CDI Russia Weekly-#183 7 December 2001 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly Home Page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: DJ: IMPORTANT REQUEST: I would very much like recipients of the CDI Russia Weekly to pass on to me e-mail addresses of possible new recipients. Please help expand the readership. 1. RFE/RL: Francesca Mereu, Council Of Europe Delegation Urges Negotiations In Chechnya Crisis. 2. Boston Globe: Karl Inderfurth, Trust, but verify - in writing. 3. polit.ru: Why Did Putin Shake the Northern Fleet? Russian political analysts comment on the recent reshuffle in the Northern Fleet, the situation in the Russian Navy, and the army reform. 4. Moscow Times: Megan Twohey, NATO Ministers Look for a Place for Moscow. 5. Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Russo-US Special Services Collaboration Post 11 September Mulled. 6. strana.ru: Sergey Markov, Future Russian National Council on Foreign Policy to Shape State Foreign and Security Policy. 7. Le Monde: Jan Krauze, With Washington's Blessing. (French Daily Analyzes Russia, US Relations in Aftermath of 11 Sep) 8. The Jamestown Foundation PRISM: Aleksandr Tsipko, HOW PUTIN'S PRO-AMERICAN STANCE PLAYS ON RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE. ******* #1 Russia: Council Of Europe Delegation Urges Negotiations In Chechnya Crisis By Francesca Mereu Moscow, 6 December 2001 -- A Council of Europe delegation spoke today with reporters about the human rights situation in Chechnya following a three-day trip to the breakaway republic. Frank Judd, the delegation's head, called for a political solution to the Chechen problem. He said people on both sides of the conflict were ready to start negotiations but that some groups in Chechnya and Russia still need to be convinced of the urgent need for talks. These groups, said Judd, oppose any political solution to the Chechnya problem. But he added that a political answer may be the only way out of the two-year crisis: "What are the alternatives? Is the Russian Federation going to eliminate Chechnya? Is the Russian Federation going to occupy Chechnya on a long-term, lasting basis? Of course, neither of these propositions is on the agenda. So there is no alternative but to find a political solution. And by definition, if there is to be a political solution, it must be one in which the widest possible cross-section of Chechen society is content, is comfortable, and of course is going to be acceptable to the Russian Federation as well." Judd expressed doubts about Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's willingness to enter negotiations with the Russian side. He cited Maskhadov's refusal to send a delegation to a recent Council of Europe meeting on Chechnya in Strasbourg. On its recent trip, the Council of Europe delegation visited the Znamenskoye refugee camp in northern Chechnya. Judd described the conditions there as "grotesque." "The tents are leaking now -- at the beginning of winter," he said, then criticized the dearth of humanitarian funding in the area. "But it is never difficult to find the money for bombs, for military equipment, for fighting. But it is always difficult to find the money for the humanitarian battle. I believe that in Chechnya [it] is a responsibility of Russia, but also it is a responsibility of the international community. Because I just don't understand why, if the international community really cared, all the effective assistance stops at Ingushetia and it is not getting to Chechnya." Dmitrii Rogozin, head of the State Duma's international affairs committee, who accompanied the delegation to Chechnya, said the problems in the camps are linked to the large number of people living there. He said that sometimes people who don't need humanitarian aid nonetheless register to receive it. But according to Lara Ragnarsdottir -- a Council of Europe representative for social problems -- the humanitarian situation in Chechnya this year is worse than it was last year: "The accommodation of the people in Chechnya, especially in the refugee camps, is very bad and it is even worse than we saw one year ago. The children have no shoes. They have no clothing to go to school. They have difficulties in surviving in many ways. The food that the people are receiving is not the food we would like our children to have in order to grow up as healthy individuals." She said many children are showing signs of malnutrition, with underdeveloped teenagers often appearing years younger than they actually are. Ragnarsdottir said there is no medicine and that hospital care is not available except for some urgent cases. She also said that education is very limited. All told, she said, the physical, psychological, and educational deprivations of Chechnya's younger generations do not present a hopeful picture for the future. Judd, who is scheduled to meet with officials from the Prosecutor-General's Office and the Federal Security Service, said Russian officials have failed to show improvement in investigating Russia's alleged human rights violations in Chechnya. Russia has been accused of human rights violations in Chechnya. In 1999 the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly suspended Russia's voting rights in the organization to protest its actions in Chechnya, but later restored them. Judd said he will not recommend new sanctions, saying he would prefer to cooperate with Russian officials in solving human rights problems in the Chechen Republic. ******* #2 Boston Globe December 5, 2001 Trust, but verify - in writing By Karl F. Inderfurth Karl F. Inderfurth, former assistant secretary of state for South Asian Affairs, is senior adviser to the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign. TODAY IS a day that will live in arms-control history. The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed by President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, comes to a successful conclusion. The treaty required both sides to eliminate thousands of long-range nuclear weapons and reach a common ceiling of no more than 6,000. This was accomplished under the watchful eyes of American and Russian monitoring teams, with the United States conducting more than 300 inspections in the former Soviet Union and hosting more than 200 Russian inspections at US facilities. START I worked because each side had confidence the other was complying with its provisions. Unfortunately, legally binding arrangements such as those included in START I may soon be a thing of the past. At their recent summit, President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin stated their intention to make major reductions in nuclear weapons - by as much as two-thirds of their strategic arsenals. This is welcome news. The world will be a much safer place for these actions. These weapons are, as Bush has said, relics of the Cold War. At the same time, however, the president also considers arms control treaties between the two former adversaries outdated relics. He is proposing that they be replaced by trust and a handshake: ''I looked the man in the eye and shook his hand.'' Some of his national security aides go even further. They believe traditional arms control should give way to a go-it-alone policy of ''strategic adaptability'' - the ability for the United States to reduce or build up its nuclear forces as it sees fit, unfettered by formal obligations imposed by treaties and agreements. Bush is right that the arms-control process has been time-consuming and often frustrating. START I was negotiated between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s but did not enter into force until 1994, after ratification by the US Congress and the Russian Duma. Certainly, this process could use updating and streamlining, as befits the new, more cooperative relationship that is developing between the United States and Russia. But the president should also be careful not to overlook the indispensable value of arms control agreements - monitoring, verification, transparency, predictability, including timetables for reductions, and confidence-building - all of which have led, and can continue to lead, to greater security and stability. This process has proven to be very valuable and reliable. Along with the success of START I, consider this example: In December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The agreement committed both states to eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,000 miles. Last May, two dozen Russian nuclear inspectors left Salt Lake City, the last of a total of 500 rotating inspectors who have watched a Utah missile plant over the last 13 years. At a similar plant in the Russian city of Votkinsk, a team of US inspectors completed their work mandated by the INF Treaty. For 13 years, the US and Russian inspectors tracked the implementation of this agreement, which resulted in the elimination of almost 2,700 missiles. Contrast this with the elder Bush's 1991 and 1992 moves to unilaterally reduce all categories of tactical nuclear weapons and completely eliminate others. In response, Gorbachev, followed by Boris Yeltsin, announced their intention to halt production and begin to dismantle a large part of Russia's short-range nuclear stockpile. According to estimates, at the beginning of the 1990s the United States held more than 7,000 short-range nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union up to 18,000. Today, the United States retains about 1,700 such weapons. Estimates of the Russian force are all over the map, ranging from 4,000 to as many as 15,000 or higher. In the absence of formal arrangements providing for verification and inspection, it is impossible to determine how many Russian tactical weapons remain. And we have no legal basis to ask for an accounting. Fortunately, Putin appears to understand the importance of ensuring, through formal agreements, that both sides have confidence that the other side is reducing its arsenal as promised. In their joint press conference in Washington, the Russian leader said: ''We are prepared to present all our agreements in treaty form, including the issues of verification and control.'' Bush seemed to concede the point: ''If we need to write it down on a piece of paper, I'd be glad to do it.'' As the two leaders prepare for their next encounter next spring in Russia, Bush should join with Putin to retain the important benefits to both nations of the formal nuclear arms control process, while working to streamline and modernize that process as part of their new strategic framework. As they do so, Bush should also keep in mind the famous injunction of Reagan, who proved to be a very successful arms negotiator: ''Trust, but verify.'' And he got it in writing. ******* #3 polit.ru December 6, 2001 Why Did Putin Shake the Northern Fleet? Russian political analysts comment on the recent reshuffle in the Northern Fleet, the situation in the Russian Navy, and the army reform (www.therussianissues.com So, Vice Admiral Gennady Suchkov has just replaced the Northern Fleet's ousted commander-in-chief Vyacheslav Popov who was exiled to the Nuclear Energy Ministry. Suchkov has worked less than six months as the Pacific Fleet's commander in chief. Now he appears to be the first candidate to replace Vladimir Kuroyedov as the Russian Navy's Commander in Chief. By all bureaucratic standards he must have resigned already. But the ousters of Admirals Popov and his chief of staff Mikhail Motsak generated conflicting responses. The formal reasons of their resignations have not yet been articulated. It is clear these were exemplary ousters. By a common opinion, both are assigned to be held responsible for the Kursk submarine disaster. "Persistently articulated reasoning that they were sacked not because of the Kursk is sheer disinformation", deputy chairman of the Duma defense committee Alexei Arbatov says. "When [Russian Chief of General Staff] Kvashnin reiterates the ousters are not linked to the Kiursk, one can draw a conclusion there is a direct link", Arbatov says. In his opinion, the ousters "demoralized and enraged naval officers". By contrast, deputy director of the Carnegie Foundation Dmitry Trenin, the Popov-Motskas double ouster sent a signal that he is a strict Supreme Commander-in-Chief who keeps a close watch for the situation in the armed forces and is prepared to take most serious personnel-policy decisions. By these sackings Putin reacted to the army top brass's "muffled resistance" to the military reform idea, Trenin says. Both Popov and Motsak favored the orthodox version of the Kursk's demise: they argued the Russian submarine collided with a foreign sub. While announcing the ousters, President Putin disavowed the collision version saying it has not been confirmed by any evidence. "It would be wrong to say Popov was ousted for his misunderstanding of the President's foreign policy; at the same time, by such a strict measure, the President has shown he fully realizes his standing as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But Admiral Kuroyedov had also referred to "a foreign submarine" as the possible cause of the Kursk's sinking and yet he has kept his post, Arbatov says, which means the both sacked admirals were made scapegoats. Trenin, however, assumes that "Putin needs a fulcrum. He cuts away branches, but he keeps the trunk intact, in order to have this fulcrum. So, the Navy Commander-in-Chief is in a position to back the policy-line of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief". In all, Trenin believes the "mopping-up" operation in the Navy was the President's major reformist step aimed at changing the very basis of the ethics of the Russian armed forces, which, in his words, "is sill minting officers prepared to wage the third world war against America". Putin, while realizing the vital need for the army reform, keeps the ideological matters under his control as well, and demonstrates who is the boss in the Russian army. ******* #4 Moscow Times December 6, 2001 NATO Ministers Look for a Place for Moscow By Megan Twohey Staff Writer Thrashing out a way to draw NATO and Russia closer together is at the top of the agenda for a meeting of NATO foreign ministers Thursday in Brussels. But any agreement reached in the two-day discussions on fighting terror will probably be vague and centrist, experts said Wednesday. President Vladimir Putin made a fresh call Wednesday for closer integration with Russia's Cold War foe, saying Moscow could do a lot to assist NATO in making Europe a more secure place. "Go into the street of any major city in a NATO country ... and ask anyone whether NATO expansion will improve his security and make him feel safer. I can assure you the answer will be no," Putin told Greece's NET and Mega television stations ahead of a visit to Athens on Thursday. "But if Russia acts together in a cooperative and effective fashion with the current bloc, will it improve the security of the average citizen in these countries? I am almost certain the answer will be positive. And it will be the truth," he said. Putin reiterated earlier statements that Russia was not waiting in line to join NATO but ready to forge new ties. NATO is also ready to rethink its relationship with Russia."Given the new spirit in relations with Russia, there's a strong sentiment that now's the right time to create something new," a NATO official said Wednesday, Agence France Presse reported. But the question that will no doubt be on Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's mind when he sits down with his NATO counterparts Friday is: What exactly is NATO prepared to offer Russia? The United States and Britain are spearheading a drive for a warmer friendship, but other NATO members, particularly the newer ones from the former Soviet bloc, do not fully trust Russia and oppose any attempt to draw it closer to the alliance. At the forefront of this week's NATO meeting is a proposal by British Prime Minister Tony Blair that would set up a new Russia-North Atlantic Council to foster more teamwork in areas like counterterrorism and peacekeeping. More importantly, the council would allow Russia the same status as NATO's 19 member states in voting on some security issues. Russia now communicates with NATO through the Permanent Joint Council, where Moscow has had no veto power and virtually no voice since its founding in 1997. NATO General Secretary George Robertson took that proposal on a visit to Moscow last month, where he said Russia and NATO would consider it with "some urgency." This week, he reiterated the sense of urgency. "We've now got an historic opportunity, and I think that many of the leaders of NATO believe this is the time to grasp that opportunity and push it forward," Robertson told BBC television. The proposal has already come under fire from members of the NATO community. In particular, it has drawn criticism from General Harald Kujat, elected chairman of NATO's Military Committee, and Czech President Vaclav Havel, who told the Czech Senate that integrating Russia into NATO would turn the alliance into a new "boundless" institution similar to the United Nations. However, opposition from the newcomers is not likely to squelch the desires of the bigger, more powerful NATO members like the United States. "The members that are saying no are the weakest," said Sharon Riggle, director of the Brussels-based Center for European Security and Disarmament. "They're just going to get sat on." Even with the momentum for closer relations with Russia in certain security areas, NATO efforts to nail down a specific proposal are likely to get bogged down by the details, analysts said. Thomas Withington, a research associate at the Center for Defense Studies at King's College in London, said a closer relationship would also pose new issues such as: If Washington suddenly got important intelligence about Chechen rebels, would it pass the information to Moscow? Can Russia and NATO's military be compatible? What kind of NATO peacekeeping missions would Russia get involved in? Answers to these types of questions depend heavily on how ready NATO members are to trust Russia. And trust may not come easily. For instance, many in the alliance were taken aback when Russians showed up unannounced in Kabul last week to set up a field hospital. "This a process of confidence-building," said Julian Lindley-French of the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies. "That didn't happen last week. It looked like Russia was showing up to support Northern Alliance President [Burhanuddin] Rabbani. It allowed members of NATO who are nervous to say, 'Here we go again.'" Even if they are able to secure an agreement, NATO would have to get approval from Russia, which is grappling with its own internal divisions over what to do about NATO. Perhaps Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov summed it up best this week. "It is completely obvious that between NATO countries and Russia there really is a mutual understanding related to the need for some collective action to counter new threats and challenges. At the same time, not everyone in NATO welcomes the development of relations with Russia," Ivanov said. "Maybe not everyone in Russia welcomes the development of relations with NATO either." ******* #5 Russo-US Special Services Collaboration Post 11 Sep Mulled Rossiyskaya Gazeta 4 December 2001 [translation for personal use only] Transcript of conversation with Yuriy Kobaladze, former major general of the Foreign Intelligence Service, and an unnamed "High-Ranking Staffer of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate," by Vladimir Bogdanov, date and place not given, under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Secrets Must be Shared" "A case of shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted." This proverb characterizes best of all the situation that has developed in mutual relations between the Russian and US intelligence services since the 11 September tragedy. The presidents of our countries have made statements on the close cooperation that has begun between the Russian and US special services in regard to joint antiterrorist actions. But what form should such cooperation take and how realistic is it anyway? Yuriy Kobaladze (in the past a major general of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service) and a high-ranking staffer of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), who wished to remain anonymous (for understandable reasons), now talk about this. [Question] A question for you both. Literally the day after the 11 September terrorist acts, Yevgeniy Primakov, a former leader of the Foreign Intelligence Service, stated that this was a matter of shame for the special services of all countries including Russia. The impression was that they were all completely helpless in the face of well-coordinated international terrorist actions. Yuriy Kobaladze: Let us recall those "happy" times when Bakatin [chairman of the USSR KGB] received the US ambassador in his office on Lubyanka Square and when delegations from the Foreign Intelligence Service and the CIA paid visits to one another. It really seemed then that something unusual and new was happening in relations between the former enemies. Positive working contacts in the joint campaign against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the trafficking in weapons and narcotics began to be established. This included the campaign against international terrorism. But unfortunately these all proved to be no more than noble intentions. Spy scandals began with the result that the Americans harbored grievances against us and then there was the war in Chechnya. Our partners withdrew "into their shell." But strange as it may seem our foreign policy departments (and not just the special services) proved to be more ready for this cooperation and more honest and frank. We found that we had a closer understanding of the English expression that "the work of the special services is a dirty business which is why it must be carried out by gentlemen." To cut a long story short, instead of concrete cooperation and the actual adoption of any real measures all our efforts went up in smoke, as it were. This also led to the tragic events of 11 September. But I do not want to be a pessimist pure and simple. My personal impression is that this was the first time that the Western countries, above all the United States, believed in our sincerity and admitted that they had made a mistake. And they entered into professional cooperation with us. The level of real opposition to international terrorism is rising, albeit slowly. The fact that the Americans spend around $30 billion a year on their intelligence community and are prepared to spend as much again in combating this world threat shows that this is a very serious business. A new subdivision is being formed within our Foreign Ministry which will tackle the problem of terrorism in the world. Within our special services, too, a reorganization is taking place aimed primarily at a greater concentration of forces and attention on the campaign against international terrorism. High-ranking GRU Staffer: I would not say that this was a matter of shame for the special services, in any event not the Russian special services, but a matter of shame concerning the attitude that exists within the political leadership's views on the interrelationship with crime. In the world today there are at least 10 international structures combating terrorism. The public at large knows little about their work. This is understandable. Their work needs no publicity. Rather the reverse. But if we, operating solely on the basis of official information, believe that international terrorism revealed itself in its full magnitude only on 11 September, then any talk of collaboration between the special services is pointless. We will simply be trailing along in the wake of Washington's policy. You have to understand that international terrorism, by its activities in Chechnya, is trying not only to dismember the Russian Federation but also to try out the forms and methods of struggle against the legitimate organs of power, models of the command and control of bandit formations, and methods of funding them and is actively training future terrorists from many states to commit similar acts anywhere in the world. In a conversation intercepted by our special services, Khattab's leader bluntly stated: "Train the personnel, we will need them in the future in other countries." Hence it is not Russia that should ally itself with the United States but vice versa. The entire civilized world should have allied itself with Russia when it called for an armed struggle against this evil back in the nineties. But what have we seen so far? A broad stream of moral and financial support from the countries of the Near East and the United States bound for Maskhadov, Khattab, and the other bandits. The Americans must accept that Russia is not a secondary partner in this struggle but an equal partner. [Question] But do they regard us as equal partners today? [Answer] I believe that we are already approaching this stage. But for collaboration between the special services to be truly equal and effective it must be developed and built up at a level of equal partners alone. Collaboration between the special services must be organized on the basis of the common decisions of our countries' supreme leadership regarding the aims and tasks of the joint campaign against international terrorism. There must be clearly formulated goals, tasks, and areas of activity here and the special services' manpower and resources used to resolve the common tasks must be identified in concrete terms. Collaboration between special services must only be centralized, not arranged in such a way that, for example, the Foreign Intelligence Service works only with the CIA or the Federal Security Service with the FBI and so on. And of course the main form of collaboration must be in the area connected with information exchange. Israeli special services' analysts believe that it took 18-24 months to prepare the 11 September terrorist acts. Were there really no "leaks" at all in those two years? I find this hard to believe. This information should have been "shared" with colleagues as a matter of urgency. However, too much openness is also harmful. In spring 1995 one of our Russian special services gave the Russian media a transcript of radio intercepts of conversations between Dudayev and Udugov, probably to show that the regime in Chechnya is truly a gangster regime. The effect was staggeringly negative. First, this had absolutely no effect on the pro-Dudayev media. And second, the United States sent special equipment to the bandits in Chechnya via the territory of Germany and Turkey and for a long time this prevented our special services from monitoring the gunmen's talks. Do not get me wrong but if we want to achieve real results in this difficult and dreadful war the media must be completely disconnected from our joint work with our Western counterparts. Perhaps it would be best if someone like John Le Carre were to give a colorful account of today's covert operations in one of his thrillers a few years from now. ******** #6 strana.ru December 5, 2001 Future Russian National Council on Foreign Policy to Shape State Foreign and Security Policy The Council would base its activity on broad consensus and regular interaction between the authorities, experts and public organizations By Sergey Markov A National Council on Foreign Policy is an idea that was put forward at roundtable discussions that were held within the framework of the Civic Forum and it was finalized at various talks. Such a council is seen as a vehicle to help in shaping foreign policy and the policy in the sphere of security on the basis of a broad consensus and regular interaction between the authorities, experts and public organizations. There is still a danger that Russia's foreign policy may boil down to implementing the foreign policy concepts of high bureaucratic officialdom and it may acquire an "ideological" or "narrow party lines" as was the case in the not too distant past. In the meantime, the society in new Russia is interacting with the authorities along a wide range of interests: various public groups, information and expert networks, branches and corporations. All these interests must play a definite role in shaping such a foreign policy that would have the backing of citizens. A bureaucratic interpretation of politics is fraught with serious problems for the country's development. Tasks facing a National Council on Foreign Policy: - To harness the potential of civic society to implement foreign policy. Public structures are capable of effectively supporting Russian diplomacy. What we are talking about here is presenting Russia's stand at international forums, as well as participation of Russian civic society in the activities of international civic forums. - Participation of society in forming mechanisms that adopt decisions on foreign policy problems. The decision-making system in Russia has departed from the Soviet system but it is still a long way from modern decision-making systems that are demonstrated by countries efficiently upholding their national interests. - Formulating principle conditions that Russian public circles definitely insist upon while practicing a foreign policy in respect to these or those countries. - Promoting a professional dialogue between various groups of experts: statesmen, experts of independent public centers, academic specialists, corporation experts, the media and other important groups. Participants in the National Council on Foreign Policy may be: - foreign policy experts representing various sectors: structures of the executive and legislative branches of power, independent research centers, civic alliances, and corporations. - representatives from regions having definite interests in the sphere of foreign politics. - leaders from Russian diasporas. - leaders from influential public associations, NGOs. - politicians that deal with foreign policy issues. - transnational corporations, business structures that have international programs. - academic specialists as well as experts from specific fields. - public opinion leaders. Organizational forms of work: - public expertise opinion on Russia's foreign political activity. - organization of public discussions on foreign policy issues. - participation of representatives from civic associations in organizing diplomatic visits (first of all, visits of foreign delegations to Russia). - National Council takes the initiative to prepare reports on the most pressing problems. - taking the initiative to organize the participation of representatives from Russian society in the work of international conferences on topics that are important to Russia (e.g., conference in Durban). - organizing forums and other structures of an international dialogue (e.g., Russian-German forum, Russian-Ukrainian forum). - forming expert-research networks for solving tasks requiring interaction between state and public structures (e.g., working with fellow countrymen). - forming expert councils in specific fields. - compiling programs for civic monitoring of elections and "power" structures. Proposed research programs to be opened: - monitoring of foreign policy topics. - monitoring new global threats (new forms of terrorism, new types of global threats to security - information and others). - the existing decision making system in Russia and how to transform it. - September 11 and the dynamics of development in the world system of relations. - Russia's image in the world. - the Russian diaspora. - new relationships in the CIS. - aligning a system of communications between various groups of experts and interested groups on foreign policy questions. - mutually favorable conditions in the post-Soviet environment. Most immediate problems and vectors of work: - choosing and working out the organizational foundations of the Council: mixed collegium? Public center? Expert network? - working out a basic agenda for the Council. - forming the structure of the Council. - holding a Russian-Ukrainian forum and studying the experience of its work. - participating in the formation of foreign ministry structures for working with fellow countrymen, and so on. ******* #7 French Daily Analyzes Russia, US Relations in Aftermath of 11 Sep Paris' Le Monde 2-3 December 2001 [translation for personal use only] Commentary by Jan Krauze: "With Washington's Blessing" Russia still has a few aspirations. The game is to accept those things that it cannot oppose while obtaining substantial advantages. This was undoubtedly the strangest moment in Vladimir Putin's visit to Washington. A Russian journalist got up during the ritual White House press conference and pointed out to George Bush that since 11 September the American administration seems to have understood the merits of Russia's approach on matters of information. In other words, some limits must be placed on press freedom. Vladimir Putin seized on the occasion to give his audience a lesson in professional ethics. Mr. Bush, seeming to have felt this was a trap, got out of it rather well by making a joke along the lines of: no, the American press is beyond redemption and I gave up long ago trying to discipline it.... All the same, during a brief moment, there was a kind of unease. It is one thing for the United States and Russia to agree on more or less everything in the name of the holy alliance against terrorism but it is pushing things just a little too far to try to compare the home of the New York Times with the country where certain services, at Kremlin prompting, have diminished the independent media one by one. The incident - or rather the impropriety - was quickly forgotten. And it does not change any of the essentials. Never have relations between the two countries appeared this excellent. The "convergence" that zealots of d?tente used to chant in the past has now become a reality. Of course, Americans did not just start wishing yesterday to see the Russians in a more favorable light. And the Russians have been working on charming the Americans for ages - almost fifteen years. Long before Putin, there was Gorbachev who achieved a few triumphs in tidal waves of "gorbymania" in Washington and New York. Boris Yeltsin did almost as well by taking off his jacket, straining to make jokes and making crude attempts at some dance steps. In his own way, each one had arguments that were far stronger than Vladimir Putin now does. They were warm and media friendly. They broke taboos and aroused or embraced their country's revolutionary metamorphosis. However, neither one nor the other obtained either from Ronald Reagan or George Bush any outpouring of friendship (on the part of the White House because the American public is henceforth interested in other things). Bush junior put his complete trust on Putin after having looked "deep down in his soul". The decisive moment, the one of the first inspiration goes back to the Ljubljana summit this summer. But the warmth was not in any way diminished in Washington and at the Crawford presidential ranch. So much so that Mr. Bush asserted that on the issue of strategic arms limitations, a "handshake" was worth a great deal more than a treaty. Mr. Putin, who had maintained a certain distance in Ljubljana, even showing through his knowledge of the issues a discreet intellectual superiority over the American president, this time piled it on in the "popular" style - good jokes and good feelings - that are George W. Bush's strong point. He even outdid his host on his own field when speaking to pupils at a school in Texas. Is the anointing of Putin's Russia based on an act of faith or on the calculation of interests? It cannot be excluded that George Bush deeply believes in the "sincerity" of his interlocutor. In her latest book (a biography of Ronald Reagan), journalist Peggy Noonan tells the story the current president told her about his first conversation with Putin. Mr. Bush seems to have been especially moved to learn that Mr. Putin's mother had been given a cross and it had survived a house fire. He also learned that Mr. Putin was very attached to the cross and therefore probably believed, as he does, in the existence of a "superior power". All feelings aside, the "bet on Russia", to use the expression used by Richard Perle, a republican theoretician, seems to be the outcome of a rationale that dates for the most part from before the events of 11 September. This [rationale] has the imprint of Condoleezza Rice, who is an expert on the USSR and the president's national security adviser. The point of departure seems to be that a weakened Russia should not be treated as an equal as was the case with the USSR. Therefore, it is out of the question to ask its consent on decisions that are in America's greater interest and which will in any event be made. This applies in particular to anti-missile defenses (and therefore to the inevitable rejection the ABM treaty over time) as well as the reduction of strategic weapons, which will no longer be an issue for discussion on an equal footing. Rather, this was the subject of a unilateral announcement on the part of George Bush. It is up to Vladimir Putin to fall into step. At the same time, in order to get Russia to swallow the pill or if we prefer to hide Russia's loss of status as a real superpower, America has offered it external signs of its highest consideration, a place with the European Union at the top ranking of its "friends". It is also adorning its president with all the qualities. This is an asymmetric approach where the appearances are not really equal to the reality of American supremacy. But Vladimir Putin's Russia has accepted this deal, perhaps because it does not have a better option. It did not do so immediately and without first dragging its feet a little, especially about the ABM treaty, which it is still trying to defend a few scraps. However, when the occasion presented itself on 11 September to justify the trust Mr. Bush had publicly placed on him, Vladimir jumped with both feet. He was first - at least that is what is said in Washington - to call President Bush and he fully accepted the American position on fighting terrorism as his own. Moreover, even though he may have been put before a fait accompli, he did not give the impression of impeding plans for deploying American forces in former soviet central Asia in any way. Was he at the same time taking a risk with Russian public opinion, laying himself open to criticism of weakness and even of aligning himself with the United States? "Russia is beginning to understand that it has no choice other than to slide over toward the West," reckons Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's former national security adviser. And "Putin is playing very well with a weak hand". The game apparently consists of accepting those things that in any event cannot be blocked, while obtaining compensation that in some cases may be very substantial. The most obvious benefit Mr. Putin obtains from the universal war on terrorism is that it allows him to put the Chechen insurgents and Bin Ladin in the same bag. In the meantime, he has accepted the beginnings of negotiations that we still do not know whether they are just a pure formality or not. But his obvious goodwill after 11 September could also help him achieve one of the Soviet Union's and later Russia's very old diplomatic goals: change the nature of NATO. Instead of uselessly opposing its enlargement to include the Baltic states as he and his predecessors have done until now, he has chosen to take the opportunity that has been graciously offered by the allies and especially by Secretary-General George Robertson. NATO loses its teeth with Russia being treated as a major partner participating in the organization's decision making process - to the point that it exercises kind of de facto veto power. Instead it will resemble more or less what Moscow has been trying to make it into for a long time: a kind of OSCE, an organization for security in Europe. This "bet", being made by the Russians this time, has not exactly been won. But there are other occasions for the Kremlin to show that it still has some aspirations. Moscow still knows how to surprise even if it has been promoted, or rather demoted, to the rank of a friend of the United States. The sudden arrival of a Russian detachment in the very center of Kabul, while the British are patiently waiting in Bagram, the French are moping around in Uzbekistan and the Americans are chasing Bin Ladin in the south, confirms if need be that the Russians are not out of the "game". It [shows] that its diplomats, generals and KGB colonels were not born yesterday and their experts perhaps know the United States just as well as Condoleezza Rice knows Russia. ******* #8 The Jamestown Foundation PRISM A monthly on the post-Soviet states November 2001 Volume VII, Issue 11 Part 1 HOW PUTIN'S PRO-AMERICAN STANCE PLAYS ON RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE By Aleksandr Tsipko Aleksandr Tsipko is a senior associate at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for International Economic and Political Research and a columnist for Literaturnaya Gazeta. There is a great variety of opinion in the Russia media these days, much of it contradictory, about the reactions of the Russian people to Putin's unexpected decision to befriend America. Some magazines and television programs point to the reassuring fact that the majority of Russians--57 percent--hope that the United States' antiterrorist actions in Afghanistan will succeed, while no more than 23 percent of those polled want the reverse. This is based on the results of a survey conducted at the end of October by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM). But at the same time, other sociological organizations claim precisely the opposite, that according to their surveys only 24 percent of Russians actively support the United States' antiterrorist operation. These figures were quoted by the prominent television commentator, Aleksei Pushkov, in his daily "Postscriptum" program. Also attracting attention are the results of an interactive poll, conducted on the same Saturday, November 10, on the "Moskovia" television channel: Some 60 percent of those who called in to the program maintained that the United States is still Russia's main enemy. Personally, I do not think that the overwhelming majority of Russians are hostile towards the United States now, in the aftermath of the terrorist bombings of September 11. Otherwise, we would not have seen Putin's popularity growing since that date and since Russia, on our president's initiative, actively and willingly joined the antiterrorist coalition under the United States' leadership. In the last two months, Putin's rating has risen from 70 to 74 points. Clearly, Putin's pro-American decision will not have the support of Russia's Muslim population, which amounts to no more than 15 percent of the total. The numerous interviews given by the leader of the "Islamic Committee," Khaidar Jamal are eloquent testimony to this. And, obviously, the alliance with America is opposed by left-wing fundamentalists and that predetermined part of the older generation which still suffers from Cold War syndrome. But at the same time, the majority Slavic part of the Russian population clearly feels not the slightest sympathy for the Afghan Taliban and therefore cannot but hope for an American victory in Afghanistan. Since the Chechen wars, many ethnic Russians have come to the conclusion that the major threats all come from the South. All this indicates that Russian attitudes towards the United States since the tragedy of September 11 are still much better than they were three or four years ago, at the time of the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO air forces. By and large, the Russians have never had anything against the Americans as people. Anti-American attitudes have always been born out of a negative reaction to expansionism by various U.S. administrations. Sympathy for the United States has broadened now because of the renowned 'universal sensitivity' of the Russian soul, and an intrinsic compassion for the sufferings of the terrorists' victims. Sympathy for the United States is growing also because of far-reaching changes in the way of life of Russians, of whom many, or at least those who have adapted to the new economic realities, are beginning to harmonize their geopolitical sympathies with their new lifestyle. Putin quite justifiably maintained that his personal decision, as president, to stand by America was based on the fact that "the overwhelming majority of Russians want to live in conditions governed by effectively functioning democratic institutions. The overwhelming majority of Russians want to live in social market conditions, want to feel that they and their country are a natural part of the modern civilized world, and want to feel this both on an international level and in their daily, personal lives. People want to be able to move freely around the world and want to be able to enjoy all the benefits that normal modern democratic society offers". Even that part of Russian society too disadvantaged to benefit directly from democracy and modern civilized life, in my view, has no deep-seated, fundamental revulsion for America. All these voguish discussions about a unique Russian mentality, about Russian "conciliarism" (sobornost) and a special 'orthodox collectivism', all of which are supposed by their very nature to be the antithesis of American individualism, have no real foundation in life. The overwhelming majority of Russians, more than 60 percent, put material comforts at the top of their list of values. In its social and cultural make-up, Russia today is an individualized and, in many respects, a westernized country. The "East," with its culture of suppression of the individual and its patriarchal family relations, is in fact alien to the modern Russian. There is a view that even the negative attitude to the United States among part of the population is situational, rather than fundamental in character or based in principle. This section of the population is concentrated chiefly in provincial Russia, and regards the United States in exactly the same way as it does to its own capital, Moscow. What we see in both instances is the ingrained envy of the poor for the wealth of others. It is a matter of hostility to America or to Moscow, combined with an objective appreciation of their social and economic advantages. For many Russians, the American way of life is the incarnation of an earthly paradise of abundance and material well-being, which is, for them, unattainable. So the ostensibly negative attitude towards the United States is more accurately one of resentment and the envy felt for a more successful and powerful rival. Yet this is not a negation of America's domestic values of material well-being, the strong family and private ownership. Envy of the United States as a successful competitor first emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when it became obvious that we'd lost everything and that the Americans had won it all, and it became clear that our own communism had brought us to a dead end, while the American capitalist system had guaranteed not only economic prosperity but the might of the United States as a state. This is one aspect of the problem. The attitude to the United States is situational in another sense because it depends in large measure on the attitude of the leadership of this country to our national dignity and to our national sovereignty. When presidents of the United States have conducted dialogue with us as equal partners, as Bush is doing, then there are no special grounds for anti-American feeling. This has always been true, as during the Second World War years, when the United States and the USSR were allies in the struggle against fascist Germany. Relations are conducted in the same favorable climate now that we have become allies in the struggle against international terrorism. Incidentally, even at the height of the Cold War, in Stalin's time, as I recall, many Soviet citizens remembered with warmth the cooperation and friendship which existed between our countries during the war. So it was no accident that the collapse of communism prompted an unusual liberal romanticism, which masked a secret affection for America. And this survived so long as people believed that a democratic Russia, set free from communism, would remain as great a power as before and that, with the death of communism, the democratic United States and the new Russia would be equal partners. Anti-American attitudes began to develop only when it became clear that the democratization of the country had in fact led to a decline in the power and well-being of former years. Here we must understand--and it is important to remember, when forecasting how relations between the United States and Russia will develop post September 11--that while the Russians can handle almost anything, they will never accept the demise of their state as a sovereign power, capable of playing an independent role in the international arena. Russian national identity is tightly bound up with this idea of Russia's traditional great-power status. And so long as the alliance and cooperation with the United States does not undermine this perception of the state as a real power, Putin's policy will not be in danger. At any rate, everyone now understands that anti-American sentiment emerged when the country's new leadership--above all the so-called government of the 'young reformers'--failed to take due account of this national dignity, and cast Russia in the unaccustomed role of 'student of democracy and market reforms'. In this period, a significant number of Russians began to identify these reformers, whom they detested, with the United States, and began to transfer their dissatisfaction with the burden of reform on to the leadership of the United States. This happened particularly because the Clinton administration contrived to strike up a friendship with the politicians most hated by ordinary Russians--the despised Chubais and Gaidar. This friendship between the Clinton team and the 'reformers' damaged not only the standing of the United States in the eyes of the Russian people, but also the business of democratic reforms and of the new Russia's entry into contemporary European civilization. It is now clear how, with the Republicans and the Bush administration in power in the United States, Putin has been able to turn over a new leaf in relations, without recourse to any of the democratic intermediaries formerly used between our two countries. Here Putin has been helped greatly by the new administration's critical attitude to the results of our market reforms, which have given rise to corruption and the misappropriation of loans. The new administration has also played a positive role by refraining from interfering in Russia's internal affairs, treating the Russian people with disrespect, trying to pass judgment on who is or is not a democrat, and from attempting to equate the fate of the freedom of speech in Russia with that of Vladimir Gusinsky's media empire. I make these comments on the situational nature of Russian attitudes to the United States in order to outline the limits within which there is a chance to preserve the new and almost amicable relations between our countries. Russians are not really mercenary, they don't really know how to bargain and they are not looking for direct gains from their good deeds. And Putin has been sincere. Russia has done everything possible to help secure a victory for the United States' antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, guided above all by moral sentiments and the desire to help a country in trouble. I think that Putin, even in taking a decision that was very unpopular in Russia--especially with the military--to close down our bases in Cuba and Vietnam, was also guided by a desire to do his utmost to demonstrate our trust in our new American partners as well as our genuine wish to make a breakthrough in relations between our two countries in the new century. So it will be a pity if Russians do not see the Americans responding in kind to our sincerity and good intentions. They have not forgotten how quite recently, only ten years ago, Gorbachev's unilateral concessions, especially on the matter of German unification and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, were regarded by the West as the "defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War." It will be bad news if the same sort of thing happens again now, and Putin's good deeds and intentions, and--let us be frank--his high-risk decisions, receive an inadequate response from the new US administration. It must be recognized that it's too late for Putin to pull out now, and that he is already a hostage to the good will of the new U.S. president. We have already gone out of our way to help the United States, and now everything depends on Mr. Bush taking reciprocal steps. It should be understood that the people of Russia will support Putin's new pro-American stance as long as they perceive it to be built on a basis of parity and equal rights, and perceive too that the American nation respects both the dignity of our state and our national interests. Everything still hangs by a thread. Not only our new, fragile friendship but also the personal fate of Putin and his policies as head of state depend on any step taken by the new administration of the United States that might be interpreted by the Russian people as an act of disrespect, such as, for example, the bombing of Iraq or a unilateral breach of the ABM Treaty. It would be most undesirable for him to go down in the national memory as another Gorbachev, responsible for the destruction of the state. Putin is potentially in a worse position now than not only Gorbachev but also Yeltsin. Gorbachev went along with the wishes of the United States and the West, relying on the whole population's weariness with the fear of nuclear war, relying also on the widespread illusion that democracy and freedom would not only bring economic prosperity but would also guarantee our geopolitical advantages as a great power. Yeltsin's political base for rapprochement with the West was considerably narrower. But he also had all the liberal democrats actively supporting his pro-American policies. And under Yeltsin all the influential media were working in support of his western 'democratic course'. But when Putin, after September 11, took the unexpectedly decisive step towards rapprochement with the United States, he had only one ally: His high rating. The paradox is that, in making this historic shift towards the West, Putin was taking advantage of a rating which was based on anti-Western and anti-American sentiments. Putin was brought to power by the hopes of the overwhelming, patriotically inclined majority of the population that he would be a leader capable of restoring Russia's traditional power and authority, and that he would begin to challenge the 'supremacy of the United States', and pursue an independent foreign policy. And Putin, to give him his due, spent almost two years constructing a foreign policy in tune with these great-power sentiments. But now there has been a complete change of direction, with the decision to follow in the wake of the United States and under its leadership, if only for the duration of the antiterrorist operation. In this new situation, since diverging from his previous foreign policy, it seems that there are two scenarios that will allow Putin to retain his popularity and, most important, his power. The first relates to the hope that the new US administration will safeguard Russia's status as a world power, at least in geopolitical terms, and will treat her as an equal partner, at least in matters relating to the global security of the modern civilized world. As yet the old majority is sticking with Putin because Bush is stressing, whether intentionally or not, that for him the support of Russia is more important than that of Western Europe. This satisfies the Russian people's traditional great-power ambitions. And they will remain satisfied as long as the Bush administration is not tempted to put us in our place again, leaving us as a mere regional power. The second way in which Putin might retain power in this new situation is more complex. It presupposes a change in the composition of the majority in response to the change in foreign policy. Such a change presupposes a shift from dependency on the 'patriotic' majority to dependency on a liberal majority. It also presupposes a qualitative change in the legitimacy of the Putin regime. But such a transition is possible only if the Bush administration acts now, without delay, to provide maximum economic support for Russia. It is a question not only of revoking the archaic and discriminatory sanctions against Russia, but also of alleviating our debt problems. For Putin to remain in power now, it is most important to demonstrate to the people of Russia that the rapprochement with the United States and the West will not only not adversely affect their welfare, as it did under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but will on the contrary guarantee substantial progress in all facets of their lives. If his pro-Western course is not backed by a real improvement in people's welfare, then things will go badly for Putin. After all, his many opponents--left-wing patriots, the frustrated military and, oddly enough, those stalwart friends of America, the liberals--are just waiting for him to fail. And it's too late for Putin to turn back. *******