
#5
Russia: Analysts Ponder Integration Into Euro-Atlantic
Community
By Ahto Lobjakas
Analysts from Russia, the United States, and Europe held a two-day seminar in
Brussels earlier this week (14-15 January) to look at the future of Russia's
relations with the West. They discussed the motives behind Russian President
Vladimir Putin's recent rapprochement with the United States and the European
Union, and explored ways the West might compensate.
Brussels, 16 January 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Russia's unprecedented willingness to
seek closer ties with the West has left European and American officials
wondering what to make of Moscow's apparent change of heart and how to respond.
President Vladimir Putin has suggested in recent months that Russia is
prepared to radically reassess its relationship with Cold War archenemy NATO,
and appears to accept the possibility the organization may soon expand into the
Baltics. Putin has also offered the European Union opportunities for closer
security and political cooperation. And contrary to expectations, Moscow barely
reacted when the United States announced its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty -- long a source of contention between the two countries.
Russia's changing relationship with the West was the subject of a two-day
seminar held earlier this week in Brussels. Participants at the seminar,
organized by the Center for European Policy Studies, seemed to agree that the
shift in Russian attitudes has finally made the Cold War a thing of the past.
There was some debate, however, over whether the shift is sustainable.
Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, calls
Russia's sudden willingness to establish closer ties with the West the result of
strategic calculations aimed at modernizing Russia. This strategy, he says, has
led Putin to "let go" of the Cold War and seek integration.
Putin, Trenin adds, wants to be seen as one of the great modernizers in
Russian history.
"What Putin did was to start bringing his foreign and security policy
into harmony with [a] 'Russia project' at home. I would submit [that] nothing is
more important to Mr. Putin than to relaunch the Russian economy. He may not be
known in the future as a great democratizer of Russia. In the order of his
priorities, that is certainly not the highest [priority]. But he wants to be
known, I think, as the guy who relaunched the Russian economy -- restructured
it."
To achieve this, says Trenin, Putin has made a rational decision to
"move the United States out of the way" and plead "no
contest" in the Cold War, in order to close that chapter of history and
enable Russia to freely embrace the new global economy. Trenin says this does
not mean Putin should be seen as "pro-American," despite his apparent
tolerance of NATO expansion and Washington's scrapping of the ABM Treaty.
According to Trenin, the focal point in integrating Russia into the broad
Euro-Atlantic political and economic structures is the European Union.
Integration into Europe will be a long-term project but one which will not lead
to Russia's membership in the European Union, at least not in the foreseeable
future. But it should result in a close economic, security, and political
partnership.
Again, says Trenin, this ambition should be viewed as a domestic initiative,
a result of Putin's drive to radically modernize Russia.
"When one talks about Russia's integration with Europe, I think one has
to make it very clear -- above all in Russia -- that what we're talking about is
not a foreign policy proposition. Russia's entry into Europe will not be the
result of a deal made in Moscow and Brussels. It will be 95, 97, 98 percent made
at home. It's the extent of Russia's 'Europeanization,' the depth and breadth of
Russia's economic transformation, social restructuring, political [and] legal
evolution that will turn Russia eventually -- and I believe it will -- into a
European country."
Trenin says Putin's modernization drive is supported by the fact that both
the elites and the wider public in Russia are beginning to give up the illusion
that there is a uniquely "Russian way" to develop.
In Trenin's view, Putin's line is domestically sustainable and
"sufficiently protected against adverse international political
conditions," and the West should reward it by granting Russia closer
institutional links.
Trenin's belief in the sustainability of Putin's reforms is shared by Angela
Stent, director of the Center for Eurasian and Russian Studies at Georgetown
University in the U.S. But Stent notes misgivings that still exist in certain
Russian military and policy circles. She says a lot will depend on how the West
compensates Russia for concessions made by Putin.
"There are a number of ways in which the U.S. hopes to encourage
Russia's greater integration -- if you like, globally, but also into
Euro-Atlantic structures -- and some of these are on the economic side. The
United States is now pushing for accelerated WTO [World Trade Organization]
membership for Russia -- something that the EU has also endorsed. We're finally
getting rid of Cold War legislation, the Jackson-Vanik amendment that tied
most-favored-nation status for Russia to emigration policies. The United States
is encouraging its business community to become more involved, to invest more in
Russia, but obviously that's a longer-term process."
Stent says core security relations between the United States and Russia,
especially arms control, remain a "more complicated issue." The U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was followed by an "in principle"
agreement with Russia on cutbacks of nuclear warheads, but now disagreement has
erupted over numbers.
Stent indicates it is in the global interests of the U.S. that both NATO and
the EU forge closer links with Russia. She says avoiding regional divisions is a
major U.S. concern.
"The one area where there is concern as one looks to the future, and
this includes the EU and NATO, is the possible effect of the dual enlargements
on the wider Europe: Russia, but some of the other countries in the post-Soviet
space -- this is a term I know some people don't like, but for want of a better
word -- and also in Southeastern Europe. I think the concern in general is that
these dual enlargements not create new divisions within Europe [between] the
prosperous 'have' countries -- the ones who are in, [who are] full members of
these institutions -- and the ones who are not, who have associate membership,
who have different forms of association with both institutions."
Stent says the United States would "probably welcome" Russia's
involvement in the EU's nascent defense project, although there is considerable
skepticism in Washington over whether the EU is willing to commit the necessary
resources to make a success of the undertaking.
Dmitri Trenin echoed Stent's comments, saying both the EU and NATO should set
up concrete institutional structures to allow for practical cooperation with
Russia. He says the twice-yearly EU-Russia summits should become a permanent EU-Russia
Council, overseeing the implementation of joint decisions with special emphasis
on "soft security."
He says special emphasis should be given to cooperation in the EU's
"eastern neighborhood." The EU and Russia could also embark on joint
peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. However,
says Trenin, Chechnya would remain off-limits for foreign military involvement,
although the EU could still perform a useful role promoting economic and social
rehabilitation there.
With regard to NATO, Trenin suggests the alliance should become the main
forum of European-Russian security relations. He says that far from withering
away, the recent British proposal to involve Russia in NATO could give the
alliance a special role in enlarging the "zone of stable peace in
Europe."
The only European representative at the Brussels seminar, Stephan de
Spiegeleire, a researcher with RAND Europe, is the most skeptical about forging
permanent institutional links with Russia. He says many governments in Europe
are not convinced the new Russian policy is sustainable and fear a backlash if
the Russian public finds Western concessions disappointing. This, de Spiegeleire
says, could lead to a reversal in Russian security thinking, bringing with it
recriminations that would "probably be even more virulent than in previous
episodes like German reunification or the first round of NATO enlargement."
De Spiegeleire says existing mechanisms of cooperation have not been used to
their full potential, and the EU should stick to its policy of slow, organic
integration. Arguing against "conjunctural" impulses to change this
long-term strategy, he says the EU's low-level engagement reaches "into the
fiber of the Russian society and polity in a way that no other external actor
could currently come close to."
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