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CDI Russia Weekly #181 Contents   Plain Text

#12
Ekspert
No. 43
November 2001
SMILES DO NOT SOLVE PROBLEMS
Washington still has to show it can take Russia's interests into account
Author: Yevgeny Verlin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

MOSCOW HAS SECURED AMERICA'S PROMISE TO REPEAL THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT, TO HELP RUSSIA JOIN THE WTO, AND TO FINALLY RECOGNIZE RUSSIA AS A COUNTRY WITH A FREE MARKET ECONOMY. WILL THIS SUFFICE TO PLACATE THE INFLUENTIAL PART OF THE RUSSIAN ESTABLISHMENT WHICH STILL DISTRUSTS THE UNITED STATES?

The Russian-American summit: successes and failures

It so happened that on the eve of and during the summit, Russia and the United States demonstrated their vulnerability again when a plane crashed in New York only hours before Vladimir Putin's presidential plane took off for New York. The plane may have been hijacked.

It is against this background that the long-awaited event (as Putin phrased it) took place in Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance took Kabul in time for the Russian president's arrival in the United States. Putin phrased his comments in a way that clearly implied: "We are watching the situation too." The trial of Salman Raduyev began in Makhachkala, Dagestan, the following day. Another not-quite-coincidence. Once again, it was a veiled message to the West: our number one terrorist (or number two, it doesn't really matter) is facing trial already while you don't even know you number one public enemy's whereabouts.

The Americans responded to this demonstration of Moscow's capacities and successes in the war on the common enemy the following day. The American special forces pulled off a successful operation and liberated eight officials of international humanitarian groups from the Taliban. (Or were they ransomed? We do not know.)

Opinion polls show that over 70% Americans are prepared to grit their teeth and accept losses in a ground operation in Afghanistan but official Washington knows the ratio may change in a hurry and that it should restrict itself to "precise" operations in its search for bin Laden and Co. Which means in its turn that what is needed is assistance of rank Asian warriors who do not require advanced American weapons, comfort in the field, and all other material-technical attributes of the post-industrial world.

In the near future at least the Americans are doomed to repeat military operations against terrorism in countries like Afghanistan. It follows that they desperately need an ally more or less close to them but still residing in the industrial era. Someone who can be a go-between in contacts with the common enemy's antagonists and who can provide them with cheap weapons (Russian-made weapons are what is meant). Not to mention informational exchange, air corridors, and lease of fragments of its geopolitical yard.

Life shows in other words that America cannot hope to triumph over the common enemy without Russia and its friends/satellites.

On the whole, Russia's alliance with the United States and the West in general is necessitated by some other objective factors as well. It is clear now that the spread of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons (with the option of it ending up in the hands of terrorists some day) cannot be checked without Russia. It is also clear - and Putin emphasized it more than once while on the visit - that the West is attracted to Russia and CIS countries as an alternative and reliable source of fuel. Indeed, who can rely on absolute stability of the Arab peninsula nowadays?

The United States needs friends wherever they can be found. The allies Washington considered reliable only yesterday (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, for example) are viewed in the United States almost as potential kegs of black powder now. These countries are focal points of the forces that do not share the West's basic values and have their own views on what the brave new world should be like.

Incurably democratic America (and democratic is what it is, despite court martial and broader powers delegated to secret services) is facing serious problems in maintenance of its security and interests. It even has difficulties with its NATO partners. Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder intended to send 4,000 servicemen to man the rear of the American troops in Afghanistan but environmentalists in the ruling coalition objected. They objected so vigorously in fact that before passing the decision to send the men to Afghanistan, the parliament was forced to vote confidence in the government.

Putin told students of the Crawford public school, "It is important that we clear away the ideological barricades made in the past, and President Bush has been very helpful with that."

These words indicate an eagerness to do away with Cold War legacy and to try and move America to where it can see the new realities. Leaders of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy were quoted as saying before the summit that military-political and civilizational aspects are coming to the foreground in globalization again, pushing all other factors (technological, economic, informational) into the background.

Even if all this lasted five or ten years (while the counter- terrorism campaign goes on), the global North should go on seeking and finding reliable and long-term resources of mutual support and mutual trust. It means Russia (not China surely which is nothing if not a potential rival of the United States).

Russia has not been America's enemy for a decade already, or at least that is what the world had been told again and again. All the same, the real breakthrough began only months ago. This is what The New York Time remarked on "the chances missed". Describing Putin's short meeting with ex-president Bush and ex-state secretary Baker in Austin, Texas, the newspaper quote critics of Bush and Baker as saying that "Relations between the United States and Russia are prospering the way they should have prospered a decade ago."

In other words, August 1991 did not endear the American political establishment toward Russia the way September 2001 did. Common threats provide a better impulse for rapprochement than common values.

Russian president put it with diplomatic finesse. "Our peoples have different histories," Putin said. "If we take look at more than two centuries of our relations, however, we will immediately see that Russia and America have always stood side by side at sharp turns of history when existence itself of our states was jeopardized."

On the other hand, all this talk about new friendship has not yet been transformed into adequate practice. Russia and America did not sign a treaty or accord on missile defense and strategic arms reduction. Bush failed to persuade Putin to dismantle altogether or radically amend the ABM treaty of 1972. Putin failed to persuade Bush of the necessity to sign a formal treaty on the planned reduction of nuclear arsenals.

Friends do not need formalities, Bush said adding that "a look in Vladimir Putin's eyes and a handshake" were all he needed to convince him of that.

"Friends do not target their nuclear missiles at their friends," commented Robert Norris, an analyst with the American council for natural resources protection. "Friendship or not, we still have long- range missiles targeted on Russia," Norris said. According to other experts, Bush's decision to reduce American nuclear arsenals to 1,700 - 2,200 warheads is based on the Pentagon's assurances that this quantity will suffice to destroy Russia.

There is another nuance: the United States doesn't need so many missiles, but Russia's situation is different. Russia can no longer afford to maintain its nuclear arsenals, and has to cut them whether it wants to or not. It isn't hard to see who retains freedom to maneuver in this case.

American experts criticizing Bush for his disinclination to get down to formalities are surprisingly supported by the leading American media. The New York Post and The Washington Post urge the US president to make a full-fledged treaty with the Russians, a treaty detalizing all plans with regard to strategic offensive and defensive arms and with regard to Moscow's and Washington's future moves in the sphere of nuclear arms nonproliferation.

There are many Americans who advocate the principle of better safe than sorry, and who do not want security issues to be dependent on personal friendships between Bill and Boris, or George and Vladimir.

Moscow secured America's promise to complete the procedure of repealing the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment (which affects trade between our states), to help Russia join the World Trade Organization, and to finally recognize Russia as a country with a free market economy.

The Americans met Moscow halfway even in the matter of Russia's debt to the United States, which the Kremlin would really like to see written off. They did so in connection with their security considerations.

Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and his colleague Richard Lugar advocate the following. Russia begins with drawing a transparent program of destruction, reliable control, and nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons from its arsenals the United States deem "vulnerable to thefts or unwarranted sales". Russia's debt to the United States will be chalked off along with implementation by Russia of certain jobs in this sphere subject to American monitoring. The plan doesn't nullify the accord dating back to Clinton and Yeltsin in accordance with which Washington has allocated almost a billion dollars a year for the same purpose.

Senator Jesse Helms suggested that Washington should also demand from the Kremlin a pledge to suspend deliveries of modern arms and military technologies to Iran. Biden replied that the Russians are doing all this in order to earn hard currency to service their debts.

In short, some progress has been made - or at least became possible - in Russia's movement to the global markets and in global stability. As for long-range positioning of the Russian Federation and the United States in the world, the matter has not become any clearer.

Take NATO for example. Does Washington want Russia in NATO, and how should the Alliance change to make it possible? All involved parties are still racking their brains about these and related questions. For the time being, Putin merely reiterates his position: "Recognizing the part NATO has been playing in the world, Russia is prepared to broaden its cooperation with the organization. If we change the quality of Russia-NATO relations, the issues of NATO expansion will cease to matter."

As for missile defense, Putin in his American TV interview on the eve of the summit expressed confidence that "a scenario will be found which takes the interests of both our countries into account." The search for this scenario is further complicated by the fact that Moscow has a working agreement with Beijing to protect the ABM treaty of 1972 and coordinate all actions in this regard. The presidents of Russia and the United States adopted a Joint Action Plan which is supposed to make interests of our countries compatible. This working document calls for broader cooperation in the war on global challenges to security and cooperation in the political, military-political, and economic spheres.

Some observers view this "Putin-Bush Pact" and results of the summit in general as a proof of future harmonization of national interests of the two states. Caspian Sea oil is something that is of mutual interest, for example. Moscow and Washington already hint, however, that they have removed the region from the sphere of geopolitical rivalry.

As for "concessions", Putin will probably have to answer his critics on return to Moscow. Gennadi Zyuganov and others are already saying that now that military bases in Cuba and Vietnam have been abandoned, the Kremlin "may opt to turn over the Kuril Islands to Japan, agree to having NATO bases in Central Asia, the Baltic states, and Ukraine, and accept aggression against Belarus." There are fears as well that the Americans may settle in Turkmenistan, build a pipeline via Afghanistan and Pakistan (the old Saudi-American project), and eventually deprive Russia of the possibility of buying cheap gas from Turkmenistan.

Elaborating on his attitude toward the American presence in Central Asia, Putin said he did not want Afghanistan to remain a breeding place for international terrorists some of whom end up in Chechnya.

Will this suffice to placate the influential part of the Russian establishment which still distrusts the United States? Time will tell. In any case, the Americans still have to walk their part of the way, to show that not only the world as such has been changed by September 11, but that their approach and attitude toward the rest of the world have changed as well.

 

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