#9
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
December 27, 2001
RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: LIMITS OF RAPPROCHEMENT
Washington's unilateral moves threaten the new Russian-US relationship
Author: Aleksei Pushkov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

THE DECISION TO DISMANTLE THE ABM TREATY MEANS THAT THE HAWKS IN THE US ADMINISTRATION GAINED THE UPPER HAND. RUSSIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR THIS TURN OF EVENTS. BUSH WAS AIMING TO DISMANTLE THE ABM TREATY SINCE THE VERY FIRST DAYS OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.

President George W. Bush and his administration came to power in the United States in early 2001 and immediately scared the whole world with their determination to act unilaterally and without regard for others in foreign policy. When Condoleezza Rice was told over and over that this was a concern to American allies and Russia, she inevitably repeated, "It's all right. They'll get used to it." Washington was forced to reverse its course soon afterwards. Now, a year later, the US Administration appears to be on the verge of reversing it again.

Unilateral withdrawal by the United States from the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty is a symbolic gesture. It should not be viewed only from the angle of possible threats to Russia's security. It should be viewed as indication of the general direction of American foreign policy strategy.

The decision to dismantle the ABM treaty means that the hawks in the US Administration gained the upper hand.

Russia should have been prepared for this turn of events. Bush was aiming to dismantle the ABM treaty since the very first days of his presidential campaign. Russian-American rapprochement since September 11 has nothing to do with it. Vladimir Putin's visit to the United States made absolutely clear that no compromise was possible. All issues were finalized during Colin Powell's latest talks in Moscow.

All the same, this event is something Russia would have preferred to do without. There was so much optimism over the Russian-American coalition, and here we are: the war in Afghanistan is not even over, and the United States warns Russia that nothing has really changed. The United States will withdraw from the ABM treaty just as it said it would. Washington' decision should have a sobering effect on some Russian enthusiasts advocating all sorts of coalitions with America. All these coalitions boil down to one and the same thing: the United States makes sure that its hands are untied and press on with whatever it is after, merely permitting Russia to support America with various degrees of enthusiasm.

The moment chosen for the announcement and withdrawal leaves the impression - and not in Russia alone - that this is a clear message: the Bush Administration is not going to depend on Russia's position. The Americans say nowadays that they have prepared Russia for the eventual withdrawal, arranged consultations and negotiations, and openly warned Putin of it before the formal announcement. True, but this is only a sweet coating for a bitter pill. The United States is doing what it intended to do before Russia's participation in the counter-terrorism coalition and Putin's decision on strategic rapprochement with the United States. Hence the question: what is going to change in America's policy with regard to Russia after the recent emotional boom?

Generally speaking, hawks' triumph in the matter of the ABM treaty does not promise anything good to Russia. Activization of America's unilateral steps in various directions and spheres is much more probable. Bush's Administration has made it clear already that it is not going to ask for UN permission in the matter of actions of vengeance in other countries. It stands to reason to expect pressure on Russia to grow in several aspects at once - in the matter of Iraq, policy of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation, and even Chechnya. The New York Times reports an interesting episode of Putin's negotiations with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Moscow on November 3. "You want from Russia a kind of flexibility that all essentially sends the ABM treaty down the drain," Putin said. It is this sort of flexibility that will be demanded from Russia in other matters as well - flexibility that will send our positions and interests in other spheres down the same drain.

What is Russia getting in return? Wholly new relations between Russia and NATO are one of the trump cards of Russia and the West. There are prominent figures in the United States, men like Henry Kissenger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, who object to these relations. The latter fears that Russia's equal rights in discussion of NATO policy will weaken integrity of the Alliance and says that NATO should be wary of Russia. The former is even more explicit. "NATO has been and remains essentially a military alliance, and protection of Europe from a Russian invasion is one of its objectives," Kissenger said.

The US Administration is also afraid that Russia may "get into NATO through the back door." These fears became apparent during the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels in December. Before the meeting, all involved states actively discussed the idea of a new Russian-NATO body where Russia would have enjoyed a decisive voice in organization of peacekeeping operations beyond the sphere of responsibility of the Alliance. The American delegation to Brussels killed the proposal. This change in Washington's position is ascribed to Rumsfeld-Wolfovitz group. There are even reports that Nick Burns, the US Ambassador to NATO, was instructed to kill the idea itself of the 20. Burns failed, the formula survived. As a result, however, we may see another variation of the Russian-NATO consultative council where Moscow's opinions will only be listened to with polite sympathy, nothing more.

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov failed to persuade NATO defense ministers to change their minds on the matter in December 19 negotiations. Russia will only be able to voice its opinion, no veto right for it.

Washington emphasizes as well that Russia will surely benefit from America's withdrawal from the ABM treaty because the United States is prepared to link it to reduction of nuclear arsenals. To be more precise, the United States is prepared to sign an agreement on substantial cuts to strategic offensive weapons which Putin suggested, the Americans say. If the agreement is signed, Russian and American arsenals will be down to 1,500 to 2,200 warheads each.

"If" is the key word. The US administration itself is split on the matter. The idea of arms control without treaties is very popular in the United States nowadays. Russia and the United States are friends now, and friends should trust one another. No treaties are therefore needed, this is what it comes down to. This idea is promoted first and foremost by the officials who advocate a dramatic buildup of the American military might. It reveals the whole idea as an attempt to leave the United States' hands untied once again.

Russia cannot accept it. Moscow once withdrew from East Germany and gave its consent for unification of Germany. No agreements were signed, no nothing. Moscow did it expecting the West to respond in kind. It got NATO eastward expansion in return. When Vadim Bakatin passed on to US Ambassador Robert Strauss a layout of Russian bugs in the American Embassy in 1991, Strauss replied, "Thanks you so very much. That's very noble on your part, but do not expect us to follow suit."

The possibility of joining the World Trade Organization sooner is the last argument for the rapprochement. As always, the devil is hiding in details. Russia does not need membership right now but on the discriminating conditions, and this is what Moscow is offered. Putin already announced that Russia did not need it.

When general public is told that this is the unique chance to leap into the Western world, it is not told for some reason that the West itself is pretty apprehensive of this leap. For the time being, the West wants to see Russia only sporadically, when it needs Russia. Russia was needed to destroy the Taliban and America began talking in terms of alliances. The operation approaches its end, and Russia is not needed that much anymore. Washington can even withdraw from the ABM treaty to remind the Russians who is the boss.

All this does not mean that Russia should forget about cooperation with NATO or the United States. It means that Russia should be aware of the existing limits of the rapprochement.

Secondly, Russia should make the United States (and particularly the staunch advocates of untied hands for America) understand that acceptance of this doctrine may do away with the promising Russian- American partnership that appears to be taking shape. This concept of untied hands will inevitably collide with serious Russian interests sooner or later. Besides, leaving the impression that Russia is going to accept every America's decision on everything will be a grave mistake. It will only solidify the positions of the part of the American establishment that is least prone to taking Russian interests into account. The Cold War may be over for Putin but not for these American state officials who continue to see a potential enemy in Russia.

Russia should be careful not to become too pliable and flexible so as not to disarm the politicians in the West who are in favor of paying more attention to Moscow's opinions and interests (regardless of the matter in question - be it NATO expansion or dismantlement of the ABM treaty). If Russia's actions stripped these political forces of all arguments against the concept of untied hands for America, if Russia showed itself a quantite negligeable, it will cease to be a factor of struggle over vital strategic decisions in the United States and in Europe alike. This policy will leave Russia in backwaters of the global politics. Rumsfeld himself needs the flexibility he expects from Russia. A little bit more flexible Russia will b a Russia ignored by the international community.

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