CDI Russia Weekly-#179 9 November 2001 Edited by David Johnson Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington DC 20036 phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559 djohnson@cdi.org The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. CDI Russia Weekly Home Page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/ Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org Contents: 1. Christian Science Monitor: Michael McFaul, Putin's risky westward turn. 2. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: COMMUNISTS, PRO-PUTIN YOUTH HOLD NOVEMBER 7 DEMONSTRATIONS and MOST RUSSIANS STILL SEE NOVEMBER 7 AS REVOLUTION DAY. 3. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Terrorists One Step Ahead. 4. RFE/RL: Tony Wesolowsky, Russia: Nuclear Security Poses Challenges. 5. Itar-Tass: Fight against terrorism no reason to expand NATO, says Russian security chief. 6. AFP: Russia holds key at UN climate talks. 7. Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Bush, Putin have much to agree on. 8. Le Monde: Russia's Kremenyuk Views Impact of Rapprochement With US. 9. US State Department: Effective Missile Defense for U.S. High Priority, Rice Says. 10. Miami Herald: Dave Montgomery, Analysts are skeptical about U.S. strategy. 11. Itogi: Leonid Radzikhovsky, From Davos to Texas. The September 11th attacks in the United States have changed Russia's political relations with the West. The same breakthrough is essential in the economic sphere. ******** #1 Christian Science Monitor November 9, 2001 Putin's risky westward turn By Michael McFaul Michael McFaul is a Hoover fellow and professor of political science at Stanford University. His latest book is 'Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin' (Cornell University Press, 2001). PALO ALTO, CALIF. - In supporting President Bush and the war on terrorism, Russian President Vladimir Putin made the boldest decision of his short tenure. Above all, Mr. Putin's acquiescence to American troops in Central Asia marks a fundamental change in Russian foreign policy. In the long run, his decision to side with the United States - a partnership that will be on display at next week's US summit - could be the turning point that anchors Russia in Europe and the West. But in the short run, the upside of Putin's gambit is not clear to all Russians. Publicly, direct criticism of Putin is limited. After all, Putin still has a 70 percent approval rating, faces no serious political opposition, and controls most national TV networks. But below the surface are subtle signs of discontent. The military, first and foremost, cannot be happy about NATO troops in Central Asia. Uzbek President Islam Karimov has hinted he would like to see US forces stay in Uzbekistan for an indefinite period to help protect Uzbekistan from "terrorists" and, though never stated publicly, the Russians. For Russian military officers still fighting the cold war, the thought of permanent US troops in a former Soviet republic must be horrifying, especially in a place as strategic and anti-Russian as Uzbekistan. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's trip last week to Tajikistan, a Russian ally, must be even more troubling to Russia's military. Second, the intelligence services, including Putin's alma mater, the KGB (now called the FSB), do not welcome the new alliance. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, a former KGB general, had to reverse remarks of caution about the US effort and pledged support for Putin's position. Still, many analysts in Russia believe Mr. Ivanov could become the focal point of opposition to Putin within the government, should the pro-American policy not yield results. Third, the military industrial complex does not welcome the new Western orientation. These companies enjoy contracts with US enemies, such as Iran and Syria, and hope to develop even further relations with other American foes in the Mideast, such as Iraq. For them, a Russian shift in the Mideast means fewer hard-cash contracts. Fourth, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia have spoken openly against Russia's new orientation, arguing that Putin's strategy represents a sell-out of Russian security interests. Fortunately, these two groups matter less than ever. Yet, their public statements are shared by many more privately. Fifth, even pro-West liberals are divided. Publicly, the Union of Right Forces headed by Boris Nemtsov and the Yabloko party headed by Grigory Yavlinsky have endorsed Putin's Western turn. Mr. Nemtsov and his associates believe Putin has decided, at least temporarily, to align with the liberals. Less publicly, voices within both organizations worry that Putin will use the war to roll back democratic practices in Russia even further. Likewise, in a strange paradox, many human rights leaders also lament the new Bush-Putin relationship. Since Sept. 11, Putin loyalists have further restricted TV-6, the last independent TV station with a national reach, while the Russian military continues its inhumane tactics in Chechnya at a time when few in the West are watching. Finally, Russian society is divided. A recent national poll conducted by ROMIR showed that only 39.8 percent of respondents favored US access to air bases in Central Asia, while 63.5 percent were against it. A solid 88.8 percent opposed Russian military involvement in Afghanistan. Does this long list of opponents to Russia's new American tilt mean that Putin might change course? Not yet. Russia's next presidential election is three years away, and the US-led war in Afghanistan is not the most important issue for Russian voters. However, in a different domestic context - say an economic downturn, which some foresee in 2003 - Putin's enthusiasm for the American war could sour. To help with his domestic opponents, Putin needs some tangible deliverables from the US, such as an agreement on missile defense or support for Russian membership in the World Trade Organization. Most important, however, Putin needs the Bush administration to win the Afghan war. Victory would vindicate Putin's policy and quiet critics, especially in the military. An American victory would demonstrate to Russia the benefits of being part of the powerful West and the negative consequences of being an enemy of the West. Liberals within Russia also would be politically strengthened, and communists and nationalists weakened. Ironically, rather than a different policy on NATO expansion or Russian debt relief, the best strategy for improving US-Russian ties is to win the war in Afghanistan. ******* #2 Jamestown Foundation Monitor November 8, 2001 COMMUNISTS, PRO-PUTIN YOUTH HOLD NOVEMBER 7 DEMONSTRATIONS. Yesterday, November 7, was the 84th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. While the day remains an official holiday in Russia, exactly five years ago yesterday then President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree renaming it the Day of Accord and Reconciliation. In Moscow, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and other communist groups, including the radical Working Russia movement, marked the day with protest demonstrations. The November 7 leftist protests became something of a tradition during the 1990s, featuring demonstrators who marched with portraits of Lenin and Stalin, decried the collapse of the Soviet Union and ritually denounced Yeltsin and his team of "reformers." While participants in yesterday's march did much the same, the objects of wrath for many of them were Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's cabinet, President Vladimir Putin and the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition, with some demonstrators even voicing support for Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement and Saudi-born terrorist Osama bin Laden. According to the Moscow police, approximately 10,000 protesters turned out for the communist actions. At the same time, the pro-Putin youth movement Idushiye Vmestye (Moving Together) held a march of its own in the Russian capital, aimed at, in the words of organizers, cleaning Russia of "political rubbish." An estimated 10,000 members of the movement marched through central Moscow, picking up litter along the way (Polit.ru, RBK, ORT, November 7). As was the case with the pro-Putin demonstration led by Idushiye Vmestye last May, some participants in yesterday's march suggested that they had been enticed to join the group and to participate in the march by such things as free cinema and concert tickets (TV-6, November 7; see also the Monitor, May 8). Both the leftist opposition parties and Idushiye Vmestye held demonstrations yesterday in other Russian cities. Meanwhile, Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, members of the Moscow city government, deputies from the Moscow City Duma and veterans of the Great Patriotic War--as the Second World War is known in Russia--laid wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and the statue of General Georgy Zhukov, located on the capital's Manezh Square. They were commemorating the 60th anniversary of the military parade held in Moscow on November 7, 1941. After they laid the wreaths, the veterans took part in a march on Red Square (RIA Novosti, November 7). MOST RUSSIANS STILL SEE NOVEMBER 7 AS REVOLUTION DAY. Polls taken prior to the November 7 holiday found a growth in what the Polit.ru website called "conservative-restorationist" sentiment with Russian society. In a poll carried out November 2-6 by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), 63 percent of the respondents said that, for them, November 7 represented the Day of the October Socialist Revolution. Only 22 percent said it represented the Day of Accord and Reconciliation--as the holiday was renamed in 1996--and only 5 percent said it represented "the day of the bloody October coup." Thirty-two percent of those polled said the Bolshevik Revolution gave a stimulus to the social and economic development of the peoples of Russia (up from 26 percent who answered this way in a similar poll taken in 1997), 27 percent said it "opened a new era" in their development (24 percent in 1997), 18 percent said it froze their development and only 12 percent said it was a catastrophe. Sixty percent said the Bolshevik Revolution was caused by the "difficult situation of the workers," 39 percent cited "the weakness of the government" and 10 percent cited "a conspiracy of enemies of the Russian people." Thirty-eight percent said they did not like the fact that the November 7 holiday had been renamed the Day of Accord and Reconciliation. Nineteen percent said it was a "correct step that will help consolidate society." The VTsIOM poll included the following question: "Imagine that the October Revolution is going on before your very eyes; what would you do?" Twenty-four percent answered that they would "survive, not participate in the events," 22 percent said they would actively support the Bolsheviks, 19 percent said they would cooperate with them somewhat, 13 percent said they would leave the country and only 6 percent said they would fight against the Bolsheviks. The Polit.ru website found this last result "completely staggering" (Polit.ru, November 7). In a poll taken late last month by the Public Opinion Foundation, 43 percent of the respondents said they wanted to return the name "Revolution Day" to the November 7 holiday. Thirty-six percent said they were against switching back to the old designation. Yet another leading polling agency, ROMIR, found in a survey carried out just prior to the November 7 holiday that 45 percent of those polled regarded the day as the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and that only 9.8 percent regarded it as the Day of Accord and Reconciliation. Both the Public Opinion Foundation and ROMIR found that the older the respondent was, the more likely he or she was to embrace the Soviet-era holiday name (RBK, November 7). ******* #3 Moscow Times November 9, 2001 Terrorists One Step Ahead By Pavel Felgenhauer Following the Sept. 11 attacks, air traffic security has been strengthened. U.S. air defense forces have been ordered to shoot down passenger airliners without much paperwork if there is a real threat that the plane could ram an important military or civilian target. There is talk of putting armed guards on board passenger planes and of giving guns to pilots so that they would be able to fight possible hijackers. In short, a repeat of the Sept. 11 outrage is highly unlikely. However, the increased security has not been foolproof. Instead of air attacks, there has been a stream of anthrax-contaminated mail that did not kill many but terrorized a large number of people. The authorities again reacted after the fact. In several months, the United States will be x-raying and sterilizing all mail. In a year or so, most industrialized countries may be doing the same. Anthrax in envelopes will be dead on arrival. It seems as though we are winning the war. However, it's troubling that terrorists are each time one step ahead, as the authorities patch up the previous security loophole. Where will the clever "villains" hit next and will the authorities be as unprepared as before? During a joint news conference with French President Jacques Chirac on Tuesday, President George W. Bush said that Osama bin Laden has threatened in the past to use chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons. Bush also said that there is no evidence that bin Laden or his al-Qaida terrorist organization possess such weapons. In 1997, retired General Alexander Lebed (today the governor of Krasnoyarsk) surprised and alarmed the world when he announced that at the time of the demise of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost track of more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear weapons. There have been reports that bin Laden may have obtained some of these Russian loose nukes. However, the Russian military strictly denied any nuclear weapons were unaccounted for, and the United States officially supported the denials. The State Department announced in 1997 that the United States did not place much credence in Lebed's remarks. A statement issued on the subject said "there is no evidence other than hearsay to support claims of portable Russian nuclear weapons gone missing." Bin Laden and al-Qaida may have no usable nuclear weapons yet, as U.S. authorities assume. However, experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency warn that there is a category of weapons that is in many respects worse than nukes and much easier to make: radioactive bombs. Such a weapon is, in essence, a device designed to inflict a deadly and massive dose of radioactive contamination on a large area without a nuclear explosion. This can be a mix of explosives with a highly radioactive substance such as spent nuclear fuel, cesium used in medicine or industry, or plutonium from a nuclear weapon or conventional nuclear power station that is unsuitable for weapons manufacture. The explosion of such a bomb creates a radioactive cloud that can cause severe and very long-lasting contamination. If such a thing happened in New York, humans might have to abandon parts of the city for hundreds, if not thousands, of years, as they have the town of Pripyat in Ukraine, near the Chernobyl disaster area. The Soviet Union tried to clean up Pripyat, but it is practically impossible to clean a modern city of radioactive dust. And it's impossible to live there. In the 1950s, when Russia and the United States did not have many nukes, radioactive weapons were developed and tested. They were later replaced by tens of thousands of regular nuclear bombs, but now the ease of making radioactive weapons and the terrifying results of their use may attract terrorists. It's much easier to obtain radioactive materials in the republics of the former Soviet Union than true nuclear bombs. Radioactive materials are plentiful and they are poorly guarded. As a scientist in Soviet times I easily obtained relatively large amounts of radioactive isotopes for research and no one ever seriously inquired about what I did with them next. Almost all recorded cases of nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union up to now have primarily involved radioactive substances, not weapons-grade nuclear materials per se. The use of radioactive weapons by terrorists would probably not cause mass deaths of civilians, but the ensuing panic and economic losses make radioactivity a tailor-made terrorist weapon -- as devastating, if not more, than anthrax, smallpox or other biological weapons. Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. ******* #4 Russia: Nuclear Security Poses Challenges By Tony Wesolowsky In the area of nuclear safety, Russia poses particular challenges. Experts agree much of its nuclear material is not well-guarded. Many of the country's so-called "nuclear cities" are struggling to cope without the lavish state support they once enjoyed. Many Russian nuclear researchers are underpaid, leaving them susceptible to outside offers for their services. As the global fight against terrorism continues, RFE/RL correspondent Tony Wesolowsky takes a closer look at the issue of nuclear security in Russia today. Vienna, 8 November 2001 (RFE/RL) -- The UN-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held a conference at its Vienna headquarters recently that focused on the risks of nuclear terrorism. The IAEA believes the threat of terrorists using nuclear weapons cannot be discounted in light of the scale of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September. At the Vienna conference, special attention was focused on Russia, because it inherited a huge nuclear weapons program following the collapse of the Soviet Union. David Kyd, a spokesperson for the IAEA, says Russia occupies a unique role in today's nuclear universe. "The position of Russia is somewhat special. First of all, they have a vast nuclear establishment even today. And 10 years after the end of the Cold War, it's estimated that about 1 million people still work in the nuclear industry and in the scientific dimension of nuclear affairs in Russia, and that is quite astounding. The number of laboratories is vast, so is the number of research reactors and other facilities." The stakes in Russia are high. Although no exact figures are available, Russia is believed to possess about 1,100 tons of highly enriched uranium and more than 160 tons of plutonium, the essential ingredients for building a nuclear bomb. The IAEA's Kyd spells out the challenge facing Russia today: "What, of course, is difficult today is to ensure that all the material generated and distributed through that vast network is properly protected. Now that is a Russian responsibility, primarily, but Russia recognizes that it does not have all the state-of-the-art equipment that the United States and other Western countries possess, and therefore there has been cooperation notably between Russia and the U.S." Matthew Bunn is a Russian nuclear expert at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Bunn is concerned about the security of Russia's nuclear intelligence and weapons stockpile. He says one of the problems of nuclear security in Russia is that Moscow's security system is still suited for the communist system under which it took form. "They had a perfectly sensible security system in Soviet times designed for a world that no longer exists. It was designed for a world with a closed society, closed borders, pampered, well-cared-for nuclear workers, everyone under close surveillance by the KGB. Now, it's largely the same security system having to face a world with an open society, open borders, rampant theft, crime, corruption, desperate unpaid nuclear workers. It's a totally different situation that the system was never designed to address." The U.S. is spending about $200 million a year to help Russia improve its nuclear security system. Noteworthy success, according to Kyd, has been achieved at Moscow's Kurchatov Institute -- Russia's principle nuclear research center -- and at the Obninsk Institute, a nuclear research institute southwest of the Russian capital. But Harvard University's Bunn, while applauding these measures, says they still fall short. He says U.S. and Russian officials privately admit that only about 40 percent of Russia's weapons-grade nuclear material has been secured as a result of these cooperative measures. But it's not just the security of nuclear material that concerns the IAEA and other nuclear agencies. Russia's vast nuclear intelligence, experts fear, could end up in the hands of terrorists or in the weapons labs of so-called pariah states, such as Iran and Iraq. Focus especially falls on nuclear workers employed in Russia, many of whom, as Bunn points out, only make about $300 a month, not much in today's Russia. The fear is that these workers could fall prey to the lure of exchanging nuclear intelligence for money. In October 2000, the UN Security Council announced that Russian security forces had foiled an attempt to recruit a Soviet-era nuclear expert then living in Central Asia. In another case, Bunn says an expert at one of Russia's premier nuclear weapons laboratories was arrested in 1998 and charged with spying on behalf of both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the latter case, Bunn says advanced conventional arms, not nuclear weapons, were involved. Another security challenge facing Russia is what to do with the 10 so-called "nuclear cities" set up in the Soviet era with the sole purpose of building nuclear weapons. Kyd describes these cities today as "rundown" and struggling to redefine their roles in a post-Cold War world. Bunn says some 750,000 workers still live in these antiquated communities. Experts believes Iraq and Iran are the most eager to acquire nuclear intelligence. Bunn says the West has been critical of Moscow's cooperation with Iran over construction of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, believing Iran may use the technology for nefarious purposes. "Unfortunately, you have really two levels of cooperation. There's the official cooperation, which is entirely on civilian matters, and then there's the unofficial, 'under the table' cooperation, much of which is not directed by the Russian government, as it is in violation of much of Russia's own laws." For example, Bunn claims that in 1995, then-Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov -- while negotiating with Tehran on Bushehr -- cobbled together a secret protocol. Under its terms, Bunn says, Russia would provide Iran with a gas centrifuge enrichment plant. Such a facility could be used to enrich uranium to weapons grade. Bunn says the U.S. protested to Moscow once it heard of the plan, and the deal was eventually canceled. After the Gulf War, Bunn says Baghdad succeeded in acquiring from sources in Russia the gyroscopes for strategic ballistic missile guidance systems, which were taken directly from Russian missiles, all in violation of Russian law and UN sanctions on Iraq. It's not only nations that have turned to Russia to either recruit nuclear scientists or purloin nuclear material. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult -- the architects of 1995's deadly nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway -- reportedly explored different pricing operations for buying a nuclear warhead from Russia. And there are reports that Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network has tried to acquire nuclear weapons from Chechen rebels. Bunn, however, does not believe any of these attempts have been successful: "I don't think those reports are particularly credible. I think if actual nuclear weapons had gone missing in Russia, we would know. I do think that the evidence that Osama bin Laden has been attempting to acquire enriched uranium to fabricate nuclear explosives from Russia is reasonably strong. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese terrorist sect, also attempted to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive material from Russia." And while experts may have a handle on the scope of the nuclear security risks in Russia, they are on much shakier footing when it comes to assessing the situation throughout the rest of the former Soviet Union. Kyd notes the nuclear establishment was spread throughout the Soviet Union. Today, Kyd says, many of the newly independent states are still trying to gauge just how much nuclear and radiological material they have on their territories. In some cases, some of the nuclear waste was left behind by Russian armed forces as they withdrew. Kyd gives Georgia as an example: "In Georgia, the Russian forces as they were pulling out simply tossed radioactive sources away, sometimes at military sites that they were abandoning, sometimes just by the roadside or lying in open fields. And we were able to detect some of those by getting French helicopters that are specially equipped and flying over Georgia detecting those and having them secured and taken away for storage." While Russia is now the focus of concern over nuclear security, it clearly is not the only former Soviet state with those problems. ****** #5 Fight against terrorism no reason to expand NATO, says Russian security chief ITAR-TASS Moscow, 8 November: The pooling of international efforts to fight terrorism must not be used to justify the plans for NATO's eastward expansion, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Vladimir Rushaylo told reporters here on Thursday [8 November]. "Several leaders of countries that are already members of NATO and of those that are planning to shortly join the North Atlantic Alliance have repeatedly stated that only the bloc's rapid enlargement could help effectively oppose terrorism," Rushaylo stated. However, he stressed, "the idea of pooling the efforts of all the world community in the fight against terrorism should not be used as a screen to cope with other goals and tasks". "NATO's expansion, both past and planned, is not linked directly with the intensification of the fight against terrorism and, due to several reasons, it can hardly be expected to give a powerful impetus to pooling the efforts of all the nations in the fight against the twenty-first-century challenge," Rushaylo stated. "Only the formation of a broad antiterrorist coalition, outside the bounds of individual blocs and alliances, will help create a single world system of security without any dividing lines," the secretary of the Russian Security Council stressed. ******* #6 Russia holds key at UN climate talks AFP November 9, 2001 Russia emerged as the main obstacle preventing a deal to conclude the Kyoto Protocol, the historic but troubled UN accord on global warming. Russia was standing by its demand for further concessions on forestry, the issue that has bedevilled Kyoto since its birth in 1997, diplomats said Thursday, as the clock ticked to a deadline late Friday for completing the draft treaty. "The political progress achieved in negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol does not solve our concerns with regard to the development of specific mechanisms for its realisation," Russian chief delegate Alexander Bedritsky said, adding he was "strongly concerned" about how the negotiations on forests were unfolding. Belgian secretary of state Olivier Deleuze, whose country chairs the European Union, was asked by reporters if Russia's hardline stance could prompt its allies in the talks -- Australia, Canada and Japan -- to follow suit. That could cause a delicate deal reached in Bonn less than five months earlier to unravel. "That is exactly the question that we are asking ourselves," Deleuze said. "We had an agreement in Bonn and we want to stick to this agreement." Kyoto requires more than three dozen industrialised countries to make a cut by 2010 of just over five percent in global emissions of "greenhouse" gases, the carbon pollutant that results mainly from burning oil, gas and coal. The pact was born amid scientific concern, now a crescendo, that these gases are warming Earth's atmosphere, stoking potentially catastrophic change to the planet's climate system. The Bonn deal saved Kyoto after the United States walked away from the pact in March, but at the cost of big concessions to Russia and its three allies. These countries argued that their forests are valuable assets which soak up carbon dioxide (CO2) and thus should be generously offset against their national targets for emissions cuts -- a big money-saver. Delegates said that the Russian demand was a near doubling of the concession it got in Bonn. But they expected the figure would be whittled down by haggling without provoking a me-too response from Australia, Canada and Japan. "I expect that we will reach an agreement despite the countries which are still making problems," German Environment Minister Juergen Trittin said. The three-day meeting in Marrakesh, gathering environment ministers from 165 states and two observers, has to smooth out other important legal and technical details before Kyoto is a done deal. Among them: the criteria for making a country eligible to Kyoto's "flexibility mechanisms" -- an innovation that would harness market forces to help the industrialised world reach its pollution target with less economic pain. The mechanisms comprise a market in carbon gas to help countries meet emissions quotas, as well as a system to give countries and corporations "carbon credits," which can be bought and sold, if they export clean technology. These ideas are notoriously complex and famously untested. But if they succeed, they could create trade worth hundreds of billions of dollars per year and act as a powerful engine to drive emissions cuts. ******** #7 Asia Times November 8, 2001 Bush, Putin have much to agree on By Sergei Blagov MOSCOW - Unprecedented bilateral cooperation in the war against terrorism could benefit the talks between United States President George W Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin when they meet in Washington and at Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, from November 13-15. The Kremlin may further tone down its objections against US plans for a national missile defense system, while the cozier relationship between the countries could lead to changes in the Central Asian oil game, including positive developments in Caspian energy projects. Notably, tense disputes over pipeline routes may become a thing of the past. Until recently, Washington has ignored Russian warnings that American plans to build a shield against ballistic missile attack, National Missile Defense (NMD), could trigger a new arms race. Last May, Bush dismissed the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia as a "Cold War relic". Russia has opposed the US plans for NMD as it says that the system would undermine its own nuclear arsenal and would also amount to tearing up the ABM treaty, which it sees as the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. However, the US hopes that an agreement on missile cuts will help persuade Russia to go along with scrapping the ABM to allow US testing of a missile defense system. The ABM treaty expressly forbids missile defense testing. Last April, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said that he was not optimistic about the prospects of US-Russian dialogue over the NMD. Ivanov said that if faced with the prospect of the United States' exit from the 1972 ABM treaty, Russia would initiate the creation of a "Euro NMD". Moscow has tried to rally European support behind an alternative scheme, already submitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which stresses diplomatic efforts to defuse any crisis but could ultimately involve stationing missiles close to countries causing concern. Last February, Russia presented its alternative proposal for a mobile anti-missile defense system for Europe. However, the Russian opposition to Washington's NMD plans somewhat softened following the September 11 terror attacks. There have been no more pledges to defeat an antimissile system or mentions of the Euro NMD. In fact, Russia and the US have grown closer. Russia has opened its airspace for humanitarian flights, shared intelligence with the US and increased aid to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. On November 3, Putin and Ivanov met with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to discuss what the Kremlin likes to call the "anti-terrorist operation" in Afghanistan. Putin said that he was impressed with the new level of cooperation between Moscow and Washington. Moreover, on the eve of his US trip, Putin indicated in an American television interview that Russia could be ready for a compromise on US anti-missile shield plans. The compromise may be achieved "as a result of very intense negotiations", he told ABC. The Russian position on anti-missile defense issues "is quite flexible" and agreements could be reached "quite quickly", Putin said in the interview released by the Kremlin press service on Wednesday. On the other hand, Putin once again ruled out Russian military action in Afghanistan as "unacceptable". To Russia, "sending troops to Afghanistan is like for the US to return troops to Vietnam", Putin said. The Kremlin also has not stood in the way of the former Soviet republics that wish to cooperate in the US military operation against Afghanistan. Last weekend, Rumsfeld paid a lightning visit to Tajikistan, where he announced the creation of a special assessment team to look into possible cooperation with the former Soviet nation. In the wake of Rumsfeld's talks in the capital Dushanbe, President Emomali Rakhmonov said that Tajikistan may allow the US to set up military bases. The US is interested in the Khudjant, Kurgan-Tube and Kulyab airfields, Rakhmonov was quoted as saying by Interfax. Oil game On the eve of his trip the the United States, Putin said in an American television interview that Russia did not expect any preferential treatment or any "payment" in exchange for the Russian support of the US military action against terrorism. "This is our common goal - to combat terrorism," Putin said in the interview. Yet despite this official pronouncement, it might be argued that in recent weeks the once tense diplomatic intrigue and disputes over pipeline routes from the Caspian have somewhat subsided. As a result, Russia may get a bigger piece of the Caspian and Central Asian oil pie, at least in terms of transit fees. The Caspian, the world's largest inland sea, is a focal point of the accelerating clash of interests - mainly because the 700 miles-long sea contains six separate hydrocarbon basins. Likewise, the littoral Caspian states have been viewed as important to world markets because of their large oil and gas reserves. It has almost become an article of faith that the Caspian Basin is the Persian Gulf of the 21st Century. Proven oil reserves for the entire Caspian Sea region were estimated at 18-35 billion barrels, while the region's possible oil reserves could yield another 235 billion barrels of oil if proven. However, in recent years the myth of Caspian riches has faded as some oilfields proved not as lucrative as originally expected. Furthermore, uncertainty over pipeline routes and the status of the Caspian has held back oil development in the resource-rich water body, although a US$8 billion international consortium led by a BP Amoco-Statoil alliance is already producing off the shores of Azerbaijan. The Caspian energy stakes are high as production in the region is projected to increase several-fold, led by major international projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In 1993, Chevron concluded a $20 billion, 50:50 joint venture deal with Kazakhstan to create the Tengizchevroil joint venture to develop the Tengiz oil field, estimated to contain recoverable oil reserves of 6-9 billion barrels. The Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium signed a $8 billion, 30-year contract in 1994 to develop three Caspian Sea fields - Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli - with proven reserves estimated at 3-5 billion barrels. The US, seeking to increase its influence in the region, has also been promoting routes west which avoid Russia. The main one to receive its backing is a pipeline costing around $3 billion from the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. In 1998, support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route was affirmed with the signing of the Ankara Declaration by the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, with Turkmenistan abstaining. The Istanbul Declaration, signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the US in 1999, reaffirmed the route. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, running 1,000 miles, with BP Amoco as the largest private investor, is one of several planned for the region. Construction of the pipeline, designed to carry up to 1 million barrels of crude oil a day, is due to start in mid-2002. BP has so far been one of the main proponents of the Baku-Ceyhan line, saying that it sees it as economically viable and beneficial to all companies and countries involved. On the other hand, Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is not economically viable. Significant flows of crude are needed to justify the expensive pipeline, while Azerbaijan is unable to supply the required amount of oil, Russian energy experts argue. Instead, the Kremlin suggests that Caspian oil should be funneled through the Russian oil export pipelines leading to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorosiisk. Notably, on October 15 of this year, the first crude was loaded into a new $2.5 billion pipeline to bring oil from Kazakhstan to Western markets via Russia. The line, operated by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), is the first to be completed since the fall of the Soviet Union to ship oil to Western markets from the Caspian Sea. Initial capacity of the pipeline is expected to be 28.2 million tons a year. Its estimated final capacity is due to reach 67 million tons a year. The CPC involves Russia and Kazakhstan, Gulf state Oman and the oil firms Chevron, LukArco, Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures and Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures. ChevronTexaco Corp is the largest private shareholder in the CPC. United States officials say that this indicated their cooperation with Moscow since the project is the largest US investment in Russia as well as the largest foreign investment in Russia. US Commerce Secretary Don Evans, visiting Moscow with a delegation of US businessmen in October, hailed the first loading. "The CPC sends an important message to the world that the United States, Russia and Central Asia are cooperating to build prosperity and stability in this part of the world," he said. This statement might signify a policy re-think as the former Clinton administration backed the Baku-Ceyhan line to ensure that Russia did not have a monopoly on the Caspian's energy fields. The US has often denied playing a repeat of the 19th century "great game" in the Caspian region and Central Asia. However, the Kremlin saw the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as an anti-Russia move, although officially Moscow said that it only judged the project financially not feasible. Russia has been accused of sowing instability among other former Soviet states in the region, notably Georgia, in order to undermine the Baku-Ceyhan project. In response, some Russian politicians have claimed that the separatist war in Chechnya is provoked by Russia's foes in order to subvert Russian oil export pipelines leading to the Black Sea port of Novorosiisk. But now mutual accusations are seemingly coming to an end. Moreover, the end of rivalry over the Kazakhstan-Novorosiisk and Baku-Ceyhan pipeline projects - and their respective backers - could be a stabilizing factor for the Northern Caucasus and Caspian regions. Yet even without involvement in the Central Asian and Caspian oil game, Russia struggles to capitalize on its own huge natural resources, although it is sitting on some of the world's richest natural wealth. Russia has long prided itself with an impressive ranking in the oil and commodity ratings. With its 12 billion metric tons of proven oil deposits, Russia is the world's third biggest oil producer, at some 6 million barrels per day (bpd), and the fourth largest exporter at 2.5 million bpd. It is the world's biggest natural gas producer and exporter, producing some 550 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year and exporting over 200 bcm. Exports of oil, gas, and the other key commodities form the backbone of Russia's hard currency earnings and account for some three-quarters of its export revenues. However, despite the recent long period of high oil and commodity prices, Russia still struggles to capitalize on its unparalleled natural wealth - due to poor management, inadequate legislation and an unfriendly investment environment. It remains to be seen whether the post-war candy for Russia could take the form of support for private investment in order to better manage Russia's huge natural resources. Nonetheless, the end of disputes over pipeline routes may well have positive consequences for the country. ******* #8 Russia's Kremenyuk Views Impact of Rapprochement With US Paris' Le Monde 7 November 2001 [translation for personal use only] Interview with Viktor Kremenyuk, Deputy Director of the Russian United States and Canada Institute, by Natalie Nougayrede; place and date not given: "'Cost of Rapprochement With West Will be High'" Moscow -- [Nougayrede] Why did Vladimir Putin decide to involve Russia in broad backing for the operation being conducted by the United States? [Kremenyuk] He is a pragmatist, who I think has not formulated any definitive line. He had already begun a "game" with the United States well before the 11 September events. He must not be regarded as a pro-Westerner. Part of his motivation lies in his own political survival. He wants to be reelected in two and a half years' time, and knows that he does not have much in the way of results to present to voters. The war in Chechnya is not over, and can only be halted at the expense of the loss of this territory, which would be a complete defeat for Putin. Perhaps he placed too much confidence in the military, who promised him a rapid victory. What could he lay claim to, if that were to happen? Perhaps an improvement in living standards. But the economy remains very dependent on oil prices, and the country faces a tough debt repayment schedule: $10.9 billion is due next year, and another $20 billion in 2003. The flight of capital continues -- $11 billion since the beginning of the year. It is against this backdrop that Putin needs a rescheduling of the foreign debt, investments, and possibly new credits. The sole source of money is in the West. The Chinese do not offer money. The price of this rapprochement with the West will be high. The ABM treaty will be sacrificed, and Putin will find himself forced to play down the importance of a further enlargement of NATO. [Nougayrede] Will this alter his relations with the Army? [Kremenyuk] The military were against granting the Americans air corridors and military bases in Russia and Central Asia. But they could not say anything, even when Putin went still further by announcing the closure of Russian military facilities in Cuba and Vietnam. Some of them think that Putin has yielded too much, too soon, without securing offsets. Some said that he was relinquishing the final vestiges of our superpower status. Putin has taken the risk of entering into conflict with the Russian structures that have supported him hitherto. It is necessary to recall his background -- that of an unknown bureaucrat that Boris yetis named as his successor and that was supported by the "ministries of force." There is a danger that his foreign policy will isolate him. But there is an important factor at play -- foreign support. Just as Yeltsin would not have been reelected in 1996 without Western financial aid. It must be kept in mind that Putin has promised a great deal. He has pledged to increase pensions, military pay, and state employees' salaries. [Nougayrede] Does his alignment with the West grant him a freer hand in Chechnya? [Kremenyuk] Be that as it may, he knows that Chechnya, like his attitude to freedom in the media and the union with Belarus, do not reflect favorably on him in the West. He knows that he must try to resolve the Chechnya question. The Kremlin's attempt to convince people, through propaganda, that the situation in Chechnya is improving has failed. For Putin, Chechnya was the shortest route to power, an opportunity to portray himself as the strong man. But he overestimated the military's abilities there. Putin is forced to negotiate, and contacts have indeed been made recently, though their significance must not be exaggerated. The fact remains that the Chechens will demand the maximum -- independence. Remember that the previous war was able to end, in 1996, only because Moscow pledged to negotiate the Republic's status, in five years' time. Now the problems are huge, because different groups will oppose such negotiations -- the pro-Russian government established in Chechnya by Putin himself, the Army and the security services, and even the leaders of the other Republics of the North Caucasus, for whom Chechnya's independence would change many things. [Nougayrede] Will the United States press for negotiations? [Kremenyuk] No, it will try to secure as many concessions from him as possible, while trying to avoid putting him in an excessively awkward position. Washington's decision to postpone tests of the antimissile system should be interpreted in this context. The Americans want to avoid weakening Putin on the domestic plane. [Nougayrede] Will the US-Russian struggle for influence over control of the oil pipelines of the Caspian region diminish? [Kremenyuk] Periodically, in the past, the United States has tried to exclude Russia from the process of exporting this region's hydrocarbon fuels. Among other things, it wooed Geydar Aliyev (Azerbaijani President -- Le Monde editor's note) in order to try to keep Moscow out of the major contracts. It is now a matter of finding a consensus with Russia, which will retain a great capacity to destabilize these regions, and especially Georgia. The issue of oil prices will also have an impact: which is better -- to construct a pipeline, or to use existing infrastructures? ******* #9 Excerpt US State Department 08 November 2001 Effective Missile Defense for U.S. High Priority, Rice Says (Holds news conference Nov. 8 in advance of Bush-Putin meetings) (5830) Acquiring an effective missile defense system for the United States and its allies is one of President Bush's highest priorities, and he believes the only way to get there is a robust testing and evaluation system, and eventual deployment, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told reporters at a White House briefing November 8. Bush is not prepared to permit the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty "to get in the way of doing that robust testing," she said, in response to questions. The President "has made clear there are a couple of problems" with the ABM Treaty that was signed with the Soviet Union in 1972, she said. "One is that it limits our ability to explore fully the technologies that we need. And, secondly, that we need to move beyond it because it is not representative of the kind of relationship that we now have with Russia; it comes from another era," said Rice. She spoke in advance of meetings next week in Washington and at the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. It will be the fourth in a series of meetings between the two leaders. "The relationship is building steadily. I think everyone can see that the relationship has gotten better and better. September 11th gave a kind of new impetus to the relationship," Rice told reporters. "The two Presidents will have, I'm sure, an extensive discussion of counterterrorism. They have continued to discuss this since September 11th in several conversations, as have their defense ministers and their foreign ministers. They will, of course, continue to discuss issues about the new strategic framework and how to move to a relationship that is more in accordance with their new relationship, not something based on the 1972 ABM Treaty, but these are discussions that are progressive. "I wouldn't expect any particular arrangements to come out of any particular meeting," she said. "This is a process that we're involved in, not a single point in time. And so, we will continue to discuss with the Russians how to move forward on a new strategic framework, we will assess what pieces of it are in place and what pieces of it still need to be developed, and we'll see what comes out of the meetings." Rice also discussed President Bush's upcoming speech at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. He is scheduled to address the gathering on Saturday, November 10. "He will take this opportunity to thank the United Nations and its member states for the quick action and strong stand against terrorism that was taken. He will reaffirm the U.S. and Allied commitment to fighting terrorism and the regimes that harbor it. "He will urge every U.N. member to live up to both the letter and the spirit of U.N. resolutions against terror, and he will pledge U.S. support for helping developing nations build capacity to fight terror and address humanitarian cases. The President considers this an opportunity to once again state the call to all civilized countries to responsibly deal with terrorism within their own borders," she said. The war against terror, Rice said, "is a broad coalition in which people are contributing on very different and very many fronts. The key to the broad coalition is to remember that while everybody, understandably, wants to focus on military contributions, this is not the Gulf War. An equally important part of this war on terrorism is a disruption of these terrorist cells abroad." In the press conference Rice also responded to questions about Iraq, the military action in Afghanistan, the U.S. public information campaign, a future government in Afghanistan, President Bush's November 8 speech in Atlanta to the nation, Argentina's economy, the Middle East and the World Trade Organization. ******* #10 Miami Herald November 8, 2001 Analysts are skeptical about U.S. strategy BY DAVE MONTGOMERY Herald World Staff MOSCOW -- While U.S. officials offer an upbeat assessment of their monthlong offensive in Afghanistan, Russians who fought a losing 10-year war there are delivering a far more cautious review of U.S. strategy. Military analysts and former soldiers are particularly skeptical of the aerial bombing campaign, noting that such large-scale bombardment had been a tactic of the former Soviet Union. But the Afghan guerrillas who opposed the Soviet Union's troops easily evaded the bombing through a network of tunnels lacing Afghanistan's corrugated landscape. Russian analysts also caution that U.S. ground forces will face the same adversities that surprised Soviet troops two decades ago: severe mountain winters that idle men and machinery; hundreds of miles of uncharted minefields, a hit-and-run enemy that can strike instantly from caves and tunnels and then disappear without a trace. U.S. military planners acknowledge they are drawing advice and intelligence from Russian soldiers and strategists who were involved in the Soviet Union's failed Afghanistan campaign -- though the scope of the information and the degree to which it is being used remain unclear. Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, a Pentagon spokesman, said former Soviet officials and army personnel have simply ``come forward'' to share their knowledge. ``The Russians have been very helpful to us,'' Stufflebeem said at a Pentagon briefing. ``We have not been shy about asking for information, but at what level and to what degree, I just honestly don't know.'' Although President Vladimir Putin of Russia and the country's top political leadership remain supportive of the U.S. war on terror, they have ruled out the use of troops in Afghanistan, largely because of memories from the former conflict. At least 15,000 Soviet troops were killed in the war there. At least 73 percent of the 642,000 who fought there were wounded or incapacitated by serious illness. The Soviet campaign in Afghanistan had some important differences from the current U.S. offensive. For one, the Soviet war was waged to install and then perpetuate a pro-Soviet government, and it ignited international condemnation. For another, the Soviet occupation was opposed with billions of dollars in assistance by the United States to Afghan resistance groups. Elite Soviet special operations units invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979, seizing key government buildings and communication centers in the capital of Kabul and killing the Afghan president, Hafizullah Amin. As one of the most powerful armies in the world, the Soviet forces were expected to crush what was perceived to be a rag-tag assortment of tribal factions. But in a white-paper review of the war, retired Lt. Col. Lester W. Grau of the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth, Kan., said Russia's modern big-army tactics were out of place in Afghanistan. The Soviets preceded every ground attack with a massive barrage of firepower from aircraft, helicopters, artillery and tanks, Grau wrote. Soviet ground troops advancing behind tanks then moved into the contested areas, ``firing indiscriminately at any moving object or just into the air until they were satisfied that their mission was achieved,'' he said. The Soviets initially made little attempt to follow through with close combat or mopping up operations ``since they felt that the huge expenditure of heavy artillery and rocket shells combined with the bombing and strafing by their fighter bombers'' had battered the enemy, Grau wrote. Further, the Soviets underestimated the Afghan guerrillas, known as the mujahedeen, which came from ``a traditional warrior society,'' Grau wrote. ``They saw no point in remaining under aerial and artillery barrages or in facing overwhelming odds and firepower,'' Grau wrote of the Afghan fighters. ``They were adept at temporarily withdrawing from Soviet strike areas and then returning in hours, days or weeks to strike the enemy where he was exposed.'' His criticism of the Soviet aerial bombardments rang particularly true to former Soviet officials. The air strikes ``proved to be totally ineffective,'' said Dmitry Olshansky, who served as the Soviet Union's top civilian advisor to Afghanistan puppet governments. He said the Afghan guerrillas easily escaped to underground hiding places, then emerged to ambush Soviet soldiers. American generals, he said, have ``prepared themselves for the previous war.'' ******* #11 Itogi November 8, 2001 From Davos to Texas The September 11th attacks in the United States have changed Russia's political relations with the West. The same breakthrough is essential in the economic sphere By Leonid Radzikhovsky (www.therussianissues.com) Russia's rapprochement with the West is aggressively on the rise. The main problem that has now become obvious is whether Russia and the West will be able to forge an economic union. In the last few years, no one has given any serious attention to this question. The Davos Forum stopped being annoyed by Russia long ago. Irritation gave way to tired sorrow. Russia was regarded as a doomed patient who could neither recover nor die, becoming a burden to doctors and nurses. It is absolutely clear that the Western tone towards Russia has radically changed. The very fact that the Davos Forum held an external session in Moscow is significant. It is also clear that Presidents Vladimir Putin and George Bush will actively discuss economic issues during their summit next week. Agreements may also be signed in such areas as power engineering and oil trade. However important these specific agreements could be, they are not everything that matters. Russia and the West need a turn in their economic relations, a psychological breakthrough similar to that in the political sphere after September 11th. It is not the prizes, but the rules of the game that have to be changed. Russia has had a lot of happy and unhappy love affairs with the West. The most recent examples include the Western adoration for Gorbachev that later transformed into a back-slapping relationship between Boris Yeltsin and his "friend Bill." All that ended without any flair when former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov ordered his plane to turn around to return to Russia when he was halfway en route to the United States. However, the history of Russian-Western relations cannot be described as one big failure. After all, Russia has become an open country, although it cannot be denied that a lot of opportunities were lost at summit discussions and ruined by the bombs dropped on Yugoslavia. As usual, both sides are to blame: the aloof and arrogant West, on the one hand, and a Russia that was too preoccupied with the preliminary accumulation of credits, on the other. The chief reason for replacing love with mutual irritation was simple: Russia and the West did not have a common cause. Each got down to solving their own problems after the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Russia found an even more original solution to its problems. Its leaders proclaimed that the country, in general, did not have any problems, except for private ones. "Western partners" helped to resolve all "private problems" while our leaders shed tears for the country's fate on television screens during election campaigns. Now, the situation has totally changed. The West has one cause in which it urgently needs Russian help. In fact, this is a question of whether Western civilization will survive or will be dumped to the "dustbin of history." To solve this problem, the West has turned to Russia. Russia is also facing some new problems: the country's new political "elite" has suddenly looked beyond the mansions' fences to see the country as a whole. Under closer examination, Russia has turned out to be a Western country with bourgeois values and capitalist economic and social systems. The time of "wild capitalism" is already in the past. Russia has laws that are working. There are economic structures that work. Tens of millions of people live according to new rules. At the same time, this is not yet the "aging" Western capitalism burdened with social reflections. Russia does not have strikes, real trade unions or any serious leftist movement; the Communist Party's nostalgic socialism no longer reveals the intellectual and moral aspirations of Russian society. So, Russia is ready for a capitalist leap - politically, economically, socially and morally. Russia needs Western aid, but not the kind given ten years ago. Russia has fundamentally changed and needs a new kind of assistance. The era of relief aid and credits for a "developing country" is over. What Russia really needs is aid to its young and burgeoning economy. The West should open its markets to Russian exports. Russia needs normal commercial investments rather than "humanitarian" handouts. Russia does not need an arrogant or superior attitude. It just wants and needs to be treated as an equal. On the other hand, the West badly needs a pro-Western Russia. The question is whether Western leaders are ready for an equal economic dialogue? Are they prepared for such a breakthrough? Are they ready to give up on their Russophobic complexes? Are they capable of thinking strategically or will they resort to their old political intrigues? However hard it may be, life is forcing Western leaders to answer these questions. *******