CDI Russia Weekly-#188 11 January 2002 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. Vremya MN: Artur Blinov, INCAUTIOUS DISMANTLING. The Pentagon does not want to destroy its nuclear warheads. 2. Financial Times (UK): Russia criticises US nuclear policy change. 3. Trud: ON PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RUSSIA-US COOPERATION. (Interview with Sergei ROGOV, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada) 4. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Ruthlessness is No Solution. (re Chechnya) 5. Vremya MN: RUSSIANS BELIEVE BETTER TIMES ARE COMING. (poll) 6. Irish Times: Gorbachev calls on European nations to unite. 7. RFE/RL: Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Moscow Attempts To Set Sea Borders. 8. San Francisco Chronicle: Steve Kettman, Why Bush can't go after Saddam Hussein. 9. eurasianet.org: Ariel Cohen, AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND RUSSIA'S UNFOUNDED WORRIES. 10. Obshchaya Gazeta: Yuri AFANASYEV, WHAT RUSSIA-US "PARTNERSHIP" PROMISES THE WORLD. 11. PONARS: Mikhail Rykhtik A Fresh Start in U.S.-Russian Relations? ******* #1 Vremya MN January 10, 2002 INCAUTIOUS DISMANTLING The Pentagon does not want to destroy its nuclear warheads Author: Artur Blinov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS SUBMITTED PROPOSALS REGARDING THE REVISION OF US NUCLEAR POLICY TO THE CONGRESS. IT TURNS OUT THAT US GENERALS WANT TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTS. IF GEORGE W. BUSH APPROVES THESE PROPOSALS, IT WILL BE THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER ARMS RACE. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has confirmed that the Pentagon has submitted a report regarding the revision of nuclear policy to the Congress. The US media has revealed the contents of this secret report, particularly its main recommendation the US should be ready to resume nuclear tests if "this becomes necessary". Previously, this idea was proposed by the Energy Department. The defense secretary says that the US does not currently intend to break the nuclear test moratorium announced in 1992. In the future the policy of the US administration will depend on the necessity of "checking security and reliability" of the nuclear arsenals, but not the moratorium. It is evident that the report contains arguments aimed at preparing public opinion for such move. According to the report, security and reliability of nuclear weapons are out of the question without tests in the circumstances of cuts to strategic offensive weapons. A reference to cuts to strategic arsenals was used as the main argument for canceling the ABM treaty. The US media note that the US military establishment needs nuclear tests for creating new types of warheads. The Pentagon has submitted two additional proposals. Cuts to numbers of strategic nuclear warheads is to be compensated by a broader use of high-precision conventional arms. In addition, the Pentagon proposes to store warheads dismantled from missiles, but not to destroy them. If George W. Bush approves these proposals, it will be the beginning of another arms race. In this regard, upcoming negotiations between Russia and the US regarding cuts to strategic offensive weapons have become very important. The first meeting of experts will start in Washington next Monday. The parties must reach a precise agreement concerning destruction of nuclear warheads. These measures must become transparent, otherwise the whole affair will become an imitation of arms control. ******* #2 Financial Times (UK) 11 January 2002 Russia criticises US nuclear policy change By Robert Cottrell in Moscow, Richard Wolffe in Washington and Eoin Callan in London Russia on Thursday responded to an apparent about-turn in US policy on nuclear weapons by inisting that arms cuts must be radical, verifiable and irreversible and "not just on paper". Moscow's response came after the Bush administration unveiled a policy change that included Pentagon proposals to remove nuclear warheads from 'active duty' without actually destroying them. The proposals to store rather than destroy the warheads will pose fresh difficulties for President Vladimir Putin as he attempts to steer Russia on a more pro-Western course. Mr Putin had one big diplomatic setback last month when the US said it would withdraw from the anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972 in order to begin work on a national missile defence system. Mr Putin called the move "mistaken", but did not threaten any counter-measures. Now the US is starting to make clear its differences with Russia over a proposed new deal to reduce nuclear warheads. Consultations at expert level are due to take place in Washington next week. But the many points of basic disagreement between the US and Russia make it far from clear that Mr Putin will get anything like the deal that he wants. Alexander Yakovenko, a spokesperson for the Russian foreign ministry, said in a statement: "We believe Russian-American agreements on further cuts in nuclear arsenals must firstly be radical, down to 1,500-2,200 warheads, secondly verifiable, and thirdly irreversible. "That means strategic nuclear weapons must be cut not only on paper," he said. Alexander Pikayev, a Russian arms-control expert, said: "Mr Putin has been doing a lot of things for the US, but so far the benefits are not clear." "The more steps he takes without having something to show in exchange, the more criticism he will face among the ruling elite," he said Mark Galeotti, a Russian security specialist at Kewell University, said the US policy change left Russian President Vladimir Putin with "very little room to manoeuvre" on arms reduction. Mr Galeotti said it could jeopardise the "unprecedented" support of the Russian military for Mr Putin's arms policy. "This is the type of thing that could make the general staff, and even the defence ministry, come out and criticise him," he said. The Bush administration has faced widespread criticism since it confirmed that it was not prepared to cut the number of warheads, but intended instead to remove them from active duty and hold them in reserve. The policy shift follows a campaign commitment by President George W. Bush to reduce unilaterally the US nuclear stockpile from around 6,000 warheads to between 1,700 and 2,000 over the next 10 years. Policy analysts from the libertarian Cato Institute and the more centrist Brookings Institution said the proposals sent "the wrong message" on nuclear arms reductions. Charles Pena, senior defence analyst at the Cato Institute, said: "This is an accounting sleight of hand, bad arms control, and bad policy. "If the US retains more weapons, so will Russia. And the Chinese will likely view the entire US strategic arsenal, not just deployed weapons, as a threat and react accordingly." Ivo Daalder, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said the policy proposals were disappointing in the light of the military tensions between India and Pakistan, which are both nuclear powers. He said: "The message that one implicitly sends to countries like India and Pakistan is: If you want to be truly secure, having nuclear weapons and maintaining them in large numbers is a good idea. "We should have tried to send the message that President Bush as a presidential candidate tried to send, that nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly marginal in the way we conduct foreign and defence policy." However, the Pentagon insisted on Wednesday that the proposed shift in policy would have a direct impact on reducing US reliance on nuclear weapons and would prompt Russia to follow suit. JD Crouch, assistant secretary of defence for international security policy, said: "The important fact is that we are actually taking weapons off of the operationally deployed force. This is the force that could be or would be used in an extreme situation, and consequently I think that is a very positive benefit. I believe in fact the Russians will be doing a very similar thing." ****** #3 Trud No. 3 January 10, 2002 [translation for personal use only] ON PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RUSSIA-US COOPERATION The Putin-Bush mutual understanding and working collaboration, which nobody envisaged, yielded ripe fruit by the end of 2001. The common enemy - the fighters of bin Laden's Al Qaeda, who also trained terrorists for Chechnya with the connivance of the Taliban - has been routed. And it was done not only with the help of the Northern Alliance, but also by Americans, Sergei ROGOV, non-voting member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, told Vladimir MIKHEYEV of Trud. Such quick military defeat of the Taliban would have been impossible without the large-scale pressure on Taliban's recent sponsor - Pakistan, who also enjoyed financial privileges from the USA, or without massive bombing and concentration of an expeditionary corps on the Afghan border. Question: You have stated recently that Moscow-Washington collaboration in the struggle against international terrorism has turned the two states into de facto allies. Do you want to take back this evaluation now that the USA has announced its decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty, for which the Russian leaders fought "to the last drop of blood"? Answer: Allies do not necessarily think alike. Did Stalin and Roosevelt, who were reliable partners in the anti-Hitler coalition, agree on the nature of the Second World War or on the post-war order in Europe? Don't the USA and its current allies - Japan and EU countries - wage banana, cod and automobile wars, firmly upholding, when they can, their national economic interests? It is another thing that there is a package of common basic values shared by all those who see more benefits in cooperation than in confrontation. Alliances are born also of the awareness of threats emanating from a common enemy. For the USA and Russia, this common enemy today is international terrorism. Question: But the Kremlin continues to chide the West for dividing terrorists into good and bad, for seeing a difference between bin Laden's fighters and Chechen separatists who survive on drug money. Answer: Of course, there are differences in their views. In particular, Moscow and Washington still cannot agree on the Kosovo Liberation Army. But one thing is indisputable: our union in the struggle against bin Laden and the Taliban is a reality. It is another question if it will be tactical and temporary, falling apart after the completion of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Question: Do you have an answer to this question? Answer: I believe we should use this favourable situation to step up cooperation in other spheres, such as the strengthening of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It is true that we have not yet coordinated our stances on many disarmament issues. In particular, the Bush Administration does not want to ratify the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Yet Moscow and Washington are kept together by a common desire to preclude further proliferation of mass destruction weapons. We should also encourage the economic dialogue. Indeed, there is no mutual economic dependence of our countries. What we have is Russia's dependent position. It is being constantly pressurised by discrimination measures, which greatly complicate the revival of our national economic potential. I think that a bilateral treaty on mutual security, which will take into account the national and state interests of the two powers, should become an inalienable part of the legal base of our partnership. Question: Don't you think that such a treaty may have the same fate as the ABM treaty? Answer: No, I don't think so, because it would not be a mutual control treaty but a treaty on political and military partnership. But we should also modernise the arms control regime. We have actually admitted that the ABM treaty has grown obsolete. Russia has changed and rivalry based on mutual assured destruction and balance of fear has become a thing of the past. We face new threats in the geopolitical context now. However, the 1972 ABM treaty is inseparably linked with about 30 security agreements, in particular START-1. Consequently, we need a new arms control regime involving other nuclear countries. The US NMD system will not create practical security threats to Russia in the next 7-10 years. But it can nullify the modest nuclear potential of China, which may be tempted to try to catch up with and overtake the USA. Nobody can guarantee that China's accelerated nuclear missile programme would not worry the neighbouring India. And if India takes up the challenge, Pakistan will join the race. As a result, we will have a race with many participants and an unpredictable but surely frightening outcome. This will have extremely negative consequences for Russia. If we notice this adverse scenario becoming a reality, we will have to take adequate military-technical measures. This is why we should start testing and deploying MIRVed warheads on our mobile Topol-M missiles, which will be cheap. And it will protect us from unpleasant surprises. Question: Maybe the reduction of nuclear warheads proclaimed by Putin and Bush will lower the level of confrontation? Answer: Further reduction of offensive weapons is a step in the right direction. Yet I think that a new agreement, which is to be formalised by the visit of the US president in mid-2002, should not stipulate the slightest details. But it should include references to the START-1 verification procedure. Such a link may be the compromise that will suit both sides. Another positive change could be clearly worded rules of Russia's participation in the NATO operation within the framework of the nascent cooperation council. Besides, Russia and the USA may sign an agreement stipulating the area of cooperation in the struggle against the common enemy, international terrorism. ****** #4 Moscow Times January 10, 2002 Ruthlessness is No Solution By Pavel Felgenhauer For two years Russian soldiers have been fighting in the streets of Grozny. There have been lots of casualties -- on some days up to a hundred dead -- and many more wounded. Thousands of bombs and shells, including highly destructive incendiary bombs, rained down on Grozny, and in the end there was not a single house left undamaged in a city that once had as many as half a million inhabitants. After almost a month of nonstop bombardment the morale of the Chechen rebels broke and they retreated in disarray, losing in the retreat many times more men than during the siege itself. Some rebel units were completely wiped out, and many rebel leaders were slain or badly wounded. Russian generals were talking of victory being at hand. Victory in Chechnya now seems as far off as ever. Russian troops are still mopping up or "cleansing" the towns and villages that they have "cleaned" many times before in search of rebels. This week a special operation was conducted in the town of Argun to the northeast of Grozny -- a town that was captured without a fight by the army in the fall of 1999. Many Chechens are killed or arrested during these cleansing operations. Some Chechens disappear while in the custody of the military or special forces -- most apparently killed without trial or tortured to death, their bodies then ditched somewhere or secretly buried. All the dead and most of the arrested Chechens are declared by the Russian authorities to be rebels or terrorists. In fact, many of them may indeed be part of the resistance. Chechnya is not large -- 80 kilometers wide and 160 kilometers in length. Most of the country is barren mountains or barren hills and steppe. There is some scrub and several small woods the size of New York's Central Park. At the beginning of the 1990s there were as many as 1 million people living in Chechnya. After a decade of devastation and killing there are several hundred thousand inhabitants left, with hundreds of thousands more living as refugees in neighboring Ingushetia. The Russian occupation force in Chechnya is more than 80,000 strong. However, sustaining such a large field force for more than two years has seriously strained the financial and logistical capabilities of the military. Plans have been announced to begin a partial withdrawal of troops, leaving only units from the North Caucasian military district to continue the suppression of the Chechen rebellion. Today, the Russian forces in Chechnya are trying to decimate the resistance in anticipation of a possible withdrawal in the spring. Russian generals are also doing their best to take advantage of the harsh winter in the North Caucasus, with the cold and heavy snow making it harder for the rebels to melt into the countryside than in summer, forcing them to take refuge in villages. Successful and ruthless operations by U.S. troops in Afghanistan have also inspired Russian commanders. If U.S. soldiers are allowed to wipe out entire villages in revenge attacks, kill hundreds of innocent civilians "by mistake," cause mass hunger and deprivation by deliberately attacking and destroying International Red Cross stockpiles of relief supplies, then who can possibly scold Russian generals for war crimes in Chechnya? Today the West has given Moscow total carte blanche to do whatever it pleases. But sheer ruthlessness cannot stop popular rebellions and is particularly counterproductive in fighting terrorists, as the United States may soon discover as it celebrates its Afghan victories. The Russian predicament in Chechnya is probably even worse. Russian troops are undisciplined, badly trained and poorly commanded. Their weapons are basically the same as those used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. They have no modern communications or night-vision equipment and no GPS positioning equipment to pinpoint targets. There are some Soviet-made precision-guided weapons in the Russian inventory, but army officers and soldiers are not trained to use them properly. Marauding and random violence by undisciplined servicemen only stimulate more Chechens to join the resistance after every cleansing operation. In a province as small as Chechnya occupied by so big an army, the resistance can survive only because it is the people. Since 1995, this is the fifth winter offensive by Russian forces in Chechnya. They did not succeed before and are unlikely to succeed ever. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. ******* #5 Vremya MN No. 1 [translation for personal use only] RUSSIANS BELIEVE BETTER TIMES ARE COMING Yevgenia OBUKHOVA It seems that life in Russia is indeed improving. At least, one can draw this conclusion from the survey entitled "2001-2002: Results and Forecasts," which has been carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation late last year. Only 22 percent of the Russians said that the year 2001 was worse for them personally than the previous year. For 36 percent of those polled, 2001 turned out better than 2000. Seemingly the same 36 percent of optimistically minded respondents believe that the new year will treat them better yet. Only 7 percent think that the quality of their life will decline. At the same time, the Public Opinion Foundation's researchers say that the Russians have grown pessimistic about both personal prospects and prospects of the country than they were in 2000 and 1999. Only 14 percent of the individuals surveyed said that 2001 was worse for Russia than 2000. On the contrary, 42 percent noted positive changes in the country. The first most popular change was an increase in people's wellbeing. Stabilisation and economic development was named second. "The situation with wages and pensions has changed for the better," and "industrial production has made a small step forward," the respondents said. In their assessments of the country's future, people relied on intuition. The frequent comment on why they thought that 2002 would be better than 2001 was: "I feel so" or "I hope." Relatively few respondents - only 8 and 7 percent - based their positive feel about the year 2002 on economic development and the president and government. "The survey results are revealing," said the head of the fund's analytical department, Grigory Kertman. "The tendency to consider each new year as more favourable for Russia in comparison with the outgoing year remains; the exception was only the year of 1998. Simultaneously, we have lately seen a breakdown in the pattern of growing optimism. 54 percent of the respondents gave a negative answer to the question of whether the year 2001 had lived up to their expectations. Polls show that people are sobering up. Obviously, one of the reasons is instability in the world." ******* #6 Irish Times January 10, 2002 Gorbachev calls on European nations to unite An impassioned plea for the unity of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals has been made by the former Soviet leader, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev. He concluded a wide-ranging address on the problems of the modern world with a call for the European Union to admit Russia to associate membership. Mr Gorbachev was introduced to his audience at the Institute of European Affairs (IEA) in Dublin yesterday as 'a charismatic figure . . . one of the few in the contemporary world'. Mr Brendan Halligan, of the IEA, said the guest speaker was 'a truly great man'. There was a standing-room only crowd for the former general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, including senior politicians Mr Desmond O'Malley, Dr Garret FitzGerald and Mr John Bruton and former European Commissioner, Mr Richard Burke. Mr Gorbachev quipped: 'It is almost like a Russian Orthodox church, they stand when they pray.' Now leader of the Russian Social Democratic Party, Mr Gorbachev expressed regret that the ending of the Cold War was not used more constructively to tackle global problems such as war and poverty. He reminded his listeners that on his initiative, a summit of leaders from across the continent of Europe was convened in Paris in 1990. They adopted the Charter of Paris which mapped out the road to demilitarisation and common European security. There was 'a real possibility to move towards a new world order' but that process slowed down after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. 'Even in Europe we saw a battle for spheres of influence.' When constituent republics in the Yugoslav federation began to declare their independence, they should have been invited to negotiations, but instead European states, particularly Germany, began to recognise those republics, particularly Croatia. 'Then we saw the inevitable result,' he said. Since then there had been accusations of genocide at the Hague tribunal, but he sometimes thought of the 'true culprits' and whether there should perhaps be a different type of tribunal. Some people said at the time that 'Europe begins at Brest, France, and ends at Brest, Belarus'. Meanwhile at the United Nations, international powers wanted to create the precedent of 'humanitarian intervention' as an arbitrary method of addressing issues. Opportunities were 'frittered away', the developed nations rejected a really new world order and then found themselves unprepared for globalisation. The result of unmanaged globalisation was growing poverty. 'It has not reduced the gap between rich and poor,' he warned. As events at Seattle, Nice and Prague had shown, there was now an anti-globalisation movement and the G8 leaders would probably have to meet on some uninhabited island. 'Maybe they should meet in Heaven, if they are accepted,' he quipped. Today, half the world was in dire poverty and terrorists were saying, 'we are working for the poor'. The September 11th tragedy had really shaken the world. 'Now we all have to think about, 'what next'?' There was no justification for terrorism, which had to be defeated. 'There is no other choice, but we need to see the root causes of terrorism and start addressing them.' Europe had to integrate, building on the 'great triumph' of the European Coal and Steel Community which led to the European Union. 'Now Europe has to define itself again.' An alternative must be found to the conflict between the 'golden billion' and the rest of the world. 'We need a united greater Europe.' He pointed out, however, that enlargement to 25 or 27 members would make for a less homogenous Europe. 'It will be difficult to absorb those economies.' Political will and vision were needed. 'We should not panic when life changes,' said Mr Gorbachev. Russia was an important part of Europe. President Bush had told him recently: 'You have all the resources, you just need to get your act together.' 'The EU cannot be anti-Russian or anti-American,' Mr Gorbachev said. ******** #7 Caspian: Moscow Attempts To Set Sea Borders By Michael Lelyveld A new diplomatic push appears to be in the works to settle the decade-old issue of Caspian Sea borders. Russia has invited the presidents of both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Moscow this month, raising concerns in Iran about the outcome. Boston, 10 January 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Trips to Moscow this month by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan suggest that a new drive is underway to reach an agreement on dividing the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan President Heidar Aliev is expected in Moscow in late January, according to ITAR-TASS. The visit of Turkmenistan's president, Saparmurat Niyazov, is scheduled for 21 January, the Russian news agency said. Although it is unlikely that the trips will coincide, the close timing may be a sign that Russia will try to mediate between the Caspian neighbors, whose feud has blocked progress on the division issue for years. In 1997, Turkmenistan convinced former Russian President Boris Yeltsin to tear up a contract with Azerbaijan to develop what it calls the Kyapaz oil field in the center of the Caspian. Ashgabat claimed the deposit, which it calls Serdar. The two countries have been at odds ever since. There are other issues that have blocked a post-Soviet settlement of Caspian borders, but the Kyapaz-Serdar problem has been one of the biggest obstacles to a deal among the five shoreline states. Turkmenistan's ties to Iran have also stopped it from backing Russia's plan for splitting the Caspian bottom along a "modified median line" while keeping the waters in common. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have agreed. Iran objects, seeking a larger share of the resources and a buffer from the Russian navy, which could be free to roam under the formula. Ashgabat's wavering stance has saved Iran from isolation. As the scheduled host of a Caspian summit, Turkmenistan has also been helpful in stalling a showdown with repeated postponements for nearly a year. Most recently in December, a working group meeting of deputy foreign ministers to draft an agreement in Moscow was called off at Iran's request with support from Niyazov. But the latest statements indicate that the fickle Turkmen leader may again be leaning Russia's way. Last week, the Interfax news agency quoted unnamed Moscow sources as saying that the Russian and Turkmen positions "have become remarkably closer." The statement came days before Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Ashgabat this week. Ivanov was said to be laying the groundwork for Niyazov's trip to Moscow. The meeting was also to discuss the Caspian issue, Ivanov told the RIA-Novosti news agency. Aliev and Niyazov last met in late November at the CIS summit in Moscow, where they agreed to restart talks on the oil field dispute. Speaking on 9 January at a meeting with Ivanov, Niyazov predicted that the Caspian summit will be held this year, ITAR-TASS reported. Niyazov said, "However, it will only be an exchange of views, and we shall not be able to settle the problem of the status of the Caspian Sea." Niyazov added, "At present, practically all concerned countries are unanimous in their approach to the division of the seabed." But he cautioned that there were still differences on the use of the water's surface. The prospect of a settlement has kept Iran busy. Tehran's Caspian envoy, Mehdi Safari, arrived in Baku on 8 January for his second visit to Azerbaijan since last month. The two countries have been trying to mend fences following a confrontation last July, when an Iranian gunboat expelled two Azerbaijani ships from another disputed oil field. But Iran's diplomatic activity has accelerated since the CIS summit. At least two readings seem possible. Tehran is either seeking to stall a settlement among its neighbors, or it is trying speed up its own negotiations so that it is not left alone as the only dissenter to a Caspian deal. Iran and Azerbaijan have been working on a package of bilateral agreements for months in preparation for President Aliev's frequently postponed visit to Tehran. The latest date for the event is in the second half of February. Russia may want to wind up its mediation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan before then. Russia has a series of incentives to dangle before Turkmenistan. Russian companies agreed last month to cooperate in developing Turkmenistan's oil and gas fields. An intergovernmental agreement on long-term energy cooperation is expected to be signed. Russian gas trader Itera recently renewed its contract to buy up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas and to transport larger volumes to Ukraine this year. But Russian purchases from Turkmenistan are still a fraction of the 30-year deal for 50 billion cubic meters annually that President Vladimir Putin discussed in May 2000 during a visit to Ashgabat. In the meantime, Russia has signed a similar cooperation deal with Kazakhstan, which could soon fill the capacity of the former Soviet pipelines from Central Asia, as Kazakhstan develops its gas industry over the next few years. Turkmenistan needs Moscow's assurance that it will not be squeezed out of the transit by a source that is closer to the Russian network. The benefits of cooperation make it likely that Russia can be persuasive if it tries to mediate a Caspian settlement with Turkmenistan. So far, Iran seems to be offering Ashgabat little that can compare with Russia's incentives for a Caspian deal. ******* #8 San Francisco Chronicle January 10, 2002 Why Bush can't go after Saddam Hussein By Steve Kettmann Steve Kettmann is a writer living in Berlin. His work has appeared in The Chronicle, Salon, the New Republic and the New York Times. Berlin -- THE BUSH administration has consistently said the war on terrorism will go beyond Afghanistan. So naturally, people are wondering what comes next. Somalia is one option. The Philippines and Yemen are also possibilities. But any analysis that takes into consideration more than Washington-based political posturing can swiftly conclude that the chances of the United States acting any time soon to topple Iraq's Saddam Hussein are negligible to nil. Here's why: Russia: The Bush administration ditching the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty might not seem like much to Americans, but its importance in internal Russian political dynamics should not be underestimated. Russian President Vladimir Putin still has powerful enemies who are not at all sure about his strategy of courting Bush, carrying on like best buddies at photo ops, and -- in the end -- acquiescing to Bush on the ABM treaty. Even Putin made it very clear that the practical result would be for Russia to equip its missiles with multiple warheads -- the dreaded MIRVing (Multiple, Independently re-targetable re-entry vehicles), which makes the world a more dangerous place. (The incentive grows to use MIRVed missiles for a first strike, rather than risk having them taken out in their silos.) Given Russia's historic ties to Iraq, which single-handedly accounts for 60 percent of Russia's trade with the Arab world, and its strong public opposition to further U.S. military action against Hussein, the Bush administration would be taking a huge risk by invading Iraq so soon after walking away from the ABM treaty. As key Bush officials are well aware, most especially Russian-speaking Condoleezza Rice, Russian politics remain a rough-and-tumble world of backroom maneuvering and the occasional high-level political murder. It would be foolish -- and dangerous -- to risk losing Putin as a friend. By making the move on the ABM treaty when it did, the Bush administration tipped its hand. No Iraqi invasion. Not, at least, until one or more other targets have been pursued. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Europeans: To longtime Washington insiders such as Richard Perle, the famous "Prince of Darkness" of the Reagan years, the case for going after Iraq seems so strong that it's easy to dismiss certain key realities. Namely: There is no Sept. 11 sympathy factor at work in this equation. If Hussein played a role in the terrorist attacks of September, it likely was a small one. And anyway, the United States tried very hard to find proof of such a role, and came up with nothing. Blair has not just been a staunch Bush ally in recent months, he has been something more than that. Actually, at times, it has seemed as if Blair, rather than Colin Powell, was the U.S. Secretary of State, flying from foreign capital to foreign capital to deliver the most recent U.S. message. Blair has been a passionate and eloquent advocate of the war on terrorism, and Bush could not have a better friend abroad. But even Blair is known to resist the idea of a U.S. invasion of Iraq behind the scenes. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made that clear last week when he said that he was confident Bush would make a "statesman-like" decision on whether to invade Iraq. As for the rest of the Europeans, they firmly backed the United States on direct retaliation for the crimes of Sept. 11, but would issue no blank checks. They were specifically concerned about the United States using the war momentum to take care of other business. If the United States were to go after Iraq in a serious way, it would be doing so without benefit of the large international coalition that Bush skillfully assembled for the campaign against Afghanistan. Middle East: Many Arab world leaders might actually be pleased to see Hussein removed from power, but that does not mean they would support more assertion of American military power in their region. And any U.S. action against Iraq would surely trigger a proliferation of condemnation and protest in the Arab world, which in somewhat different circumstances might be a price well worth paying to have Hussein's head on a platter. But the timing is wrong, with the Arab-Israeli conflict in so precarious and dangerous a position. The Bush administration had been widely perceived, at least early on, to be backing off of a peace-keeping role in the Middle East, and it has a long way to go to make up that ground. It's already likely that a year from now, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be the largest foreign-policy problem facing the administration. War against Hussein, lacking the proxy forces at U.S. disposal in Afghanistan, might take months, long enough for it to incite anti-U.S. feeling all over the Middle East. Even the Persian Gulf War, brief as it was, inflamed anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the Arab world. Factoring that influence into the nightmarish cycle of violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is enough to give anyone pause. There's no doubt that the success of the Afghanistan operation has the president and his advisers full of confidence about what U.S. power can accomplish, and that could be a good thing. Maybe the next time we are confronted with genocide in places such as Rwanda or Bosnia, we will not place so much stress on what we cannot do, rather than what we can. But the talk of war with Iraq is something to keep the armchair warriors busy, not a serious option for a world power facing so intractable and thorny a problem as worldwide terrorism. ******* #9 eurasianet.org January 9, 2002 AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND RUSSIA'S UNFOUNDED WORRIES By Ariel Cohen Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at The Heritage Foundation and author of "Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis" (Greenwood/Praeger, 1998). Many Russian academics have voiced concern about a US inclination towards unilateralism, which they say is underscored by actions of American forces during the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, along with Washington's decision to withdraw from a 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. However, such complaints by Moscow's inside-the-Ring-Road political elite serve to mask Russia's own difficulties in harmonizing its strategic and economic capabilities. US defense officials assert their actions merely reflect the geopolitical changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some Russian academics have sought to draw a connection between the rapid success of US troops in Afghanistan and the American decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The implication is that hubris produced by rapid military success influenced the US ABM decision. However, US officials insist the roots for junking the ABM treaty are in the prevailing strategic analysis in Washington, not in the performance of the Green Berets in mountains of Tora Bora. The United States sooner or later would have withdrawn from the pact regardless of the anti-terrorism campaign. According to the thinking of the policy trio at the Pentagon - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary for Policy Doug Feith - the ABM Treaty simply outlived the world for which it was designed. Washington defense policy makers base their decision on the following logic: one of the parties to the Treaty, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. In 1972, when the pact was signed, there were two military superpowers: the Soviet Union, which invented and deployed its own missile defense in the 1950s and '60s, and the United States, which at the time was mired in the Vietnam imbroglio. Back then, US leaders engaged in exhaustive talks to get then Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin to limit the deployment of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile shield to the capital city of Moscow. Now, US policy makers argue that if the Cold War is truly over, the United States should treat Russia just like it treats other friendly nuclear powers: France, Great Britain, India and Israel. No arms control treaties there. Today, the situation is different than that which existed in the 1970s: new threats are on the horizon. In any event, Russia will enjoy an ICBM arsenal capable of penetrating any American strategic defenses. Indeed, the planned US missile defense system, when deployed, will be designed to thwart an attack originating from North Korea, Iran, Iraq or any other emerging nuclear power. Thus, Russia, even if it does not see itself as a true friend and ally of the United States, does not stand to be denied second-strike capability, and does not lose its strategic parity with the United States. The prevailing Republican Party thinking on the ABM Treaty stems from President Ronald Reagan's idea of an elaborate missile defense plan, commonly known as Star Wars. The commitment to build a missile defense featured prominently on successive Republican Party platforms throughout the 1990s. Some Russian analysts have portrayed the US move on the ABM treaty as an insult to Russian prestige. Such statements indicate that not all of the Russian political elite has reconciled with the country's diminished geopolitical clout. However, President Vladimir Putin is an important exception. Putin's measured response on the ABM issue indicates that he understands that the US move is not necessarily directed at Russia. The Russian president also seems to comprehend the value of continued US-Russian cooperation against a common enemy - Islamic radicalism that is not limited to Afghanistan. The Russian government today appears to be getting over the trauma of the Soviet collapse, realizing its place in the world as that of a great power, not a superpower. The Russian economy cannot sustain global ambitions. The country's GDP, GDP per capita, population size and military capabilities leave it less intimidating or dominating than the Soviet Union. Some Russians are becoming aware that this drop in stature can be a benefit, as the costs of empire only served to hinder the development of a consumer market for ordinary Soviet men and women. Instead of seeking to remain on a military par with the United States, Russia might be better served by consolidating its strategic desires. The recent performance of the two militaries starkly illustrates the gap that separates Washington's ability to project force from Moscow's. The United States achieved stunning battlefield success - the 1991 Gulf War and the current campaign in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia lost both its Afghan campaign and the 1994-1996 Chechen war. The outcome of the current Chechen operation is in doubt. The Russian army is not on par with American military primarily because Russian generals have bungled reforms. A modern military is a very expensive, high tech proposition - a luxury only very rich nations can afford. Russia's defense establishment has not been able to match spending with strategic commitments. Those Russian experts and officials critical of the United States gloss over the fact that Moscow turned out to be more important for the United States in the war in Afghanistan than any of its NATO allies with the exception of Great Britain. Overall during the campaign, Russia has been second only to Pakistan in geopolitical importance. This ensures that the United States will continue to respect Russia as a strategic player in Europe and Asia. Putin has called on the United States to treat Russia as an "equal partner," (specifically in reference to the issue of Russian membership in the World Trade Organization). US action vis a vis Moscow in the anti-terrorism campaign demonstrates that Washington already treats Russia on a level equal to that occupied by other European powers. While the Russian forces did not fight in Afghanistan, neither did the French or the Germans. In fact, the United States turned down the unprecedented offer of assistance by NATO, not because of non-existent unilateralism, but because of insufficient battlefield compatibility between cash-starved European militaries and the high-tech US forces. It still may come out that the Russian special forces played a critical role in re-supplying the Northern Alliance in the early days of the war. Moreover, Washington insiders told EurasiaNet that US-Russian intelligence cooperation was exemplary - a great achievement after 80 years of geopolitical and ideological rivalry. What the Russian political establishment must realize is that equal treatment entails responsibilities. Partnership implies compromise, and thus Russia should refrain from supplying weapons to Iran or providing diplomatic support for Saddam Hussein in Iraq. US-Russian security cooperation is a critical component in the effort to contain Islamic radicalism. It is unseemly for members of the Russian political elite to poison the achievements of US-Russian cooperation to date by incessant whining about American unilateralism and mistreatment of Russia. ******* #10 Obshchaya Gazeta No. 52/1 [translation for personal use only] WHAT RUSSIA-US "PARTNERSHIP" PROMISES THE WORLD Yuri AFANASYEV At first I was deeply happy when I heard that Russia joined the global counter-terror operation. The desire to see, at long last, my homeland not in a state of confrontation with European civilisation but together with it took the upper hand over scepticism, although for a short while. The September 11 tragedy in the USA and subsequent serious changes in the international situation seemed to promise a cardinal change of Russia's role and place in the world community. Such a radical turn in foreign policy, if it happened, would have been a brilliant success of President Putin. Regrettably, our hopes once again proved illusory. Shortly before his US visit, Vladimir Putin confirmed, among other things, Russia's firm choice in favour of "a new policy" of partnership with the USA and proclaimed resolve to act jointly with the USA in order to establish "proper order" in Afghanistan. But let's have a closer look at this "partnership" and "order" and at what they promise Russia and the rest of the world. For example, does "fundamentally new" cooperation with the USA entail renunciation of cooperation with Iraq, Libya, North Korea and other regimes? Many people already voice doubts concerning the survival of the counter-terror coalition after the active phase of the Afghan campaign and predict - with good reason - that Russia would continue to support the so-called rogue countries. The atmosphere of vague understatements and significant silence is abnormal for a stable and confident society. Or take another example. According to some printed reports, the American secret services ignored the warning of their Russian colleagues about the planned terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. By keeping mum about this fact or neglecting to disprove it, the Russian president is saving the US president not only from a shameful resignation but also from trial. Apparently such goodwill gestures are justified only in case of colossal returns commensurate to the service done. I think the "dividends" could come in the form of, say, Russia's full-fledged involvement in the US globalisation schemes. Or the removal of barriers hindering Russia's admission to the WTO and of discriminating limitations. Or a kind of Marshall Plan for Russia. Such a "game" would be worth the candle. It would meet the "national interest" as interpreted by the current Russian regime. But there are no signs of such proposals, either. I don't want to be misunderstood and so I repeat: in this case I am worried above all not by the absence of true knowledge about a certain event, but the growing clouds of reticence and eventually the good old "mysteriousness of politics." The latest developments put in question the allegiance of Europe and the USA (their official leaders) to the priority of human rights, which took humankind many centuries to assure, over any national, state or other group interests. They also show the actual neglect of the fundamental democratic principle of legal equality for each and all without exception. Such "minor exclusions" are tantamount to the creation of A GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIETY, where some "most democratic" countries appear to be "more equal than others." Hardly a day after the New York tragedy passed when George Bush promised the Americans to bomb SOMEBODY out. Next the USA provided the top leaders of potentially allied states secret but "undeniable" proof of bin Laden's guilt, allegedly acquired by the US secret services which had been found lacking only a short while before that. And you call this reason for a global punitive operation? And lastly, the State Department made public a list of other "rogues" labelled as criminals with less proof (if this is possible) and designated as targets for "training bombing raids." If we cast aside the highly qualified "propaganda coverage," we will be forced to admit that the world community is invited to retreat to the "might is right" principle. The collapse of the Soviet Union certainly signified the end of an international policy launched in the 17th century that was based on a permanent balance of forces and confrontation of blocs and coalitions. The time came to revise international relations, to reassess the place of Russia and to radically change foreign policy instruments. But in practice the actions of the Russian authorities and the situation of the country in the early 21st century are not fundamentally different from the past. First, our leaders that were "elected by the whole people" still make truly history-making decisions, that should determine the world outlook for a long time to come, secretly, behind closed doors. They have at their disposal the well-oiled mechanisms of mass misinformation, virtually inexhaustible resources and experts in the manipulation of public opinion. Second, it turned out that hot-line talks between the current "national leaders" or "shuttle diplomacy" at top level at best are enough for a "justified" beginning of war. The loud phrases about the "basic values" of democracy are nothing other than a cover for the "might is right" principle, which practically buried the supremacy of law. Third, current international organisations (the UN, the Council of Europe and others) turned out to be no more effective in the search for peaceful solutions to transnational conflicts and ensuring a bloodless progress of humankind than the late League of Nations, which died of impotence. But "real politicians" ignore the growing demand for searching for an effective anti-military alternative to the UN or at least for revising existing mechanisms. The trouble is that the illusion of "inevitable consensus" in the UN suits too many people. Meanwhile, even the US NATO allies, let alone the Security Council, have to backdate their accession to decisions made by Washington "geopoliticians." And the latter again and again choose in favour of egoistic "national interests," to be paid for by those who are not allowed to join in the victors' feast. The timid acceptance of the manipulations of US "geopoliticians" is extremely dangerous for humankind and above all for Russia. For fate placed Russia on the dividing line between the East and the West and hence it will be the first candidate for "eternal sleep" in case of a new global conflict. Current politicians and generals regard a new world catastrophe as improbable because the thermonuclear and other mass destruction weapons have not been used since the US experiments in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And so they continue their experiments on the territory of "the rest of the world," thinking that it would never be able to pay back. But nothing lasts forever under the sun. The START and ABM talks have been going on for nearly three decades. There were cases of unilateral reductions, which were invariably presented as "a history-making event." Everyone fights the "bad terrorists" from time to time - and supports the "good" ones. All deliberations about a "global counter-terror international" become senseless if we remember that the US CIA has two equally important tasks: to collect intelligence information proper and to carry out "secret operations," which means subversive acts and sabotage in foreign countries. And nobody has cancelled this task. The two presidents' meetings could have become truly history-making only if our chief executives stopped their demonstrations of mutual love and started tackling the complicated and vital tasks of creating a fundamentally new world order, above all an effective system of international security that will be completely different from the current one, which has been proved ineffective more than once. ******* #11 PONARS Center for Strategic and International Studies http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm A Fresh Start in U.S.-Russian Relations? Mikhail I. Rykhtik Nizhny Novgorod State University December 2001 PONARS Policy Memo No. 228 Prepared for the PONARS Policy Conference Washington, DC January 25, 2002 Considering September 2001 as the turning of an important political page not only for U.S.-Russian relations, but also for general international relations as well is tempting. So far, though, the United States and Russia have exchanged many promises and optimistic interviews instead of making real agreements. Obviously, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington affect the United States' priorities as a state and its engagement with countries around the world. Russian foreign policy, on the other hand, will not be affected in quite the same way. Undoubtedly Russia has shown itself as a country attempting to become a part of West. The one real consequence of this is that Russian foreign policy has become Western oriented. This means sharing not only common values and principles with Western governments, but also sharing common threats and enemies as well. More importantly, this means working together as a team. The United States quickly returned to work after the tragedy. As President George W. Bush said a few days after the attacks, "Today millions of Americans mourned and prayed, and tomorrow we go back to work." Russia also began engaging in the same work, but the question is for how long. Back to work means rewriting national strategy and revising foreign policy. Those who like paradoxes can find similarities between the presidencies of George H. W. Bush and his son George W. Bush. Both Bushes had to start their presidency facing new international realities without "traditional" threats to U.S. society. George H. W. Bush had to deal with a dead Warsaw Pact. George W. Bush, on the other hand, had to face a "new" old threat-terrorism, which has shown itself to be all too real and all too close to the lives of ordinary U.S. citizens. With the recent transfer of political power in the U.S. and in Russia just two years ago, two relatively new teams in the Kremlin and in the White House are looking for new approaches to the issues facing both countries in general and U.S.-Russian relations in particular. This political fact assures some experts and analysts of the existence of a fresh start in relations between the two countries. Some analysts, however, have doubts about this new start in relations. These analysts are not saying that we will see a continuation of past tension and conflict, but they also do not see a real basis for partnership, strategic or tactical. The main basis for these new relations, they claim, is primarily psychological. Challengers to U.S.-Russian Relations Due to the uncertainty of the current international system, Russia is having difficulty in its relations with United States. During the Cold War, bipolarity was more or less clear. It was easy to differentiate friends from enemies. The current situation is very different. Despite interdependence with the United States on security policy, Russia has its own interests in the North Caucuses and in Central Asia that sometimes conflict with U.S. interests. Even now we can see that Washington and Moscow have different allies in Afghanistan and different preferences regarding the main players in any postconflict Afghan government. This means that Russia and the United States have to work to overcome a new geopolitical challenge. In geopolitical terms, U.S. interests are directed primarily at North and South America while Russian interests are concentrated more in Europe. Russia wants to be a Pacific power, but competitors in that region do not wish to see Moscow in a strong position there. The interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere have grown dramatically in the last decade. This does not mean that the United States will become more of a regional power and less of a global one, but taking into account the Republican presence in the White House, some sort of isolationism in U.S. policy would not be entirely unexpected. Instead, this means that Washington, despite its superpower status, will resist acting unilaterally due to domestic forces. Economically, Russia focuses heavily on its relations with Europe and is very interested in preserving its dominant position in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Unfortunately for Russian interests, the CIS continues to be economically unproductive. Former Soviet republics, now independent states, are looking for more reliable trade and economic partners. Conceivably U.S. and Russian interests might not coincide in this realm. Another challenge to U.S.-Russian relations is energy. Oil plays an extremely important role in the Russian economy, but falling oil prices in November 2001 showed that its international image means more for the Kremlin than budgetary and economic stability. U.S. dependence on imported oil for its energy needs affects U.S.-Russian cooperation because the two countries need different oil prices. Some experts blame the Russian government for waiting too long (until the end on the President Vladimir Putin's official visit to the United States) before replying positively to OPEC's recommendation to sell less oil on the world markets. The energy riches of Russia produce both mutual interest and friction with the United States (one example-the Caspian pipeline dispute). Russia is very interested in receiving new foreign investment. Western firms are reluctant to invest, however, as long as the legal basis for cooperation between the countries remains in doubt. Western firms are very interested in mineral resources, while Russian wants to attract investors in manufacturing and production. Despite the political elites' support of aid to Russia, U.S. public opinion has long favored leaving Russia to solve its own problems. In the current situation, joint counterterrorism operations will help to create a more positive attitude in the U.S. toward Russia. The task of politicians is not to miss a unique chance to improve economic relations between Russia and the United States. Can the United States and Russia Work Together? Some results of cooperation between Russia and the United States can be found in the areas of space exploration, science, and nonproliferation. The Shuttle-Mir Program taught both states how to work across international boundaries on complex human space flight operations, improved understanding of the effects of long-term living in space, and contributed to the success of the International Space Station through reduced risk and more efficient assembly techniques. Cooperation in the peaceful use of space is important to both countries. Equally important is mutual cooperation to ensure the prevention of the militaristic use of space, such as missile proliferation. Nonproliferation in all its aspects is an area of great importance to the United States and Russia. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their missile delivery systems, according to official U.S. statements, pose a direct and serious threat to U.S. national security. The United States and Russia currently work together as members of the Missile Technology Control Regime to halt the transfers of missiles and missile-related technology. The United States pursues programs in the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, to help these states control and dispose of massive quantities of WMD and missile materials. One such program is the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), which promotes nonproliferation. A 1992 agreement between the European Union, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States founded it. The center gives weapons scientists from the countries of the CIS opportunities to use their scientific expertise in pursuit of peaceful science. It also offers opportunities for foreign scientific and commercial organizations to propose projects that gainfully employ weapons scientists. Despite a number of disagreements, the United States and Russia have been working successfully in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation for more than 30 years. The treaties in place and the effectiveness of complicated verification systems testify to this success. Now presidents Bush and Putin want to create a new sphere of partnership in counterterrorism. However terrorism is a very specific threat. Up to now the international community has had problems defining terrorism due in part to conflicting interests. The best that can be hoped for is a definition of terrorism that is acceptable to both social science analysts and the politicians, lawyers, and human rights activists, and those who consider themselves the defenders of freedom and civil liberties. Terrorists rarely use the word terrorism at all when referring to their own activities. From a legal point of view, an undefined enemy is an unacceptable base for defining terrorism. Another aspect raising concern is that terrorism has no territory. The United States' current counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan should not become the precedent of how to deal with international terrorism. Imagining a future scenario in which members of the international community, provided with top secret information, begin bombing a third country supposedly accused of harboring or training terrorists is not difficult. That is a dangerous trend, as bases for terrorism can "be found" in many countries, depending on your definition of terrorism. Without an international standard defining terrorism, terrorism could divide the world as it once did 50 years ago. If countries have different geopolitical interests, they look for threats in different places. An issue that must be addressed is whether countries view fighting terrorism as an instrument to achieve "old" goals in a "new" world? If it can be agreed that the current distribution of power reflects multipolarity, then the United States will sometimes be a partner with Russia and sometimes an adversary. Although Russia and the United States have become closer psychologically, both countries still carry wounds from the past. Current geopolitical and economic interests, as well as a change in the balance of power, may yet produce conflict. Both sides need to be realistic in their expectations. A fresh start in U.S.-Russian relations is unlikely if the two sides continue to speak in different languages and define key issues differently. It is apparent that neither the United States or Russia is quite ready for the mutually advantageous and sustainable partnership that recent events and statements have encouraged. *******