#2
Boston Globe
December 5, 2001
Trust, but verify - in writing
By Karl F. Inderfurth

Karl F. Inderfurth, former assistant secretary of state for South Asian Affairs, is senior adviser to the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign.

TODAY IS a day that will live in arms-control history. The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, signed by President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, comes to a successful conclusion.

The treaty required both sides to eliminate thousands of long-range nuclear weapons and reach a common ceiling of no more than 6,000. This was accomplished under the watchful eyes of American and Russian monitoring teams, with the United States conducting more than 300 inspections in the former Soviet Union and hosting more than 200 Russian inspections at US facilities. START I worked because each side had confidence the other was complying with its provisions.

Unfortunately, legally binding arrangements such as those included in START I may soon be a thing of the past.

At their recent summit, President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin stated their intention to make major reductions in nuclear weapons - by as much as two-thirds of their strategic arsenals. This is welcome news. The world will be a much safer place for these actions. These weapons are, as Bush has said, relics of the Cold War.

At the same time, however, the president also considers arms control treaties between the two former adversaries outdated relics. He is proposing that they be replaced by trust and a handshake: ''I looked the man in the eye and shook his hand.''

Some of his national security aides go even further. They believe traditional arms control should give way to a go-it-alone policy of ''strategic adaptability'' - the ability for the United States to reduce or build up its nuclear forces as it sees fit, unfettered by formal obligations imposed by treaties and agreements.

Bush is right that the arms-control process has been time-consuming and often frustrating. START I was negotiated between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s but did not enter into force until 1994, after ratification by the US Congress and the Russian Duma.

Certainly, this process could use updating and streamlining, as befits the new, more cooperative relationship that is developing between the United States and Russia.

But the president should also be careful not to overlook the indispensable value of arms control agreements - monitoring, verification, transparency, predictability, including timetables for reductions, and confidence-building - all of which have led, and can continue to lead, to greater security and stability. This process has proven to be very valuable and reliable.

Along with the success of START I, consider this example: In December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The agreement committed both states to eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,000 miles.

Last May, two dozen Russian nuclear inspectors left Salt Lake City, the last of a total of 500 rotating inspectors who have watched a Utah missile plant over the last 13 years. At a similar plant in the Russian city of Votkinsk, a team of US inspectors completed their work mandated by the INF Treaty.

For 13 years, the US and Russian inspectors tracked the implementation of this agreement, which resulted in the elimination of almost 2,700 missiles.

Contrast this with the elder Bush's 1991 and 1992 moves to unilaterally reduce all categories of tactical nuclear weapons and completely eliminate others. In response, Gorbachev, followed by Boris Yeltsin, announced their intention to halt production and begin to dismantle a large part of Russia's short-range nuclear stockpile.

According to estimates, at the beginning of the 1990s the United States held more than 7,000 short-range nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union up to 18,000. Today, the United States retains about 1,700 such weapons. Estimates of the Russian force are all over the map, ranging from 4,000 to as many as 15,000 or higher.

In the absence of formal arrangements providing for verification and inspection, it is impossible to determine how many Russian tactical weapons remain. And we have no legal basis to ask for an accounting.

Fortunately, Putin appears to understand the importance of ensuring, through formal agreements, that both sides have confidence that the other side is reducing its arsenal as promised.

In their joint press conference in Washington, the Russian leader said: ''We are prepared to present all our agreements in treaty form, including the issues of verification and control.''

Bush seemed to concede the point: ''If we need to write it down on a piece of paper, I'd be glad to do it.''

As the two leaders prepare for their next encounter next spring in Russia, Bush should join with Putin to retain the important benefits to both nations of the formal nuclear arms control process, while working to streamline and modernize that process as part of their new strategic framework.

As they do so, Bush should also keep in mind the famous injunction of Reagan, who proved to be a very successful arms negotiator: ''Trust, but verify.'' And he got it in writing.

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