CDI Russia Weekly-#184 14 December 2001 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. AFP: US withdrawal from ABM treaty gets mixed reaction. 2. Christian Science Monitor: Fred Weir, US arms move could spark political fallout for Putin. Bush told Russia yesterday that the US will withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty. 3. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Going Unilaterally Ballistic. 4. Interfax: Russia will always be able to break through any US missile defence - army source. 5. Baltimore Sun: Mark Matthews, Unilateral approach revisited. Bush reverts to style used before Sept. 11. 6. Versiya: Vadim Saranov, CRITICAL MASS. There are too many armed formations in Russia. 7. RFE/RL: Jeremy Bransten, 2001 In Review: Russian Foreign Policy Brings Moscow Closer To West. 8. Obshchaya Gazeta: Dmitriy Furman, The World Community and Us: A Friendship Against -- Will the Fate of the Anti-Hitler Coalition Befall the Anti-Terrorist Coalition? 9. PONARS: Kimberly Marten Zisk, Why Peace Operations in Afghanistan Should Heed Soviet Lessons Learned. 10. Digital Freedom Network: Jacqueline Kozin, Russia's "spymania" highlights lack of legal reform. 11. Asia Times: Gustavo Capdevila, Democracy inoculation lets disease wave the red flag. ******* #1 US withdrawal from ABM treaty gets mixed reaction AFP December 14, 2001 The US decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty drew mixed reactions, with Russian President Vladimir Putin describing the move as "mistake". US President George W. Bush said he had given Moscow the required six months notice to withdraw from the 1972 treaty, the cornerstone of Cold War arms control efforts, to allow the United States to build a missile shield. "Both Russia and the United States, compared with other nuclear powers, have for a long time had an effective system for penetrating anti-missile defences," Putin said in an address to the nation.. "That is why I can say with complete certainty that the decision taken by the American president is not a threat to the security of the Russian Federation. "We are not surprised by this decision which we nevertheless consider to be a mistake," Putin said, adding that Russia was not preparing to withdraw jointly from the ABM treaty as proposed by the Americans." Bush's long expected move also drew criticism from the US Congress, where the US Senate's Majority Leader, Democrat Tom Daschle, said he was "concerned" about US allies' reaction to the announcement. "I think it could rupture relations with key countries and governments around the world ... (and it) presents a very serious question regarding future arms races," Daschle said. "Unilateral action by the United States sends the wrong message. I think we could expect the withdrawal of treaties by other countries," he said, adding that abandoning the treaty was "a high price to pay for testing" the missile defense system. Although Congress cannot affect Bush's decision, it does hold the purse strings for any future missile defense development. House Majority Leader Republican Dick Armey applauded Bush's decision. "The threat of attack from rogue states and organizations grows everyday," he said in a statement. A spokesman for British Prime Minister Tony Blair said the world had moved on since the ABM treaty was signed. The treaty was therefore a matter for those two countries "and its future is essentially a matter for them," he said. "What is important is the maintenance of strategic stability rather than a particular framework to achieve that." China did not immediately react after Bush's announcement but earlier expressed "concern" and called for talks on the issue. "We've taken note of the relevant reports and express our concern," foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said, adding that China was worried about "negative impacts". A German foreign ministry spokesman welcomed Bush's announcement as "an opportunity to reduce the strategic nuclear threat". Germany would however "have welcomed a renegotiation of the ABM treaty," he added. France said it hoped "binding international mechanisms" could be put in place to provide strategic stability following the US decision. A foreign ministry statement called the ABM treaty "an essential component of strategic stability in recent years". In Brussels, NATO spokesman Yves Brodeur said the alliance had "no official reaction, as this involves a bilateral treaty" signed by Washington and Moscow. There was also no reaction from the European Union. Russia's neighbor Finland voiced hope that the ABM treaty would be succeeded by new international arms agreements, but greeted the US pullout from the pact with a suggestion that its usefulness had expired. "We think the ABM treaty has had considerable significance by increasing stability" in the world, a foreign ministry spokesperson said. Neighboring Sweden said the US move posed a risk of reigniting an arms race and triggering further nuclear proliferation. Czech President Vaclav Havel, a key leader of the struggle which brought down communism, expressed understanding for the United States' withdrawal, saying the agreement was "outdated". ****** #2 Christian Science Monitor December 14, 2001 US arms move could spark political fallout for Putin Bush told Russia yesterday that the US will withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty. By Fred Weir Special to The Christian Science Monitor MOSCOW - President George W. Bush's decision to withdraw from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile treaty, announced yesterday, will deal a severe blow to his new friend Vladimir Putin, Russian experts say. Russia has long opposed any modification of the treaty, which bans testing and deployment of antimissile weapons. But Mr. Bush has called the treaty a cold war relic and has said that terror threats underscore the need for missile defense. Though Russia acknowledges that it is no longer a superpower on par with the US, many in the country's establishment still view the arms control framework as a guarantee that it enjoys a special relationship with the US and commensurate influence in world affairs. Initial Russian reaction to Bush's decision sounded ominous. "The US utilized our help in the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, then announced this stance on the ABM treaty," says Vladimir Lukin, a leader of the liberal Yabloko party and former Russian ambassador to the United States. "We counted on closer cooperation with the US, but now we will have to struggle to see this decision as a unique event, rather than the general trend." The chief of Russia's General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, warned that the pullout "could lead to a new spiral in the arms race." Since September President Putin has defied his conservative military brass by backing the US-led anti-terrorist coalition and making a far-reaching reevaluation of relations with the West. Ties have warmed dramatically. But the Kremlin's most ambitious hopes, for a whole new strategic deal with the West, appear to have suffered two setbacks in barely a week. Russian expectations of a full voice in NATO went unrealized at last week's "NATO at 20" summit. US withdrawal from the ABM treaty undermines much of Putin's recent talk about building a new, collective system of global security. "The US clearly does not understand how radically Putin broke with his own elite when he joined Russia with the American coalition against terrorism," says Sergei Kolmakov, an analyst with the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarism, which is linked to the State Duma. "Support for Putin's pro-West policy is far from unanimous in key sections of the Russian elite, and it is going to be much harder for him to defend it now." Notice of withdrawal from the ABM treaty allows the two sides six months in which to negotiate new terms. Optimists say American moves toward missile defense entail no immediate impact on Russian national security - the Kremlin still controls an overwhelming nuclear deterrent - and create the opportunity for Moscow and Washington to explore new ideas for coexistence. "US leaders have made clear that Russia is no longer seen as a strategic rival," says Yevgeny Bazhanov, a specialist with the official Russian Diplomatic Academy. "We should have some faith in new approaches. After Sept. 11, the US knows that it cannot solve global problems unilaterally, but must seek cooperation from Russia and the global community. This will reshape our relations in the long run, but we must be persistent." Pessimists warn that Putin could face intense political pressure to take military counter-measures, which at best might bring on a chill in relations or, at worst, reignite the arms race. In this scenario, the Kremlin may declare all US-Russian arms control agreements null and void, then proceed to redeploy the big, multiple-warhead ICBMs that were banned under START-2 (which is still unratified by the US Congress). "If the ABM treaty ceases to exist, it follows that Russia should have a free hand in nuclear planning," says Dmitri Rogozin, chairman of the Duma's international affairs committee. "Logic dictates that we should move to offset the damage done to our security." ******* #3 Moscow Times December 14, 2001 Going Unilaterally Ballistic By Pavel Felgenhauer The war in Afghanistan against the radical Muslim Taliban militia, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida terrorist organization seems to have been won. U.S. forces have established bases inside Afghanistan, and Russian aid in securing bases in Central Asia is no longer essential. Since the Sept. 11, attacks close relations with Moscow have been considered an issue of paramount importance in Washington. Now the emphasis has clearly shifted and the decision made that it is time to officially announce the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. "The time is coming when we will need to move beyond the ABM Treaty. The president will let you know. The time is near," National Security Council spokesman Sean McCormack told reporters this week. Sources in the White House and the Senate say that in January or earlier Washington will give the required official six-month notice of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Last month, President Vladimir Putin's chief of staff Alexander Voloshin told reporters: "Our military experts have calculated that the existing ABM Treaty allows the United States to continue its missile defense testing program for five to seven years; if there are obstacles, we are ready to discuss how to change the treaty." The only response from Washington has been to scrap ABM unconditionally. Even a limited missile defense will not be ready for deployment for a decade or so. ABM abrogation by the United States is not a military-strategic move per se, and in Russia many see it as a deliberate slap in the face for Putin. The Russian military establishment will draw encouragement from seeing Putin's pro-Western foreign policy endeavor rewarded with such a public humiliation. They will surely say, "We warned you never to trust the Americans," and proceed to ask for more weapons procurement money. The U.S. military will presumably be as glad as their counterparts in the East to see Russia's attempts to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations discouraged. The U.S. Navy is now lobbying for money to build a new series of nuclear attack submarines; the only possible enemy that could warrant the building of these new submarines is Russia with its nuclear submarine fleet. If Russia becomes a true ally of the West, large parts of the Pentagon's armed forces will become redundant and may be cut. If a new generation of attack submarines is not procured, the U.S. nuclear submarine-building yards may have to be closed down. In a generation we may all be living in a world where there are virtually no nuclear submarines left at all. The U.S. and Russian militaries will surely unite in coordinated opposition to such a threat. Last week the Pentagon and its chief, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, did their best to stop NATO countries approving a "NATO at 20" (meaning the 19 members plus Russia) decision-making committee. "NATO at 20" was in the end approved in principle but stripped of any true decision-making role. Russian military chiefs, in turn, have been stating recently that there is no need for Russia to join NATO, that "NATO at 20" does not add anything new and that it will be unproductive. It is obvious that there are powerful special interest groups in the West -- maybe even more powerful than anti-Western influence groups in Moscow -- that want to keep Russia out. At the same time the war in Afghanistan has lost the ability to promote an alliance with Washington. As different former anti-Taliban Afghan factions feud over the spoils of victory -- primarily over control of narcotics production and the heroin trade -- Russia and the United States may also start to squabble, as they find themselves backing opposing warlords. Russia, however, needs an alliance with the West more than the West needs an alliance with Russia. It's possible that Putin may continue his drive toward the West despite the ABM Treaty. The Kremlin may play down the termination of the treaty, wait for the fallout to settle and continue business as usual, emphasizing there is no imminent threat in a nonexistent missile defense system. Putin has clearly made a long-term decision to Westernize Russia. The multipolar world concept has been abandoned by the Kremlin, and its author -- former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov -- will effectively be leaving public politics if he is elected president of Russia's Chamber of Commerce and Industry this week, as expected. Even the maverick leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, has announced that his party is abandoning anti-American and anti-Western elements in its ideology. If this pro-Western drive is rejected, will there be another chance? Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. ****** #4 Russia will always be able to break through any US missile defence - army source Interfax Moscow, 13 December: Russia has worked out measures "that can minimize the negative consequences" of the US decision on Thursday to unilaterally back out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, military and diplomatic sources in Moscow have said. "In purely military terms, Moscow is considering about 20 measures that do not require any substantial increase in expenditures and can be taken in response to the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty," one of the sources told Interfax. He said Russian leaders do not believe that "from the military point of view the departure of the US from the ABM treaty will lead to any substantial decrease in the potential of Russia's strategic offensive armaments". One possible measure is to lift restrictions put on the Topol missile complex by a strategic armaments treaty. "We may give up these restrictions, which would radically change the Topol both in the sense of breaking through the NMD [planned US national missile defence] and in the sense of the combat equipment of its missiles," the source said. He said the impending US withdrawal from the ABM treaty "leaves no other choice to Russia than to develop its own means of breaking through the American NMD and equipping its strategic forces with them". The US NMD idea "is quite dubious both from the point of view of military policy and from the point of view of technological resources. Russia will always be able to break through any American NMD system. Both Russian and American professionals in the NMD field realize perfectly well that it is impossible to create a system of absolute protection," he said. The sources interviewed by Interfax said the United States' departure from the ABM treaty may block the process of reduction of nuclear weapons, end strategic stability and destroy the nuclear-deterrence regime. "This step will move nuclear powers, above all China, and also threshold states, to intensify their programmes of development of strategic armaments," one of the sources said. The sources claimed that it would take the United States at least six years to deploy the NMD from the moment of its declaration of departure from the ABM treaty. According to the sources, Pentagon experts believe that the NMD will be able to intercept 300 to 350 Russian strategic missiles and that Russia will be able to keep only 600 to 700 nuclear warheads by between 2007 and 2010. "All these calculations as well as allegations by individual persons in the Pentagon that the USA is in a position to destroy up to 450 strategic missiles with conventional weapons raise serious doubts," the sources said. The ABM treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States, bans both parties from creating a national missile defence. But it allows each party to build a stationary surface-to-air missile shield for only one, strictly marked region - Moscow Region in Russia as legal successor to the Soviet Union and the area of the intercontinental ballistic missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota, in the United States. Each region can have a maximum of 100 launchers and no more than 100 strategic missile defence systems. ******* #5 Baltimore Sun December 13, 2001 Unilateral approach revisited Bush reverts to style used before Sept. 11 By Mark Matthews Sun National Staff WASHINGTON - As it scrambled to mount a global anti-terror coalition in the tense aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration seemed to be a sudden convert to the religion of international cooperation. But not anymore. Flush with military success in Afghanistan, the White House has taken a series of steps that mark a return to what critics in the United States and Europe call its "unilateralist," go-it-alone approach to world affairs. The most significant step is President Bush's decision, which might be officially announced today, to scrap the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Moscow. The treaty bars the development of a system to defend the United States against missile attack, a system that is one of Bush's most important foreign policy goals. As recently as last month, even as Bush continued to call the ABM pact a "relic of the Cold War," Secretary of State Colin L. Powell hinted that he was trying to reach an accommodation with Moscow that would allow robust testing but avoid pulling out of the treaty. Russia has proved to be a valuable ally in crushing the Taliban and al-Qaida terrorist network in Afghanistan, allowing use of its airspace and bases in nations that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. This marked a reversal not only of its decades-long hostility to the West under the communist Soviet regime but also of Russia's post-Soviet drive to maintain a shrinking sphere of influence. Despite an increasingly close relationship with Bush, however, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin has consistently refused to acquiesce in abandoning the ABM treaty, which he has called a key foundation block of international security. In meetings last week with arms-control specialists in Washington, high-ranking Russian military officers said a U.S. withdrawal from the treaty would not seriously damage the new relationship. But the Russians "also warned that their likely response would be to withdraw from other arms-control agreements," including pacts that limit the number of long-range nuclear weapons, eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles and conventional forces in Europe, according to Wade Boese of the Arms Control Association. Bioweapons discussion Bush's decision was the second setback in a week for international arms-control advocates. On Friday, administration officials maneuvered to break off discussion at an international conference aimed at enforcing a worldwide ban on biological weapons, causing the convention to collapse. U.S. officials argued that had it not acted, the convention might have approved enforcement measures that were ineffective. In July, the United States, acting alone, opposed enforcement measures that were the result of years of negotiation, but it was trying at last week's conference to get a number of its own proposals adopted by other countries. Both the ABM Treaty and the so-called enforcement protocol for bio-weapons are widely supported by America's European allies, who this year were openly critical of what they view as the Bush administration's disdain for international agreements and institutions such as the United Nations. Europeans were cheered by Bush's early reaction to the Sept. 11 terror attacks, when he instructed Powell to assemble a broad coalition to fight al-Qaida and welcomed European offers of support for the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan. But leaders of several European countries, including Britain, France and Germany, were later chagrined to find the United States conducting the war virtually on its own while their forces sat on the sidelines. No peacekeeping role Meanwhile, the United States has refused to participate in a subsequent and less visible peacekeeping role, calling on the allies to share the burden. At the same time, it wants the allies to share the cost of rebuilding Pakistan. The Pentagon says it has been difficult for its commanders to find appropriate roles for the allies, whose armed forces have fallen behind the United States technologically. During the war over Kosovo in 1999, U.S. commanders grew impatient with a cumbersome allied decision-making process. "What we have seen in the last two months is an implementation of the Rice doctrine," said Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution, referring to proposals during the 2000 campaign by Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security adviser. Rice spoke at the time of a division of labor in which the United States fought the wars and Europeans followed up with peacekeeping. In the Middle East, the United States has also veered away from a "multilateralist" approach adopted in the aftermath of Sept. 11 as it tried to assuage Arab critics of its anti-terror campaign. Angered by Yasser Arafat's reluctance to crack down on Palestinian terrorists who in the past two weeks have killed more than 40 Israelis, the administration dropped the "even-handed" tone favored by its Arab allies and made counter-terrorism the centerpiece of its Mideast policy. Most or all of these moves are widely viewed as internal administration victories by hard-liners, most often identified with the Pentagon leadership, who are deeply wary of international agreements that constrain American freedom of action in the world and impatient with the sticky process of gaining a consensus among allies. They are also perceived as defeats for Powell and State Department officials, who have tried to restrain the administration's "unilateralist" tendencies and work more cooperatively with other countries. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, an opponent of the ABM treaty, has gained new influence in the administration because of the U.S. military success in Afghanistan, says Catherine Kelleher, an international policy specialist at the Naval War College. China factor The ABM treaty decision will have reverberations beyond the U.S.-Russia relationship and dismay in Europe. With China, which in the foreseeable future is less likely than Russia to be able to penetrate an American missile-defense system, it could prove to be a double-edged sword. China is likely to use Bush's ABM decision as an excuse for a military buildup it was planning anyway, according to James R. Lilley, a former U.S. ambassador to Beijing. But development of a missile-defense system gives the United States a bargaining chip to use in getting China to curb its development of missiles, he said. Administration critics and some Europeans see the American go-it-alone trend as possibly counterproductive in the war on terrorism and other struggles that require international support for the United States. "We don't want to fight wars ourselves. It's not politically doable over the long term," says Daalder. ******* #6 Versiya No. 47 December 11-17, 2001 CRITICAL MASS There are too many armed formations in Russia Author: Vadim Saranov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] RUSSIA'S ARMIES: THE ARMED FORCES ARE THE LARGEST, COMMANDED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND THE GENERAL STAFF. THE INTERIOR MINISTRY WITH ITS OWN ARMY, THE INTERNAL TROOPS, IS SECOND FROM THE TOP. THEN THERE IS THE FEDERAL BORDER GUARDS SERVICE, AND SMALLER FORCES WHICH ARE ALSO ARMED. How many armies are there in Russia? Large ones How many armies are there in Russia? The Armed Forces are the largest, commanded by the defense minister and the General Staff. They comprise the Ground Forces, Navy, Strategic Missile Forces, Airborne Troops, and central command units. By rough estimates alone, the matter concerns over 1.2 million people - plus nuclear warheads, artillery, tanks, aircraft, ships, and satellites. Everything, in other words, that Russia would throw against a potential aggressor. The Interior Ministry with its own army, the Internal Troops, is second from the top. The Internal Troops number over 200,000 servicemen and have light arms, light armored vehicles, and aviation (also light). And several special assignment units like the Vityaz regiment and Rus, Rosich, and Skif detachments. Other units of the Interior Ministry include OMON special assignment commandos and SOBR rapid-response detachments. They total several thousand men. OMON and SOBR include light arms and some armored personnel carriers. Troops of the Federal Border Guards Service number almost 200,000 servicemen. They are supposed to be cut down to 183,000 by 2003 within the framework of reorganization of the Armed Forces. The Federal Border Guards Service includes ground and naval units plus several helicopters and transport planes. Sergei Shoigu's Emergencies Ministry has a small army of its own too. It is called Civilian Defense Troops, numbering 30,000 men or so. There were the plans to up their numerical strength to 50,000 men but they collided with the general reduction tendency. The Emergencies Ministry also has several well-equipped special assignment detachments. Shoigu's structure has light armored vehicles, amphibians, helicopters, and transport planes. It also has light arms, sophisticated communications means, and systems of radiation and germ detection. The list of troops (or small armies) is completed with Railroads Troops numbering 50,000 servicemen. Small ones Established in 1997, the Federal Service of Special Construction comprises the most exotic armed formations - Main Military Directorate of Exploitation and Restoration of the Ministry of Communications, Central Directorate of Military Construction Units of the Nuclear Energy Ministry, Federal Road-Building Service. The Federal Special Construction Service has just over 14,000 men. The Main Directorate of the Special Programs of the President is somewhat larger. Special programs is an all-encompassing term. It may mean anything from mobilizational readiness of state power bodies to servicing special governmental objects. The Directorate has almost 20,000 men. The Federal Protection Service serves the authorities too. It protects them. The Presidential Regiment is its fighting nucleus. It is more than a palace guard unit despite the widespread opinion. Even elite units of the Defense Ministry may envy intensiveness of its combat training. The numerical strength of the Federal Protection Service is over 3,000. Smaller armed formations exist in the Federal Security Service. The matter concerns primarily the Special Assignment Center of the Counter-Terrorist Department of the Federal Security Service. The Center includes two special assignment units, Alpha and Vympel, and numbers between 1,500 and 2,000 men. The Foreign Intelligence Service has its own special forces. The unit was formed in 1998 and called Zaslon. Different reports estimate its numerical strength at between 300 and 500 servicemen. The Main Penitentiary Directorate of the Justice Ministry has special forces of its own to suppress prison riots. These detachments are used in Chechnya as well. Special detachments of physical protection can be found within the Federal Tax Police Service and State Customs Committee. They are small special assignment units brandishing light arms. Again, reports on their numerical strength vary. It is generally believed, however, to be under 10,000 men. Sum total All in all, fourteen types of armed formations operating in Russia quite legitimately. Doesn't that seem like too many? ******* #7 2001 In Review: Russian Foreign Policy Brings Moscow Closer To West By Jeremy Bransten Thanks to a combination of unforeseen circumstances and skilled statesmanship, Russian President Vladimir Putin has guided his country's foreign policy through a string of successes in the past 12 months. Still regarded with suspicion by both the United States and Europe at the start of the year, Russia ends 2001 as a potential strategic partner to both. RFE/RL correspondent Jeremy Bransten traces this stunning transformation. Prague, 13 December 2001 (RFE/RL) -- The year opened frostily for U.S.-Russian relations, with U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice declaring in January that Russia "constitutes a threat to the West in general" and to America's "European allies in particular." The director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet, in hearings before the U.S. Senate's Select Intelligence Committee, echoed those comments: "Let me be perfectly candid. There can be little doubt that President Putin wants to restore some aspects of the Soviet past status as a great power, strong central authority, and a stable and predictable society -- sometimes at the expense of neighboring states or the civil rights of individual Russians." But by year's end, U.S. President George W. Bush was hosting Putin at his Texas ranch, declaring the Russian leader to be a close friend: "We had a great dinner last night. We had a little Texas barbecue, pecan pie, a little Texas music, and I think the president really enjoyed himself." The two leaders were still unable to overcome some points of contention -- among them, Washington's impending departure from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- but a sea-change in attitude has taken place on both sides. Bush announced that the United States would cut its nuclear arsenal over the next decade by two-thirds, from just under 6,000 warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. Putin pledged to reciprocate. Earlier, Putin had announced Russia would close its intelligence listening post in Cuba and let the lease expire on its naval base in Vietnam. As for the old bugbear of NATO expansion, which Russia had hitherto opposed, Putin said he could see Moscow joining the alliance at a later date. What caused this dramatic turnaround? The initial breakthrough appeared to come during the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders in Slovenia, in June. Bush, at that time, spoke of the need to end the suspicion of the Cold War era and said Putin was a man he could trust. But without a doubt, the defining moment in Russian-American relations came in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the United States. As Bush has often repeated, Putin was the first foreign leader to telephone him on that fateful day, to offer his country's assistance. Putin's immediate decision to publicly and wholeheartedly support the U.S. war on terrorism has won him much mileage in Washington and could do more to advance the cause of U.S.-Russian relations than years of talks and treaties. But Putin's stance has also advanced Moscow's ties with its European partners. During a visit to Berlin just two weeks after the U.S. attacks, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder seemed to accept Moscow's call for a new partnership, as well as Putin's interpretation of Russia's ongoing military campaign in the breakaway republic of Chechnya. Schroeder implied it was time for the West to soften its criticism of the action in Chechnya as it, too, was directed against terrorism: "Regarding Chechnya, there will be and must be a more differentiated evaluation in world opinion." Otto Latsis, deputy editor of the Russian daily "Noviye Izvestia," recently told RFE/RL he believes Putin is gambling on a new overall framework for relations with the West. If Putin's vision is accepted, Latsis says, agreements on specific issues can be resolved later. "I think that this wager on an overall change in Russia's whole system of relations with the West is a wager that Russia will become the same part of the Western world as Germany, France, Britain -- that it will become like any other large Western country," Latsis said. But Stephan De Spiegeleire, a Russia analyst at the RAND Europe think tank, told RFE/RL that both sides may be getting ahead of themselves in their enthusiasm to forge new ties. "I'm one of these people who thinks that foreign policy shouldn't run ahead too much of economic realities and of political realities. And it seems to me that this is exactly what is happening now," said De Spiegeleire. "Russia is engaging more and more with the West, but it's not nearly as close to the West that it would warrant the type of institutional rapprochement that we're heading towards now, both with respect to relations with NATO but also with the EU -- the fact, for instance, that Russia now has an arrangement whereby every month they get briefed by this new political and security committee of the European Union. That's something that we don't even do with the United States." The other concern, according to De Spiegeleire, is that Putin may be getting ahead of his own supporters in Russia. After an initial honeymoon period when no voices of opposition to his policies could be heard, the Russian president now finds himself the target of criticism from some powerful domestic interests. If Putin's new policy of rapprochement with the West fails to yield tangible results, De Spiegeleire says it could become a convenient stick in the hands of Putin's opponents. "The thing that really sort of worries me is that if I read the Russian press and even some of the commentaries of some of the more liberal parts of the foreign policy establishment, they're quite critical of what's happening. So that to me suggests that Putin really has to be very careful," De Spiegeleire said. "Now, to look at Russia, put that against the background of what's happening domestically, where for the first time it seems to me Putin is really encountering real resistance on a number of issues and from a number of different angles: certain business leaders being unhappy with him; the regional leaders coming back and saying, 'Wait a second, you've gone too far'; the military being unhappy about a variety of different things, going from the sacking of the Northern Fleet command to military reform to some financial issues. Even the power structures, which were traditionally one of the main pillars of the new Putin political structure, like the ministry of the interior, the judicial system -- even these people are starting to think, 'Wait a second. What's happening here?' " Both sides in this new East-West relationship are testing the waters -- seeing how far they can extend cooperation. In December, NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels agreed to set up a new forum for closer cooperation with Russia, but planned to limit the decision-making power offered to Russia. The ministers agreed to create a council for consultation and joint decisions between the 19 NATO members and Russia. But NATO Secretary-General Lord George Robertson underlined NATO's right to bypass Russia if necessary. De Spiegeleire says that in the upcoming year, the limits of this new entente may become better-defined. Both sides will have to keep cool heads in order to avoid the ups and downs of the 1990s, which began with enthusiasm on both sides and ended with a degree of estrangement. "There is quite a bit of political capital that is being invested in this new relationship, both on the Russian side and on the Western side. All I am trying to say, though, is that there are still a lot of forces of opposition on both sides that may make it very hard to fulfill the promises of this new relationship," he said. "And if these promises do not get fulfilled, we may actually be in a worse position than we were at the beginning, because there will be mutual recriminations, as indeed we've probably seen during the '90s. It might be similar to that." As the saying goes, a year is a long time in politics. And 2002 could be pivotal in determining whether this honeymoon between Russia and the West will dissolve or grow into a solid strategic relationship. ******* #8 Russia-US Anti-Terror Coalition Likened to USSR-US Alliance Against Hitler Obshchaya Gazeta 6 December 2001 [translation for personal use only] Article by Dmitriy Furman: "The World Community and Us: A Friendship Against -- Will the Fate of the Anti-Hitler Coalition Befall the Anti-Terrorist Coalition?" The decisiveness of the foreign-policy choice in favor of the West that Putin made after 11 September, in my view, has been somewhat exaggerated. When Hitler, against whom the Western countries were already at war, attacked the USSR, our alliance with the West also became inevitable. Stalin and the Western countries did not have any particular choice -- whether to enter into it or not. The alliance between Russia and the West became almost equally inevitable after the terrorist acts in the US, when the West launched a struggle against the Islamic extremists who had been supporting the Chechen separatists and had been threatening Central Asia, which we regard as our "zone of influence." There was no way we could have sided in this conflict with the Taliban. True, it was possible to take a more "neutral" position, do all we could to accentuate way the suffering of the Afghan civilian population and resist the creation of US military bases on CIS territory -- which would have been more consistent with our entrenched foreign-policy habits. But there were no guarantees, in my view, that the Central Asian regimes would have listened to us and resisted the temptation to become "strategic partners" of the US. Under this scenario we may have said good-bye altogether both to our influence in Central Asia and to the CIS, and found ourselves in total isolation. It is quite likely that Putin decided that it is better to approve what is inevitable anyway. Undoubtedly, our president sized up the situation more quickly than most of our elite. But he didn't have a particularly broad choice. Just as the West didn't have a choice -- whether or not to accept the assistance offered by Putin. We "became friends against" Islamic extremism, just as the USSR and the Western countries once became friends against Hitler. But it is not easy to be allied with someone against a common enemy and to dislike the ally at the same time. It is hard to judge our president's deep-seated feelings, but for the psychologically simpler Bush, love for Russia was also predetermined by the events of 11 September. And again there is a great similarity here to the anti-Hitler coalition. When Bush reported that he had looked into the Russian president's eyes and saw that they were honest, clearly the same psychological mechanism was operating as the one that prompted Roosevelt to say once that conversations with Stalin had convinced him that deep down the dictator was a real Christian. The analogy between the current antiterrorist coalition and the anti-Hitler coalition can be extended. They are not only alliances against an enemy that suddenly became a common one, alliances that even give rise to something like love. They are also alliances between social organisms that are fundamentally different and are developing along different trajectories. The alliance between Stalin's USSR and the West was an alliance between countries with totally different systems, which were not even very comprehensible to each other and that were developing according to their own laws and couldn't move closer to each other just because they had joined a common coalition. Post-Soviet Russia, of course, is closer to Western society than Soviet Russia was. But post-Soviet Russia is still built on completely different, "non-Western" foundations (on the fundamental impossibility of the opposition coming to power), with its own logic of development, which by no means leads in a "Western" direction. I think the alliance with the West will have practically no impact on our internal evolution, just as the analogous alliance in its own time had practically no impact on the internal evolution of the USSR. Even after 11 September and our joining the antiterrorist coalition, "normal" life goes on in our country, not related in any way to foreign-policy developments. A unified party is created, modeled on the CPSU. The new Leningrad-Chekist "family" prepares to "devour" the old Yeltsin "family." "Russian Orthodox" oligarchs try to drive out non-Orthodox oligarchs. The courts and prosecutor's office remove from elections regional leaders who are not to the Kremlin's liking. The authorities get ready to shut down TV 6. A massive event in a typically Soviet style -- the Civic Forum -- is held. None of these events or processes are related in any way to the alliance with the Western democracies. It is possible, of course, that the new friendship with the West will prompt the president to exercise more caution inside the country, even to stress somewhat the need to observe "human rights." The reverse is also possible -- that it will prompt him to fight even more resolutely for a "vertical power structure" while the friendship has not cooled and the friend is forgiven for something that someone else would not be forgiven. But all this represents small deviations and fluctuations around the very nature of our development, which has very deep causes and on which neither an alliance nor a quarrel with the West can exert serious influence. And if this is the case, then our current alliance with the West cannot be a lasting one, either, just as the anti-Hitler alliance could not be lasting. The alliance between Stalin and the Western democracies broke up not because of "a difference of interests." A difference of interests implies that everyone wants the same thing but each wants something for himself, and this creates the possibility of a rational agreement, of a delineation or unification of interests. That alliance consisted of fundamentally different societies that couldn't even clearly comprehend what the partner could want. They didn't even have a common language in which they could negotiate. As soon as the common enemy disappeared, the alliance did as well. And in the new cycle of the spiral, most likely, a milder form of the same thing is in store for us. That is the nature of "anti-Hitler coalitions" -- they give way to a "cold war." This time there won't be a "real" cold war, but an end to the alliance euphoria and a return to the "difficult" relations that are natural for the West and post-Soviet Russia and are replete with a mutual lack of understanding and suspicion are, in my view, inevitable. Our integration with the West is not a problem of foreign-policy choice. It is a problem of our internal development, which within the framework of our current regime distances us from the West. Someday the regime will be replaced and our differences from the Western countries will become not differences of various political "species," but differences of national individualities within the same species. And only then will it become possible to have not a situational alliance against a common enemy, but just an alliance, an entry by Russia into the system of relations that exists in the Western world. ******* #9 Why Peace Operations in Afghanistan Should Heed Soviet Lessons Learned PONARS Policy Memo 209 Kimberly Marten Zisk Barnard College and Council on Foreign Relations November 2001 Common wisdom says that the United States has little to learn from studying the military lessons of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. U.S. military actions have been designed not to encounter the disadvantages that the Soviets faced in 1979. The United States has gone in better prepared, more knowledgeable about the terrain and opposition facilities because of its covert operations there in the 1980s, and availing itself of good military intelligence shared by Moscow. This time around, the intervention is multilateral, it has the support of Pakistan and other Afghan neighbors, and is not designed as an imperial exercise. Most important, the U.S. goal is not to prop up a particular regime or to occupy territory, but instead to do quick in-and-out strikes against well defined targets. Conventional wisdom concluded that this would not become a U.S. quagmire. However the Soviet experience in Afghanistan does hold real lessons for the complex peace operations that will be put in place once the military campaign winds down. Three lessons in particular are relevant. First: Outsiders cannot rid the country of rebel fighting. Afghanistan has been at civil war for thirty years, with factions changing sides repeatedly and the entire population caught up in the violence. This time around, Taliban leaders and their Al Qaeda friends will become the rebels challenging whatever coalition government emerges. Ambitious warlords who remain unsatisfied with whatever power-sharing arrangement is reached under UN auspices will join them. No matter how successful the U.S. military campaign is, never will all rebels defect to the winning side. The rebels who are left will not stop fighting, no matter how hard conditions get. The Soviets learned this the hard way. Soviet forces targeted villages in order to drive the civilian population away, believing that if they could separate the rebels from their supporters, the rebels would run out of resources. The Soviets effectively deprived the rebels of easy access to basic supplies, burning down agricultural fields and food warehouses; yet the rebels kept on fighting anyway. They were so highly motivated to regain what they thought was rightfully theirs that they would not give up, no matter what. Soviet forces achieved a number of defensive successes against rebel attacks, and were able to protect their troops located inside cities better and better as time went on. Yet they gained few measurable offensive successes in terms of causing rebel activity to be curtailed. This means that any United Nations peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan will have to include a strong military enforcement component, to protect both the UN mission and the recognized Afghan government from rebel attack. Otherwise, the country will tumble once more into the anarchy that provides a hospitable base of operations for terrorism. Second: The sympathies of neighboring states, especially Pakistan, will have to be maintained over the long-term to prevent rebels from resupplying themselves with weapons and ammunition. Although it is a myth that the Soviet forces were defeated by Stinger missiles-in fact, Soviet aircraft adapted quite well to their use, for example by using infrared decoys to confuse the Stinger targeting mechanisms-the success rate of Soviet operations unquestionably declined after U.S. weaponry started flowing into Afghanistan through Pakistan in 1985. The Soviets lost the air superiority that they had established in previous years, and were left unable to carry out complex air operations in valleys, because the decoys only worked against missiles fired from below, not from mountaintops. This gave the resistance a psychological advantage while weakening Soviet morale. Because rebels will continue to operate in Afghanistan no matter what kind of government emerges there, keeping their weaponry as limited as possible will be important. This requires the cooperation of states where significant parts of the population are sympathetic to those rebels. In turn this means that the war against terrorism has permanently complicated U.S. diplomacy in the Central and South Asian region. Washington will have to continue giving support to Pakistan, even though its authoritarian military regime has taken aggressive action (and supported terrorist attacks) against the more democratic India, has flouted international law on weapons proliferation, and has trampled human rights. This could have unfortunate ripple effects on Pakistan's nuclear confrontation with India, leaving both sides with fewer incentives to act responsibly in return for U.S. support. Third: Facing rebels successfully in Afghanistan requires strong political will and advanced military capabilities. The major reason that Afghanistan became a quagmire for Soviet forces was that they did not deploy very many troops there, and did not deploy enough of their best people. The peak Soviet deployment level was 120,000 troops per year, as compared to 600,000 troops per year at the peak of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and they used only one and a half of their available eight special forces divisions. However it was special forces that they needed for military victory, because maintaining conventional supply lines for water and fuel in Afghanistan's rugged mountain and desert territory is almost impossible. Reports that the Afghan rebels tortured their war prisoners to death so intimidated conventional Soviet troops that they tended to stay huddled inside their armored vehicles, rather than striking out in the kinds of small, independent formations that are required in counterinsurgency warfare. The Soviets never had enough highly qualified personnel on the ground at any one time to wage a successful fight. The lack of Soviet political will is also demonstrated in their low casualty levels: the Soviets sustained only 14,000 deaths during 10 years, as opposed to the 58,000 Americans killed in one decade in Vietnam. In fact, the Soviet government tried to hide from its own population that any kind of war was occurring in Afghanistan at all. Too many soldiers coming home in body bags would have made the extent of fighting clear, even in the absence of a free press, and this led the Soviet leadership to be overly cautious in their tactics. This means that whoever takes the lead enforcement role in an Afghan peace operation will have to be able to sustain domestic political will during the long term, and will have to be prepared to fight rebels using the hit-and-run techniques favored by U.S. and British forces during recent months. Conclusion The UN peace mission in Afghanistan will not be easy. Yet maintaining stability in that country is vital for the struggle against terrorism being waged by both the United States and Russia at the moment. Our future security depends on it, because failure to achieve calm in Afghanistan will reinvigorate Al Qaeda networks. This means that the United States cannot afford to play a minor, supporting role in the UN mission. The U.S. and its western European allies, particularly Great Britain, have unique military capabilities and strong security motives to make a peacekeeping mission there effective in a way no one else can. The U.S. economy will weather the looming global recession better than most other countries will. The United States also has large reserve military forces to call on if needed, as well as immense popular support for the current antiterrorism campaign. The United States has the experience, the resources, and the political will to see a difficult peace enforcement mission through to the end, and it must step up to the challenge. ******* #10 Russia's "spymania" highlights lack of legal reform by Jacqueline Kozin, Digital Freedom Network (December 11, 2001) With Vladimir Putin's rise to power, a new trend has evolved that highlights Russia's continuing struggle to become a full-fledged democracy. In the past three years, there has been a noticeable increase in the arrests and harassment of people accused of being spies by Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). Some speculate President Putin is allowing his former colleagues too much freedom in their pursuits of keeping the state secure as those they target are not engaged in clandestine or illegal activity. The pattern of arrests and harassment seems to focus on those who are scientists, environmentalists, nuclear activists, or people who have contact with foreigners or are foreigners. When arrested, they are often imprisoned without fully knowing the charges against them. There has been a pattern of planting drugs on individuals who will not fully cooperate with the FSB or finding other substantial "evidence" against them which does not exist. The FSB is then able to bring them to trial on drug charges. In the past three years, there has been a noticeable increase in the arrests of people accused of being "spies." Not only does the arbitrary arresting of individuals highlight the stagnation in Russia's democratization efforts, but so does the legal process after detention. Although some are assigned an FSB attorney as legal representation when first imprisoned, the interests of the accused are not properly represented and do not make them any better off than those refused any representation. When independent attorneys take up one of these cases, full access to evidence against their clients is denied. They have to wait until the trial to find out what exactly implicates their clients. This requires the attorneys to request a recess to become familiar with the materials, which thus prolongs the trial. Trials are often further extended by the prosecutors who request additional time to "prepare" some materials. When the evidence is submitted before the court by the prosecutor, it is usually created, such as drugs "found" on the accused or documents found in the defendant's possession. Sometimes, individuals are accused of possessing "secret" material. Of course, many times these documents were not classified and publicly available, but nevertheless were presented as proof of the defendant's intent to divulge state secrets because of their subject matter. In a few cases, like that of Valentin Moiseyev, a court rules that there is not sufficient evidence to prove the individual guilty. However, the prosecutor files an appeal, and gets another trial with different judges and a likely conviction. Trapped by the judicial system The trial is brought before a panel of judges without a jury, and all information about what occurs in court is kept secret. Judges will some times illegally cease the trial and order a new one to begin, which also significantly lengthens the defendant's imprisonment. Judges often accept the distorted evidence submitted by the prosecution and rule against the defense when they object to this or other judicial discrepancies. There is a prevalent sentiment among judges that whoever stands before them accused of a crime must pay for it simply because someone needs to. In a June presentation at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, former Moscow Court Judge Sergey A. Pashin recounted a recent story of a judge who was distressed with having to acquit someone for murder because the public prosecutor refused to try the person. The judge had never acquitted anybody and felt someone had to be punished for the crime. Recently, President Putin submitted an adjustment to the criminal code that would allow those accused of serious crimes, like espionage, the right to jury trials. However, many feel that given the state of the judicial system, the code would be ignored if passed. Why should one think otherwise? If the Russian judicial system did adhere to the existing law, according to Article 7 of the Federal Law on State Secrets, four environmentalists should never have been charged and imprisoned for espionage or treason. ******* #11 Asia Times December 13, 2001 Democracy inoculation lets disease wave the red flag By Gustavo Capdevila GENEVA - A United Nations agency has warned of the grave crisis facing health services in the countries of eastern and central Europe, and the members of the Community of Independent States (CIS). The most impoverished populations of the formerly communist nations are exposed to new outbreaks of disease and epidemics, which has led to a sharp decline in life expectancy in the region, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO) report. Citing a survey of 8,600 families in the Ukraine and statistics provided by the government of that country of 51 million, the study indicates that 88 percent of the population finds it difficult or impossible to obtain health care. But the situation is even more serious in other countries, said Guy Standing, director of the ILO program on socio-economic security, who pointed to the desperate situation in Moldavia and Armenia. In Moldavia, population 4.4 million, the poorest country in Europe, health services are on the verge of collapse, and health professionals, when paid, receive their salaries months behind schedule. The study also notes that 82 percent of Hungary's 11 million people face difficulties gaining access to or affording medical care. The report, drawn up in conjunction with Public Services International (PSI), a global trade union federation for public sector unions that represents 20 million public sector workers around the globe, was presented last week by the ILO at a meeting of trade unionists and specialists. The ILO and the PSI - a non-governmental organization for the public sector within the ILO - noted that the economic situation in a number of countries in the region has driven health services to the brink. In many cases, health professionals are earning less than the minimum salary. In Moldavia, for example, doctors currently earn US$12 a month, Standing said. The decline in health services in eastern and central Europe has contributed to a drop in life expectancy, often dramatic. For instance, the life expectancy rate has plummeted from 68 to 58 in Russia over the past decade. A large number of illnesses that were under control or had even disappeared have cropped up again, and are on the rise, including diphtheria, cholera and tuberculosis, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The crisis is a result of spending cuts by governments and the decentralization of health financing, said Standing. "The evidence shows that if you cut health care services to the extent that they have been cut, you run down their capacity to function," PSI representative Alan Leather said. "In many hospitals there are no drugs, no bandages, nothing to support patients, who have to supply them for themselves." In the Ukraine, patients undergoing surgery must pay not only the doctor, but must also cover the costs of the medicine and the rest of the care provided by the hospital, he pointed out. Many patients who cannot afford to pay for treatment simply do not receive any - the results of which are reflected in the declining life expectancy rates, said Leather. The worst situation is seen in the countries of the former Soviet Union. But, Leather observed, while conditions in the countries of central and eastern Europe are "certainly better, they are not good, because even in those countries you would still be expected to pay something to the doctor or nurse for any kind of treatment". Although health care services have not been widely privatized in the region, the cost of drugs is high, due to the privatization of the pharmacies. Under the socialist public health systems of the past, medicines were provided free of charge to anyone who presented a prescription. Dentist clinics and rehabilitation spas have also been privatized, although few hospitals have. Under the communist regimes that governed the region, many rehabilitation clinics and spas were connected to state enterprises, which to some extent were "the center of life", said Standing. But as the enterprises have been sold into private hands, "they have been outsourcing, privatizing or abandoning their social facilities", he added. Another consequence of the trend towards privatization was the elimination of safety committees or departments in many companies. The ILO official cited a marked rise in on-the-job accidents and injuries, as well as work-related illnesses, "which is leading to a long-term erosion of people's health". (Inter Press Service) *******