CDI Russia Weekly-#186 28 December 2001 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. Interfax: Russians name their men and women of the year. 2. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, The Ghost of Christmas Past. 3. Irish Times: Putin sees Chechnya advantage in support for war on terrorism - Seamus Martin, International Editor, looks at the Russian President's political year. 4. strana.ru: In 2001 Russia registers one of the world's highest GDP growth rates, Prime Minister Kasyanov. 5. AVN: US antimissile system exists on paper only, says Russian general. 6. Itar-Tass: Russia to allow US experts to its secret nuclear centres. 7. Itar-Tass: Russian Security Council chief upbeat on results of outgoing year. 8. Los Angeles Times: Nina Khrushcheva, What Comes First in Russia: Democracy or Trust? 9. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Aleksei Pushkov, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: LIMITS OF RAPPROCHEMENT. Washington's unilateral moves threaten the new Russian-US relationship. 10. Izvestia: Yevgeny Bai, EUGENE LAWSON: SEPTEMBER CHANGED OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. An interview with Eugene Lawson, Chairman of the US-Russia Business Council. 11. WPS Monitoring Agency: POLITICAL FORECASTS [press review]. 2002: THE YEAR OF THE HORSE HARNESSED IN TANDEM WITH THE DRAGON. ******* #1 Russians name their men and women of the year Interfax Moscow, 27 December: The majority of Russians - 57 per cent - have named President Vladimir Putin man of the year. Interfax on Thursday [27 December] obtained this information from the All- Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Research, VTsIOM, which recently conducted a representative interview poll of 1,600 respondents. Those polled were requested to name four or five Russian or foreign citizens who deserved this title. The poll revealed that all the other people mentioned by the interviewees received a significantly smaller share of the vote than Putin. Following the Russian president in the poll are US President George W. Bush (7 per cent), Russian Emergencies Minister Sergey Shoygu (6 per cent), international terrorist Usama Bin-Ladin (4 per cent), Russian Communist party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov (4 per cent), Nobel Prize winner Zhores Alferov (3 per cent), Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka (2 per cent), leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (2 per cent), Kemerovo Region's governor Aman Tuleyev (2 per cent), and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (2 per cent). In previous years, Russian men of the year included Vladimir Putin in 2000 and 1999, Yevgeniy Primakov in 1998, Boris Nemtsov in 1997, Aleksandr Lebed in 1996, [TV presenter] Vladislav Listyev in 1995, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in 1994 and 1993, Boris Yeltsin in 1992, 1991, and 1990, and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989 and 1988. Asked to name the woman of the year, 14 per cent of Russians chose Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matviyenko. Following Matviyenko are Union of Right Forces leader Irina Khakamada (9 per cent), pop singers Alla Pugacheva (7 per cent) and Alsou (2 per cent), President Putin's wife Lyudmila (2 per cent), first deputy speaker of the State Duma Lyubov Sliska (2 per cent), ex-minister and prominent public figure Ella Pamfilova (2 per cent), tennis player Anna Kurnikova (1 per cent), opera singer Galina Vishenvskaya (1 per cent), and stage comic performer Klara Novikova (1 per cent). Last year, Russians also named Valentina Matviyenko woman of the year; in 1999 - Irina Khakamada, in 1998 - [politician] Galina Starovoytova and before that, Alla Pugacheva was named woman of the year for four years in a row. ******* #2 Moscow Times December 28, 2001 The Ghost of Christmas Past By Pavel Felgenhauer A year ago, U.S.-Russian relations seemed to be going from bad to worse. There were tit-for-tat expulsions of alleged spies from Moscow and from Washington. The new U.S. President George W. Bush promised to abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russian officials responded by threatening to break out of all other existing arms control treaties, promising to put more nuclear warheads on existing warheads and so on. Of course, everyone understood that Russia was not capable of financing a full-blown arms race with the West. But China officially supported Moscow's stand on ABM and NATO expansion, so a new Cold War-style confrontation between East and West seemed possible. Last January, U.S. government officials leaked information to the press that Russia secretly had moved tactical nuclear weapons to the Kaliningrad region -- a small patch of Russian sovereign territory sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania on the shores of the Baltic. Moscow fiercely denied that there were any nuclear weapons in the area. President Vladimir Putin told journalists that the report was "rubbish." Nukes in Kaliningrad were never conformed, and the story died away. But somehow the Russian denials did not sound convincing. The military did not, apparently, deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, but was clearly running exercises to prepare for a swift deployment of nukes by air or by sea from St. Petersburg, in case the Baltic countries closed their air space to Russian military transport planes in the event of a NATO blockade and siege of Kaliningrad. Ten years after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russian generals still see NATO and the United States as their main potential enemy. The chilly tension that was so evident only a year ago was seen in the defense community as ample proof that armed deterrence is the only valid policy in facing NATO and that battle plans on the Western theater (first of all in and around Kaliningrad and in the Barents-Norwegian seas) were still of utmost importance. Kaliningrad, surrounded by NATO member Poland and NATO-hopeful Lithuania, was seen since the beginning of the 1990s as the most vulnerable point against which NATO could apply various forms of military pressure or a military-backed economic blockade without risking a global nuclear confrontation. Russian military planners still believe that a conflict over human rights violations in Belarus, ruthlessly ruled by President Alexander Lukashenko, or Russian actions in the Caucasus could trigger a NATO military response: A full sea, land and air blockade of the Kaliningrad region and then an attack with stealth bombers and conventional cruise missiles on military bases in Kaliningrad, Belarus and the nuclear Northern Fleet exposed at its anchor bases near the Norwegian border in the Murmansk area. Russia would either have to start a global nuclear war it would probably lose and surely be annihilated, or surrender like Yugoslavia and accept Western (U.S.) domination. All major military exercises the Defense Ministry has managed to run in the last 10 years followed basically the same scenario. The latest took place in August, several weeks before the Sept. 11 attack on America. In a joint air-defense exercise, Belarussian and Russian forces prepared to repel a NATO air offensive against Kaliningrad and Belarus, combined with a Taliban invasion of former Soviet Central Asia, tacitly supported by the United States. Russian military chiefs (as many of their counterparts elsewhere) try to paint a world full of horrifying threats to extract as much defense money as possible. In the mid 1990s, a joint command under naval supervision was established in Kaliningrad, so all the forces could fight as the united garrison of a besieged fortress. It was also considered of paramount importance that tactical nukes be rushed into Kaliningrad before NATO closes in. The Kaliningrad garrison could use the nukes to fight its own local nuclear campaign that might not involve the rest of Russia. Tactical nukes could also serve as a regional deterrent. But it's important that the warheads be rushed in at the last moment, so NATO could not destroy them in a surprise preventive strike. It is also important that the nukes not be deployed beforehand so as to prevent giving the West a pretext to attack Kaliningrad. Last September, Russian strategic forces were preparing to launch an exercise that would involve bombers flying to the American coastline to mimic a cruise-missile attack on targets on the U.S. mainland. President Vladimir Putin called off the exercise at the last moment, because U.S. cities were already indeed hit from the air and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, was on edge. Today it would appear the world has profoundly changed, but for the Russian military it's more or less the same. When the United States paused for several weeks in September before attacking the Taliban in Afghanistan and offered peace if Osama bin Laden was handed over, our generals muttered: Trickery. Today the Talibs and other extremist forces have dissolved into an underground army in Afghanistan. Joint action by Russia, Iran and the United States has diminished the threat to Central Asia. But there are more and more signs that Russia and the West are backing competing "anti- Talib" factions, so Afghanistan in the future will most likely be (and to some extent already is) more a source of contention than a reason to unite. Last week, on Dec. 17, when the Strategic Rocket Forces celebrated their 42nd anniversary, Russian generals actually toasted with glasses of vodka the health of Bush, who several days before had announced a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The toast went like this: "Comrade Bush made America's aggressive intentions obvious and as the ABM shield is built the threat will increase, so the future of our nuclear deterrent is secure for a generation at least." When over a glass of vodka or wine in the last days before Christmas and New Year's, I tell Russian generals and members of Moscow's small foreign policy elite that the world has maybe truly changed, that Putin maybe is indeed serious about turning Russia into an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic community of nations and a trustworthy ally of the United States, that there will be no need anymore to maintain defenses against the West, most gaze in total disbelief. They shake their heads, some chuckle, some go ballistic and talk of betrayal. Their Western counterparts also shake their heads in total disbelief: "Is Putin actually serious?" I don't know. Even if he is, it all hinges on just one man, a former KGB spy recruiter, whose word, apparently, should never be taken at face value. Maybe those wise men in epaulets know better? For generation after generation the generals and diplomats of the Euro-Atlantic community (including Russia) have shown their ability to make nightmare scenarios come true. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. ******* #3 Irish Times December 27, 2001 Putin sees Chechnya advantage in support for war on terrorism - Seamus Martin, International Editor, looks at the Russian President's political year Irish Times; Dec 27, 2001 President Putin's suggestion that he might accept NATO's expansion to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was instantly greeted by some commentators as an important part of the international coalition-building process in the wake of the attacks on the United States on September 11th. It is not for nothing, however, that Russians are noted as the best chess players on earth. Hidden in the small print of Mr Putin's statement was the suggestion that NATO reform itself and become a political rather than military organisation. If his proposal were to be accepted, NATO would have conformed to the long-term aims of Russia and it is to be assumed that Mr Putin's astute suggestion was made in the knowledge that while it would gain publicity for the Russian cause it would in the end be rejected by the United States which, after all, is the key component of the organisation. When his offer was made it appeared that Mr Putin's plans were going well. While genuinely supporting the United States in its response to September 11th he, like many political leaders elsewhere, not least the British Prime minister, Mr Blair, saw that advantages could be gained for his national interest. Russia, it should be noted, has the largest Muslim population of any state in Europe. Islam has 20 million adherents in the Russian Federation, ranging from the militants of Chechnya to the milder and more pragmatic followers of Mr Mintimer Shaimiyev, the president of the autonomous republic of Tatarstan. By allying himself to the coalition of international forces supporting the United States in its campaign against the Taliban rulership of Afghanistan and its backing for Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network Mr Putin had the opportunity to equate the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington with the earlier bombing of apartment blocks in Moscow and Russian provincial centres, for which Chechen separatists have been blamed. The opportunity was taken to equate President Bush's decisions to bomb the appallingly extremist Taliban regime in Afghanistan with his weapons of increasingly accurate advanced technology with President Putin's less discriminate efforts at bringing Chechnya to heel. The fact that Chechens have participated on the Taliban side in the Afghan war suggests, however, that Mr Putin's problems are far more complicated than those faced by Mr Bush, except in the important matter of publicity. While Mr Bush must face the unpredictable attentions of an independent media, Mr Putin and his associates have, in the course of 2001, benefited from the removal of critical forces from Russia's major television networks. The end of NTV as an important focus of dissident opinion due to the exile of its former proprietor, Mr Vladimir Gusinsky, and its takeover by pro-Putin interests has been a major factor in ensuring that damage to Mr Putin's image at home has been limited. This media dominance by the Kremlin could hardly have come at a better time. In recent days the decision by the Bush administration to abjure its commitment to the 1972 ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile) treaty in order to pursue its plans for a second 'Star Wars' programme has left Mr Putin open to severe criticism at home. It is convenient, therefore, that this criticism is likely to be expressed mainly in the serious newspapers, whose circulation has been considerably diminished, in military circles and among liberal as well as national-bolshevik political circles. There has already been pressure from military-industrial circles for Russia to increase its numbers of multi-warhead missiles as a response to Mr Bush's Star Wars proposals. Mr Putin has not yet clarified his own position but because of his media dominance he can, at least, avoid widespread condemnation as someone who is under American control. Mr Putin also has the remarkable distinction of having presided over one of the very few economies to run contrary to the recessionary trends so evident elsewhere. Regarded for years as the sickest economy in Europe, Russia has showed itself to be distinct from the western economic cycle, though many believe this to have been due to the high price of oil which prevailed for most of the year. Now oil prices are at their lowest for some time; America has shown that it is willing to impose its views on Russia in the area of nuclear weaponry and looming in the background is a burgeoning incidence of HIV-AIDS infection among the younger generations of the Russian Federation. Mr Putin's pro-American actions in using his considerable influence on Afghanistan's neighbouring states of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as well as his own very strong support of the Northern Alliance forces in Afghanistan itself may yet be seen by the Russian electorate as having been insufficiently rewarded. With the undoubted diminution of the free media in Russia, however, a less vigorous reaction is likely in 2002. ******* #4 strana.ru December 27, 2001 In 2001 Russia registers one of the world's highest GDP growth rates, Prime Minister Kasyanov By year-end Russian GDP growth will exceed 5% In 2001, Russia registered one of the world's highest GDP growth rates, over 5%, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov told this year's last government meeting Thursday. "We are finishing the year with good results, although there are certain drawbacks," he said. In his words, the Russian economy's dependence on exports declines, although it still remains sufficiently high. Real incomes grew 6% in the current year and more than 15% over the two previous years. "The growth of real incomes formed the consumer demand, which is one of the chief sources of economic growth," he said. At the same time, there are "certain disproportions" in evidence in this sphere, he added. Specifically, "The rate of growth of real incomes exceeds labor productivity growth rate," he said. Besides, "not quite competitive" Russian industry fails to satisfy the growing demand, which leads to an increase in imports. To quote the Prime Minister, the industry has registered the highest level of circulating assets in the last ten years. The average profits in industry in the outgoing year were 11-12%. He stressed at the same time that so far a great part of profits were created in the mining industries. Russia's international ratings grew to the level, which had been before the August 1998 crisis, he said. Besides, the country's debt obligations grew in price. The Russian corporate sector now had a chance to borrow in order to make investments into the real sector of the economy. The natural monopolies, which until recently had been in the red, were gradually emerging in the black, he claimed. "The tariff policy in the natural monopolies is pursued in a more sensible manner," he said. According to Mr. Kasyanov, tariff policy principles for next year will be finally shaped in early 2002. "The year was one of the most stable ones," he said. The work on the main principles of the economic policy for next year will be accomplished early in 2002. The Government managed to "create a good mid-term foundation for building up the rate of change," he said. He also noted as important the creation in the outgoing year of new transport arteries for the export of Russian energy resources: construction work continues on the bed of the Black Sea, where the Blue Stream gas pipeline is being laid; the Baltic Pipeline System project has been completed and Vladimir Putin is going to attend its inauguration Thursday. Last year saw greater rapprochement between Russia and the European Union; there was a boost in negotiations on Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. It also became possible to solve many problems involving CIS countries, specifically to finally settle Ukrainian gas problems. The Prime Minister also went on record as saying that a model had been developed for an accelerated rapprochement between Russia and Belarus within the framework of the Union State. In his words, the agreements the sides reached must be filled with concrete results in the first quarter of next year "for the rapprochement to proceed at an even faster rate." He also stressed that in 2001 the Government "managed to find a common language with the Parliament in practically all directions," due to which, "it became possible to create a firm foundation for the mid-term." ******* #5 US antimissile system exists on paper only, says Russian general Russian AVN Military News Agency web site Moscow, 27 December: The Russian Defence Ministry's leadership fully shares President Vladimir Putin's assessment of the consequences of the US withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and believes that it poses no direct threat to Russia's security. "The president of the Russian Federation and the Russian minister of defence have said many times that the US decision to pull out of the ABM Treaty was no surprise for us and does not pose a serious threat to Russia's security," Lt-Gen Anatoliy Mazurkevich, head of the Defence Ministry's main directorate for international military cooperation, told reporters on Thursday [27 December]. Taking a question from Interfax-Military News Agency, Mazurkevich said there was no chance of creating real and efficient antimissile defence systems in the near future, because such technologies exist only on paper. ******* #6 Russia to allow US experts to its secret nuclear centres ITAR-TASS Washington, 28 December: The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry and the US Department of Energy have designed the rules for the visits of US experts to the so-called Russian "nuclear cities". A corresponding agreement was initialled in Moscow and is now subject for the final approval by the Russian government, according to Steve Black, a high-ranking official of the Energy Department who is in charge of nuclear non-proliferation programmes. He told ITAR-TASS on Thursday [27 December] that the final approval is expected from Moscow already in January and that the access agreement was an important step in the implementation of the "Nuclear cities" programme. The "Nuclear cities" programme was launched by former US President Bill Clinton to promote Russian military conversion in nuclear research centres and the employment of experts from converted nuclear enterprises. The programme covers three nuclear cities - Sarov (former Arzamas-16), Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70) and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). However another seven cities are expected to join it. The US draft 2002 budget envisaged 42 million dollars for non-proliferation purposes. ******* #7 Russian Security Council chief upbeat on results of outgoing year ITAR-TASS Moscow, 27 December: "Reaching a qualitatively new level in Russia-NATO relations has become an important result of the outgoing year," Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushaylo believes. He summed up the results of the work done by the Security Council in 2001 in today's exclusive interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent. "The levels of cooperation between Russia and the alliance should be clearly defined," Vladimir Rushaylo believes. "Russia is ready for cooperation in the field of safeguarding strategic security, however defence policy issues are NATO's internal affair," he said. "NATO's firm intention to continue expanding eastwards cannot but cause Russia's anxiety," Vladimir Rushaylo said. "We will not be queuing for NATO membership, and there is hardly any need to consider in earnest any prospects for Russia joining the alliance. However, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to maintain most profound forms of cooperation with the alliance, and ever more frequent contacts between defence agencies prove this," he said. During his recent visit to Moscow, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson spoke about the need to work out new effective procedures for Russia's cooperation with the North-Atlantic bloc. "Russia is ready for this," the Russian Security Council secretary said. According to Rushaylo, "changes in Russia-NATO relations also leave their imprint on bilateral contacts with the alliance's member states". "Similarity of the stands taken by Russia and the USA on the main issues of safeguarding strategic security gives grounds to hope that the withdrawal of the USA from the ABM treaty will not affect mutual relations of trust, which have been established between the two countries, and the balance of forces in the world as a whole," the Russian Security Council secretary believes. However, "all nuclear states will have to seek new points of contact in a bid to safeguard strategic stability in the modern world, which has long been guaranteed by the ABM treaty". ******* #8 Los Angeles Times December 27, 2001 What Comes First in Russia: Democracy or Trust? By NINA KHRUSHCHEVA Nina Khrushcheva teaches international media at New School University in New York and Moscow State University in Moscow. MOSCOW -- Every nation gets the government it deserves. This old saying, which implies that the autocratic nature of the Russian state matches the meekness of its people, is attributed to the Sardinian ambassador to Russia in 1811. It seemed absolutely truthful here until Monday, when Russian President Vladimir V. Putin answered questions from Russian citizens in an unprecedented, two-hour live town hall-style nationwide TV session. The country was glued to television in disbelief. After 10 years of the false promises of Boris N. Yeltsin's democracy--which resulted in poverty and inequality for most of the nation, with only a handful of enriched oligarchic and state structures--people now are blind to the authentic democratic practices unfolding before their eyes. In the late 1980s, when Mikhail S. Gorbachev declared glasnost and initiated a near-revolution among Russian leaders by authorizing the transmission of live political discussions and not canned (and usually nauseating) Soviet speeches, the country was also glued to its televisions. Yet while Gorbachev was listened to with hope--after the years of ideological secrecy, could glasnost be for real?--Putin was listened to by a people grown accustomed to questioning their government's actions and motives, an audience skeptical about the new leader's desires, let alone his ability to do something for them. In a "normal" country, which Russia aspires to be, a direct dialogue between the leader and the nation is seen as normal, even routine. Yet in Russia, Putin's attempt to exercise a promised democracy and to build a better sociological basis for his future policies was taken by many "democratic" analysts and some opposition media as just another trick to assert his authority. However, their accusations cannot undermine the necessity of this well-organized exercise in democracy. Instead of deciding by decree what the country needs (as the Soviet leaders and Yeltsin did), instead of listening to hysterical media that value breaking news over levelheaded reporting, instead of waiting until social problems sparked rioting in the streets (as in Argentina recently), Putin wisely used TV to allow the public to vent its frustrations. Yet the post-Yeltsin public, disillusioned with anything that sounds or looks democratic, was unwilling to give Putin the benefit of the doubt. In Murmansk in northern Russia, for example, many people regarded the TV session as a setup: Questions were prepared, censored and screened for government purposes. Pointed or not, however, the questions that were aired concerned pensions, wages, racketeering, corruption, drugs, education, science and health care subsidies, the future of oil prices and Chechnya--all vital issues. Prepared or not prepared, Putin tried to give some honest answers, or at least coherent ones, yet another precedent for any Russian leader. Russia's worst problem today is not that it can never seem to have or do anything good, or that it remains an odd mutant, an aggressor and victim all at once. Russia's problem is that it can't see when it has it good. The country never trusted its government because it never trusted itself to withstand the government's pressures. On Monday, the Russian president went on TV to ask his people's opinion, but they still didn't trust his trust, dismissing this new democratic step as a blatant public relations move. In the West, which is Russia's democratic role model, public relations is good. When Colin Powell advances Madison Avenue advertising executive Charlotte Beers from promoting Uncle Ben's rice to promoting Uncle Sam's smile, we in Russia were all in favor. When the Russian president answered questions on the radio in the U.S. during his November visit, we were all happy. Why then do we see a similar act taking place within Russia as an exercise in autocracy? Because democracy and freedom of speech are still viewed as someone else's virtues, virtues we believe we are incapable of possessing ourselves. Today, the question of Russia's democracy and freedom of speech is not a question for its leader but a question for its people. ******* #9 Nezavisimaya Gazeta December 27, 2001 RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: LIMITS OF RAPPROCHEMENT Washington's unilateral moves threaten the new Russian-US relationship Author: Aleksei Pushkov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] THE DECISION TO DISMANTLE THE ABM TREATY MEANS THAT THE HAWKS IN THE US ADMINISTRATION GAINED THE UPPER HAND. RUSSIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR THIS TURN OF EVENTS. BUSH WAS AIMING TO DISMANTLE THE ABM TREATY SINCE THE VERY FIRST DAYS OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. President George W. Bush and his administration came to power in the United States in early 2001 and immediately scared the whole world with their determination to act unilaterally and without regard for others in foreign policy. When Condoleezza Rice was told over and over that this was a concern to American allies and Russia, she inevitably repeated, "It's all right. They'll get used to it." Washington was forced to reverse its course soon afterwards. Now, a year later, the US Administration appears to be on the verge of reversing it again. Unilateral withdrawal by the United States from the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty is a symbolic gesture. It should not be viewed only from the angle of possible threats to Russia's security. It should be viewed as indication of the general direction of American foreign policy strategy. The decision to dismantle the ABM treaty means that the hawks in the US Administration gained the upper hand. Russia should have been prepared for this turn of events. Bush was aiming to dismantle the ABM treaty since the very first days of his presidential campaign. Russian-American rapprochement since September 11 has nothing to do with it. Vladimir Putin's visit to the United States made absolutely clear that no compromise was possible. All issues were finalized during Colin Powell's latest talks in Moscow. All the same, this event is something Russia would have preferred to do without. There was so much optimism over the Russian-American coalition, and here we are: the war in Afghanistan is not even over, and the United States warns Russia that nothing has really changed. The United States will withdraw from the ABM treaty just as it said it would. Washington' decision should have a sobering effect on some Russian enthusiasts advocating all sorts of coalitions with America. All these coalitions boil down to one and the same thing: the United States makes sure that its hands are untied and press on with whatever it is after, merely permitting Russia to support America with various degrees of enthusiasm. The moment chosen for the announcement and withdrawal leaves the impression - and not in Russia alone - that this is a clear message: the Bush Administration is not going to depend on Russia's position. The Americans say nowadays that they have prepared Russia for the eventual withdrawal, arranged consultations and negotiations, and openly warned Putin of it before the formal announcement. True, but this is only a sweet coating for a bitter pill. The United States is doing what it intended to do before Russia's participation in the counter-terrorism coalition and Putin's decision on strategic rapprochement with the United States. Hence the question: what is going to change in America's policy with regard to Russia after the recent emotional boom? Generally speaking, hawks' triumph in the matter of the ABM treaty does not promise anything good to Russia. Activization of America's unilateral steps in various directions and spheres is much more probable. Bush's Administration has made it clear already that it is not going to ask for UN permission in the matter of actions of vengeance in other countries. It stands to reason to expect pressure on Russia to grow in several aspects at once - in the matter of Iraq, policy of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, and even Chechnya. The New York Times reports an interesting episode of Putin's negotiations with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Moscow on November 3. "You want from Russia a kind of flexibility that all essentially sends the ABM treaty down the drain," Putin said. It is this sort of flexibility that will be demanded from Russia in other matters as well - flexibility that will send our positions and interests in other spheres down the same drain. What is Russia getting in return? Wholly new relations between Russia and NATO are one of the trump cards of Russia and the West. There are prominent figures in the United States, men like Henry Kissenger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who object to these relations. The latter fears that Russia's equal rights in discussion of NATO policy will weaken integrity of the Alliance and says that NATO should be wary of Russia. The former is even more explicit. "NATO has been and remains essentially a military alliance, and protection of Europe from a Russian invasion is one of its objectives," Kissenger said. The US Administration is also afraid that Russia may "get into NATO through the back door." These fears became apparent during the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels in December. Before the meeting, all involved states actively discussed the idea of a new Russian-NATO body where Russia would have enjoyed a decisive voice in organization of peacekeeping operations beyond the sphere of responsibility of the Alliance. The American delegation to Brussels killed the proposal. This change in Washington's position is ascribed to Rumsfeld-Wolfovitz group. There are even reports that Nick Burns, the US Ambassador to NATO, was instructed to kill the idea itself of the 20. Burns failed, the formula survived. As a result, however, we may see another variation of the Russian-NATO consultative council where Moscow's opinions will only be listened to with polite sympathy, nothing more. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov failed to persuade NATO defense ministers to change their minds on the matter in December 19 negotiations. Russia will only be able to voice its opinion, no veto right for it. Washington emphasizes as well that Russia will surely benefit from America's withdrawal from the ABM treaty because the United States is prepared to link it to reduction of nuclear arsenals. To be more precise, the United States is prepared to sign an agreement on substantial cuts to strategic offensive weapons which Putin suggested, the Americans say. If the agreement is signed, Russian and American arsenals will be down to 1,500 to 2,200 warheads each. "If" is the key word. The US administration itself is split on the matter. The idea of arms control without treaties is very popular in the United States nowadays. Russia and the United States are friends now, and friends should trust one another. No treaties are therefore needed, this is what it comes down to. This idea is promoted first and foremost by the officials who advocate a dramatic buildup of the American military might. It reveals the whole idea as an attempt to leave the United States' hands untied once again. Russia cannot accept it. Moscow once withdrew from East Germany and gave its consent for unification of Germany. No agreements were signed, no nothing. Moscow did it expecting the West to respond in kind. It got NATO eastward expansion in return. When Vadim Bakatin passed on to US Ambassador Robert Strauss a layout of Russian bugs in the American Embassy in 1991, Strauss replied, "Thanks you so very much. That's very noble on your part, but do not expect us to follow suit." The possibility of joining the World Trade Organization sooner is the last argument for the rapprochement. As always, the devil is hiding in details. Russia does not need membership right now but on the discriminating conditions, and this is what Moscow is offered. Putin already announced that Russia did not need it. When general public is told that this is the unique chance to leap into the Western world, it is not told for some reason that the West itself is pretty apprehensive of this leap. For the time being, the West wants to see Russia only sporadically, when it needs Russia. Russia was needed to destroy the Taliban and America began talking in terms of alliances. The operation approaches its end, and Russia is not needed that much anymore. Washington can even withdraw from the ABM treaty to remind the Russians who is the boss. All this does not mean that Russia should forget about cooperation with NATO or the United States. It means that Russia should be aware of the existing limits of the rapprochement. Secondly, Russia should make the United States (and particularly the staunch advocates of untied hands for America) understand that acceptance of this doctrine may do away with the promising Russian- American partnership that appears to be taking shape. This concept of untied hands will inevitably collide with serious Russian interests sooner or later. Besides, leaving the impression that Russia is going to accept every America's decision on everything will be a grave mistake. It will only solidify the positions of the part of the American establishment that is least prone to taking Russian interests into account. The Cold War may be over for Putin but not for these American state officials who continue to see a potential enemy in Russia. Russia should be careful not to become too pliable and flexible so as not to disarm the politicians in the West who are in favor of paying more attention to Moscow's opinions and interests (regardless of the matter in question - be it NATO expansion or dismantlement of the ABM treaty). If Russia's actions stripped these political forces of all arguments against the concept of untied hands for America, if Russia showed itself a quantite negligeable, it will cease to be a factor of struggle over vital strategic decisions in the United States and in Europe alike. This policy will leave Russia in backwaters of the global politics. Rumsfeld himself needs the flexibility he expects from Russia. A little bit more flexible Russia will b a Russia ignored by the international community. ****** #10 Izvestia December 27, 2001 EUGENE LAWSON: SEPTEMBER CHANGED OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP An interview with Eugene Lawson, Chairman of the US-Russia Business Council. Author: Yevgeny Bai [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] US-RUSSIA BUSINESS COUNCIL CHAIRMAN EUGENE LAWSON COMMENTS ON A REPORT ON PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. HE DISCUSSES PROTECTION MEASURES AND DEREGULATION. HE SAYS THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT IS LIKELY TO BE REPEALED NEXT SPRING. US Commerce Secretary Don Evans has received a report on prospects for Russian-American trade and economic relations drafted by the US-Russia Business Council. We are the first newspaper to receive a copy, and have approached US-Russia Business Council Chairman Eugene Lawson for comments. Question: American leaders regularly say that the September tragedy has dramatically changed the political relationship between our countries. What changes, if any, are taking place in trade and economic relations? Eugene Lawson: Those changes are no less dramatic. The pattern of relations between the defense sectors of the two states is completely different now. Despite the provisional restrictions on aircraft contracts [Boeing cancelled its contract with the Urals metals plant - Izvestia], the US aerospace industry still needs titanium from Russia. These deliveries compensate for the shortage of our own raw materials and enable our companies to compete with the Europeans. We hope that when the US Congress has adopted the new general system of preferences, titanium will be exempt from customs duties. The Pentagon can manage that, I think. Question: Russian steel and aluminum producers are having serious difficulties with access to the American market. Eugene Lawson: Yes, protectionism there is considerable. I think this sphere should be reorganized too. It should be a two-way street, figuratively speaking. Russia should be removed from the list of countries from which we demand additional customs duties. Question: Many Russian goods are barred from the American market due to incomprehensible bureaucratic restrictions. Eugene Lawson: That situation is changing for the better too. The process of certification for Russian MI-26 helicopters is underway. America does not have anything like this helicopter, which can lift 22 tons. American helicopters lift only 13-14 tons. The MI-26 could be actively used to fight forest fires, in construction, or when large shipments have to be moved. When the helicopter is no longer criticized for environmental reasons or its noise level, we will buy a substantial number of MI-26s. Question: The US Congress has to repeal the outdated Jackson- Vanik amendment as well. Eugene Lawson: According to what I've heard, the Congress will do so in spring 2002. Before President Bush's visit to Russia. Question: The report mentions a fairly new sphere of investment: investment in Russian leasing. Eugene Lawson: We expect the amount of American goods leased to Russia to increase at least five-fold in the near future, and the ratio of direct investment in leasing to amount to 25-30% of all investment. American companies are interested in development of leasing in the colossal Russian market. Russia has financial difficulties, and leasing is one of the most reliable ways of getting high-quality equipment. We emphasize in the report that the transition to the new level of cooperation became possible when America became convinced that Russia intends to serious amend its legislation. Deputy Director of the Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak and me discussed these matters twice. We have some serious proposals on the pensions reform and the system of insurance. Not so long ago a consultative center in the insurance sphere opened in Moscow with our assistance. We view it as a serious move towards appearance of American insurance companies in Russia. Question: This spring you elected Semyon Kukes of the TNK oil company to the board of directors of the US-Russia Business Council. He is the first Russian there. Are there any other candidates? Eugene Lawson: Yes. We offered a seat on the board to Sberbank CEO Andrei Kazmin. He accepted the offer. We hope to see him at the next meeting in Washington in spring. Mikhail Barkov, Russian Trade Representative in the United States: Yes, prospects of US companies' participation in development of leasing in Russia interest us greatly. Even the largest transport companies in Russia have pools of only 200-300 trucks. The American company Penske alone has 100,000 trucks and an annual turnover amounting to $11 billion. Many parties in Russia can afford to rent its trucks at $2,000-5,000 a month. ****** #11 WPS Monitoring Agency www.wps.ru December 26, 2001 POLITICAL FORECASTS [press review] 2002: THE YEAR OF THE HORSE HARNESSED IN TANDEM WITH THE DRAGON [www.wps.ru/e_index.html] The end of 2001 marks the middle of Vladimir Putin's presidency. These two occasions have prompted multiple summaries and predictions for the country and the president in the media. However, few articles are very optimistic. The [Kommersant] newspaper anticipates, "Things will get worse: political scientists say Russia will not have a cloudless future." Well-known economist Mikhail Delyagin was especially radical in his predictions: he stated that in the near future the country should expect a most severe crisis and a military-political dictatorship regime. According to Delyadin, "the problem is not that Stalin is ruling us, but that this is a very petty Stalin, who is unable to work out a strategy and to decide where he wants to lead the country." However, says the director of the Globalization Institute, those who feel strong enough in such a situation should still "work on the nation's economic strategy, since sooner or later it will be needed, if not during the junta period, then after its collapse." It should be noted that Delyagin's pessimism is not new for those who follow discussions in the press. What is interesting is that this time presidential economic adviser Andrei Illarionov almost agreed with him. As expected, Illarionov's speech at the Alexander House conference was published in full in Boris Berezovsky's [Nezavisimaya Gazeta]. As Illarionov stated, electing Vladimir Putin as president "gave hope to finally principally break the most repulsive traits of the economic and socio-political development of the country." However, in his opinion, this year it has become obvious that "this hope is mostly an illusion". As for the economic growth of the past three years, Illarionov explained that the government has had nothing to do with it, as it is a result of "redistribution of tremendous financial resources from abroad in favor of Russia". At the same time, Illarionov believes that if the 1999 economic policy of Russia had not changed, this year the economic growth could have been not 5% but at least 15%. The hopes for elimination of corruption in Russia were not fulfilled either: the scale of corruption does not differ much from what it was in Boris Yeltsin's time. From Illarionov's standpoint, the only difference is that previously the corruption was "more amateurish", while at present "it is becoming more and more institutionalized, formalized by official resolutions of the authorities, both federal, regional, and local." As for politics, according to Illarionov, all that was characteristic of the seemingly bygone regime is returning, first of all it concerns the fight between various groups at power. "I'm afraid we are returning into the same ditch we had recently got out of," said Illarionov. According to him, the cause of the constant tension in the top circles is the imperfection of the Russian political system that is in fact a presidential republic. "The development experience of transition economies over the past twelve years demonstrates that a presidential republic is very often less efficient than a parliamentary republic," since the latter is able to provide more effective control over executive branch of power. Various periodicals have taken note of the power-struggles. For instance, Yabloko's [Novaya Gazeta] writes, "Under Yeltsin the power used to have lots of opponents: the Communists, the disobedient Duma, regional governors - as a consequence, there was only one powerful team, the 'Family'." While Vladimir Putin does not have any real opponents, if not take into account indefatigable Boris Berezovsky, "No one is competing with the president for power; all are competing for a place under his right heel." That is why there cannot be a single united team, instead there are two rival opposing groupings in the power, the old and the new one, the Family and the St. Petersburgers. Meanwhile, the paper stresses, "fighting for big power also demands big money, which St. Petersburgers don't have." Moreover, they have no possibilities to make this money, as the level of their "services" is not high enough. According to the paper, the latest major property conflicts - because of Kuzbasugol, the Karabash plant, the Ust-Ilim lumber plant and so on - proved it: "in all cases the money in question were tens and hundreds of million of dollars in cash - and the KGBists were unable to get this tidbit," though all they needed is just "some" aptitude to use administrative resources. Moreover, the paper states that whenever the offended ones applied to the security structures, the latter suggested a "radical solution to the problem", while after the client rejected such services all the information about him was conveyed to his rivals. No wonder, the paper says, that St. Petersburgers were able to "get fixed" only in places where the president brought them holding their hand: Miller in Gazprom, Sergei Zivenko - in Rosspirtporm, Valery Yasin - in Svyazinvest. The paper also ironically notes that all "these appointed magicians have made the least success they could". That is why representatives of the security structures should not be taken for a slip-knot on tycoons' necks, they are rather a muzzle, "to prevent from biting". This means that it is useless to hope for effective fight against corruption, the paper stresses: at present the aim of the new team is not to destroy the vicious system, but to push the old team aside. [Novaya Gazeta] explains, "If Alexei Miller replaces Rem Vyakhirev in Gazprom instead of making Gazprom transparent, this means the Kremlin is satisfied with the principles of Gazprom's functioning, but is not satisfied with the person who receives the money." No one is going to kill the hen that lays golden eggs, so the reform of the system the tycoons established for their own needs is likely to be carried out. Moreover, [Novaya Gazeta] concludes, "Nationalization of the system instead of its annihilation became the basis for the new power's success." According to the [Obshchaya Gazeta] paper, conservatism is the main peculiarity of the current political life; 'fights and events' have left it. Even elections, the usual pride of the Russian democracy in the post-Soviet period hardly have any alternative today: "during gubernatorial elections the main question is: who the top authorities to appoint the winner and who is to be withdrawn from the elections." Moreover, the absence of alternatives has spread to all areas of the Russian public political life: "A president without an alternative is doomed to finally create a corresponding parliament with votes without an alternative." According to the paper, this system is evidently excessive, although it has not completely formed yet - the upper house of parliament has already achieved the necessary extent of non- alternativeness, and the lower house of parliament will catch up with it soon. So, putting its own people to the most important positions, the authority is trying to not only secure itself from possible threats (though the paper states currently there are hardly any in the country), but to rule out any danger of their appearance in the future. The motto of the new team is - total predictability and control. From this standpoint, the recent dismissal of Federal Council chair Yegor Stroev is very indicative, in accordance with an old Soviet tradition he "voluntarily resigned" and his successor Sergei Mironov, who is hardly known but was "recommended from the top", was elected by an overwhelming majority. As the paper explains, the authorities needed not to have a necessary person elected only, but also to have the results of the elections 100% predictable, natural, routine, and absolutely "alternativeless" action. The elections to the Moscow City Duma were held in accordance with the same principle: all the places were distributed between parties beforehand. The present authorities are highly concerned about high independence level, "no matter if this can cause any real danger or not". All this greatly reminds of Soviet times, when the authorities were concerned about abstractionism art exhibitions, or theatrical performances of the Taganka Theatre, which were not dangerous in the least. At the same time, the paper reminds: "disappearance of political events from publicity does not mean that they have disappeared at all". Fight for the power is still on, it only changed its form, "It has transformed from a fight for people's love into a fight for the ruler's love and is turning from open into secret." However, [Obshchaya Gazeta] thinks that "the process of predictability liquidation" is far from being over, and it is too early to speak about stagnation. On the other hand, the paper can't help extrapolating the present processes to predict the future, "It will be a country where the results of voting at all levels will be the same, 90%. Where nothing happens in the public political sphere, and all events are rituals - the ritual of elections, the ritual of a parliamentary meeting, a ritual of regular meetings of the president with his civil society, and so on and so forth. People will be judging of the real political fight in this country basing on gossips and rumors, and the real signs of any fight will be resignation or arresting for corruption of this or that official". "Transition to an authoritarian "hard hand" regime and even to sever totalitarianism does not necessarily demand a revolution or an upheaval," writes the [Vremya MN] paper. Sometimes this process is very peaceful and democratic, under the pressure of people, who are tired of "democratic chaos". According to the paper, today one of the fundamental democratic values - free elections - has been practically disavowed. Preservation of the present democratic camouflage does not change the essence of the process: actually the people are offered the only and convenient to the power candidate. "Those, who can really become the people's elect - a deputy, a mayor, or a governor - are crossed out of the list in advance, on the basis of a court verdict." On the other hand, of the candidate is "a favorite", the Center will do its best to "fix" the position for good by means of removing rivals. Moreover, everything will be done only according to the law. "So, the two cornerstones of any democracy - the law and the court - are disfiguring democracy in the country," writes the paper. The [Moskovsky Komsomolets] newspaper held a poll among its readers on the possibility of honest elections in Russia. The results are even more discouraging than the official data, in accordance with which the number of naive voters who still believe in honesty of Russian democratic procedures amounts to approximately 25% of all Russians. According to [Moskovsky Komsomolets] results, there are only 1.5% of such people in the country. Commenting on the results of the poll, author of the article Alexander Minkin noted that although the poll questions concerned elections and work of the Central Election Commission, the responds of the poll participants made it clear what people really think of the incumbent authorities. The [Novoye Vremya] magazine reported that according to monitoring.ru group, the State Duma is considered to be one of the most 'dishonest' organizations in Russia, while the traffic police are the leader on the black list. The law enforcement bodies (the police, prosecutor's office, and the tax police) hold the second place - 67% of respondents think they are dishonest; and the Duma and political parties are the third, respectively 67% and 65% of people think so. No wonder the majority of Russians simply do not know who to believe. As [Novoye Vremya] reports, if the parliamentary elections were held now, 21% of voters would not know who to vote for; 18% of voters would not participate in the elections at all; another 18% of respondents would vote against all. On the other hand, 16% of voters stated they would vote for the Unity and Fatherland - All Russia bloc; 13% of respondents are still devoted to the communists; and 6% of people support Yabloko; the Unity of Right Forces and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia both have 4%. Apparently, creators of new Liberal Russia party count on this large percent of unsure and "against all" people. However, at the constituent congress of the new party a representative of the Unity of Right Forces Leonid Gozman warned the members of the new party that the Liberal Party does not have any real chances, "No one will join you, as this will deprive them of voices... I would suggest voting for not creation of the Liberal Russia party." However, Sergei Yushenko, the founder of the party considered this speech of the Unity of Right Forces representative a clear proof that the right wing takes this new offspring of Berezovsky's as their rival. According to [Nezavisimaya Gazeta's] optimistic statements, "no matter how much the new political gambler may be criticized today, with the course of time the Liberal Russia is likely to become a real force, which both the authorities and the democratic colleagues will take into account." At the same time, [Novye Izvestia] informed that the new party has at least two new allies: Valeria Novodvorskaya and Konstantin Borovoi promised the Liberal Russia the support of the Democratic Union and the Party of Economic Freedom. Valeria Novodvorskaya said, "I hope you will defend the country from the president!" However, many people do not agree that the country needs to be defended from the president. As Viktor Loshak, the editor-in-chief of the liberal [Moskovskie Novosti] weekly, said commenting on Vladimir Putin's Monday television conference in the open air, "Putin and the country are at least interested in each other". Loshak also shared his opinion about the dialogue, "The liberal president met with his conservative people. An lecturer with international experience made a speech to the people who are still partially under the Iron Curtain". On the other hand, [Moskovsky Komsomolets] editor-in-chief noted that it is "good that grandiose plans left together with Soviet leaders". Putin formulated the next year's objective rather cautiously, "We need to make a small, but noticeable step towards better life." However, according to observations of the [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] newspaper, this is the weak point of the majority of Russians. As it turned out in the course of the conference, the electorate is mostly interested in day-to-day issues, "how to survive in Russia today?" While the Kremlin's main trump card of today - the foreign policy and the "western turn" of the president - hardly concerns the Russian provinces. The paper concludes that like a hundred years ago, the Russian people have to resolve their issues all by themselves. "In fact, this demonstrates, that despite all statements and victorious relations of the authorities, the present reforms of the Kremlin and the government have not changed much in the country." An observer of [Vremya MN] paper Leonid Radzikhovsky writes, "Over the past two years the Russian interior politics has reduced to empty declarations." The Chechen war is still on. Establishment of the notorious power hierarchy turned to be more difficult than it seemed - for instance, it keeps failing in Yakutia. The personnel policy is in fact also a failure: "the ridiculous "St. Petersburg personnel revolution" is the proof that Putin has no one to lean on." Another issue is the resuming of the terrible for Russia's reputation informational wars. According to Radzikhovsky, there can be two explanations for this: wither Putin is forming his own system of balances and counter-balances, or he is unable to control his own surrounding. Overall, it takes long to name all the failures of the authorities, including "castration of the Duma, the Federation Council, the media, and final liquidation of the opposition." On the other hand, from Radzikhovsky's viewpoint, this is not a disaster - today the power dictatorship is hardly possible in Russia. The issue is different: "There is no public opposition to the authorities, but there are no actions of the authorities either!" However, the [Moskovskie Novosti] paper writes, that judging by the television dialogue between the president and the Russian people, the latter still "believe that all their problems can be resolved like in a fairy-tale", and this belief is still connected with the president. According to the poll held by the All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), Vladimir Putin is still the "best man of the year", a third year in a row. Moreover, the number of Putin's supporters has grown to 52% in 2001 against 38% in 1999 and 2000. VTsIOM Director Yury Levada wrote, "The president became the axel around which all the activities of the political peak turn and to which the attention of the whole country is attracted." Presidential popularity ratings are not only a subject for endless surprise, but also for Kremlin intrigues: from time to time the press hints that the real indices are much lower than the officially stated ones. According to Levada, it is not ruled out that the presidential rating is a means for exerting pressure on the president. In particular, [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] published the opinion of Director of Applied and Regional Politics Valery Khomyakov, who thinks "something is happening to Putin's popularity." And this might have been the major reason for the president's intention to talk to people, as "The popularity rating for Putin is his main asset." Meanwhile, according to VTsIOM polls, over the past year the popularity rating of the Russian president has grown from 70% to 80%. However, Levada stresses, just as in 2000 the main support of the presidential rating is "not an assessment of what the president has done, but hopes for what he is likely to do in the future". And hope can distort reality, "to exaggerate the small, to notice the unnoticeable, and to overlook the unpleasant". The [Izvestia] paper published results of a poll done by the Public Opinion Foundation. According to these results, this year the level of public optimism has fallen considerably, by 10% for individuals and by 6% for the nation. Almost a third of respondents don't know what to expect from the coming year. Pollsters believe this change is due to the fact that Russian citizens had their optimism peak earlier: "The euphoria the majority of the population experienced after the election of the new president is obviously dwindiling." Besides, according to researchers, it is not ruled out that Russian national tradition is operating here: as the present situation in the country is fairly stable, people prefer to reduce their expectations, in order "not to tempt fate". One way or another, 70% of respondents were unable to explain the reasons for their optimism. However, 92% of the pessimists were even more mysterious: they were unable to explain the reasons for their pessimism. So the impending Year of Horse has aroused a whole wave of disturbing expectations. Nonetheless, [Izvestia] says that according to Chinese fortune-telling, which is popular in Russia, the Horse is always harnessed in tandem with Dragon. President Putin is a Dragon - and according to Chinese horoscopes, 2002 will be an especially lucky year for him. Overall, astrologers say, "Next year Russia will become a Noah's Ark". It is a rather ambiguous prediction, but fortunately, not too gloomy - thank goodness for that! (Translated by Arina Yevtikhova) *******