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CDI Russia Weekly #177 Contents   Plain Text

#6
gazeta.ru
October 20, 2001
The Growing Divide between the Two Putins
By Natalya Gevorkian, Gazeta.Ru Columnist

In my eyes Putin's personality has gradually began to split. If I know something about myself for sure, it is that I do no drink and I have sensed this ailment in Putin (or in myself?) after September 11.

One Putin is concluding what was started by Gorbachev and Yeltsin closing down Russian military bases in Cuba and in Vietnam, while the another Putin continues to rearrange influence over the mass media to his own advantage, and has unexpectedly come up with a final solution for the national question, for some reason by leaving the cops act in that sphere.

Along with Putin, his closest entourage is also beginning to split. And it is of no importance where that entourage is formally seated, in the Kremlin, in the White House (the seat of the government) or in the Defence Ministry.

The first sign that the hitherto-absolute conformity of opinions that was fed to the country to the point of nausea after the victorious election of the new president is faltering was not even the languid dispute on restoring the Soviet-era national anthem. And not even the episode with the Kursk submarine.

The symptom emerged against the background of the necessity to make a choice: Who are you with, Mr.Putin, after the New-York nightmare?

The first cautious "We'll see" of the Kremlin was very much in the spirit of the 70 per cent of electors, who hitherto perceived Putin as their president. Further, impetuous rapprochement with the West with all ensuing concessions threatens Putin with, at the minimum, a realignment of sympathies at home, which means an imminent decrease in the number of his fans. He must understand that.

And hence his habitual initial hesitation. Russian participation within the parameters of the anti-terror operation, initially declared as being limited and being of a humanitarian nature, will later be transformed into more active participation involving the military. And everybody understands that with every new American warplane landing on the territory of the former USSR, Putin is losing traditional allies, including those with tarnished reputations, but with whom not so long ago he sat at the same table.

In the same way he is losing part of his voters who made multi-million businesses with those traditional allies.

Among those "businessmen" are also our military. And, obviously this is why the comments of Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov increasingly vary from the presidential statements.

One can feel the split when the president makes yet another decision addressed to the West, Sergei Ivanov comes out with a reaction addressed to the domestic consumer.

For instance, when Sergei Yastrzhembsky explained that Putin had not presented an ultimatum to the Chechens to lay down arms within 72 hours, but in truth offered to launch talks, Sergei Ivanov stated that now the West has grown to understand better Russia's use of force in Chechnya.

Those two statements conflicted with each other, but neither conflicted with the text of Putin's statement that could be interpreted both as seeking a peace settlement and, at the same time a threat to do away with Chechnya on the sly, while the world combats terrorism. That is why the image of Putin has started to split. In the same way, the contrast between the discreet statements on Georgia from Putin's lips, and the absolutely unrestrained comments of the military on the same issue.

But there are some things that are absolutely understandable. Firstly, Putin's extraordinary international activity of late is yet more proof that the former intelligence office has always been more concerned with foreign policy than with boring state building at home.

Secondly, Putin has realized that Russia is too weak to become an influential country merely through its own aggressiveness, independence and opposition to the civilized world.

Putin has seen an alternative way to boost Russia's international influence, (which is his dream!) via integration into that very civilized world. That way bodes well, but demands payment. That payment, as well as the prospect of rapprochement with the West and America, above all, makes many people allergic and evokes an even more negative response with the military.

Kommersant Daily quoted an officer's reaction after the Defence Ministry sitting where Putin announced our withdrawal from Vietnam and Cuba: "Chewing our last Soviet-era crumbs."

And those were bitter words.

And what do the military, for which America to this very day remains enemy number one, feel now? And what do they think of the prospect of talks with Maskhadov's representatives in Chechnya? And what motions do they feel hearing the words Afghanistan, NATO, ABM?

It is a very intriguing situation. Now Putin is walking a very thin line between his own past and his possible future.

Standing on that line, it is dangerous to lie to oneself and it is not worth trying to deceive others, both in and outside the country. If it is decided that Russia has made its choice not in favour of its own special historical way, but in favour of adopting rules whereby the civilized world lives, then that decision cannot apply to foreign policy only.

Otherwise, what happened to Gorbachev will recur - the whole scenario, including Foros.

If those rules are extended to all spheres of life inside the country (and they cannot apply only to economics), Putin will have to seriously amend himself and his attitude, including towards the mass media. Hope that the West will turn a blind eye to the authoritarian manners of the Russian president at home in gratitude for compliance and understanding on the foreign level is hardly justifiable.

After he has made his choice concerning Russia's position in the world, the president is to decide whom he is with inside his country. This choice is far more complicated and risky, since those who supported him yesterday do not like his rapprochement with America, and those who may support him tomorrow, do not like the Soviet anthem and his selective approach to democracy.

 

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