#9
eurasianet.org
January 9, 2002
AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND RUSSIA'S UNFOUNDED WORRIES
By Ariel Cohen
Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at The Heritage Foundation and author of "Russian Imperialism: Development and Crisis" (Greenwood/Praeger, 1998).

Many Russian academics have voiced concern about a US inclination towards unilateralism, which they say is underscored by actions of American forces during the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, along with Washington's decision to withdraw from a 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. However, such complaints by Moscow's inside-the-Ring-Road political elite serve to mask Russia's own difficulties in harmonizing its strategic and economic capabilities. US defense officials assert their actions merely reflect the geopolitical changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some Russian academics have sought to draw a connection between the rapid success of US troops in Afghanistan and the American decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The implication is that hubris produced by rapid military success influenced the US ABM decision. However, US officials insist the roots for junking the ABM treaty are in the prevailing strategic analysis in Washington, not in the performance of the Green Berets in mountains of Tora Bora. The United States sooner or later would have withdrawn from the pact regardless of the anti-terrorism campaign.

According to the thinking of the policy trio at the Pentagon - Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary for Policy Doug Feith - the ABM Treaty simply outlived the world for which it was designed. Washington defense policy makers base their decision on the following logic: one of the parties to the Treaty, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. In 1972, when the pact was signed, there were two military superpowers: the Soviet Union, which invented and deployed its own missile defense in the 1950s and '60s, and the United States, which at the time was mired in the Vietnam imbroglio.

Back then, US leaders engaged in exhaustive talks to get then Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin to limit the deployment of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile shield to the capital city of Moscow. Now, US policy makers argue that if the Cold War is truly over, the United States should treat Russia just like it treats other friendly nuclear powers: France, Great Britain, India and Israel. No arms control treaties there.

Today, the situation is different than that which existed in the 1970s: new threats are on the horizon. In any event, Russia will enjoy an ICBM arsenal capable of penetrating any American strategic defenses. Indeed, the planned US missile defense system, when deployed, will be designed to thwart an attack originating from North Korea, Iran, Iraq or any other emerging nuclear power. Thus, Russia, even if it does not see itself as a true friend and ally of the United States, does not stand to be denied second-strike capability, and does not lose its strategic parity with the United States.

The prevailing Republican Party thinking on the ABM Treaty stems from President Ronald Reagan's idea of an elaborate missile defense plan, commonly known as Star Wars. The commitment to build a missile defense featured prominently on successive Republican Party platforms throughout the 1990s.

Some Russian analysts have portrayed the US move on the ABM treaty as an insult to Russian prestige. Such statements indicate that not all of the Russian political elite has reconciled with the country's diminished geopolitical clout. However, President Vladimir Putin is an important exception. Putin's measured response on the ABM issue indicates that he understands that the US move is not necessarily directed at Russia. The Russian president also seems to comprehend the value of continued US-Russian cooperation against a common enemy - Islamic radicalism that is not limited to Afghanistan.

The Russian government today appears to be getting over the trauma of the Soviet collapse, realizing its place in the world as that of a great power, not a superpower. The Russian economy cannot sustain global ambitions. The country's GDP, GDP per capita, population size and military capabilities leave it less intimidating or dominating than the Soviet Union. Some Russians are becoming aware that this drop in stature can be a benefit, as the costs of empire only served to hinder the development of a consumer market for ordinary Soviet men and women.

Instead of seeking to remain on a military par with the United States, Russia might be better served by consolidating its strategic desires. The recent performance of the two militaries starkly illustrates the gap that separates Washington's ability to project force from Moscow's. The United States achieved stunning battlefield success - the 1991 Gulf War and the current campaign in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia lost both its Afghan campaign and the 1994-1996 Chechen war. The outcome of the current Chechen operation is in doubt. The Russian army is not on par with American military primarily because Russian generals have bungled reforms. A modern military is a very expensive, high tech proposition - a luxury only very rich nations can afford. Russia's defense establishment has not been able to match spending with strategic commitments.

Those Russian experts and officials critical of the United States gloss over the fact that Moscow turned out to be more important for the United States in the war in Afghanistan than any of its NATO allies with the exception of Great Britain. Overall during the campaign, Russia has been second only to Pakistan in geopolitical importance. This ensures that the United States will continue to respect Russia as a strategic player in Europe and Asia.

Putin has called on the United States to treat Russia as an "equal partner," (specifically in reference to the issue of Russian membership in the World Trade Organization). US action vis a vis Moscow in the anti-terrorism campaign demonstrates that Washington already treats Russia on a level equal to that occupied by other European powers.

While the Russian forces did not fight in Afghanistan, neither did the French or the Germans. In fact, the United States turned down the unprecedented offer of assistance by NATO, not because of non-existent unilateralism, but because of insufficient battlefield compatibility between cash-starved European militaries and the high-tech US forces.

It still may come out that the Russian special forces played a critical role in re-supplying the Northern Alliance in the early days of the war. Moreover, Washington insiders told EurasiaNet that US-Russian intelligence cooperation was exemplary - a great achievement after 80 years of geopolitical and ideological rivalry.

What the Russian political establishment must realize is that equal treatment entails responsibilities. Partnership implies compromise, and thus Russia should refrain from supplying weapons to Iran or providing diplomatic support for Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

US-Russian security cooperation is a critical component in the effort to contain Islamic radicalism. It is unseemly for members of the Russian political elite to poison the achievements of US-Russian cooperation to date by incessant whining about American unilateralism and mistreatment of Russia.

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