#6
The Daily Telegraph (UK)
November 15, 2001
We must not sacrifice our own interests to keep Putin sweet
By James Sherr

James Sherr is a Fellow of the Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst. Views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Ministry of Defence

THERE is very little to criticise in President Putin's support of the United States since September 11, but there is much to consider. His support is almost unequivocal, strident even, particularly in comparison with that of several other American allies. The provision of this support - particularly in Central Asia - has forced Putin to overrule one of his closest associates, minister of defence Sergey Ivanov, and exercise truly presidential authority over a Russian military establishment that still sees America as the main enemy.

By promising to cut American strategic nuclear arsenals by two thirds on the first day of his summit with Mr Putin, President Bush has demonstrated recognition of this fact. But by adhering to a tough line on the revision of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Mr Putin has shown his recognition of the strength of military suspicion of the US.

Like the military establishment, Mr Putin does not believe that September 11 has changed Russian interests. What he does believe is that it has changed American interests. No less important, he believes that a trend is now accelerating which is changing interests throughout Europe - to the immense and long-term benefit of Russia.

Mr Putin articulated what those interests are in a speech he gave to the Bundestag, to great applause, on September 25. "Nobody doubts the great value of Europe's relations with the United States," he said. "However, I simply think that, certainly and in the long-term, Europe will better consolidate its reputation as a powerful and really independent centre of international politics if it combines its own possibilities with Russia's human, territorial and natural resources, with Russia's economic, cultural and defence potential."

Mr Putin also articulated the belief that Europe and North America now need Russia. This to him is the real significance of September 11. There will be no return to the condescending "partnership" of the Clinton-Albright years, dedicated more to the micro management of Russia's reforms than to the accommodation of its geopolitical interests. Gone is the early priority of the Bush administration - that America has to pursue its core interests and if the Russians don't like it, "they can go to hell", in Truman's words.

The attacks of September 11 mean a reconsideration of the Chechen conflict and the moral authority of Russia as the country which "stood alone" and which, in the words of the former head of Russia's foreign intelligence service, "forms the real barrier to drug trafficking, organised crime and fundamentalism crossing from Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe".

The most important gain for Russia comes with the widening recognition that the elusiveness and tenacity of al-Qa'eda - and the vulnerability of America - will persuade the European Union that Russia must become its indispensable partner as it enlarges towards the east. At least, this is how matters are seen in Moscow.

Given these perceptions, the possibilities and risks of the new partnership need to be understood. A closer relationship between the European Union and Russia is to be welcomed. The risk is that the EU will make unwise concessions to secure it. The extension of the acquis communautaire - all the legislation and agreements that membership of the community entails - and the Schengen accord to Russia's borders will be a profound challenge to Russia, as will the enlargement of the EU to include several avowedly Atlanticist states.

Today, the EU accounts for 35 per cent of Russia's foreign trade, but the volume of this trade disappoints Russia and Europe alike. The situation since September 11 provides Europe with the opportunity to propel Mr Putin further down the path he is already taking: towards systematic economic and legal reform. Such a framework will provide Europe with a breakthrough into Russia no less significant than Russia's hoped for breakthrough into Europe. But if the EU abandons its interests and principles - by putting a spanner into Nato enlargement, by delaying its own enlargement and by ignoring the security needs of newly independent states - it will delay Russia's transformation, rather than advance it.

The second area of concern is Nato. Russia is not reviving schemes to join Nato. It is reviving schemes to transform its relationship with Nato if the alliance, as the Russian foreign ministry says, "becomes a different structure". Ukraine endorsed Nato's invocation of Article 5. Russia has not. The argument that Russia has been a stronger ally of America than Nato is designed to marginalise Nato, and also to persuade key Nato members that they should not allow the question of Nato enlargement to jeopardise alliance with Russia.

The most complex, but least discussed area of concern is how the "war against terrorism" will affect Russia's relations with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. For the Russian military establishment, the presence of American forces in Central Asia is the realisation of a nightmare. For Mr Putin, it could strengthen rather than weaken Russian influence.

If civil war returns to Afghanistan in the coming months and years, will Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, turn to America for assistance, or will he seek the assistance of the power with permanent interests in the region, Russia?

Mr Putin claims that the events of September 11 vindicate a conviction which has always been questionable: "Terrorism, national hatred, separatism and religious extremism have the same roots everywhere and bear the same poisonous fruit." Nevertheless, he has behaved with shrewdness and prudence, even to the point of seeking discussions with Chechens.

Putin wants Europe to understand that Russia is part of the West, and he knows that the West has its standards. To abandon these standards - principally on the matter of Nato enlargement and the rights of newly independent states - would be worse than shameful, it would be pointless.

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