#7
Ekspert
No. 39
October 2001
INTERNATIONAL PANORAMA
The US will lose this war unless it takes other interests into account
Author: Yevgeny Verlin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN IS FORCING WASHINGTON TO START LOOKING FOR A NEW BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW. THE BRAVE NEW WORLD WILL NEVER BE STABLE UNLESS THE INTERESTS OF ALL NATIONS ARE CONSIDERED. The world needs spheres of influence defined and some dividing lines drawn

When the Americans launched their operation in Afghanistan, an acquaintance of mine close to upper echelons of the Foreign Ministry met with me for a private chat. "We support the Americans, of course - but only to the extent that will not anger their enemies," he said off the record. "We hold many others responsible for various events; but we ourselves are to blame for almost nothing. We talk unity with the civilized world against terrorism; but we are always ready to change our statements if the Americans go too far. In short, we have considerable room for maneuver, and somewhere to fall back."

Another acquaintance, a senior officer in one of the Russian secret services, told me in a private conversation that he's glad the Americans have invaded Afghanistan. "They will take up where we left off. What they will achieve will benefit Russia and strengthen Russia's positions there," he said.

On October 18, The Financial Times said that what the United States and Britain are doing in Afghanistan is:

- the implementation of President Vladimir Putin's threats to order air strikes on Afghanistan if the Taliban continues to support Chechen terrorists; and

- confirms Putin's numerous statements to the effect that the international community in this region has been threatened by the existence of Muslim extremists.

Not everyone in Moscow thinks that the arrival of the Americans on the southern borders of Russia and the CIS is in Russia's national interests. Putin's latest gift to President George W. Bush - namely the decision to close down Russian military bases in Vietnam and Cuba - sparked another wave of dissatisfaction in the Kremlin. Certain Duma deputies began talking about "restricting the zone of Russia's strategic influence to the borders of the Moscow region", and so on.

The Russian Foreign Ministry did its best to calm down the rumbles of discontent. According to its spokesman, the Kremlin is now waiting a gesture from Washington too (suspension of the NATO radar project in Norway, for example). The public is also being told that the Kremlin's decision with regard to bases abroad, made on the eve of the Shanghai summit, was also a "gift" to China, Russia's strategic partner. Indeed, the Russian naval base at Kam Ranh annoyed Beijing no less than the ELINT center annoyed Washington.

Chechnya, progress made on missile defense and NATO expansion, reforming international security structures and Russia's active involvement in them, some progress on membership of the WTO and European Union, easing up on Russia's financial obligations... The United States in particular, and the West in general, are already considering this unusual wish-list from Russia. Something is already happening: the US stance on the issue of Chechnya is more flexible and subtle than it was only recently; neither have the Americans shown anger over Russia's latest arms sales contacts and contracts with Iran. The military campaign in Afghanistan is forcing Washington to start looking for a new basis for a long-term relationship with Moscow.

Paul Sanders, Director of the Nixon Center, ascribes Washington's milder stand on Moscow's behavior with regard to Chechnya and Iran to the simple fact that it has finally dawned on Bush and his Administration that the war on terrorism will demand a great deal more from them by way of concessions and compromises.

Analysis of the first days of the hostilities shows plainly that the Americans and British understand all too well they will never accomplish their objectives in Afghanistan without others' support. They will have to deal with the forces that are not necessarily pro- American.

From this point of view, the agreement and mutual understanding Moscow and Washington finally reached on no representatives of the Taliban on the future Afghani government is significant indeed. Needless to say, the matter does not concern the Pushtu, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They must be represented in the government and represented properly. Igor Ivanov and Colin Powell agreed that the UN should and would play an instrumental part in the post-conflict resolution in Afghanistan. Along with everything else, it should mean an international peacekeeping contingent in Afghanistan, Powell said. Moscow accepted it even though the matter has to be brought up to the attention of other UN Security Council members yet.

The Americans understand that they need Europeans. Certain unequivocal signals were sent to Europe on the necessity of more effective forms of political and other assistance. Foreign Minister of Germany Joschka Fischer set out for the region following in British Prime Minister Tony Blair's steps. After stopovers in Pakistan and Tajikistan, Fischer will visit Saudi Arabia, Israel, Palestinian territories, and Iran.

The events of September 11 made it clear to the West that the "battle for the minds and hearts" of the Muslim part of the world should be backed up with real money and not to be restricted to sermons on incompatibility of extremism and the civilized world. These are direct investments in future security.

Importance of the "limited alliance" with Russia is growing at the rate it dawns on them finally that there are not so many countries in the world (save for NATO members and some other loyal satellites) ready to join the international counter-terrorism front under the American aegis.

The ATEC summit in Shanghai began with the statement of Malaysian Minister of Commerce Rafida Aziz who condemned the military operation. "You will kill one generation of terrorists only to find it replaced with another," she said. "Literally everybody can become a terrorist whenever that person has reasons to be ready for forsake his or her own life promoting his or her objectives."

There is the widespread opinion in Asia that there exist certain objective circumstances breeding terrorism. Chinese political scientists are of the opinion that in the conditions of globalization, cultural and ideological expansion of the West, in the conditions when strange political standards are forced on them, weaker cultures have found themselves in the position of defense. In some cases, their self-defense takes radical forms.

All these moods prevailing in Shanghai resulted in the following. The draft communique on terrorism did not even mention bin Laden or the military operation in Afghanistan. The document became a kind of general document urging the international community to fight terrorism without any specific targets or addresses. Leaving for Shanghai, Bush said the war might last over two years and spread to countries other than Afghanistan. Political elites of the Islamic word would give much to find answer to the question of who will be next. Supporting the war on terrorism in words and "in principle", Muslim leaders disagree with the West on specifics. They do not think the problem may ever be solved by military means alone, be they precise strikes or not. They think roots of terrorism have to be analyzed, and an international conference under the UN aegis (a conference on terrorism that is) will do for starters. Besides, the Palestinian problem has to be solved. It seems that Washington is perfectly aware of the delicate nature of the situation. That is why it is ever so careful not to utter so much as a single word on the possible future "recipients" of counter-terrorism actions. Eager to broaden the international counter-terrorism front, the United States would not want at the same time its participants to operate against their own targets and enemies, the ones not approved by official Washington. When New Delhi began talking about how nice it would be to organize a large scale offensive and finally drive extremists from Kashmere, Powell responded with a definite no-go. Subtly threatening with the prospect of returning to the sanctions regime recently lifted from India and Pakistan, he did his best at negotiations to extinguish the mutual aversion. Sorting out the ranks of their own allies will be particularly difficult for the Americans. Official beau monde in the United States has never yet identified Saudi Arabia as the major source of Islamic radicalism or organizers of the September 11 terrorist acts. "One might think the terrorist acts were planned in the caves in Afghanistan," one American expert acidly commented. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told Federation Council members that "we bring up the matter of Saudi Arabia in negotiations with our Western partners, and do so in no uncertain terms." Apparently, Moscow has found a chink in Washington's armor which it can use whenever necessary: accusing the Americans of double standards, lack of determination, and so on - depending on specific circumstances. It is clear that unless the new zones of natural interests and spheres of influence are legitimized at some sort of modern Yalta Conference, discord and friction will appear every now and then, jeopardizing the fragile counter-terrorism alliance. The world needs spheres of influence defined and some dividing lines drawn, and the process appears to be unfolding already. Russia is leaving Cuba - over Castro's loud protests. The Americans, in their turn, are careful to discuss with Russia all their moves in Central Asia and may even start having similar discussions with China with regard to Taiwan. The UN is useful whenever anyone's sole dominance is impossible for some reason. Political settlement in Afghanistan is possible only under the auspices of the UN. It follows that the so-called multipolar world is taking shape all by itself, on the ruins of the World Trade Center and Pentagon. A world as unstable as a monopolar world would have been. The problem is that nobody can be sure that the leading world powers - primarily the United States - will ever learn to adjust their national interests with the interests of countries which were only recently considered enemies.

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