CDI Russia Weekly-#185 21 December 2001 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-797-5277; fax: 202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly Home Page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. RFE/RL: Jeffrey Donovan, Russia: U.S. May Pay Price For Unilateralism, Analysts Say. 2. Washington Times: David Sands, U.S. joins chemical arms audit. 3. BBC: Russian secret police archive released. 4. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: THE WEST DEMONSTRATES A NEW FORMAT OF COOPERATION. But Nezavisimaya Gazeta experts are not in a hurry to become euphoric. AN INTERVIEW WITH SERGEI KARAGANOV AND COLONEL GENERAL LEONID IVASHOV. 5. UPI: Martin Hutchinson, Book Review: 'Building Capitalism.' (By Anders Aslund) 6. Moscow Times: Megan Twohey, Russian Peacekeepers Unlikely in Kabul. 7. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Dmitry Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, discusses the state of U.S. - Russian relations. 8. US Department of State: Foreign Media Reaction, U.S. SCRAPS ABM TREATY-- AND POST-SEPT. 11 COOPERATIVE SPIRIT AS WELL? ******* #1 Russia: U.S. May Pay Price For Unilateralism, Analysts Say By Jeffrey Donovan President George W. Bush recently announced the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM Treaty, despite Russian opposition. Some analysts see that move as further evidence the Bush team is pursuing a 'unilateralist' foreign policy. As RFE/RL correspondent Jeffrey Donovan reports, the approach could cool further warming in U.S.-Russian relations. Washington, 19 December 2001 (RFE/RL) -- Much has been made of the "new relationship" between Russia and America, but the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty is raising doubts as to whether Washington really wants Moscow as a long-term friend. Last week's announcement that the U.S. would pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was proclaimed by President George W. Bush as further evidence that the Cold War is indeed over and that America and Russia have entered a new era of friendly, cooperative relations. Few analysts would disagree that relations have in fact improved. But observers in both countries see American intransigence on the treaty -- which Moscow viewed as the cornerstone of global security -- as confirmation that the U.S. is simply pursuing its own agenda, regardless of the interests of other nations. And that "unilateralist" approach, analysts say, may bode ill for what has been called President Vladimir Putin's historic bid to align Russia with the West following the 11 September terrorist attacks on America. Analysts, who say Putin faces strong pressure at home not to trust Washington, point to an array of possible future problems -- on issues such as arms proliferation and cuts and NATO expansion -- that could still spoil the new U.S.-Russian relationship. James Lindsay, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, believes Bush's "go it alone" approach could backfire when he needs future help from Russia. Lindsay says that the ABM withdrawal, which Putin said was "mistaken" but would not harm U.S.-Russian relations, sent a clear signal that America no longer considers Moscow an equal. "I would suggest that the dominant opinion in this administration is not that Russia is something we have to keep at an arm's length because it could be a threat, but rather Russia is irrelevant and unimportant and that we are powerful and the Russians have no choice but to follow us." Russians, too, appear to perceive a new disregard from America. Alexei Arbatov, chairman of the Russian State Duma's Defense Committee, made this remark about U.S.-Russian relations to reporters in Moscow on 17 December. "We [Russia and the U.S.] have many common interests. We have a common enemy. The problems that used to divide us could have been solved. Now I can't say that's true. The Americans [withdrawing] from this treaty -- that was very important for Russia from a military and political point of view. It demonstrated how they view our partnership and relations. It is like the relationship between a rider and a mule." Prior to U.S. withdrawal, Putin appeared willing to amend the ABM Treaty to allow Washington to pursue development of a missile defense shield. And one notable American commentator, Thomas Friedman of "The New York Times," argued to keep the treaty, saying it would give Putin vital political cover at home while allowing him to complete Russia's Westward shift, a transformation he said was clearly in America's interests. But analysts say the Bush team never seriously considered Putin's domestic political situation in making its ABM decision. Frank Gaffney is head of the Center for Security Policy, a defense consultancy in Washington. A long-time advocate of missile defense, Gaffney says that Bush long ago decided to scrap the treaty to pursue a defense shield that he believes essential to protect America from attacks by terrorists or rogue nations. "My guess is that there were people within it [the administration], most especially the State Department, who were very keen on emphasizing those issues [Putin's domestic opposition]. So I would guess that, yes, they were factored into the overall deliberations. I don't think they weighed terribly heavily." Lindsay says most U.S. officials believe Putin's decision to move Russia toward the West is permanent and based on clear national interests. Lindsay says the Bush team simply assumed that Putin could handle any political fallout from its ABM move. "There's certainly no evidence for anything they [the Bush team] have said publicly that they were particularly worried that the Duma or Russian public opinion will mess up or complicate U.S.-Russian relations after the ABM Treaty. I think they pretty much judged this was a doable thing and that the signal they had gotten from President Putin was that while he didn't like it, he could live with it and he could handle it politically." But Fiona Hill, another Brookings fellow, sees possible pitfalls in the Bush administration's Russia strategy. Hill views the U.S. government as split between those who genuinely want to help Russia join the West -- the State Department -- and those at the Pentagon who want to keep Moscow at a distance. Hill says that if this internal conflict is to be resolved, it will happen only after the two countries confront their next most pressing set of issues, such as NATO enlargement and weapons cuts. "We've still got a lot of obstacles and the question is whether there are enough incentives within the Bush administration, whether enough of the principle players believe that Russia is a priority issue [and] will push along some major benefits or concessions toward Russia." One possible incentive for Bush, however, lies in Moscow's dealings with Iran and Iraq, which the U.S. says are aided by Russian sales of nuclear materials and other commercial exchanges. When and if Bush ever wants a Russian favor -- such as backing for a future war against Baghdad, or stopping nuclear sales to Teheran -- analysts say the likelihood that Bush will be rebuffed is greater now that he's denied Putin a favor on the ABM Treaty. ******* #2 Washington Times December 20, 2001 U.S. joins chemical arms audit By David R. Sands Russia and the United States have agreed to a joint audit of Russia's huge chemical weapons-stockpile management program, former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin said yesterday. Mr. Stepashin, now chairman of the Russian government's primary auditing agency, said he had agreed to the joint audit in talks with General Accounting Office head David Walker this week. The investigation will look into the efficiency of the equipment provided to destroy the chemical weapons and into how U.S. money for the program is being spent. "As Russia has about half of the world's chemical weapons stocks, this is an issue that's important not just for us but for world security," said Mr. Stepashin, who met with reporters at the Russian Embassy. Congress lifted a two-year block on U.S. funding for the chemical weapons program in August. Russia spent $100 million on the program this year and has budgeted $200 million for 2002, Mr. Stepashin said. But he added that a proposed $2 billion U.S. contribution was critical if the program was to move forward. Originally intended to destroy the former Soviet Union's chemical weapons stocks by 2007, the program now calls for their elimination by 2012. Mr. Stepashin said the joint U.S.-Russian audit would bolster confidence that the program was being managed wisely. The Russian official said he had floated the idea that Russia could shoulder the bulk of the costs of the chemical-weapons destruction program — estimated at $10 billion to $15 billion over the next decade — in return for an equal amount of forgiveness on some $67 billion in Soviet-era government debts. Vice President Richard B. Cheney, who met with Mr. Stepashin by teleconference from an undisclosed location because of security concerns growing out of the September 11 attacks, agreed to form a joint working group to consider the idea and the program's long-term financing. Mr. Stepashin said he discussed with GAO officials the U.S.-led campaign to cut off funding for terrorist organizations in the wake of September 11. He said Russian financial officials were working to build relationships with the country's banks to deny terrorists access to the financial system. He said Russia may have special expertise from its long struggle with Islamic fundamentalist groups in Chechnya, which Moscow contends have extensive links to the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden. "We know very well that the Chechen terrorists and bin Laden's networks used some of the same schemes to get financing," he said. On another issue, Mr. Stepashin said he was increasingly confident that talks with congressional leaders would lead to an easing of sanctions on Russian exports. He said legislation to repeal the Soviet-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which imposes sanctions in protest of Russia's emigration policies, could be introduced before Christmas and would almost certainly be passed next year. He said Russia is also hoping for normal trading rights with the United States as it bids to join the World Trade Organization and is seeking the end of dumping charges that block the sale of Russian steel here. "We are aware that the United States has to protect its internal markets, but our arguments met with understanding here," Mr. Stepashin said. Mr. Stepashin briefly served as prime minister under former President Boris Yeltsin in 1999 before being replaced by an unknown former KGB officer named Vladimir Putin. Named chairman of Russia's Audit Chamber in April 2000, Mr. Stepashin is credited with taking on some of the country's most sacred cows. His investigators have probed the Kremlin's notorious property division, the shaky finances of the Russian Baltic Sea enclave Kaliningrad and the financing of the war in Chechnya. He said the cooperation he met with this week in Washington reflected the closer U.S.-Russian ties since September 11. Divisive issues such as the Chechnya campaign have faded in importance since the attacks, he said. "I received no questions about Chechnya the whole time I was here," he said. ******* #3 BBC 19 December 2001 Russian secret police archive released Soviet history may have to be rewritten now that the Russian secret police headquarters has released the archives of Stalin's secret agents into the public domain. Russia's NTV said the three-volume collection of unabridged documents stored at the Lubyanka spy HQ contains "sensational material on abuses of power at the highest levels". The collection, entitled "Top secret: Lubyanka reports to Stalin on the situation in the country", is now under the scrutiny of Russian scholars. The documents are stamped "for Stalin's eyes only" and "destroy after reading". Shocking Most of them were written by the forerunners of the KGB, the CheKa and the GPU, between 1917 and 1934, and will "change ideas about Soviet history", the TV said. "The summaries of the Cheka agents are more like confessions, and mercilessly expose the regime they themselves created," it said. "Paragraph after paragraph describe abuses in the army and in the Communist Party, as well as the immoral conduct of Communists and Komsomol (Young Communist League) members." "The historians themselves seem to be shocked by the materials that they have been allowed to study," according to NTV. Alongside the secret memoranda addressed to Stalin, the material includes official announcements and Pravda front-page articles of the same period, which shed light on discrepancies between accounts of events in secret police reports and the official propaganda pedalled by the country's leaders. The TV described the new evidence as "a new USSR history textbook, one that is much more reliable and terrible than even the boldest of its like produced today". In a hurry The publication of the records has been rushed through by the Russian history research institute, with the assistance of the current secret service, the Federal Security Service. Institute head Andrey Sakharov told NTV there had been "a great rush" to submit the documents for public scrutiny, for fear "permission might be withdrawn at the very last moment". "We did not rule out that someone might want to interfere with the process and hamper the truth from coming out," he said. Material from the 1937-39 "Great Terror" period when millions of people, including artists and intellectuals, were arrested as "enemies of the people", remain classified for now. "Perhaps there are too many historical contradictions and things that are difficult to explain there," the TV commented. A bit of history Under communism, the secret police changed its name at least eight times. It started after the 1917 October Revolution as the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee Against Sabotage and Counter-Revolution) tasked with investigating "counterrevolutionary" crimes. Under Stalin, the secret police, based in Moscow's central Lubyanka square, acquired vast punitive powers. No one knows exactly how many people were sent to the camps during Stalin's purges, but Russian historian Dmitriy Volkogonov estimates that between four and five million people were detained at any one time in both before and after World War II. ******* #4 Nezavisimaya Gazeta December 20, 2001 THE WEST DEMONSTRATES A NEW FORMAT OF COOPERATION But Nezavisimaya Gazeta experts are not in a hurry to become euphoric Author: Andrei Artemov, Mikhai Khodarenok [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] AN INTERVIEW WITH SERGEI KARAGANOV AND COLONEL GENERAL LEONID IVASHOV. The new format of relations between Russia and the West, the talk of the day, was reiterated on Tuesday evening. When NATO defense ministers and their Russian counterpart Sergei Ivanov met in Brussels, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced an counter-terrorism operation in Somalia. Ivanov made it clear that Russia will support military strikes at other countries provided it was shown irrefutable evidence of some regime's connection with terrorism. When the Russian-NATO United Permanent Council met, Ivanov and NATO General Secretary George Robertson exchanged documents on the opening of the military liaison mission of the Alliance in Moscow. The level of relations within the Format 20 will be formed by May 2002, Ivanov said. The subjects that may be discussed in this format include war on terrorism, nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons, peacekeeping, prevention of crises including civil ones, and European anti-ballistic missile defense. The discussion is supposed to be on equal terms, with Russia having the veto right as well. The Alliance retains the right to act and made decisions all on its own (sans Russia) in the matters concerning its obligations and responsibilities. The final decision on the new rules of relations between Russia an NATO is to be made in Reykjavik next May. Commenting on the outcome of his meetings and conversations in Brussels, Ivanov emphasized that the war on terrorism and nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons were the top priorities in the new Russian-NATO relations. Ivanov said in a TV interview that Russia was not going to participate in the international peacekeeping contingent in Afghanistan. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta asked Sergei Karaganov of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council and Major General Leonid Ivashov to comment on Ivanov's latest statement. Question: To what extent would you say the refusal to participate in the peacekeeping activities in Afghanistan concurs with Russia's national interests? Sergei Karaganov: I know that the Russian leadership is not yet decided on the matter. On the one hand, there is the temptation to participate in the hope to build up or retain political clout. On the other, Russian society openly fears involvement in another Afghani tangle. I think therefore that the decision should also be ascribed to the allergy to the presence of Russian military contingents, peacekeeping or not, in Afghanistan that exists in Russia. Leonid Ivashov: The decision is absolutely correct because the Americans and their allies are essentially establishing military- political control over this important regions of the world and will eventually establish it all over Eurasia. Russian influence is going to weaken gradually. I think that given time, Russia will find itself driven out of Central Asia altogether. As for involvement in the peacekeeping operation, Moscow has already done a lot for the Americans helping them settle in the region for a long time to come. Military-political situation being what it is, our involvement in the operation will be superfluous. In the long run, it will only answer America's interests. We should not steer clear of the processes taking place in Afghanistan but our involvement should be somewhat different. It should be something where interests of Russia and its allies and partners are taken into account. Question: Is it possible to see some analogies between the upcoming deployment of peacekeepers in Afghanistan and how and under what circumstances peacekeepers entered Kosovo more than two years ago? Sergei Karaganov: I do not think there is a lot of likeliness here. It was different in 1999 but this time peacekeepers will be sent to Afghanistan with the consent of all leading world powers including Russia and probably even under the UN aegis if not with the UN Security Council mandate. It means that the international community is decided on the matter. I think it a serious difference. Leonid Ivashov: There is something common about Kosovo and Afghanistan. I'm talking about Washington's eagerness to build up its influence in the Balkans in the former case and in Central Asia in the latter. Russia was, however, the first in Kosovo. It deployed its units in Pristina and Slatina. Our single battalion put the Americans and all their allies behind the eighth ball. And when we were negotiating matters even before that, we were openly thrown out of the upcoming peacekeeping operation. Some insignificant part was reserved for Russia - just a battalion or two in the American sector. The battalion Moscow sent to Pristina changed a lot. The situation in Afghanistan is different to a certain extent. Russia, Iran, and other Central Asian states supported the Northern Alliance long before the American counter-terrorism operation against the Taliban. At the same time, we tried to persuade the warring sides to seek a political settlement. It should be noted here that the Americans outperformed us in Afghanistan. At best, we may play the second role in this country now. We do not have a bridgehead in Afghanistan nowadays. That's is why I think Russia should concentrate on a political settlement of the conflict and formation of the new Afghani government, promoting into the upper echelons the men we know for a fact will be our allies and partners. And yes, relief aid to the population should continue as well as assistance in post-war economic restoration. Question: How broadly shall we interpret the Brussels accord on Russian-NATO close cooperation in the war on international terrorism? Sergei Karaganov: In the first place, we cannot yet say how broad and deep Russian-NATO cooperation in the war on international terrorism is going to be. NATO is still fairly inexperienced in this sphere. It is a different matter altogether that there exist serious objective reasons for our cooperation with the Alliance in this sphere. Last but not the least, we should always remember that the war on international terrorism should be waged not only together with NATO but first probably together with the European Union. Probably within the framework of the concept of the European security zone discussed nowadays. Talking of joint counter-terrorism efforts, we do not bring up the matter of participation of any foreign contingents in suppression of terrorists in Chechnya. We do invite observers from the Council of Europe and OSCE, we constantly discuss the matter in our dialogue with the European Union. I think Russia will manage all on its own. I repeat that the war on terrorism in Europe should not be restricted to military actions alone. It should involve first and foremost exchange of information, interaction of secret services, and interaction of services maintaining security of society. Leonid Ivashov: I dislike the term, you know. As I see it, combating international terrorism in Afghanistan is only a secondary mission as far as the Americans are concerned. Demonstration of its military might is what the United States is really after. I even think that there is more to objectives of the operation that the war on terrorism as such. In other words, the counter-terrorism operation in Afghanistan may be viewed as a means of crushing the Taliban and, more importantly, establishing American hegemony in this part of the world. The Americans themselves do not deny it, by the way, referring to their strategy of national security. Along with that, Russia's political support of the operation against terrorists in Afghanistan is correct because these terrorists posed a potential threat to our southern borders and security of our partners in the Central Asian region. I want to emphasize that Russia's support and assistance to the Northern Alliance dates back to before the beginning of the dates back to before the beginning of the American operation in Afghanistan. Putting it blindly, the Americans all but refused to recognize the Northern Alliance then. All the same, Washington made cunning use of our accomplishments and solved a lot of its problems with the hands of the Northern Alliance. It has outplayed Moscow in this respect. As for our own counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya, the West is still using the policy of dual standards I think. ******* #5 Book Review: 'Building Capitalism' By Martin Hutchinson UPI Business and Economics Editor WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 (UPI) -- Restructuring formerly Communist economies is something the West will probably never get to do again (since South Korea will presumably take care of North Korea, and China and Vietnam seem to be looking after themselves). There is thus a sense of nostalgia in reviewing the process, the economic equivalent of "Greatest Generation" books about World War II. Anders Aslund's "Building Capitalism -- The transformation of the former Soviet bloc" of course makes the point that there is much left to do, that a number of countries have reverted largely to Stalinist traditions, and that in most countries of the region the free market system as we would understand it is by no means securely established. Nevertheless, as Russia takes firm control of her own destiny, central Europe and the Baltics move inexorably towards the EU, and even Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine finally start to show some economic growth, there is a sense that for the West the most difficult phase of transition has passed. Certainly the decade ahead is unlikely to see the number and penetration of Western advisers that the early 1990s saw. At their best, the Western advisers were very good indeed and in some cases made a crucial difference to the economies of their client states. However, for the individual advisers at least, the game is now largely over; the large bureaucracies of the EU, US-AID, the World Bank, EBRD and the accountants' consultancy firms have taken over, and it is time to find another field of endeavor. Aslund's central thesis is that "shock therapy" -- rapid implementation of as full as possible a slate of free-market reforms -- worked better than its opponents have admitted. In terms of gross domestic product, "shock therapy" countries were growing again within 3-4 years of the treatment; they have since shown more consistent growth and far less corruption than their peers, and have seen inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, increase only to West European levels. On the other hand, with the notable exception of Estonia, none of even the "shock therapy" countries has achieved a polity significantly to the right of West European social democracy, in terms of size of government or tax levels. At the other extreme, a number of countries have seen essentially no reform. While official statistics suggest that their fate has been only moderately bad, Aslund demonstrates that official statistics greatly overstate their performance. In general, these countries have limited or no civil liberties, and are sinking slowly deeper into a Stalinist mire. Aslund's most interesting analysis is of the middle group, those that opted for reform, but on a gradualist program. These countries have suffered the most severe fall in living standards, both nominally and in many cases in real terms -- gradualism, from every point of view, was clearly inferior to "shock therapy." They have also suffered the greatest increases in inequality, although their Gini coefficients are still only at U.S. levels and well below those of Latin America. Nevertheless, a number of gradualist countries are showing that reform, once it progresses beyond a certain point, and provided it is accompanied by democracy, may be irreversible and indeed self-reinforcing. Partially reforming countries, subject to ferocious economic attack by kleptomaniac "rent-seekers" tend to suffer economic crises. However in a number of cases, notably Bulgaria in 1997 and Russia in 1998, the crises themselves have pushed the countries towards greater reform rather than away from it, and have reduced the power of the rent-seeking former-nomenclatura "oligarchs." Aslund draws surprising conclusions about the role of the West, and is severely critical of Western economic assistance policies. In spite of a peace dividend to the United States totaling $250 billion per annum from the fall of the Soviet Union, the West missed the chance to provide Russia with crucial economic aid in early 1992, when reformers were securely in control, and thereafter provided subsidies that largely went into the pockets of the oligarchs. During the middle period of transition, 1993-97, Western public sector aid for the reforming countries was in total negative, since debt repayments and interest on old Soviet-era credits exceeded the flow of new money. Only the private sector, which began investing directly in 1993 and has remained a net investor on a fairly consistent basis since, provide the capital that these countries needed. As for Western technical assistance, it was crucial at first in reorienting the thinking of decision-makers in these countries, but rapidly expanded in size and deteriorated in quality (and was accompanied by innumerable bureaucratic requirements, particularly from the EU's Phare and Tacis programs) to the extent that its value became minor at best and in some cases negative. One area where in my view Aslund is excessively optimistic is the question of the interaction between democracy and reform. It is certainly clear that dictators generally were captured by the "oligarchs" and hence increased the level of "rent-seeking" and that democratic supervision of the political process has tended to eliminate those governments for which theft was their principal raison d'etre. Nevertheless, at no time in these countries, other than right at the beginning, does there appear to have been a clear democratic wish for a free market, except with levels of social provision attached that were unsustainably expensive. Even since Aslund's book went to press, two election results, in Poland and Bulgaria, have re-emphasized the lack of electoral commitment to reform. In Poland, an admirably reforming government, with a good economic record, was not only voted out of office but received so few votes that it was no longer represented in parliament. In Bulgaria, the reformist president Peter Stoyanov was unexpectedly replaced by a Communist, a member of a government that had run the Bulgarian economy into the ground only four years before. In Slovakia, too, opinion polls are pointing to the likely return of the odious Vladimir Meciar in next year's elections, again in spite of a reform process and economy that have performed well. Aslund leaves out former Yugoslavia, and to some extent raises doubts over his case by doing so --- if you include the countries of former Yugoslavia, economic health appears more correlated with geography than with reformism. Slovenia, with a highly unreformist government since 1992 and a very corrupt banking sector, is nevertheless the richest country in Central Europe, and the readiest to join the EU. Croatia, bedeviled by civil war and until 2000 ruled by president Franjo Tudjman, the type of "strongman," albeit fully democratically elected, that Aslund abhors, was by the time Tudjman died in many respects ahead of most central European countries in terms of reform and privatization, even without significant Western economic or technical help. As the head of Croatia's Privatization Agency said to me in 1994: "We have had one enormous advantage --- absolutely NO foreign advisers." Aslund's book is fascinating to those interested in the transformation, and full of hope for the future for most of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Yet, at the end, it remains an exercise in nostalgia. There is still much to be done, in all of these countries -- but we Western advisers and consultants won't, in general, be doing it. From now on, they're on their own. ****** #6 Moscow Times December 20, 2001 Russian Peacekeepers Unlikely in Kabul By Megan Twohey Staff Writer Russia will probably not be among the countries that the UN Security Council picks to deploy peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan, an exclusion that should please both Moscow and Kabul, experts said. But even without peacekeepers, Russia will maintain a military presence in Afghanistan, they said. Its military will continue to orchestrate intelligence gathering there, escort and protect humanitarian aid efforts and provide equipment and training to the Northern Alliance. What's more, Russia will continue to have thousands of peacekeeping troops on watch in neighboring Tajikistan. Moscow itself has sent mixed signals about whether it wants to ship peacekeepers to the country that Soviet troops withdrew from in defeat just over a decade ago. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov hinted that Moscow may send troops earlier this month. But when asked about it this week, he firmly ruled out the possibility. "No Russian servicemen will take part in any armed action on Afghan territory in any form or in any way," Ivanov said in Brussels on Monday, Interfax reported. Britain has been charged with rounding up participants, a task that began when the United Nations Security Council promised to provide a multinational peacekeeping force as part of an agreement on an interim Afghan government, which is scheduled to take power Saturday. The Security Council is currently debating the duration of the mission and how much force the soldiers will be authorized to use. A decision is expected Thursday. Russia does not appear to be on the list of candidates. Its representatives were absent from recent London meetings between military officials from 17 countries that have offered to send peacekeeping troops to Afghanistan, a British Defense Ministry spokesman said. Participants included the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Canada, Turkey, Jordan, Denmark, Malaysia, the Czech Republic and even the United States, which is not expected to contribute any troops. Russia's recent history in Afghanistan makes it unlikely that Afghans, Russians or the West want it to dispatch peacekeeping troops there, experts said. Memories linger on about the Soviet Union's promises of short-term military deployments in 1979 that stretched on for a decade. "We have an Afghan syndrome that is even more powerful than America's Vietnam syndrome," said Alexander Konovalev, president of the Institute for Strategic Assessment in Moscow. "We're still recovering. "Plus, Russia knows that it already has a military presence in Afghanistan," Konovalev said. Indeed, Emergency Situations Ministry troops have already marched into Kabul to oversee the establishment of a hospital. Similar deployments are expected to accompany the humanitarian aid Russia is shipping there. In addition, Russia says it plans to continue providing the Northern Alliance with military equipment -- which is widely believed to be sent along with Russian military experts to provide instruction on how to use it. Also, an estimated 20,000 Russian peacekeeping troops are stationed next door in Tajikistan, and they will continue to keep an eye on both the border and northern Afghanistan. "Russia can sit in Tajikistan and say, 'If anything goes wrong, we'll stop you on the border,'" said Alex Vatanka, editor of Jane's Sentinel Russia CIS in London. For the time being, Russia's skeletal presence in Afghanistan shouldn't ruffle any feathers, experts said. "If the political coalition stays strong, than everything should be fine," said Celeste Wallander, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "But if it doesn't, then the interests of all countries that have been participating will be thrown into question." A possible conflict between Russia and the United States could surface if the Afghans receiving military assistance from Moscow start acting out of line, a diplomatic source said. During negotiations over the new interim government, representatives of the Northern Alliance first objected to and then begrudgingly approved the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. Some experts predicted that Afghans will feel uncomfortable with even a limited Russian military presence. "Even the sight of Russian soldiers escorting humanitarian assistance could cause troubles," said Alexei Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center. ******* #7 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace www.ceip.org How Durable is the New U.S. - Russian Partnership: A Perspective from Moscow December 12, 2001 Dmitry Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, discusses the state of U.S. - Russian relations. On December 12th, Dmitri Trenin spoke at the Endowment on the nature of the new relationship that has arisen between the U.S. and Russia in the wake of September 11th. Trenin set out to qualify what sort of partnership has been created. The United States and Russia are currently engaged in deep 'geostrategic cooperation' against the Taliban that includes serious intelligence sharing. But beyond this, it is difficult to describe precisely what this new partnership is. There has really been much talk about a new relationship but very little substance to support its existence. Trenin remains optimistic that current rhetoric could turn into a lasting relationship given the nature of the post-9/11 security environment. In Trenin's words, "September 11th drew a line between the present day and the end of the cold war, making the cold war not simply history, but ancient history." In effect, September 11th provided President Putin with the maneuverability to implement an entirely new foreign policy strategy for Russia that had been germinating for quite some time but would have been otherwise impossible to carry out. It is still unclear what motivated Putin to throw his support behind the United States. In Trenin's view, the argument that Putin acted out of pure pragmatism is convincing. Putin may simply have calculated that there was no other winning option, no way to keep the US out of Central Asia and thus decided that cooperation would bring the most benefit. In the end, the U.S. has done what Russia itself had already contemplated doing; it had removed the Taliban from Afghanistan and bolstered the position of Russia's client, the Northern Alliance. Now Russia has a buffer zone along its southern frontier. Likewise in Chechnya, it is possible that Putin realized the failure of the military campaign to date and decided that assuming the mantle of world leader in the fight against terrorism could prove expedient. | Pragmatism aside, Putin is very serious about Russia's 'European vocation,' Trenin pointed out. If anything, Putin's actions since 9/11 have highlighted his commitment to integrating Russia with Europe and it is likely that this commitment is what has been motivating Putin. Unfortunately, this drive towards integration also brings with it certain risks. In Trenin's words, "Putin is on a very slippery slope," as Russia will have to abandon the last vestiges of its superpower status in favor of regional integration. There is little conceptual backing for this in Russian society and Putin may find himself out on a limb. Currently the structure of the country precludes the development of strong opposition to the President in the near term, but this is no long-term guarantee. Future Challenges Irrespective of the character of the new relationship that is forming between the U.S. and Russia, there are some serious challenges the two sides will have to face in the near future. Trenin predicted that Russia will have to deal with three issues: U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, possible U.S action against Iraq and the expansion of NATO to include the three Baltic States. On the issue of the ABM treaty, it seems likely that the Russians have rightly concluded that abrogation will be solely a unilateral American decision and therefore there is little use in expending resources to counter it. Moreover, it is probable that the Russian government has satisfied itself that whatever system the U.S. attempts to put in place, Russia's strategic forces will not be seriously challenged for at least the next twenty years. U.S. withdrawal from the treaty will likely have little effect on the overall Russian-American relationship. In the end, the proposed warhead cuts will be made and the strategic dialogue will continue. The issue of U.S. intention towards Iraq hinges on what course of action the U.S. decides to pursue. Should the U.S. limit itself to air strikes, it is probable that Russia would be able to accommodate itself with a minimum of complaint. Should the U.S. decided on ground intervention, then Russian reaction will be much more serious. In the case of such action, Trenin argued that concerted U.S. action would be required to nullify Russian concerns. But, in the end, these concerns are primarily financial. In Trenin's words, "Iraq is not a sentimental issue," but a 'pocket-book' issue. Thus what is at stake in Iraq is not a fundamental conflict of interests, but a question of appropriate financial compensation. The question of Baltic membership in NATO presents a more philosophical problem. According to Trenin, Baltic membership would be a serious affront to Putin. However, the Russian government has learned from the experience of the first round of NATO expansion that loud and forceful opposition doesn't serve the interests of the country. Thus it is unlikely that even this development would be allowed to derail the favorable progression of U.S.-Russian relations. From the American perspective, there are quite a number of things that Russia might do to cause friction. Among the issues cited by Trenin was a broadening of Russian military action in the Caucasus that could include incursions by independent-minded Russian generals into parts of Georgia; greater restrictions on the freedom of the Russian media; an attempt by President Putin to extend his stay in power and the destabilizing effects of an economic slowdown produced by falling oil prices. All of these scenarios are possibilities and each would sour relations in their own way, but none are insurmountable. In each case, it would be up to the U.S. to voice its concerns and attempt to steer Russia on a better course while trying to preserve the ground already gained in relations between the two countries. In summation, Trenin concluded that there is much reason for optimism. President Putin's power stems from his popularity with the people. This popularity is based on a perception of hope about the future, not on the basis of past accomplishments. An economic setback could seriously jeopardize Putin's political security. But even if the situation within Russia should change, hope can be found in the fact that the decisions made by President Putin since September 11th have all been fundamentally in Russia's interests. The commitment of Russia to arms reduction and military reform indicate that it is no longer thinking about global war and the proposed reinvention of NATO-Russian relations stands to fundamentally alter the nature of the Russian armed services for the better. All this indicates that although a rocky road may lie ahead, Russia's interest lies in integration with Europe and this will continue to be the foundation of a new U.S.-Russia relationship. Question and Answer The first questioner asked Trenin to describe the foreign policy outlook of the new elites of Russia. Trenin responded by observing that Russia is still a work in progress and that it continues to change constantly. Of all the new elites that have risen over the past ten years, none is probably more western-oriented than the oil concerns. These companies and the people that run them are major supporters of further integration with the West and they are enthusiastic about the possibility of U.S. cooperation in the exploration and development of Caspian Sea basin reserves. In Trenin's view, many of these individuals are fed up with what they see as the excessively cumbersome geostrategic considerations of the political establishment. Turning to address the impact of possible U.S. victory in Afghanistan, Trenin concluded that the military brass of Russia has probably turned green with envy. The predominant feeling in Russia is that the U.S. has done everything right in its campaign to date and this is not an easy thing for the Russian military establishment to accept. On the one hand, a U.S. victory will alleviate the security concerns emanating from Russia's southern border that had become an increasing source of worry. On the other, the decisiveness of U.S. victory strengthens Putin's hand in pushing through military reform by removing the ability of its opponents to make excuses. Trenin evinced certainty that the lessons of this latest Afghan war would not be lost on Russia. Responding to concerns that the current rhetoric surrounding the U.S.-Russian partnership resembled that which had been criticized during the Clinton administration, Trenin explained that as of yet partnership is nothing more than a promise and not a reality. There will be setbacks along the way, and a positive outcome is not assured, but Trenin dismissed the fear that the term 'partnership' is being over-used. Summary prepared by Karlis Kirsis, Junior Fellow, Russia & Eurasia Program. ****** #8 Excerpt US Department of State Foreign Media Reaction December 19, 2001 U.S. SCRAPS ABM TREATY--AND POST-SEPT. 11 COOPERATIVE SPIRIT AS WELL? President Bush's formal notice of the U.S.' withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty drew predictable fire overseas. Upon hearing the news, editorialists (primarily in Russia, NATO capitals, East and South Asia) resurrected pre-9/11 charges of the U.S.' acting unilaterally, undermining arms control regimes, and provoking an arms race by pursuing missile defense. Almost no one endorsed Bush's argument that Sept. 11 underscored the need for MD. Writers, instead, made the opposite case: The terrorist attacks demonstrated the "uselessness" of a missile shield. Many found it especially galling that Washington was "jeopardizing" its coalition-building efforts by reverting to "self-willed unilateralism." A Toronto writer summed up the resentful mood: "The ABM announcement demolishes the conventional wisdom that the terror attacks...taught the Bush administration that unilateralism is not the way to go." Voices of support--mainly conservative dailies in the UK, a few smaller European capitals, Canada and Taiwan--were rare. They pointed to the U.S.' right to self-defense and its foresight in moving beyond Cold War "gridlock." Themes follow: Russian media see Bush move as "mistake," potential "blow" to Putin's pro-West agenda. Some government and non-official papers adopted the Kremlin's tone of "restraint," describing Bush's decision as mistaken, but not unexpected. Putin's muted reaction was "balanced" and appropriate in light of recent progress in bilateral relations, according to these writers. They argued that Moscow's interests are better served by countenancing Washington's "escapades," than by protesting in vain. "Russia clearly needs the West more than the West needs Russia, so the Kremlin will keep up the policy of rapprochement," concluded one weekly. Others, nationalist as well as more mainstream papers, were skeptical of official statements downplaying the ABM abrogation as "no danger to Russian security" and no major obstacle to improved ties. For them, the unilateral withdrawal served as proof that U.S. avowals of a new partnership amounted to "empty talk." A parliamentary broadsheet held: "When the U.S. needed support...in Afghanistan they called us a partner, but they forgot the partnership once they decided to scrap ABM." Some in this camp portrayed Bush's move as an "insult" to Russia and a "heavy blow" to Putin's pro-West policies. For many European writers, Russia's "restrained" reaction was the only reassuring note. In pre-9/11 commentary, analysts feared a hostile Russian response should the U.S. abrogate the treaty in order to proceed with MD. The current view, however, was that Putin would not squander benefits accrued from Russia's joining the anti-terror alliance by protesting too strongly--especially were the U.S. to proffer "consolation prizes" such as a written agreement on nuclear arms reductions. Some writers in NATO capitals urged the U.S. to recognize that Bush's decision dealt a "serious blow to Putin's prestige" at home (especially in "military and KGB circles fed with anti-American propaganda"). Therefore, they maintained, the U.S. must be forthcoming with more "dividends" for Putin--along the lines of the recent deal on closer NATO-Russian ties--in order to ensure domestic support for his Westward tilt. East Asian outlets--not only Beijing and Hong Kong, but also Tokyo and Seoul--registered the most alarm. Media characterized the Bush decision as a "threat to world peace" and as evidence of USG double-standards: Washington "stresses international cooperation in its efforts to build a coalition against terrorism, while unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty for its own interests," averred a Seoul daily. In copious comment, Chinese papers underscored the Bush administration's perceived isolation on the issue (they repeatedly noted international opposition to the ABM pullout, often citing Western media criticism). Beijing's official press also reiterated shopworn suspicions of U.S. motives for pursuing MD, seeing it as a means for the "sole superpower to achieve hegemony and establish a U.S.-dominated unipolar world." ... RUSSIA: "Pentagon Goes Populist" Artyom Rud asserted in the official parliamentary Parlamentskaya Gazeta (12/19): "Though the Americans claim they are ready to deploy NMD, technological problems won't let them do so until 2008-2010. The Pentagon's optimistic reports about the NMD program are mostly 'populist' and are meant to get Congress to allocate more funds for the project." "U.S. Cuts Russia Down To Size" Pavel Felgengauer commented in the reformist weekly Moskovskiye Novosti (# 51, 12/19): "Coming to Russia next spring, Bush may sign an accord on mutual arms reduction. Moscow says it must be a treaty. Washington believes that friends can do without formalities--a handshake will suffice. The Americans are likely to prevail again: it is hard to expect the treaty to be prepared in the time left before the spring. If something is to be signed at the next summit, it is going to be a non-binding agreement or charter, at best.... Russia clearly needs the West more than the West needs Russia, so the Kremlin will keep up the policy of rapprochement with the United States, no matter what.... Apparently, Washington, as it decided (for the first time in world history) to scrap an arms control agreement, wanted to cut Russia down to size in the first place. Only a month ago, it sought an alliance with Moscow, thinking it vital for the success of the anti-terrorist coalition. Now that is a thing of the past. With the Taliban and Al Qaeda knocked down and the U.S. and British troops deployed, the need for Russian assistance is not all that great.... But Moscow does not despair--terrorists are still there, and America may still have a brush with China over Taiwan. We are ever ready to offer friendship and support in exchange for admission to the WTO, NATO.... The Kremlin seems to realize that, with major technological and economic reforms in Russia long overdue, it can't get them off the ground without a close alliance with the West." "Moscow Loses First Major Battle" Igor Korotchenko commented in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (12/18): "Having virtually scuttled the negotiations with the U.S. on a modified ABM treaty, with Washington growing even more determined to pull out of the treaty, the (Russian) Defense Ministry assured the President that it was nothing much and that the U.S.' decision caused no damage to Russia's security. Putin's response to Washington's unilateral move, basically, is a replica of the position of Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and First Deputy Chief of the Army Staff General Yuriy Baluyevskiy. Washington's withdrawal from the ABM treaty, in effect, is Russia's first major foreign policy setback and has serious implications for strategic stability in the world." "U.S. Creates Security Vacuum" Yevgeniy Grigoryev said in the centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (12/18): "It was with reason that Russia and many other countries, including the U.S.' allies, worried about the ABM treaty. That they have reacted sort of calmly to Washington's statement does not mean that they don't care. The U.S.' policy and behavior directly affect the interests of the rest of the world.... Now there is the question: What is Russia supposed to do under the circumstances? Of course, with the ABM or without it, we can't fence ourselves from the U.S. That would be the end of anything worth the name of policy. It is imperative that Russia develop and maintain good relations with the Americans, never mind their escapades and 'surprises.' Their latest, while helping us learn more about cowboy manners, doesn't free us of having to do our utmost to 'minimize' the damage to strategic stability and disarmament, even more to think of a future security architecture." "Russia Humiliated" The nationalist opposition Sovetskaya Rossiya (12/18) front-paged this by Vasiliy Safronchuk: "It would seem that, with strong opposition to renouncing the ABM treaty inside the U.S. and outside it, the Kremlin could have effectively resisted the Americans' trying to dismantle the current system of arms control. Instead, Putin avoided even the cautioning statements he had made before.... It looks as if Bush and Putin coordinated their statements.... Russia must review all its agreements with the U.S. on arms control and freeze the accords on heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads." "Partnership Questioned" Anatoliy Anisimov commented on page one of the official parliamentary Parlamentskaya Gazeta (12/15): "Unfortunately, everything we have heard over the last few years about the basically new non-confrontational, if not partner-like, relationships between the U.S. and Russia, has turned out to be empty talk. When the Americans needed support for their military action in Afghanistan, they called us a partner. But they forgot the partnership once they decided that they wanted to scrap the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of the disarmament policy. It is true what people say about charity beginning at home. With the damage done, no accolades over President Putin's statement will repair it." "Moscow Reluctant To Slow Progress" The centrist army Krasnaya Zvezda (12/15) noted in a comment by Vadim Markushin on page one: "Moscow has taken a balanced position, reluctant to slow progress in the bilateral relations it has made jointly with Washington in the past few months." "Gloating Is Inappropriate" Mikhail Khodaryonok said in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (12/15): "The tests that are being carried out in the U.S. are without precedent. Interception (of incoming missiles) is an incredibly complicated thing, so failures at the early stage are unavoidable. Gloating or rejoicing maliciously at setbacks would be most inappropriate.... The latest failure has born out what Russian President Vladimir Putin said about the U.S.' NMD posing no threat to Russia's security." "Ulterior Motives" Anatoliy Verbin contended in nationalist opposition Sovetskaya Rossiya (12/15): "Serious plans usually have serious motives or problems behind them. So apparently, the motives behind the new Star Wars program differ considerably from what is said publicly. Only a very naive person can believe that countries whose military potentials will never be nearly as big as the ex-USSR's pose a threat to the U.S. You can't trust the Americans when they refer to 'international terrorism' as their other enemy either. To pull out of the ABM treaty, they must have had far more important reasons. Of those, the state of the U.S. economy seems to be the chief one. Indications are that the world's capitalist economy, especially the U.S. economy, needs a big stimulus." "A Planned Mistake" Reformist Izvestiya (12/14) front-paged a comment by Svetlana Babayeva, Yevgeniy Bai and Dmitriy Safonov: "In effect, the Russian and American presidents made that decision together at George Bush's ranch in Texas. That it came as no surprise is evidence of a new quality of relations between the two countries. Putin was restrained. He said that the unilateral withdrawal from the treaty 'poses no danger to Russia's national security.' Other Russian officials have been just as restrained. Even if critics, contrary to the new climate of (U.S.-Russian) relations, tried something stronger than rhetoric, they would be hard put to do so. Nobody knows what Russia can do besides being discontented or why it should it should do anything else." "Moscow Suffers Defeat" Sergey Guliy stated on page one of reformist Noviye Izvestiya (12/14): "Fighting to hold its own on what it considers a key foreign policy issue, Moscow has suffered yet another ignominious defeat. It might have avoided it, though, if Putin had accepted a compromise, as Washington in the last year of Clinton's presidency wooed Moscow to make it agree to modifying the treaty so that, with its basic provisions remaining unchanged, the U.S. could carry out MD tests.... The fact that Bush and Putin have suddenly become emotionally attached to one another can only influence the methods they use to pursue their policies, not the policies themselves." "It Is Not A Crime. It is a Mistake" Centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (12/14) editorialized on page one: "According to this newspaper's experts, the U.S.' decision to pull out of the ABM treaty can complicate its relations with Russia. The same newspaper quoted Aleksey Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee: 'This decision is not meant to insult or hurt Russia. Yet this is exactly what it has done. The U.S. would have had many more years for research and testing without having to breach the ABM treaty. All it would have had to do is coordinate with Russia in amending it. To use Talleyrand's words, (Washington's decision) is worse than a crime. It is a mistake.' Konstantin Kosachev, deputy chairman of the Duma's foreign relations committee, said, 'Politically, the U.S.' decision is at variance with the new climate of trust and cooperation characteristic of relations between the two countries in the months after September 11.'" "Bush Acts As He Sees Fit" Aleksandr Kuranov commented in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (12/14): "The U.S. president, taking advantage of the post-September 11 situation, keeps acting in foreign affairs as he sees fit. Russian politicians should not be too hopeful as they shake hands with Bush and see smiles on the face of Secretary of State Colin Powell, perhaps the most experienced and 'proper' member of the current U.S. leadership. He may really think that Bush needs to be cured of Russophobia, but there are more than enough people around the President who think otherwise." "Bush Capers About, But Nobody's Afraid in Moscow" Reformist business-oriented Kommersant (12/14) cited several Russian officials in an article by Gennadiy Sysoyev on page one: "Moscow, while dubbing the U.S.' decision a mistake, pretends that nothing terrible has happened. President Putin is quite certain that it 'poses no danger to Russia's national security.' All politicians whose opinions amount to Moscow's official position sound placating, saying the same things, which is rare. Presidential aide Sergey Yastrzhembskiy: 'Russia's reaction will be calm since our nuclear potential is enough to protect our national interests.' Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov: 'We feel confident as far as our defense capability is concerned.' Chief of the Russian army staff Anatoliy Kvashnin: 'Militarily, the issue of the U.S.' withdrawal from the ABM treaty is solvable'.... Reluctance to mar relations with the U.S. is not the only reason for Moscow's calmness. Russia still hopes to get compensation for maintaining composure." "It Doesn't Seem Like A Step In The Right Direction" Vadim Markushin remarked in centrist army Krasnaya Zvezda (12/14): "Russia's military security will be none the worse for that. But military wariness will persist in spite of the bilateral relations beginning to change for the better. Russia will have to take adequate retaliatory measures to strengthen its security. Other powers, including China and France, won't remain indifferent either. So the U.S. president's statement does not sound like a step in the right direction." "A Blow To Putin's Merger Policy" Nationalist opposition Sovetskaya Rossiya (12/14) ran this by Vyacheslav Tetekin: "The U.S.' decision is a heavy blow to the policy of Russia's merger with the West which President Putin has worked hard to implement in the last few months. With the Russian strategic forces a major factor and the only deterrent to the U.S.' aggressiveness, the Americans clearly aim to render it useless. That Secretary of State Colin Powell warned Moscow in advance...makes no difference. The timing is quite remarkable. The U.S. decision is sure to upset the entire system of international agreements of the last few decades. Putin, apparently softened by the flattery of Western politicians and the media, does not seem able to respond firmly, as the leader of a great power should, to the dangerous moves by his new 'ally'.... We must think of Russia's security. We need to think fast, and we need to act even faster. It is time we stopped playing the game of 'the threat of international terrorism' and recognize that a real threat comes from the Kremlin's new 'ally,' the U.S.A." "One-Sided Bush" Reformist, business-oriented Kommersant (12/13) front-paged a comment by Leonid Gankin: "The U.S. president has confirmed his country's plan to withdraw from the ABM Treaty unilaterally. Russia's reaction will not be too strong. It would look irrelevant, as relations between Moscow and Washington have been very close indeed over the past few months.... According to U.S. sources, Vladimir Putin, meeting with George Bush in the U.S. last month, assured him that the relations between the two countries won't be impaired even if the U.S. withdraws from the treaty unilaterally."