for inflation, but the government has conveniently chosen to forget about this. Now the Defense Ministry is trying to convince servicemen that their living standards will rise on July 1. This is the date when military wages are to be made equivalent to wages for civil servants. According to Kudelina, officers’ wages will rise two to two-and-a-half times. So, it would seem it’s only a question of a little patience before officers begin to live the good life. But rather than rejoicing, officers are making calculations for the future. This is because with the wage rise comes the loss of two benefits. First, they will now have to pay income tax. Second, they will now pay housing and utilities costs. Even Defense Ministry officials say that wages will rise by no more than 40-60 percent in real terms, and that is without taking inflation into account. This is not the kind of improvement in living standards that Putin had promised the military. This is all the stranger as it comes when government officials are all talking about unprecedented economic growth. Unlike in past years, the Defense Ministry not only received all the money it was promised in 2001, it also got an extra $20 billion to cover costs linked to the war in Chechnya and the operation to raise the Kursk. What’s more, the defense budget for 2002 has more than doubled compared to 1999. A more interesting question is where this money went. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that 60 billion rubles were spent on developing new arms. But attempts to ascertain what was developed and produced haven’t yielded any result. The worst expectations look confimed. A number of economists had said that Russia’s military-industrial complex all but didn’t exist anymore and that only huge orders could revive the whole chain of sub-contractors needed to produce modern military equipment. But this would take sums of $600 billion rather 60 billion rubles. As the state doesn’t have this kind of the money, the allocations it has made for development and production of new equipment are quite simply being stolen. The other "black hole" pointed out by Deputy Defense Minister Kudelina is increase in natural monopolies’ rates – railway freight, gas and electricity costs – that wasn’t provided for in the budget. The paradox is that, as the economy grows, these rates will continue to rise and will draw more and more money from the military budget. The problem then is less about lack of money. Mistaken political choices are in evidence here. Defense Secretary Sergei Ivanov and his generals realize that the Revolution in Military Affairs isn’t just some invention by Donald Rumsfeld. They are afraid of being left so far behind they’ll never be able to catch up. So they try to resolve the problem by throwing all the available funds into developing new military technology, assuming that the resulting cutting-edge equipment will be used by impoverished officers and semi-literate conscripts. The Russian military leadership refuses to understand that converting to a professional army is a precondition for a revolution in military affairs. But for that to become reality, soldiers have to receive decent wages. So far, the state is playing a game with officers, giving them money with one hand and taking it away with the other. But, perhaps there is something else at work, too – someone who doesn’t like Putin’s sharp turn to the West and is deliberately trying to drive a wedge between Putin and the officers. ****** #8 Jamestown Foundation Monitor January 23, 2002 NO BIG CHANGES PLANNED IN SIZE OF RUSSIAN ARMS BUDGET. President Vladimir Putin's promises to "civilianize" and reform the armed forces notwithstanding, the process by which Russia's defense budget is formulated has remained highly secretive. But if the figures now being circulated in the press are a reliable indication of the government's intentions, then it appears that Russia's uniformed personnel will not be the only element of the country's sprawling defense establishment likely to be left disappointed by the government's defense spending plans for 2002. Indeed, reports have indicated a considerable amount of resentment among military officers regarding what they feel is the Kremlin's failure to deliver on promises of pay hikes for 2002 (see the Monitor, January 7). Now, as figures emerge regarding the government's intentions with respect to procurement spending, it may be the turn of Russian arms makers to start feeling pinched. Government procurement will rise in 2002, but the modesty of the increase will ensure that defense enterprises are compelled to scramble for yet another year to keep afloat. What this means for the Russian military is that service chiefs can expect little in the way of new weaponry or equipment in 2002. What it means for the nation's arms manufacturers, however, may be more significant. Survival for many of them is likely to depend ever more on their ability to peddle arms to foreign customers. Hard figures on the details of Russian defense spending for 2002 are hard to come by, but a January 17 meeting of the Russian cabinet at which the defense order for this year was set has generated a number of Russian reports. And according to these reports, Russian spending on arms procurement will total 79 billion rubles in 2002, or about a forty percent increase over procurement figures for 2001. However impressive this might sound at first glance, however, initial Russian reports have been unanimous in asserting that the increase is not only modest, but that it will do little to help Russia's struggling defense industrial sector overcome the enormous budget shortfalls of the previous decade. In fact, the Kremlin appears to be sticking to an earlier military reform plan, under which significant increases in defense procurement are not to occur until at least 2005, and that apparently only under the condition that Russia's economic output more generally--and government revenues drawn from it--continues its steady rise. Meanwhile, the secrecy of the Russian defense budgeting process ensures that details will remain fuzzy regarding exactly how the government intends to direct those funds which have been allocated for procurement. One fact has apparently been made public, and that is that research and development work will continue this year to get the same portion of total procurement funding--42 percent--as it did last year. Earlier, there had been general indications that suggested Russia's ground--or conventional--forces would be a big winner in this year's procurement debate. That is because an intense political battle over Russian defense priorities ended last year with an apparent victory for those who supported a shift in priority funding from the country's strategic rocket troops (which, according to some reports, were getting as much as 80 percent of the defense order) to the country's bedraggled conventional forces. This shifting of funding priorities, moreover, was accompanied by a restructuring of the top Russian military command itself. An independent ground forces command was recreated as one of three service branches (along with the air and naval forces), and newly named Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Nikolai Kormiltsev was given pride of place over the other two service chiefs when he was also named as a Russian deputy defense minister. The extent to which the Ground Forces are benefiting from these reordered spending priorities is difficult to say, however. Kormiltsev has himself complained that his service is to get 28 percent of the Defense Ministry's budget this year, a figure well below the 40-50 percent that he claims it requires. And reports indicate that current plans continue to stipulate that the Ground Forces receive no new weaponry or military equipment until at least 2010. Comments by Russian officials, moreover, also suggest that procurement spending priorities will do little in the short run to benefit the ground forces. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov was quoted last week as saying that most of the 2002 defense order will be devoted to spending on aviation, communications, space equipment, and weapons (presumably upgrades of current hardware) for the ground troops and navy. He also hinted that the government was prioritizing development of a fifth generation military fighter plane. A leading Russian defense analyst, meanwhile, said that the government was expected this year to focus its procurement expenditures on modernization of Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, on research and development of new, unmanned aircraft, and on naval vessels, both surface ships and submarines. The ground forces, he said, would get a minimum amount of modernization for existing hardware and some purchases of ammunition. If the Ground Forces do not seem to be quite the big winner in the 2002 procurement sweepstakes that many had expected them to be, a big loser seems quite definitely to be Russia's strategic rocket forces. Most notably, the forces are scheduled to receive only six new Topol-M missile complexes this year, the same number that they received in 2001. That is below the ten missiles which had earlier been planned for deployment per annum, and but a fraction of the thirty to forty new Topol-Ms per year that the rocket forces had expected to receive only a few years ago to deploy. The strategic missile forces appeared to take another hit last week, moreover, when Russian Colonel General Yury Baluevsky (who led the Russian delegation at last week's Russian-U.S. strategic arms talks in Washington) said publicly that the government intends in the years to come to give priority to the naval leg of Russia's nuclear triad. What all of this appears to mean, on the one hand, is that Russia's military service chiefs face at least several more years of low procurement budgets and a further deferral of rearmament plans. Russia's major arms makers, on the other, will have to continue to look beyond their own government and domestic defense spending to find the financial means for their survival. That means that they will have to increase their arms sales to foreign customers, and it can therefore be expected that already aggressive moves by Russian arms dealers to peddle arms abroad will likely intensify still more in 2002 (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Vedomosti, January 17; Izvestia, Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, January 18). ****** #9 UNFRIENDLY TOWARD RUSSIA, SAYS FOREIGN MINISTRY AS U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT RECEIVES CHECHEN SEPARATIST MOSCOW, January 24. /RIA Novosti/ - Ilyas Ahmadov, prominent on the Chechen separatist top and Minister of Foreign Affairs of self-proclaimed Ichkeria, visited the US Department of State to be received by its official spokesman, Moscow regards yesterday's Washington event as unfriendly toward Russia, says the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press and information department. Whatever justification can be made for them, this and similar steps evidently clash with the spirit of bilateral partnership against international terrorism, as the ministry had pointed out long before. While calling for a resolute rebuff to terror, whatever form it may take and in whatever part of the world, the US Administration, in fact, supports the Chechen separatist banditry as they are going on with hit-and-run action against Russian soldiers, local administration officers and defenceless Chechen civilians. The conference with Ilyas Ahmadov indicatively coincided in time with the US media and other sources offering ever new irrefutable proof of Chechen warlords closely linked with Ossama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida. There is firm evidence of Chechen terrorists financed by them, and being trained in Afghan terrorist camps, stress ministerial PR. Is the grip of stale mental cliches strong enough on the US Administration to go on dividing terrorists into good and bad guys, wonders the ministry. Current developments show clearly enough that Chechen and any other terrorists are all birds of a feather, and must be fought in a close alliance. Russian anti-terror efforts in Chechnya are part of a global crusade, emphasises the Foreign Ministry. ****** #10 Russia: Council Of Europe Calls On Moscow To Improve Conduct In Chechnya By Jean-Christophe Peuch One year after the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe restored Russia's voting rights in hopes that Moscow would take steps to improve its human rights record in Chechnya, the pan-European body yesterday concluded that progress has been insufficient. The Assembly now is calling on the Kremlin to allow permanent observers in the region, but human rights groups say even stronger measures are needed. Prague, 24 January 2002 (RFE/RL) -- The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) reprimanded Russia yesterday over human rights violations and indiscriminate use of military force in its breakaway republic of Chechnya. In spite of the strong criticism, however, the Strasbourg-based Assembly adopted a final resolution unlikely to satisfy human rights activists, who have in the past rebuked the body for lacking the political will to force Moscow into a more compliant policy toward Chechnya. The document adopted yesterday says it is imperative to increase political efforts to end the conflict and notes that the general situation in Chechnya "has not improved enough to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights and rule of law by the population." The Assembly called on Moscow to allow it to set up a joint permanent office with the European Union to monitor the situation in the North Caucasus. But it stopped short of adopting stronger measures advocated by human rights groups. In remarks to RFE/RL's Russian Service, former Kremlin human rights commissioner Sergei Kovalyov -- the only Russian delegate who voiced concern about Moscow's policy in Chechnya yesterday -- made the following assessment: "With regard to this resolution, I would say that it contains all sorts of sound, but vaguely worded, criticisms [toward Russia]. But there is absolutely nothing in it that could indicate efforts to take effective measures [against human rights abuses]." Kovalyov's remarks echoed previous criticism expressed by the Moscow-based Memorial human rights group. Earlier this week, on 22 January, this non-governmental organization said it expects no support from the Council of Europe in its campaign to denounce violence committed by Russian troops on Chechen civilians. Speaking to journalists in Moscow, Memorial activist Oleg Orlov said that, in his view, PACE "does not want any conflict with Russia" and that, by moderating its criticism, "it wants to show that its work is having positive results." A year ago, Memorial and other human rights watchdogs lambasted the Council of Europe for reinstating Russia's voting rights in its Parliamentary Assembly. Moscow's credentials had been suspended the year before over reports of military violence against Chechen civilians. The decision to restore Russia's voting rights was made in hopes that it would foster a peaceful solution to the conflict and improve the human rights situation. Some of the non-Russian speakers in PACE who participated in the discussion that preceded yesterday's vote acknowledged their expectations had been unrealistic. The rapporteur of the Assembly's committee on legal affairs and human rights, German Socialist Deputy Rudolf Bindig, pointed out that persistent abuses in Chechnya are violating the Council of Europe's human rights and democracy standards. "We have to insist that a political process be put into motion, so that violations of human rights are finally exposed. We insist that those Russian officials who are responsible [for these abuses] stop what they are doing," Bindig said. "They can do so if they want. They are responsible. They agreed to certain obligations when they joined the Council of Europe." Even the rapporteur of the Assembly's political affairs committee, Britain's Lord Frank Judd -- who last year was one of the fiercest advocates for the restoration of Russia's credentials -- blamed the Kremlin for lack of progress toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict and for failing to bring servicemen and officers suspected of gross human rights violations to justice. "What is the general situation [in Chechnya]? I wish I could be more positive. Frankly, the situation is still far from reassuring. There is a long way to go. In the sphere of human rights, progress is frustratingly slow," Judd said. "There is still, in my mind, a failure to distinguish between initiating action to prosecute those responsible for unacceptable action and bringing such legal action to a conclusion. The number of cases itself is very small. The number of conclusions is depressingly slow." Judd continued: "In the military sphere, there is still indiscriminate action, still disproportionate action, perhaps not on the scale of the past, but it still happens." However, as he did last year, Judd said he opposes the idea of renewing sanctions against Russia because -- as he put it in his report to the assembly -- such a decision can be justified only by "a lack of willingness on behalf of a country to admit existing problems and to accept the Council of Europe's assistance in solving them." Judd's conclusions sparked some controversy within the Assembly, notably among delegates who openly question the Kremlin's willingness to stop human rights abuses in Chechnya. Russian representative Kovalyov told RFE/RL that, in his view, the Council of Europe's policy "can only encourage the pseudo-humanism expressed by the Russian leaders." He added: "You see, the problem is that our [representatives] have learned how to speak the 'European way.' Before, they would make a great protest each time Russia was being criticized. But they have changed their defense system. They now say, 'Yes, you are right. There are problems [with regard to human rights], but look at how actively and effectively we are progressively solving this issue!'" The Kremlin claims to have made substantial progress in improving the human rights situation in Chechnya. But in its latest report on Russia, New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) notes that the new military strategy announced in 2001 by President Vladimir Putin -- involving operations against specific Chechen leaders described as "terrorists" by the Kremlin -- "did not affect the conduct of Russian forces with regard to Chechen civilians." The organization said it has evidence showing federal troops have continued to conduct large-scale "mop-up" operations and make arbitrary arrests of civilians. HRW also denounced ill treatment and torture it said are routinely imposed on detainees, as well as the kidnapping and murder of civilians. Over the past 12 months, Chechen villagers have uncovered a number of mass graves containing the bodies of people last seen in Russian custody. The largest -- containing 51 corpses -- was found last February near the main Russian military base of Khankala, on the outskirts of the Chechen capital, Grozny. Addressing the PACE session yesterday, Kovalyov blamed his country's leaders for botching criminal investigations into the killings. As an example, Kovalyov mentioned an incident that occurred two years ago and that he said remains to be investigated: "In February 2000, in the village of Novye Adly, more than 50 residents were found dead after Russian troops had conducted a so-called 'clean-up' operation. The [subsequent] investigation went into a deadlock. Up until now, it has not been possible to find the suspects." PACE delegates yesterday also noted very little progress has been made toward a peace settlement. On 24 September, in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing, Putin urged Chechen fighters to disarm and enter into negotiations with Moscow. He later mandated Vitkor Kazantsev, his envoy to the North Caucasus, to conduct talks with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's representative, Akhmed Zakayev. On 19 November, Kazantsev and Zakayev held consultations in Moscow and agreed on further talks, but they have not met again. In an interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service on 22 January, Zakayev said the November meeting produced no result because, in his words, the Kremlin had no concrete proposals: "When Putin mandated his representative to negotiate with us, we were hoping that he was sincerely committed to entering into a peace dialogue. At least this is what we thought. But the fact that the Russian side did not bring a single articulate proposal and that it has, since then, stepped up its aggressive policy toward [Chechen] civilians shows that the Russian president's [September] remarks were aimed at public opinions in the West, at making them believe that he was ready to find a political solution to the conflict. Perhaps he also hoping that [we] would interpret his statement as an ultimatum and ignore it?" The Kremlin in mid-January said it is ready to resume talks with the separatists, provided they disarm first. But Zakayev made it clear the Chechen leadership will turn the offer down. He said separatist leaders are proposing that Russian military operations be suspended first and that each side appoint a commission to monitor the cease-fire. They are also demanding that Russia immediately stop all "mop-up" operations against Chechen towns and villages. Only then, Zakayev said, will it be possible to start talks. "So far, the Russians have not responded to our proposals. On the contrary, they have increased their repression, conducting up to 13 or 14 punitive expeditions against villages in a single day, as they have acknowledged themselves," Zakayev said. "With all the violence perpetrated by this mob, how could we possibly talk about contacts, about negotiations?" (Natalya Golitsyna and Andrei Babitsky of RFE/RL's Russian Service contributed to this report.) ******** #11 Excerpt US Department of State Foreign Media Reaction January 18, 2002 U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY: 'SLEIGHT OF HAND' DOESN'T ESCAPE FOREIGN NOTICE RUSSIA: "America Sticks To Its Guns" Vladimir Georgiyev stated in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (1/18): "As expected by many, the talks in Washington have ended practically in nothing. The United States has barely been reacting to Moscow's initiatives in the area of strategic offensive arms. Despite Washington's stated commitment to the dialogue, what has really been done to date is too little--and this applies not only to the Americans' decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and their plans to store dismounted warheads, but also to their intention to resume nuclear tests." "Newsmakers Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz Eclipse Secretary Powell" Nikolai Zlobin of the U.S. Center for Defense Information commented in reformist Izvestiya (1/18): "Politicians and the military in Russia, their focus on one aspect alone, point out that the Americans don't want to destroy nuclear warheads but will store them instead. There are other, more serious irritants in the bilateral relations. Firstly, the Bush team does not feel like signing any accords.... Secondly, the Americans believe that they can save [money] not only by reducing arms but also by not destroying warheads. Frugality like that won't make the process of arms reduction irreversible.... Finally, the United States still trusts that it has won the Cold War, so it doesn't give a damn about what the vanquished party thinks. The Americans' success in Afghanistan is a factor, too. Donald Rumsfeld and his 'right hand' Paul Wolfowitz have had their influence inordinately increased.... They have become the chief newsmakers, with Colin Powell hardly seen or heard from." "Relapse Into Past" Vitaliy Gan said in neo-communist weekly Slovo (# 2, 1/18): "Moscow's calls to make nuclear arms reduction irreversible have been ignored with characteristic haughtiness. The White House thinks the Russians' position weak since they will have to write off their fast-aging nuclear arsenal anyway. Surely, playing up Russia's financial and economic problems is not consistent with Bush's harangues about 'new times' in relations between Russia and the United States." "Putin Riding The Texas Mustang" Leonid Nikolayev painted the following picture in nationalist opposition Sovetskaya Rossiya (1/17): "As Putin whips on the Texan mustang going farther West, he may one day look back and find that he is all alone, with Russia having gone the other way." "Deja Vu" As the United States and Russia were set to begin the first round of consultations on nuclear arms reduction, the reformist Vremya MN (1/15) predicted in a piece by Vladimir Frolov: "What is going to happen gives no solace. Most probably we are in for a repeat of the ABM story. Either we will have a 'feeble' agreement, with the issue of 'irreversible cuts' left aside and everybody pretending to see nothing wrong with that, or there will be no agreement at all, if both sides refuse to budge." "Another Myth Exploded" Vasiliy Safronchuk commented in nationalist opposition Sovetskaya Rossiya (1/15): "Quite recently pundits, interpreting the results of the meeting between Putin and Bush in Texas last November, insisted that the presidents had agreed to reduce their countries' nuclear arsenals equally by two-thirds. That, they alleged, was the price the U.S. president had to pay for his withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The myth crashed last week once the local media caught on to something from a secret Pentagon report on changes in the U.S. defense doctrine.... Oddly, Putin still keeps quiet about Washington's intention not to destroy, but rather to store the number of nuclear warheads he promised to reduce to a third in the next few years. This is another instance of Russia having been humiliated in front of the whole world, just a few weeks after the U.S. president announced his withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Washington's action is all the more humiliating because it follows in the wake of the Kremlin's letting the Americans gain bases in Central Asia.... Washington does not hide that its long-term plans in post-Soviet Central Asia go far beyond its 'antiterrorist operation' in Afghanistan.... Obviously, the Americans have been gaining ground in Central Asia with Putin's blessing." "U.S. Doesn't Trust Russia" Andrey Lebedev concluded in reformist Izvestiya (1/14): "Despite its partnership with Russia in the war on terrorism, Washington doesn't quite trust this country.... Both U.S. reports (one by the Pentagon and one by the CIA) can only be interpreted as a clear hint that Russia is going to have a shaky position at the coming consultations (on arms control in Washington). Yet Moscow is determined to insist on 'controllable and irreversible' cuts.... There is also the idea of compensation for storage of Russian nuclear warheads. Increased financial assistance from the United States may become a sweetener, as Russia is urged to drop its 'irreversibility' demand. But in that case, Russia would be right not to hurry to use up warheads after they are taken off the missiles either." "Back To The Old Agenda" Aleksandr Lomanov commented in reformist Vremya Novostey (1/11): "As the global war on terrorism turns into daily humdrum, there comes more of the 'old agenda' in international relations. Though Russia and the United States, starting /to come together on September 11, are still on converging courses, their relations, for the most part, are new in name alone. Judging by two major documents (one by the Pentagon and one by the CIA) on nuclear and rocket technology that have just been published in the United States, nothing has changed." "President Bush Spares His Warheads" Ivan Safronov opined in reformist business Kommersant (1/10): "U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld ordered the creation of a Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The task of the MDA is to exercise strict centralized control over all the ABM programs being implemented in the different armed services of the United States. Simultaneously, Washington announced it is forgoing the destruction of nuclear warheads being cut under the existing Russian-U.S. arrangements. The decision now is to store a large part of them.... The most recent decision of the Bush administration to forego the complete destruction of the warheads being cut and to put a large part of them in storage as a reserve (at issue are the Russian-U.S. agreements to cut their strategic arms to the level of 1,700-2,000 nuclear warheads), made public during the Congress hearings on Tuesday, would clearly not suit the Kremlin. As Kommersant learned from sources in the General Staff, the Russian Foreign Ministry will forward a clarification request to the United States in the near future. 'We cannot be satisfied by the contribution Washington is prepared to make to nuclear disarmament: 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, and two or three hundred warheads whose 'useful life' has expired. This is ridiculous,' the Kommersant correspondent was told by a ranking General Staff official." "Bush And The Bomb" Official Rossiiskaya Gazeta wrote about the reaction in Russia to Washington's possible resumption of underground nuclear tests (1/10): "Almost simultaneously, two influential U.S. newspapers--the Washington Post and New York Times--published a version of a classified Pentagon report on the state of U.S. nuclear forces, which recommends a resumption of the underground nuclear tests.... The Russian military took this information quite calmly. In October last year Colonel-General Igor Volynkin, chief of the 12th Main Department of the Russian Defense Ministry, said that, according to his information, U.S. specialists have been keeping their nuclear testing ground at a half-year readiness for the re-start of nuclear tests. Ranking sources in the Russian General Staff point out that the possible resumption of U.S. nuclear tests may be due to at least two reasons. Firstly, the drafting of programs to develop a national ABM defense. Secondly, the natural obsolescence of nuclear warheads which are now 'on duty' or stored in nuclear arsenals. Russia can also resume its nuclear tests, which was mentioned by Volynkin. For this eventuality, the Central Testing Ground on Novaya Zemlya is now being prepared." "Underground Plans" Andrei Lebedev and Dmitry Safonov observed in reformist Izvestiya (1/9): "The United States is set to renew underground nuclear tests, as evidenced by the document the Bush administration sent to the U.S. Congress yesterday.... American officials stress the need to conduct tests to check the combat-worthiness of the nuclear warheads on service duty.... If the United States does resume underground nuclear explosions, it would be for the sole purpose of developing new types of nuclear weapons. Most probably warheads for the future NMD. The problem is that the American project of intercepting enemy missiles with its own anti-missiles is not very effective.... The USSR was solving the problem of intercepting enemy ballistic missiles with the help of a nuclear explosion. That achieved 100 percent success rate in interception. Apparently the U.S. has decided to take a leaf from the Russian notebook." ********