#8
Russia's Kremenyuk Views Impact of Rapprochement With
US
Paris' Le Monde
7 November 2001
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Viktor Kremenyuk, Deputy Director of the Russian United States
and Canada Institute, by Natalie Nougayrede; place and date not given: "'Cost
of Rapprochement With West Will be High'"
Moscow -- [Nougayrede] Why did Vladimir
Putin decide to involve Russia in broad backing for the operation being
conducted by the United States?
[Kremenyuk] He is a pragmatist, who I
think has not formulated any definitive line. He had already begun a
"game" with the United States well before the 11 September events. He
must not be regarded as a pro-Westerner. Part of his motivation lies in his own
political survival. He wants to be reelected in two and a half years' time, and
knows that he does not have much in the way of results to present to voters.
The war in Chechnya is not over, and can only be halted at the expense of the
loss of this territory, which would be a complete defeat for Putin. Perhaps he
placed too much confidence in the military, who promised him a rapid victory.
What could he lay claim to, if that were to happen? Perhaps an improvement in
living standards. But the economy remains very dependent on oil prices, and the
country faces a tough debt repayment schedule: $10.9 billion is due next year,
and another $20 billion in 2003. The flight of capital continues -- $11 billion
since the beginning of the year. It is against this backdrop that Putin needs a
rescheduling of the foreign debt, investments, and possibly new credits. The
sole source of money is in the West. The Chinese do not offer money. The price
of this rapprochement with the West will be high. The ABM treaty will be
sacrificed, and Putin will find himself forced to play down the importance of a
further enlargement of NATO.
[Nougayrede] Will this alter his
relations with the Army?
[Kremenyuk] The military were against
granting the Americans air corridors and military bases in Russia and Central
Asia. But they could not say anything, even when Putin went still further by
announcing the closure of Russian military facilities in Cuba and Vietnam. Some
of them think that Putin has yielded too much, too soon, without securing
offsets. Some said that he was relinquishing the final vestiges of our
superpower status. Putin has taken the risk of entering into conflict with the
Russian structures that have supported him hitherto. It is necessary to recall
his background -- that of an unknown bureaucrat that Boris yetis named as his
successor and that was supported by the "ministries of force." There
is a danger that his foreign policy will isolate him. But there is an important
factor at play -- foreign support. Just as Yeltsin would not have been reelected
in 1996 without Western financial aid. It must be kept in mind that Putin has
promised a great deal. He has pledged to increase pensions, military pay, and
state employees' salaries.
[Nougayrede] Does his alignment with the
West grant him a freer hand in Chechnya?
[Kremenyuk] Be that as it may, he knows
that Chechnya, like his attitude to freedom in the media and the union with
Belarus, do not reflect favorably on him in the West. He knows that he must try
to resolve the Chechnya question. The Kremlin's attempt to convince people,
through propaganda, that the situation in Chechnya is improving has failed. For
Putin, Chechnya was the shortest route to power, an opportunity to portray
himself as the strong man. But he overestimated the military's abilities there.
Putin is forced to negotiate, and contacts have indeed been made recently,
though their significance must not be exaggerated. The fact remains that the
Chechens will demand the maximum -- independence. Remember that the previous war
was able to end, in 1996, only because Moscow pledged to negotiate the
Republic's status, in five years' time. Now the problems are huge, because
different groups will oppose such negotiations -- the pro-Russian government
established in Chechnya by Putin himself, the Army and the security services,
and even the leaders of the other Republics of the North Caucasus, for whom
Chechnya's independence would change many things.
[Nougayrede] Will the United States press
for negotiations?
[Kremenyuk] No, it will try to secure as
many concessions from him as possible, while trying to avoid putting him in an
excessively awkward position. Washington's decision to postpone tests of the
antimissile system should be interpreted in this context. The Americans want to
avoid weakening Putin on the domestic plane.
[Nougayrede] Will the US-Russian struggle
for influence over control of the oil pipelines of the Caspian region diminish?
[Kremenyuk] Periodically, in the past,
the United States has tried to exclude Russia from the process of exporting this
region's hydrocarbon fuels. Among other things, it wooed Geydar Aliyev
(Azerbaijani President -- Le Monde editor's note) in order to try to keep Moscow
out of the major contracts. It is now a matter of finding a consensus with
Russia, which will retain a great capacity to destabilize these regions, and
especially Georgia. The issue of oil prices will also have an impact: which is
better -- to construct a pipeline, or to use existing infrastructures?
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