CDI Russia Weekly-#187
4 January 2002
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036
phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, 
economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation,
CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense 
Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. 

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Contents:
1. Interfax carries 'text' of Putin New Year's message.
2. AFP: Eastern Europe digs out from snow as cold deaths climb.
3. gazeta.ru: Pre-Christmas Polls Show Change of Hearts in Russians.
4. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Lidia Andrusenko, WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THE PUTIN 
PHENOMENON? President Putin's approval rating may soon start sinking.
5. RFE/RL: Michael Lelyvedl, Russia: Economy And Oil Prices Remain Open 
Questions.
6. Chicago Tribune: Colin McMahon, NATO, Russia maneuver as Baltics watch.
7. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Russia's global player status uncertain. 
8. www.russiaproject.org radio series: What's Next for the Russian Military?
9. PONARS: Pavel Podvig, The End of Strategic Arms Control?

*******

#1
Interfax carries 'text' of Putin New Year's message  

MOSCOW. Jan 1 (Interfax) President Vladimir 
Putin following an established tradition addressed the nation shortly 
before the beginning of New Year. Here is the text of the message 
obtained by Interfax: 

"Respected citizens of Russia, Dear friends, This 
year was generally successful for Russia in home affairs and in foreign 
policy. And each day of it took us further away from the difficult time 
of economic and social upheavals. All of us have done much to this end. 
We worked together to make life more predictable. We achieved small but 
visible results. The year 2001 noticeably differed from the previous one. 
Not only was the tendency of economic growth preserved but the life of 
our people improved though even slightly. We managed to demonstrate that 
the fairly good results of the previous year had not been accidental. 
That they had not been a passing episode of our life. Important headway 
was made in the outgoing year. A legislative foundation was formed for 
new serious steps in economic and social policy. Decisions were made that 
should influence the business climate in the country in the long term, 
for several years ahead. The world regarded Russia with greater trust and 
respect. There was a better understanding of us. It become evident that 
the consistent struggle against terrorism is prompted not only by our 
national interests but also a global threat. The world community 
responded with unprecedented intensive international cooperation to the 
latest challenge of terrorists. Countries united and together with Russia 
came to the defense of peace, calm and life itself. Dear friends, Not 
everything we planned has been done. So far there are more unresolved 
things than achievements. Not all citizens of this country started living 
better in the outgoing year. And not everyone is capable of achieving 
that by himself without the support of society or the state. We must 
remember that when we sum up results and when we make plans for the 
future. Now that very little time remains until New Year I primarily wish 
all citizens of Russia wellbeing." Putin wished the nation happiness, 
success, love and good faith. "Let us tell kind words to our near and 
dear ones. Let us give good advice to our children. And wish everyone of 
us good health and success," he noted. "Happy New Year, dear friends! 
Happy year 2002!" Putin concluded. 

*******

#2
Eastern Europe digs out from snow as cold deaths climb
AFP
January 4, 2002

From the Baltics to the Balkans, eastern Europeans dug out from heavy 
snowfall that blanketed the region as plunging temperatures caused a spate of 
deaths from severe cold.

With southeastern Europe lashed by the most severe snowstorms in three 
decades, dozens of towns and villages in northeastern Bulgaria remained cut 
off Thursday by snowdrifts up to two metres (six feet) deep.

Several dozen Polish villages also remained completely cut off, while 180 
towns in western Ukraine have remained without electricity since the New Year 
after heavy snowfall and severe winds created drifts three metres (nine feet) 
deep.

Skies cleared across much of eastern Europe Thursday, allowing road crews a 
chance to catch up after a week of intermittent snow, but temperatures 
plunged causing a number of deaths from cold.

Seven people were found dead from the cold in Turkey Wednesday, bringing the 
casualty toll from heavy snowstorms and sub-zero temperatures across most of 
the country since the weekend to at least 19, authorities said.

In Bulgaria a 67-year-old pensioner was found frozen to death in the snow 
near her home outside Burgas, while a tramp died sheltering near the entrance 
to a building, his feet wrapped only plastic bags.

In Moscow, authorities said 14 people had died from cold since New Year, 
including 10 overnight Wednesday, bringing the death toll in the Russian 
capital to 281 since the start of the winter, according to the Interfax news 
agency.

Polish police said a dozen people have died from cold since the start of the 
year, bringing the death toll since October to 221.

Two deaths from hypothermia were reported in the Latvian capital Riga over 
the holidays as temperatures plunged to minus 25 degrees Centigrade (minus 13 
Fahrenheit).

Rescue workers also had their hands full in several countries on Thursday.

Twenty seven school children who spent 17 hours trapped in a bus under an 
avalanche in mountainous eastern Turkey were rescued, Anatolia news agency 
reported.

A snowplow managed to free on Thursday a train that got stuck Wednesday 
evening near the Bulgarian city of Silistra. The passengers were unharmed.

But some 60 tourists remained blocked for a fourth day in a mountain hotel 
near Veliko Tarnovo in central Bulgaria, civil defence authorities said.

Several dozen secondary roads in northern Romania remained impassable 
Thursday, with snow removal efforts hampered by wind gusts of up to 80 
kilometers (50 miles) per hour.

In the northern region of Iasi patients had to be taken to hospital by sleigh 
after ambulances could not reach homes.

In Turkey the people of Izmir on the Aegean, known for its temperate climate, 
woke up to their first snowflakes in half a decade, local reports said.

In the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi, the country's only subtropical 
city, palm branches were breaking from the weight of heavy snow, with traffic 
at a near standstill.

Some 6,000 residents of the city of Volkov near Saint Petersburg were living 
without heat after a pipe burst as the temperature sank to minus 25 degrees 
Centigrade (minus 13 Fahrenheit).

In the Czech Republic, school was cancelled until Monday in what the private 
TV station Nova termed "snow holidays".

To the west, many routes were impassable over the German border and icy 
conditions were responsible for a number of fatal road accidents particularly 
in the eastern region of Moravia, police announced.

Polish police appealed to drivers to travel only if necessary as many 
secondary roads remained impassable. They recommended drivers leave children 
at home and bring with them a shovel, sand, rope, hot beverages and a mobile 
phone.

About a quarter of Lithuanian secondary roads remained impassable on 
Thursday, with the army on alert to help rescue services if needed, the 
Baltic News Service reported.

*******

#3
gazeta.ru
January 3, 2001
Pre-Christmas Polls Show Change of Hearts in Russians
By Alexander Kornilov  

According to poll studies, in the first year of the new century the public
opinion, unlike the economic situation, changed greatly. By the end of 2001
the share of Russians who assume that the country develops into the right
direction has exceeded the share of pessimists, convinced that the nation
moves into a deadlock. 

Thus, for the first time in ten years of public opinion research in Russia
(the research during the Communist years can hardly be considered accurate)
the number of optimistic respondents outweighed those for whom the glass is
half empty. Also, the latest public opinion studies reflect the steady
increase in popularity rating of the president Vladimir Putin. 80% of
Russian citizens fully approve his moves. 

At the end of 2001 the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Studies
(VTsIOM) reviewed the results of year’s research, analysing changes in
Russians’ views and attitudes. 

Apparently, what proved the most striking about the results of conducted
analysis is that the share of optimistic Russians has for the first time in
years exceeded the number of pessimists. When asked: “How are things in the
country?” more respondents than ever before said fine. 

At this, it is worth noting that the number of optimists was growing and,
the chances are, such tendency will continue in 2002. 

Of 1600 respondents – Russian citizens from various regions of the country
who took part in the poll – by the end of the 2001 48% said that they have
already adjusted to the changes of the past ten years. 22% said they hope
to adjust in the near future. 

In other words, public opinion researchers have determined that
approximately 70% of Russian population have grown used to economic changes
and are ready to abide by new rules. 

However, sociologists have concluded that most of respondents judge the new
president not by his actual performance and by what he has done already but
mostly by his potential. Many pin great hopes on Vladimir Putin,
considering him capable of handling the problems the nation is facing. 

By the end of the year the president’s rating soared. 80% of respondents
said they fully approved of his actions. Only 18% denied him approval owing
to various reasons, and 2% found it difficult to answer the question. 

If the presidential election took place today, Putin would win support of
54% of Russians, or two-thirds of all those who expressed readiness to take
part in voting. 

When asked what feelings respondents felt toward the president, 4% said
they admired him, 34% said they treated him with sympathy and 38% saw
nothing bad in his actions. 

On the other hand, 11% of respondents proved to treat him neutrally, 8% -
cautiously, 3% see nothing good in him, 1% of respondents dislike him and
1% found difficulty in answering. 

Given such results, it deems scarcely surprising that by the end of 2001
Vladimir Putin proved on top of many domestic ratings. He was called a man
of the year by many observers. In ex-Soviet republic Latvia Putin even
proved more popular than George W.Bush. 

Public opinion experts hold that Putin’s popularity helped to improve the
hitherto ailing image of certain high-ranking government officials and law
enforcers, in particular, Russian PM Mikhail Kasyanov and the
Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov. 

For instance, the personal rating of the premier Mikhail Kasyanov by the
end of 2001 proved to be considerably higher than in all previous years.
53% of Russians said they approved of his performance, 34% disapproved. 13%
found difficulty in answering. 

As for the government as a whole 46% showed approval of its activity, 45%
disapproved and 9% failed to answer. 

42% respondents praised Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, 35%
disapproved of his actions and 23% could not answer. 

The chief prosecutor had never before enjoyed such high support either.
Observers tend to explain such tendency by the active participation of the
Prosecutor-General’s Office together with the Audit Chamber in
investigation of serious financial violations in ministries and other
governmental agencies. 

Besides, Vladimir Ustinov gained more score taking part in raising the
Kursk nuclear submarine and leading the public prosecution in Salman
Raduyev’s case in 2001. 

The Kursk sub sank in the Barents Sea in August 2000 claiming lives of 118
sailors, and was raised in October this year. Ustinov personally supervised
the raising operation. Evil tongues surmised he used the Barents Sea
scenery to boost his public image and made a one-man show out of the
operation. 

The notorious Chechen rebel Salman Raduyev was sentenced to life in
December, charged with terrorism and murder for perpetration of ruthless
attacks on Dagestani settlements in 1996 whereby dozens of civilians and
policemen were killed. 

One more important conclusion drawn by VTsIOM’s experts on the threshold of
the new 2002 year is that Boris Berezovsky, in the opinion of most
Russians, has no chances whatsoever to return to the Russian political
arena and to regain his former influence. 

Controversial Russian businessman Boris Berezovsky, who once used to be one
of the key figures behind the scenes in the Kremlin, is temporarily abroad
in the self-imposed exile, with fraud charges brought by the
Prosecutor-General’s Office against him at home. 

Throughout the 2001 Berezovsky attempted to restore his influence in Russia
with the help of media outlets that he still controls and setting up a new
opposition force Liberal Russia. 

VTsIOM poll studies have shown that only 4% perceive Berezovsky as a
political figure capable of creating an influential socio-political movement. 

31% of Russian nationals hold that Berezovsky will continue annoying the
authorities with political intrigues whereas 44% of respondents say he has
no serious political potential. 

So, one might say that in that aspect the year’s results are favourable for
the Kremlin as well. 

Russians deny Berezovsky support, whereas authorities ratings grow
steadily. The question is, whether the Kremlin and, primarily, Mr. Putin is
able to secure that tendency. 

Luckily, in 2001 he committed no serious political mistakes that could
shatter the public sympathy towards him, though on the other hand he was
never forced to take difficult decisions under pressure of time. 

Russian president was the first to call Mr.Bush with condolences on
September 11. He fulfilled his promise to raise the sunken Kursk. 

On the other hand, he let the USA pull out from the START to proceed with
anti-missile shield construction, without winning any benefits for Russia
which made many observers accuse him o mildness and compare him with
Mikhail Gorbachev and the way the Soviet president gave up Eastern Germany. 

*******

#4
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
December 28, 2001
WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THE PUTIN PHENOMENON?
President Putin's approval rating may soon start sinking
Author: Lidia Andrusenko
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
PUTIN'S UNBELIEVABLY HIGH APPROVAL RATING STILL REMAINS AT THE SAME 
LEVEL, BUT ACCORDING TO ANALYSTS, THE SITUATION MAY SOON CHANGE, WITH 
THE IMPENDING CRISIS DRAWING CLOSER. THE PRESIDENTIAL TEAM WILL HAVE 
TO FIND OR CREATE SOME ENEMIES, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE PRESIDENT'S 
POPULARITY.

     The steadily high approval rating of the Russian president 
remains a political puzzle for many analysts. Some of them have even 
called it "the Putin phenomenon" - there are no signs of prosperity in 
Russia, yet the people's trust in the president keeps rising. Of 
course, there have been public attempts to question such high approval 
ratings, but they failed: leading polling agencies have refuted all 
allegations, declaring that opinion polls are done regularly, and with 
maximal accuracy. If we were to draw some average level of Vladimir 
Putin's popularity, based on data of the National Public Opinion 
Research Center (VTsIOM), the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) and 
ROMIR, then the president's confidence rating would be around 70%, 
while the approval rating reaches 80%. And if presidential elections 
were scheduled for next Sunday, Putin would win in the first round.
     However, there is nothing unusual in these figures. The 
"Turkmenian", in the words of Vladimir Ryzhkov, rating of the 
president remains rating of hope. And hope for the young, energetic 
and intelligent president, who would help Russia overcome setbacks, 
has only become stronger this year. The reason for this is, first of 
all, the extreme events in the world. at the background of 
embarrassment of leaders of other states facing the new threat, the 
Russian president has shown himself in a better light, which was 
immediately reflected in his rating.
     Putin has become a sudden discovery not only for the west. No 
mater how strange it may seem, some research shows that his rating has 
increased due to his firm "pro-western" policy. It seemed before that 
Russians preferred the east, or at least, should choose neutrality. 
The support of Russians, not of the political elite, which doubted in 
choosing priorities, if not exactly got split, allowed Putin to make 
several radical steps, which would have been impossible in another set 
of circumstances: in particular, he accepted the USA withdrawal from 
the ABM Treaty without hysterics and decided to cooperate with NATO.
     However, Putin's recent interview with citizens broadcast on TV 
proved that Russians are not very interested in foreign affairs. And 
we do not rule out that if after the events of September 11 Putin had 
taken another political line, they would have supported him all the 
same.
     Actually, this is what is called "the Putin phenomenon": people 
trust him, but not institutions of power, which implement the 
president's policies. For example, a lot of citizens still believe 
that the State Duma deals with unnecessary matters. Only 9% of them 
are sure that the lower house works well, passing laws and decisions 
which are important for Russia. Only 8% think that the Federation 
Council is a useful state body; though both the Duma and the Senate 
are dominated by the presidential majority.
     The Cabinet is luckier, because, firstly, Russians traditionally 
prefer the executive branch of power and, secondly, it is somehow 
associated with the Kremlin. But they do not place their hopes in the 
Cabinet, and the activity of the president in improving the economy is 
assessed as "not very successful". The major claims of the populations 
to the president come down to the following seven points: increasing 
prices, lack of social protection of people, unemployment, increase in 
criminality rates, absence of plan for overcoming the economic 
setback, corruption in the government and the war in Chechnya.
     The security structures do not enjoy great popularity either. At 
that, when it was announced that several criminal cases had been 
started against several top-ranking officials, the rating of the 
General Prosecutor's Office has increased - almost a quarter of 
citizens decided that this is the beginning of the long-expected 
corruption campaign. And the overwhelming majority of Russians were 
sure that Ustinov was acting on Putin's orders. The rating of federal 
envoys is very low - around 33% (for comparison: the rating of 
governors is 55%), which proves that the idea of the president to 
tighten the hierarchy of power by dividing the country in seven 
federal districts did not quite come off.
     As for the parties' ratings, they are very strange. The pro-
presidential party Unity (or United Russia now) ranks only second, 
with less than 30%. Another "party of power" the Union of Right Forces 
has only 7%. And the leader of the list is the oppositional Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation. Perhaps, if Putin headed United 
Russia, which Shoigu, Luzhkov and Shaimiev hope for, they would win 
more supporters, but now we have what we have.
     Obviously, the rating of trust toward the president will be 
decreasing. Hope for the better cannot last long. Especially since 
small incomes of people have stopped increasing by the end of the 
year. Average pension level has not reached the pre-crisis $50. The 
economy increase pace and production are slowing down. Low spirits 
have not reached the provinces yet, but a lot of analysts foresee a 
serious economic and political crisis. It is clear why it will be 
economic, and it will concern policies because the present power 
system has exhausted itself and cannot tackle the problems. Of course, 
the political system will be re-organized gradually, however, we will 
not escape enemies, which would be looked for in order to re-construct 
the power regime. For the time being, these enemies are not defined 
clearly - bureaucracy, corrupted civil servants. But as the crisis is 
drawing closer, their figures will be clearly cut, up to their 
surnames and positions. Especially since the preparations for the 
parliamentary and presidential elections have already started. And the 
rating of Putin and power structures will directly depend on real 
actions of the government, security structures and parties, supporting 
the president.
(Translated by Daria Brunova)

********

#5
Russia: Economy And Oil Prices Remain Open Questions
By Michael Lelyveld

Questions continue this year for Russia's economy after oil prices ended 2001 
on a down note. Officials say the new Russian budget can withstand falling 
oil prices, but troubles may multiply if Moscow's deal with OPEC falls apart.

Boston, 3 January 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Russia's economy may be starting the new 
year with the same questions that dogged the old year to its end, as oil 
prices weaken despite attempts to prop them up.

So far, markets have shown mixed reactions to a deal to cut worldwide oil 
output on 1 January. On the last trading day of 2001, crude oil prices 
dropped nearly 3 percent, driven by doubts that the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) would be able to trim supplies by 1.5 million 
barrels per day.

OPEC has worked on its plan to rein in production for the past two months, 
but the soft economy since 11 September has kept oil demand falling faster 
than the plan could be put into place. Despite OPEC's agreement on 28 
December to lower its output, the market continues to fret about an oil glut.

A Bloomberg News service survey of analysts concluded that OPEC reductions 
would reach only 1 million barrels per day, due to sales by some countries 
above their assigned quotas. The cartel has already compromised on its demand 
that Russia and other non-OPEC producers pitch in with another 500,000 
barrels in cuts of their own.

After weeks of arm-twisting, the non-OPEC total came up short with only 
462,500 barrels per day. There are also problems with Russia's pledge to 
contribute a decrease of 150,000 barrels, since the Kremlin has encouraged 
Russia's oil companies to shift more of their output to products like heating 
oil instead of crude.

The switch may help to keep Russia's oil revenues high. But the effect on the 
market may be the same as no cut at all, since a surplus of oil products may 
drag prices down as much as a surplus of crude.

OPEC seems to have deliberately looked the other way rather than call 
attention to the Russian loophole, in part because the market's reaction has 
been ruled by sentiment rather than fact for the past two months. The last 
days of December were no exception.

Prices rose sharply the day before OPEC's announcement, but they quickly 
settled back during the next two trading sessions, although there was little 
data to support either move. OPEC leaders were forced to concede that their 
preferred corridor for prices of between $22 and $28 per barrel had been 
broken.

On 28 December, Saudi Arabia Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said, "We hope that 
prices will stabilize within reasonable limits, meaning between $20 and $25. 
This is what is expected now."

But on 31 December, prices dipped again below $20, raising concerns for both 
OPEC nations and Russia, which remains reliant on exports of oil and gas.

Russian officials have issued conflicting statements about the effect of oil 
prices on the 2002 budget. Early in December, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 
said, "Even with an average annual price of $12 per barrel there should be no 
problems for the budget."

But in late December, Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin told reporters that his 
budget revenue plan was based on the "optimistic scenario" that Urals crude 
would sell for $23.50 per barrel. In October, Kudrin said the budget was 
designed with a "reference point" of oil prices at $18.50.

The budget appears to have room for fluctuation because it was designed with 
a surplus equal to 1.65 percent of gross domestic product. But officials also 
hope it will support foreign debt payments of some $14 billion in 2002 with a 
reserve set aside for payments of $19 billion in 2003.

While the government may have some flexibility, it also seems to be aiming at 
moving targets. It has relied on raising domestic tariffs for gas, 
electricity, and railways by 35 percent this year and housing by 60 percent, 
according to "The Moscow Times." Such hikes have proved unpalatable in the 
past and could be halted if inflation rises too fast.

It is also unclear if there is any plan if Russia loses its game of 
brinksmanship with OPEC and a price war breaks out. Kasyanov's assurance on 
the budget even if oil falls to $12 per barrel does not seem to cover the 
possible effect on the ruble if confidence is lost due to an oil price plunge.

At least two pieces of evidence seem to argue for a pessimistic view.

The first is a forecast in December by the Middle East Economic Survey that 
Russia's average daily exports of crude outside the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) will rise by 200,000 barrels rather than fall by 
150,000 barrels this year. MEES projects that Russia's net exports of oil 
products outside the CIS will rise by an additional 60,000 barrels per day.

Unless economic recovery comes quickly, OPEC nations may be forced to balance 
the increases with further cuts to keep prices from falling further. But the 
second sign suggests that OPEC members could be hard to persuade.

Under OPEC's agreement in Cairo, some members like Iran and Venezuela have 
already been asked to accept cuts that are greater than Russia's pledge of 
150,000 barrels, even though they already export far less.

In a shrinking market, Russia's export growth can only come at the expense of 
oil revenues for countries like Iran, making resistance likely if more 
reductions are needed to keep prices up. If the OPEC deal did not solve last 
year's problems, it may only create more in 2002.

*******

#6
Chicago Tribune
January 3, 2001
NATO, Russia maneuver as Baltics watch
By Colin McMahon

VILNIUS, Lithuania -- The latest dialogue between NATO and Russia has raised 
concerns about how much influence Moscow might gain in the Western military 
alliance, but it has done nothing to shake the confidence of Lithuania, a 
former Soviet republic that has become a leading candidate to join NATO.

Like its Baltic neighbors Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania has spent several 
years and hundreds of millions of dollars improving its armed forces. The 
three hope to be invited into NATO at the alliance summit this November in 
Prague.

But Russia opposes NATO's eastward expansion, particularly in the Baltics. 
And some analysts are asking questions: How much say will Moscow have under a 
new NATO-Russia partnership unofficially dubbed, "NATO at 20"? And how much 
are the United States and its NATO allies willing to bow to Russia's concerns 
to entice Moscow to broaden its relationship with the West.

Vilnius officials suggest it will not be much on either score.

No real changes seen

"There has been discussion more than anything else," said Lithuanian 
President Valdas Adamkus. "But I don't see any real changes. Russia's 
attitude has not changed much."

Last month in Brussels, foreign ministers from NATO's 19 nations approved 
creation of a new NATO-Russia council. Intended to give Moscow more of a say 
in NATO policymaking, the council is supposed to be in place by the end of 
May.

The goal, alliance members say, is to foster cooperation with Moscow on such 
issues as terrorism, arms control and peacekeeping. But this expanded role, 
alliance members now insist, will not amount to a Russian veto over NATO 
decisions.

"The alliance will retain the right to act on any issue whether or not it has 
been discussed with Russia," U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said.

Adamkus went further. He said the proposal to significantly expand Russia's 
role on NATO policy from its current advisory one, first made in Moscow by 
NATO General Secretary Lord Robertson, was akin to a trial balloon.

"I believe this was more or less a political move to test the borders and to 
see what the reactions will be on both sides," Adamkus said.

So far, the reaction has been mixed, even within governments.

U.S. officials are split. Some view Russia as neither very trustworthy nor 
very relevant. Some want to reward Russian President Vladimir Putin for his 
efforts to integrate Russia into the West. Roughly, this places Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on one side and Powell on the other.

NATO's newest inductees, the former east bloc nations of Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, are pushing for more expansion. They joined NATO in large 
part to ensure protection from Russia. The Cold War may be over, but the 
Poles, Czechs and Hungarians understand why the Baltic states might fear a 
revived Russia with a history of imperialism.

Lithuanian diplomats say the Scandinavian nations are clearly in their 
corner. Germany, long ambivalent on expansion into the Baltics, has offered 
more encouragement as well, said Rytis Paulauskas, who directs the department 
of multilateral relations in Lithuania's Foreign Ministry.

As for Britain and Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has been pushing NATO to 
open up to Russia, Lithuania insists it does expect London to turn its back.

Putin, meanwhile, has become more coy on NATO expansion. In a recent speech 
in Helsinki he acknowledged that independent states have a right to choose 
the groups to which they belong. Though that would seem self-evident to most 
people, in Russia and Eastern Europe, Putin's statement was greeted as more 
evidence of his modern thinking.

"If you analyze the Putin comments, you can see the changes," Paulauskas 
said. "How quickly will that filter down into the political and military 
elite is the big question."

Putin has floated the provocative if, for now, unrealistic idea of Russia 
entering NATO. He lobbies most consistently for a NATO "transformation"--a 
word Lithuania's Adamkus made a point of avoiding--in which the defense 
alliance would become a political organization. Few in NATO are keen on that.

If NATO does expand, particularly to include one or all of the Baltic states, 
Putin would come under strong pressure from Russia's military and diplomatic 
communities to make a stand. The Russian public would also consider NATO 
expansion another kick to the ribs.

But Putin swears that his efforts at partnership with the West are sincere.

"This new NATO-Russia partnership is mostly meaningless. It is for the 
benefit of the Russian public and for Putin," said Audrius Matonis, political 
editor for Baltic News Service in Vilnius. "For so many years Putin and 
others were telling Russia that NATO was bad. Now Putin has a reason to say 
why the attitudes have changed. He can say NATO is turning to a political 
group from a military group."

Moscow's concern

Russia's current argument against NATO expansion is basically this: If we are 
all friends now, why does a Western military organization feel compelled to 
advance right up to our border?

The Baltics answer this way: If we are all friends now, why should Russia 
care?

"The possibility of a real military conflict with Russia is very low," said 
Povilas Malakauskas, a vice minister of defense in Lithuania. "That is our 
evaluation. That is the evaluation of our Western partners. We hope it is the 
evaluation of Russia too."

The Lithuanians, like the Latvians and Estonians, argue that their membership 
in NATO would actually help Russia. The Baltic states and their military 
officers know better how to work with Russians, they say, so they can help 
Russia build links with its European neighbors.

The Baltic states also argue, though this strikes most Russian military 
officers as preposterous, that a NATO stretching across almost all of Europe 
would take away the last remaining threat of conflict with Russia. This would 
allow Russia to redeploy its stretched forces, funds and energies to the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.

"We cannot change our geography," said Malakauskas, who said Lithuania's 
building of an army almost from scratch has progressed even better than he 
thought possible. "Russia always was, is now and always will be our neighbor. 
The only way is to build a cooperative relationship."

Still, when Russian forces hold war games, they often have NATO in mind. A 
potential NATO attack on neighboring Belarus, an international pariah state 
but a close ally of Russia, was the theme of one training exercise last year. 
So, too, was a NATO blockade against the Russian Baltic enclave of 
Kaliningrad.

*******

#7
Asia Times
January 3, 2002
Russia's global player status uncertain 
By Sergei Blagov 

MOSCOW - Since the Soviet Union fell apart 10 years ago, the Russian
leadership has repeatedly pledged to create a strong state and improve the
country's international standing. However, President Vladimir Putin is far
removed from achieving that objective, either at home or abroad. 

According to political observers, in his first full year in the Kremlin,
Putin has consolidated power, creating the conditions necessary to make
major changes in the way the country is run. Yet his favorite project,
restoring Moscow's control over the country's 89 regions, has been
undermined by concessions to governors. 

One of the new laws created a mechanism for removing regional leaders who
ignore federal laws, governing according to their own rules. But so far,
Putin has not used this powerful new weapon. Putin has stated that he
favors a strong state. But liberals are concerned about the rise of former
KGB and military officers to top posts in his administration. It has been
pointed out that Putin's eventual break with the Family (the group of
Kremlin insiders under Boris Yeltsin) is imminent. But Putin has been
unable or unwilling to shake the Family's influence completely. 

Although Putin's approval rating soared before the presidential election in
March 2000 due to his tough rhetoric on Chechnya, a pacification campaign
in the breakaway province goes ahead for the third year. Putin's high
approval ratings have barely gone down since his election as some
two-thirds of Russians approve of his performance as president. 

Yet it has been argued that Putin did not take full advantage of a
broad-based support from a loyal parliament and an economy boosted by high
oil prices, to push through real reforms in fighting Russia's endemic graft
or improving the legal system. 

Perhaps Putin's most striking achievement was to force his political
enemies either off the political field or onto his team. But not everybody
is impressed and some academics and politicians have criticized his
political and economic record. The problem is not that Russia is governed
by a "Stalin", the real issue is that it is a very small "Stalin", who is
unable to work out a strategy for Russia's development, said Mikhail
Delyagin, an economist who heads the Institute of Globalization Problems. 

Even Putin's chief economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, concedes that
Russia still follows basically the same policies as it did under Boris
Yeltsin. Moreover, the scale of corruption is even higher than under
Yeltsin, admits Illarionov. 

Apart from pressing domestic issues, Putin is faced with immense foreign
policy challenges. Moscow has moved closer to joining the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Russia has also emerged as a reliable alternative to
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), keen to ally
politically with the West. 

Nonetheless, despite repeated Russian warnings that American plans of an
anti-missile shield could trigger a new arms race, the Kremlin is
constrained to live with new realities in the aftermath of the US
jettisoning of a treaty that Washington saw as Cold War era dead-weight. In
response to the US withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
treaty, with effect from June 13, 2002, Putin told his countrymen in a
nationwide television address that the Washington move is a "mistake", but
one that will not threaten Russia's security. Russia had opposed the US
plans to abandon the ABM treaty, which Moscow regarded as the cornerstone
of nuclear deterrence. Under the ABM pact, Russia and the United States may
protect only one site each with such a system. 

Putin has managed to drum up some support from the former Soviet states for
his response to the US decision to scrap the ABM treaty. Ukraine's
President Leonid Kuchma backed Putin's statement, describing it as a
balanced assessment of the US move. The ABM treaty used to be a stabilizing
factor. Yet Kuchma said that following the September 11 terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington and subsequent global changes, the US had "a
moral right" to abandon ABM. Russia's closest ally, Belarus, warned that
the US withdrawal from ABM might undermine "strategic stability and
international security". 

On the other hand, many Russian politicians have defended Putin's policy of
rapprochement with the West. In the wake of September 11, Putin made the
only right choice, said Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the liberal
Yabloko party. 

Meanwhile, Russia's once ultra-nationalist Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR)
announced that it has decided to drop its anti-Western, anti-American and
anti-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stance. The party's leader,
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, told the LDPR 13th Congress recently in Moscow that
following the September 11 terrorist attacks Russia should ally with what
he described as "Northern civilization", notably the United States and
Western Europe. The LDPR had become notorious because of its anti-Western
and nationalist rhetoric. Not surprisingly, Zhirinovsky has described the
party's change of mind as the LDPR's "second birth". 

There are signs that despite the ABM demise, the Kremlin still aims at
approaching the West differently. As the US move to abandon ABM came
against a backdrop of Russia's improved relations with the West, political
observers are of the view that Moscow's global status as Washington's equal
partner faces yet another reality test. 

Some analysts see a silver lining on the horizon for Russia. The current
situation gives Putin a unique chance to become a mediator between
Washington and Beijing, argued Lilya Shevtsova, an analyst at the Carnegie
Endowment. This view is, however, interpreted by other analysts as a sign
that Russia's global status is undergoing yet another downgrade, because
even optimistic scenarios give Moscow a mediation role rather than seeing
it in the position of a powerful global player. 
(Inter Press Service) 

********

#8
www.russiaproject.org
Radio series
transcript
Part 2: Can This Be Democracy?

What's Next for the Russian Military?
Reported by Keith Porter, co-host, Common Ground

WALTER CRONKITE: Following the devastation of World War II, the Soviets built 
one of the largest militaries in history with three million troops, naval and 
air bases circling the globe, and a nuclear arsenal with terrifying capacity. 
Now, ten years after the end of the Soviet Union, the Russian armed forces 
are a mere shadow of their past glory. Correspondent Keith Porter reports 
from Moscow.

[Announcer: Russians drive for Berlin! (sound of artillery fire)] 

["Thousands of Russian tanks crush Nazi resistence and German dead litter the 
road."]

DIMITRY GRIGORIEVICH: (Via Translator) We went to Romania, then Poland, 
Germany, then Czechoslovakia—we deployed there quickly because they needed 
help. We were victorious, thanks to our love of the motherland.

KEITH PORTER: Dimitry Grigorievich wears a chest full of shiny, red and gold 
medals honoring his service in World War II. He's describing his role in the 
Soviet Army's liberation of countries occupied by the Nazis at the end of the 
war. Here at Moscow's Victory Park, Grigorievich says he's worried about 
today's Russian military.

GRIGORIEVICH: Today there's no army, there's nothing. When you compare the 
army today with what was before—you can't even do it. There was glory back 
then. These days, there's none.

PORTER: His comrade in arms, Alexey Vassilievich, agrees.

ALEXEY VASSELIYVICH: (Via Translator) Those soldiers were real soldiers, real 
officers. They saved Russia from the German fascists—and they held the
nation 
together—that was our generation. But this generation gives up too easily.

PORTER: Pavel Felgenhauer, independent defense analyst in Russia, says the 
veterans have reason to worry about today's Russian military.

PAVEL FELGENHAUER: (Via Translator) Morale is very low and this is not only 
my opinion. That's what many high-ranking Russian generals tell me; that the 
morale of the Russian military is appalling. And morale continues to slide, 
and I know that in the top of the Russian military there is a lot of anxiety 
about what's happening right now with the Russian armed forces.

PORTER: This anxiety reaches beyond Russia's borders. A weak, chaotic, 
disorganized Russian military could pose an internal threat to democracy and 
could be a destabilizing force internationally according to Celeste Wallender 
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. 

CELESTE WALLENDER: It is absolutely the case that a weak Russian military in 
these terms is not in American national security interests. Russia is a big 
place and it needs to feel secure. A corrupt, underpaid, underfed Russian 
military is susceptible to selling not only Kalishnikovs to Chechen rebels, 
but nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to the highest bidder.

PORTER: The Russian armed forces are now four times smaller than the Soviet 
armed forces ten years ago. And defense spending has dropped 95%. The decline 
of the Russian military began when former president Boris Yeltsin 
deliberately cut the military budget and weakened the armed forces because he 
feared their political power. Now Russia is paying the price. The headlines 
are full of stories about sinking ships and submarines, crashing military 
planes, and deserting soldiers. 

[Heavy altillery and Russian men shouting: "ammo is ready!"]

PORTER: Thousands of Russian troops have been killed in Chechnya. And with 
every new story of horrendous human rights violations and deep corruption, 
morale plummets even lower. So does the military's public image. World War II 
vet Dimitry Grigorievich reacts with anger to the stories of Russian troops 
selling weapons to the very rebels they are fighting in Chechnya.

GRIGORIEVICH: (Via Translator) These people are not soldiers nor officers; 
they're traitors. With them you can do little but line them up against a wall 
and pull the trigger. A bastard in life is a bastard in the army too. 

PORTER: Alexandr Golts covered the Russian military for ITOGI (ee-tow-ghi), 
the premier Russian newsmagazine forced out of business in the Spring of 
2001. He says Russian soldiers at the lowest end of the pay scale make the 
equivalent of one US dollar a month. Officers do a little better but still 
don't make anything near a living wage. Given this, Golts says the path to 
military corruption is sometimes paved with good intentions.

[Sounds of Army marching]

ALEXANDER GOLTS: (Golts Farm) I can tell you a usual story of how an officer 
became corrupted. He will use the single thing this commander can use, the 
slave labor of soldiers. So he uses it. He sends his soldiers to nearest 
brick factory or to the nearest farm, and he receives money to feed them. But 
in eyes of any prosecutor it is a crime. It is the normal way to corruption.

PORTER: Russian President Vladimir Putin is well aware of the morale and 
corruption problems in the Russian military, and he has proposed a number of 
steps to solve the problems. His chief aim is to make the Russian military 
even smaller. The goal is simple. Slash the number of troops without cutting 
the budget. In theory this leaves more money per soldier. But Alexander Golts 
says getting rid of soldiers isn't enough. 

GOLTS: This logic doesn't work when we speak about Russian armed forces. From 
the early 90s there were at least three total—very big—reductions in
Russian 
armed forces. But each time we received a smaller copy, but absolutely 
inefficient copy of the Soviet Army. 

PORTER: Golts says the answer is to eliminate the draft and create a 
professional military—a task which will demand lots of money. But how can 
Russia's leaders justify more defense spending at a time when so much money 
is also needed for housing, agriculture, medical care, and other priorities? 
One age-old method for getting more military resources is to convince the 
public that the world is becoming more dangerous. Making that argument became 
much easier following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, according to Celeste Wallender. 

WALLENDAR: Putin has been arguing that there is an opportunity now for Russia 
to be able to be in cooperation with the West and the United States, to 
effectively address the problems of terrorism that Russia has been facing 
through the 1990's, and that may ring more true to the Russian public.

[Orchestra & chorus]

PORTER: Of course some Russians, like the veterans back at Victory Park, 
don't need to be convinced that Russia should do whatever it takes to build a 
strong military.

VASSELIYVICH: (Via Translator) President Putin should take power in his hands 
and return everything back to the way it was—then all these generals that 
whine about the army should be fired.

PORTER: In the end, all agree that morale is low and corruption is high in 
the Russian military. The needed reforms carry a high price tag, but the new 
global environment may make it easier for President Putin to find the money. 
Yet, one problem remains. Reforming Russia's military may do nothing to stop 
their biggest enemy. Russian State Duma member Sergei Rogov says the biggest 
threat to Russia, is Russia.

SERGEI ROGOV: The enemy is us. The enemy is our inability to use the enormous 
human and natural resources of Russia to make life here decent and to make 
Russia a respectable member of the international community.

PORTER: Fixing Russia's military is a formidable, but feasible task. Fixing 
Russia, on the other hand, will be much more difficult. For the Russia 
Project, I'm Keith Porter, Moscow. 
© 2001 by The Stanley Foundation

*******

#9
PONARS
Center for Strategic and International Studies
http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm

The End of Strategic Arms Control?
By Pavel Podvig
Center for Arms Control Studies
December 2001
PONARS Policy Memo No. 217
Prepared for the PONARS Policy Conference
Washington, DC
January 25, 2002

An overview of the arms control field today gives a contradictory picture. On 
one hand, the United States and Russia are very upbeat about their 
relationship and claim that they do not consider themselves enemies or 
adversaries, which seems to present a good ground for cooperation on wide 
range of issues. On the other hand, very few of nuclear arms control or 
disarmament problems are being solved. The START II treaty has no chance of 
entering into force and there are virtually no prospects for a bilateral 
agreement that would set a limit on the number of nuclear weapons beyond the 
one set by START I, which is more than ten years old now. 

The immediate reason for the lack of progress with the traditional arms 
control agenda is the disagreement about the future of the ABM Treaty and 
about the approach toward reductions of offensive weapons. The differences in 
the U.S. and Russian positions were clearly demonstrated at the Crawford 
summit meeting in November 2001.

The summit was marked by an announcement of seemingly radical reductions of 
the U.S. nuclear arsenal. During the summit, President Bush declared that the 
United States would reduce the number of "operationally deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads" to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade. 
Details of the reductions have not been released yet, but these numbers would 
be consistent with the intention to decommission all MX/Peacekeeper missiles 
and convert four Trident submarines into SLCM platforms, which was announced 
several months ago. Although the planned measures will represent a 
significant reduction of about 1300 warheads, it seems that there will be 
few, if any, reductions that go beyond that. Most of the rest of the 
reductions will be done either by "downloading" existing launchers or simply 
by not counting them. It is plausible, for example, that none of the 
strategic bombers will be counted as "operationally deployed."

Russian president Vladimir Putin replied to the U.S. announcement by 
reiterating his proposal of November 2000, in which he suggested reducing 
strategic nuclear arsenals to a level of 1500 warheads on each side. However, 
he did not make a binding commitment to the reductions. Instead, Putin 
underscored that the proposal would become a reality if Russia and the United 
States have it "in a treaty form, including the issues of verification and 
control." This means that unless a treaty is signed, Russia will not consider 
the reductions undertaken by the United States as real.

This, of course, does not mean that the United States will not implement the 
announced cuts. However, the legal status of these reductions will remain 
unclear. It should be noted that the situation is markedly different from the 
one with tactical nuclear weapons unilateral initiatives of 1991. Although 
those initiatives also did not become a subject of a formal treaty, at that 
time neither side officially questioned the commitment of the other to carry 
on the promised reductions (which was exactly what Putin did this time). 
The prospects for a binding agreement that would codify the reductions are 
very dim, even if it will include very modest verifications measures based, 
say, on START I procedures. Russia and the United States announced that they 
will work on an agreement of this kind, but left the summit with uncertainty 
about how they would to achieve it. 

The outcome of the discussion about the future of the ABM Treaty was even 
more uncertain. Despite expectations of a breakthrough, Bush and Putin simply 
reiterated their old positions about the ABM Treaty being a "relic of the 
cold war" or a "cornerstone of strategic stability." Details of a proposed 
compromise, which were leaked to the press before the summit, clearly showed 
that neither side seems to understand what a compromise may look like. 

Although the presidents agreed to continue consultations, it is not clear 
what kind of outcome these consultations can produce. 

From the point of view of traditional arms control, the outcome of the 
Crawford summit is disappointing. The United States and Russia not only 
failed to overcome their differences, but also did not suggest a course of 
action that would help reconcile their positions in the future. The problems 
are exacerbated by highly politicized nature of the discussed issues (missile 
defense in particular), which raises the stakes and makes a compromise 
virtually impossible.

On the other hand, the lack of progress with the arms control agenda may 
reflect serious changes in the relationship between the countries and in the 
role that they assign to nuclear weapons. From this perspective, the results 
of the summit are encouraging, since they indicate that changes are indeed 
taking place.

It would be wrong to say that the two countries are ready to renounce nuclear 
deterrence or that the relationship between them could be characterized as a 
partnership. A closer look at various aspects of the U.S.-Russian 
relationship shows that in spite of recent rapprochement it still 
characterized by a significant degree of mistrust and has a fairly strong 
confrontational component. Nuclear deterrence is still considered an 
important component of the relationship. At the same time, what we see is 
that the long-admitted fact that the nuclear arsenals on both sides far 
exceed any reasonable requirements seems to have finally found its way into 
practical policies pursued by U.S. and Russian military and political 
institutions. 

Among practical steps that reflect this development is the U.S. willingness 
to reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal unilaterally, regardless of whether 
Russia reduces its forces. The most telling example of the changing attitudes 
toward the traditional arms control agenda is the lack of U.S. reaction to 
the Russian threats to respond to missile defense development by either 
extending the service lives of its heavy ICBMs or deploying multiple warheads 
on its new Topol-M missiles. Nor does the United States seem concerned about 
setting limits on Russian nuclear testing program, as the debate about the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty indicates. 

This may reflect understanding of the well-known inability of Russia to 
maintain its strategic forces at the current level and the existence of a 
"hedge" policy, which would allow the United States to get its forces back to 
Cold-War levels. At the same time, the readiness to forgo reciprocity in 
nuclear reductions and most verification measures that come with it indicates 
that the United States does not assign high priority to questions that were 
at the center of traditional U.S.-Soviet arms control agenda-limiting the 
military capabilities of the Soviet/Russian forces.

The attitude toward arms control in Russia is similar to that in the United 
States, although it may be driven by a different set of considerations. While 
the Russian military continues to underscore the importance of parity between 
strategic forces, the recent practical steps of the Russian leadership show 
quite clearly that parity is not considered vitally important. Among these 
steps are the decision to curb the deployment of new land-based missile and 
redirect the funds into conventional forces, unwillingness to revive the 
stalled START negotiation process, and the consistent refusal to find a 
compromise on missile defense. Although Russia admittedly has very little 
room to maneuver, if it was seriously concerned about the emerging 
disparities in strategic nuclear arsenals, it would have pursued somewhat 
different policies.

These developments in the U.S.-Russian relationship (which, it should be 
noted, predate the events of September 11 and the subsequent "westward turn" 
in Russian policy) seem to reflect the growing understanding of the changing 
nature of nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War, it was estimated that 
deterrence required thousands of weapons to inflict "unacceptable damage" to 
the adversary. While this logic remains largely unchallenged today, the 
number of weapons that would inflict "unacceptable damage" is most certainly 
in the low single digits for both sides. This makes the actual number of 
nuclear weapons that could be delivered relatively unimportant, as long as 
this number is greater than zero. As a result, the deterrence value of 1500 
Russian nuclear warheads is not really different from that of 3500 warheads. 
Similarly, from Russia's point of view it does not really matter whether the 
United States cuts its nuclear arsenal to 1700 weapons or leaves it at the 
level of 6000.

The reluctance to reduce nuclear arsenals is also understandable. Although 
both sides seem to realize that the number of weapons that they have far 
exceeds what is necessary for deterrence, neither is certain about exactly 
how far it can go in reducing their arsenals. Given these uncertainties and 
the absence of incentives for reductions provided by the logic of arms race, 
military and political institutions in both countries are unable to come up 
with a policy that goes further than maintaining status quo. 

Since the arms control dialogue is largely irrelevant from the military point 
of view, other issues have replaced traditional military ones. These issues 
may have nothing to do with arms control and disarmament, but they come to 
dominate the dialog, which may not provide the best venue for addressing 
them. 

Both current controversies-the need for a binding disarmament agreement and 
the ABM Treaty-seem to illustrate this point very well. The Russian military 
and political leadership seems to understand very well that development of a 
missile defense that would in any way interfere with the Russian capability 
to deter the United States is currently not technically possible. Preserving 
the ABM Treaty stopped being a question of military balance long time ago. 
Moreover, Russia's policy strongly suggests that it is not interested in 
preserving the treaty for the sake of avoiding a precedent of unilateral 
withdrawal from a major international agreement (if it was interested, it 
would have agreed to a modification of the treaty, which would formally 
preserve it). Rather, Russia considers the question of the ABM treaty as a 
matter of principle and sees this issue as a vehicle for asserting its 
position in international affairs.

The issue of weapons reductions is being treated very much the same way. A 
call for a comprehensive treaty that would include verification measures and 
control is hardly a practical policy. The problem is not only that an 
agreement of this kind is probably impossible (and maybe unnecessary). It is 
that Russian leadership seems to value an agreement of this kind not because 
it would set limits on nuclear weapons or destroys them, but because it would 
provide yet another way of showing that the United States considers Russia an 
equal partner. As a result, the traditional arms control agenda, whether it 
is preserving the ABM treaty or concluding a verifiable disarmament 
agreement, has been taken over by political issues that have nothing to do 
with arms control.

One conclusion that follows from this analysis is that progress on 
substantive arms control issues is virtually impossible. The United States 
and Russia are still operating within the old arms control negotiations 
framework, which provides few incentives for solving the problems that exist 
today. Both countries seem to understand that they need to replace this old 
framework with something new, but so far their efforts have stopped at a 
rhetorical level. Moreover, what we see today are attempts to approach new 
problems-the most important of which is building a non-adversarial 
U.S.-Russian relationship and moving away from the nuclear confrontation of 
the Cold War-as if they are simply "warhead counting" and "strategic balance" 
problems of traditional arms control.

In practical terms, no one should expect that missile defense or questions of 
strategic parity will disappear from the U.S.-Russia agenda any time soon, 
primarily because the underlying political issues, which are the real cause 
of the controversy surrounding these issues, cannot be resolved easily. If 
any successful agreement is possible here, it will have to address the 
political issues, rather than provide a technical arms control solutions. For 
example, a compromise on the ABM Treaty may include an agreement that would 
call for cooperative work on some components of missile defenses. Although 
practical importance of cooperation of this kind will be negligible, its 
political effect could prove sufficient for a compromise.

While traditional ABM Treaty and START-type negotiations remain deadlocked, 
progress can be made in areas that are not considered part of traditional 
arms control and therefore are not affected by political controversies. One 
of these areas is dismantlement of nuclear warheads and disposal of weapon 
grade fissile materials. If handled properly these areas may provide 
opportunities for real progress in reducing nuclear arsenals, which 
eventually may prove more important than traditional SALT and START 
approaches. 

The traditional strategic arms control process may never recover from the end 
of the Cold War. Attempts to revitalize it by using the threat of a new arms 
race have largely failed, primarily because no arms race of the Cold War type 
is likely to materialize. On the negative side, this has left the United 
States and Russia with large nuclear arsenals and few ideas of how to cut 
them. On the positive side, the current problems of arms strongly indicate 
that the cold war confrontation is over. Of course, the United States and 
Russia are still far from overcoming all the problems they inherited from the 
Cold War. They seem to be making steps in this direction, but they have yet 
to build a framework that would allow them to deal with these problems 
effectively.

*******