CDI Russia Weekly-#176
19 October 2001
Edited by David Johnson
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20036
phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559
djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, 
economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With support
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the MacArthur Foundation,
CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense 
Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization. 

CDI Russia Weekly Home: http://www.cdi.org/russia/


Contents:

1. AFP: Powell says Russian base closures mark end of 'post-Cold War era.'
2. The Nation: Stephen Cohen, 2nd Chance With Russia.
3. AFP: Russian Communists, hardliners protest Cuba spy station closure.
4. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, Perfect Anthrax Application.
5. RFE/RL: Kathleen Knox, Russia: Home Of Former Anthrax Outbreak Offers Aid.
6. RIA Novosti: RUSSIA BELIEVES MILITARY MIGHT NOT LAST, BEST & ONLY 
SOLUTION TO TERROR.
7. The Global Beat Syndicate: Jon Wolfsthal, Russian Nuclear Weapons as a 
Terrorist Threat. After the anthrax attacks, nuclear terrorism is not out 
of the question.
8. Los Angeles Times: Philip Gordon and Michael O'Hanlon, Sept. 11 Verdict: 
Yes to Missile Defense.
9. The Taipei Times: Ralph Cossa, Ice thaws between Russia, US. A warming
in relations between the two countries has been rapid. Building on the links now 
calls for well-honed management skills and a real desire to alter the face of 
international politics 
10. Moskovskiye Novosti: Yuriy Fedorov, Silent Resistance of the Generals.
(Sizable Russian Military, Foreign Ministry Opposition to Putin Noted)
11. Moscow Times: Pavel Podlesny, Landmark in U.S.-Russian Relations?
12. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL CONTINUES, 
DEFYING GLOBAL TREND.
13. The Asia Times: Sergei Blagov, Moscow to take Central Asian worries to APEC.
  
*******

#1
Powell says Russian base closures mark end of 'post-Cold War era'
 
SHANGHAI, Oct 18 (AFP) - 
US Secretary of State Colin Powell said Thursday that Russia's decision to 
close military bases in former Soviet satellites Cuba and Vietnam marked the 
end of the "post-Cold War" era and a recognition of 21st-century threats such 
as terrorism.

"Not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also over," 
Powell said of Russian President Vladimir Putin's announcement on Wednesday 
that Moscow would shut its Lourdes listening post in Cuba and its naval base 
in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.

Powell's comments to a group of US business leaders went beyond those made by 
President George W. Bush, who on Wednesday called the closure of the Lourdes 
facility "another indication that the Cold War is over".

"President Putin understands that Russia and America are no longer 
adversaries; we do not judge our successes by how much it complicates life 
for the other country," Bush said.

Putin, who said his decision was based on financial concerns, will meet Bush 
here on Sunday on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) leaders summit.

Powell said he was hopeful the base closures indicated Moscow's willingness 
to engage Washington in a new strategic dialogue that would include dropping 
opposition to US plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system.

"It's a part a new strategic opportunity to work with Russia," Powell said.

Washington and Moscow are at odds over Bush's plans for NMD, which Russia 
vehemently opposes and is currently barred under the 1972 anti-ballistic 
missile (ABM) treaty.

The United States has proposed replacing the treaty, which it calls a Cold 
War relic, but Russia has objected, leading Washington to threaten a 
unilateral withdrawal from the pact.

US officials say NMD is needed to counter missile threats from so-called 
"rogue states" such as North Korea and Iraq, but Moscow says the system would 
lead to a destabilizing arms race.

Powell said Putin's move showed that Russia was willing to move forward in 
countering new threats and warned that if countries like Iraq and North 
Korea, which are both deemed "sponsors of terrorism" by the United States, 
did not change their ways, they would suffer.

Countries that are "transfixed in some past life will find themselves being 
left further and further behind," he said.

*******

#2
The Nation
November 5, 2001
2nd Chance With Russia 
By Stephen Cohen

The monstrous events of September 11 have given the United States a second 
historic chance, after the squandered opportunity of the 1990s, to 
establish a truly cooperative relationship with post-Communist Russia. Such 
a relationship is essential for coping with today's real security dangers, 
which exceed those of the cold war and make the United States so vulnerable 
that even it can no longer meaningfully be considered a "superpower." 

Indeed, both the decay of Russia's nuclear infrastructure since 1992 and 
the "low-tech, high-concept" attacks on America in September may be omens 
of an unprecedented dark age of international insecurity. None of its 
dangers can be dealt with effectively without Russia, the world's only 
other fully nuclearized country and its largest crossroad of civilizations. 

President Vladimir Putin's agreement to cooperate with Washington's 
military campaign against terrorism, specifically in neighboring 
Afghanistan, opens the way to such a relationship, but it will require 
major revisions in US policies that existed before September 11. Those 
unwise steps had led to a Russia seething with anti-American sentiment and 
a cold peace between the former cold war rivals. They included the Clinton 
Administration's policies of virtually imposing shock-therapy economic 
measures, along with crushing foreign debt, on Moscow in the name of 
"reform"; violating a US promise to the Kremlin in 1990-91 not to expand 
NATO eastward; and bombing Serbia, Russia's fellow Slav nation. 

During its first eight months in office, the Bush Administration also based 
its policy on the prevailing myopic notion that "Russia no longer matters." 
Disdaining serious negotiations with Moscow, it declared its intention to 
push NATO all the way to Russia's borders by including the former Soviet 
republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and to unilaterally abrogate 
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow considers vital to its 
nuclear security. 

Despite grudging applause for Putin's decision to participate in the US 
antiterrorism campaign, there is no sign of any American official or media 
rethinking of these policies. (It does not seem to matter, for instance, 
that since September 11 Russia has become more important to US objectives 
than are most NATO members.) There are instead reaffirmations of those 
policies and dire editorial warnings against making any substantial 
concessions in return for Moscow's participation, particularly in regard to 
the Kremlin's brutal war in Chechnya. 

But it is unlikely that Putin can stay the American course against 
terrorism without significant US concessions, if only because he is 
surrounded by political elites deeply distrustful of Washington and unhappy 
with his decision. They are already reminding him of the despised 
"Gorbachev-Yeltsin syndrome"-a pattern of far-reaching Russian concessions 
in the 1980s and 1990s that were met only by Western broken promises and 
aggrandizement. They are warning, for example, that the Bush Administration 
will transform permission to use bases in Uzbekistan into a permanent US 
military presence in former Soviet Central Asia; exploit Russian assistance 
in Afghanistan to install a pro-American regime in Kabul; and use the 
"coalition" to settle accounts with Iraq, a move long opposed by Moscow. 

Nor is a softening of US opposition to the Chechen war, which has always 
been mostly rhetorical, high on Putin's list of needed concessions. Of much 
greater importance are NATO expansion (few people on either side take 
seriously the talk of Russian membership), the ABM treaty and Moscow's 
inability to invest in its ravaged economy and impoverished people while 
servicing its foreign debt of some $165 billion. 

US policy changes on all three issues are both necessary and desirable. Can 
we really expect Moscow to support NATO's war against terrorism while that 
same cold war alliance is creeping toward Russia? Can we expect Moscow, 
whose defense budget is only some 15 percent of Washington's, to bear the 
costs of military cooperation in Afghanistan and possibly elsewhere without 
debt relief? And can the White House ask the Kremlin to trust its 
intentions after the United States no longer needs Russian help while 
continuing to refuse to negotiate on missile defense and the ABM Treaty? 

Still more, all of these "concessions" would be in America's long-term 
national interest. A Russia whose Western borders are menaced by NATO, 
whose nuclear security is undermined by US strategic unilateralism and 
whose economy is in bondage to Western debt will eventually respond by 
doing what the United States should hope it will not do-by seeking reliable 
allies in the East, by further overloading its decrepit nuclear 
infrastructures with more weapons and by selling more arms to states 
Washington has accused of sponsoring terrorism. 

Thus the events of September 11 confront George W. Bush with not one but 
two historic challenges-to defend America from unprecedented dangers and to 
develop an unprecedented relationship with Russia. Properly understood, 
they are inseparable. Stephen F. Cohen 

Stephen F. Cohen is professor of Russian studies at New York University. 
His most recent book, Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of 
Post-Communist Russia, was recently published by WW Norton in an expanded 
paperback edition.

*******

#3
Russian Communists, hardliners protest Cuba spy station closure
  
MOSCOW, Oct 18 (AFP) - 
Russian Communists and ultranationalists protested Thursday against President 
Vladimir Putin's decision to pull the plug on a key spy station in Cuba, 
accusing the Kremlin of abandoning Russia's claim to be a world power in 
order to save money.

The Communists accused Putin of dismantling not only the Lourdes radar 
station itself, but a symbolic cornerstone of the Soviet spy architecture 
that had given Moscow Cold War parity with Washington in the superpower 
stakes.

"Putin is pursuing a policy of shrinking Russia's influence until it barely 
reaches beyond the outkirts of Moscow," Communist deputy Viktor Ilyukhin told 
the State Duma (lower house of parliament).

"It's a policy initiated by (former Soviet president Mikhail) Gorbachev and 
(former Russian president Boris) Yeltsin, and it's nothing more than a 
capitulation to the West," he added.

Ilyukhin added that Putin's decision, announced Wednesday, to shut down the 
Cuban spy station, and the Cam Ranh naval base in Vietnam, "poses a grave 
risk to our military interests, and will significantly reduce Russia's role 
in the world."

Rightwing nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky joined the Communists in demanding 
an urgent review of this "national problem" by the Duma's security committee.

The Cuban government said late Wednesday it was in "total disagreement" with 
Moscow's decision to shut the base at Lourdes, 60 kilometres (40 miles) south 
of the capital Havana.

Cuba was a former Soviet satellite during the Cold War.

The United States predictably hailed the shutdown of two key Soviet-era bases 
as a sign of Russia's long-overdue recognition that the Cold War was over, 
and that both Moscow and Washington could now unite to fight terrorism.

"Not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also over," said 
US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Shanghai, where US President George W. 
Bush is due to hold talks with Putin this weekend on the sidelines of the 
APEC summit.

The Russian foreign ministry sought to defuse Cuban anger Thursday by 
explaining the Lourdes decision in terms of Russia's unprecedented support 
for the US-led campaign against Saudi-born extremist Osama bin Laden and his 
al-Qaeda terrorist network.

"It is obvious that the fight will be long and require plenty of funds. So we 
will have to be economical, bearing in mind that the nature of challenges to 
our national security has seriously changed since the end of the Cold War," 
said ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko.

He added that Russia and Cuba had been discussing the future of the spy 
station "for a long time, so the decision cannot be unexpected."

Announcing the radar station shutdown on Wednesday, Putin reminded the United 
States that Russia still advocated "a full lifting of the economic blockade 
against Cuba."

Putin cited financial reasons Wednesday for the decision to dismantle "this 
year" the spy station in the United States' backyard.

"It costs 200 million dollars a year in rent to Cuba. For that amount, we can 
buy and launch 20 military satellites into space," the Russian chief of the 
general staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin said, explaining Putin's decision.

Around 1,500 Russian engineers, technicians and soldiers currently observe 
submarine activity from the base at Lourdes at a total cost of 300 million 
dollars (333 million euros) a year to Russia, according to military experts.

Washington says Moscow is using the facilities to spy on the US.

However, Russia reiterated Thursday that it hoped the decision to pull the 
plug on the radar station would not damage relations between Moscow and 
Havana.

*******

#4
Moscow Times
October 18, 2001
Perfect Anthrax Application
By Pavel Felgenhauer  

The Soviet Union actively developed biological weapons in violation of the
1972 international convention banning them, and anthrax was one of the
favorites. Only in April 1992, after the demise of the Soviet Union, did
President Boris Yeltsin sign a decree banning work on biological weapons
and officially acknowledging that the treaty had been violated by Russia.

In unfavorable conditions, anthrax can form a spore -- a thick-walled
capsule inside the body of the bacteria -- that contains the DNA and other
essential parts of the living bug. Such spores can withstand frost, heat
and drought for decades, sometimes even centuries. When the spore finds
favorable habitation, it hatches to produce a living pathogenic bug.

Many different species of bacteria found in the soil can also form spores,
but anthrax is the only one known to be able to infect humans -- through
small skin cuts or through inhalation -- and develop into a potentially
deadly disease. This makes anthrax an ideal bioweapon: It can be
mass-produced and stockpiled in peacetime. In fact, anthrax can be loaded
into military delivery systems years before actual use.

However, anthrax's main shortcoming in a military application is that any
potential enemy will probably be prepared for it. During the Cold War,
Russia and the United States prepared millions of doses of anthrax vaccine
to treat all combatants in time of war.

Russia possesses some rare natural strains of anthrax, and the Russian
military boasts of having the world's best complex anthrax vaccine -- a
compound that supposedly protects against all existing anthrax bugs,
including those that the West does not possess. In the fall of 1990, the
United States asked to buy this vaccine for its troops in anticipation of a
possible Iraqi bacteriological attack during the Gulf War. The Soviet
authorities, however, turned down the request, mainly for security reasons
according to Defense Ministry sources.

Anthrax may cause serious outbreaks in cattle, but is not easily (if ever)
transferred from human to human. Antibiotics can effectively treat anthrax
if diagnosed in time, and in most cases, it takes millions of spores to
cause sickness, since the human immune system can effectively cope with
smaller-scale infections. The effectiveness of anthrax and other bioweapons
depends on the weather conditions at the time of release and on other factors.

Other infectious bugs that may be used as bioweapons have to be kept alive
till delivery and are not as easy to stockpile as anthrax. Under the the
Soviet Medical and Microbiological Industry Ministry, a network of
industrial plants and research centers was built between 1970 and 1980 to
produce commercial single-cell protein from yeast. Military sources say
that in wartime, the same facilities could mass-produce lethal germs.

The Russian military was also very much interested in investigating the
possibilities of creating lab-designed lethal bugs with the help of genetic
engineering techniques. Special expeditions were also sent to Africa and
Asia to collect rare local contagious bacteria and viruses. The task was
not only to find new vicious bugs for military use, but also to prepare
antitoxins to defend against the United States, which was also active in
the same field.

Still, the biological military effort was not part of the mainstream Soviet
military buildup. Soviet generals had in 1986 up to 50,000 nuclear warheads
and 40,000 tons of chemical weapons -- much better payloads for their
missiles than anthrax. Bioweapons could kill hundreds of thousands or no
one at all, depending on the weather and other factors that are hard to
predict. Four star General Mikhail Kolesnikov, Chief of Russia's General
Staff from 1992 until 1996, told me that during Soviet times, "biological
warfare was never an intrinsic part of the Soviet military doctrine, and we
did not include biological weapons in our plans."

Today, however, the perfect application has at last been found for anthrax
and other such bugs: The inaccuracy and unpredictability of bioweapons
makes them the perfect terrorist weapon that may kill few, but is
guaranteed to terrify all. 

The main consequence is that international pharmaceutical companies will
drastically increase sales and profits. Market regulators should look into
recent pharmacy stock transactions. Who was the guy that was placing huge
buying orders from Kandahar, when the markets went into free fall last month?

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.

*******

#5
Russia: Home Of Former Anthrax Outbreak Offers Aid
By Kathleen Knox

Russia this week offered medicines and vaccines to help the United States 
fight a spate of anthrax cases. Russia has more experience than most 
countries in dealing with anthrax -- it was the site of one of the world's 
worst outbreaks in 1979, when at least 66 people died of the disease 
following an accident in a germ-warfare plant in Sverdlovsk. 

Prague, 17 October 2001 (RFE/RL) -- In April 1979, people in the Soviet city 
of Sverdlovsk started collapsing and dying from a mysterious illness. 

City authorities hosed down buildings and streets, believing some sort of 
industrial spillage might have caused the spread of the invisible killer 
germs. But the death toll continued to rise -- at least 66 people died over 
the course of two months -- and suspicions mounted that something far more 
insidious was at work.

The city was sealed off. Mass vaccinations and antibiotic treatments were 
ordered. The authorities finally acknowledged the cause of the deaths was 
anthrax. 

The official version of the time -- put forward by then-local Communist Party 
boss Boris Yeltsin -- named the source as anthrax-contaminated meat. 

But others, including the U.S. administration, suspected the real source was 
a military facility in the city thought to be a biological weapons factory.

It wasn't until 1992 that Yeltsin, by now Russia's president, admitted the 
outbreak was caused by an incident at the plant. Around the same time, a team 
of Western and Russian scientists visited Sverdlovsk, now called 
Yekaterinburg.

They looked at autopsy samples and plotted where all the known victims were 
located on the day of the incident. What they found was that the victims -- 
who all died of inhalation anthrax -- were situated along a very narrow line 
downwind from the plant.

What's now believed to have happened is that technicians at the plant 
neglected to replace a filter, allowing some anthrax spores to escape.

Alison Dale is a specialist in biological and chemical warfare at London's 
Center for Defense Studies. She says it's hard even now to pin down exact 
details of the incident, as any research has to rely on records from the 
time. Some of these were confiscated and others may not be reliable.

But Dale says that in one aspect, the incident's legacy was clear -- 
demonstrating how potent a weapon anthrax could be: "At the time there was a 
particular direction of the wind that carried [the anthrax spores] in one 
direction, [and] actually limited the amount of deaths and infections it 
caused. It showed that under the right conditions and in the right 
environmental conditions, a particular strain of anthrax could be used and 
disseminated via inhalational anthrax."

The long period between the first death and the last -- six weeks -- baffled 
some people at the time who suspected inhalation anthrax was the cause. But 
some have concluded that the original hosing-down meant to clear the city of 
germs in fact appears to have set off a second wave of exposures.

Dale says that the specific wind and weather conditions present in the 
Sverdlovsk incident showed anthrax is difficult to target with any precision. 

"We cannot use this particular case to say that every time anthrax is 
released via aerosol, or if another accident occurs like here in the Soviet 
Union, where it was released through an air filter -- there's no guarantee 
that every time that happened there would be a specific [number] of deaths. 
That couldn't be guaranteed because people couldn't completely guarantee 
specific meteorological conditions.[So] it did prove that anthrax is very 
useful as a weapon, that it could spread and is odorless and not visible. It 
could be spread easily enough through the air and it maintained its strength 
and virulence through an air filter. [But again], a lot of investigations 
that have been carried on throughout the years have shown that there are a 
lot of drawbacks to it as well."

Russian Health Minister Yurii Shevchenko said earlier this week that Moscow 
is willing to help the U.S. fight the current spate of anthrax cases by 
putting its expertise and vaccines at Washington's disposal. 

Dale says Russian help could certainly be of use: "They have a theoretical 
knowledge of how to deal with these incidents -- on the scientific side, on 
what should happen -- rather than the actual practical side of having to deal 
with outbreaks. Aside from this particular incident and perhaps others that 
have happened, they haven't actually had to deal with biological terrorism on 
the scale that we may be looking at now. It's not been an issue for them. 
What they've probably dealt with is outbreaks and tests that they may have 
done themselves. So they are well-equipped and a good ally to have in a time 
like this."

The U.S. ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, today welcomed the Russian 
offer of help. But whether the U.S. would be likely to use the Russian form 
of anthrax vaccine -- which is based on live spores -- remains to be seen.

As for the Sverdlovsk plant, it was dismantled in the 1980s and production 
moved to a facility in Stepnogorsk in Kazakhstan, which has denied any 
involvement in the anthrax cases discovered in the U.S. 

The Sverdlovsk anthrax was hauled across Russia in sealed containers before 
being dumped on an island in the Aral Sea and doused with bleach.

In the wake of the anthrax scares now spreading anew across the globe, the 
name of that island, Vozrozhdeniye, is eerily appropriate -- it means 
"revival."

******

#6
RUSSIA BELIEVES MILITARY MIGHT NOT LAST, BEST & ONLY SOLUTION TO TERROR

NEW DELHI, October 18, 2001. /From RIA Novosti's Valery Sevryukov/. - The 
roots of the problem of terrorism will not be eliminated until the situation 
is settled in the world's many flashpoints, including the Middle East, 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov believes. He was 
speaking to RIA Novosti upon arrival in New Delhi, where he was to attend an 
extraordinary meeting of the joint Russian-Indian workgroup on Afghanistan. 

The Deputy Foreign Minister stressed that military might is not the ultimate 
and certainly not the only solution to the problem of terrorism as the war on 
terror is a far more long-term, many-sided, and complex issue. "It includes 
economic and social leverage and the humanitarian component," Trubnikov said. 

"It is not by hearsay that Russia and India know the problem of terrorism. We 
have a lot of approaches in common to the way we need to tackle it," he 
added. 

He went on to say drawing out the military phase of the ongoing war on terror 
would not be a welcome development. "The longer it goes on, the larger the 
danger looms of victims among the civilians and the combatants in the action 
alike," he said. "This would adversely affect not just the region, but the 
rest of the world as well, including the United States." Enlarging on 
Afghanistan's future, Trubnikov stressed the post-Taliban government would 
have to be a coalition and multi-denominational one. Representatives of the 
Taliban regime are, too, entitled to aspire to positions in such a 
government. However, he said the regime has largely discredited itself as the 
Taliban is hardly a partner to expect a shift in position from. Furthermore, 
they are the force that was instrumental in Osama bin Laden and other 
terrorists' accession to power and in spreading the scourge of terror beyond 
Afghanistan. 

In addition, Trubnikov noted that Pakistan has both the right and the 
capability to take part in any steps geared toward postwar settlement in 
Afghanistan. "However, one has to bear in mind that the whole business is 
first and foremost up to the Afghans themselves", the co-chairman of the 
Afghanistan workgroup said. 

*******

#7
The Global Beat Syndicate
Russian Nuclear Weapons as a Terrorist Threat
After the anthrax attacks, nuclear terrorism is not out of the question
By Jon Wolfsthal
October 16, 2001 

WASHINGTON -- An internal government report, obtained by an outside watch dog 
group, reveals that America's 10 nuclear weapons research and production 
facilities are vulnerable to terrorist attack and have failed about half of 
recent security drills. In several cases, commando squads were able to 
capture enough nuclear materials to make nuclear weapons.

If this report scares you, then just imagine how much worse things are in 
Russia, with its huge and under-funded nuclear weapons complex. 

The former Soviet Union produced over 1,300 tons of nuclear weapons-grade 
plutonium and uranium, most of which is now vulnerable to theft or diversion. 
Only a few kilograms are needed to produce even a crude nuclear weapon. 

Of even greater concern is the fact that Russia itself doesn't even know how 
much material it produced or where all of its is. In the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, the world has to confront the very real possibility 
that some of this material already may be missing. We know that terrorist 
groups, including Al-Qaeda, have shown interested in getting such material 
from Russia in the past.

U.S. programs designed to secure Russian nuclear weapons, materials and 
technology have made significant progress, despite having come under recent 
funding pressures and skepticism by the Bush administration and Congress. The 
attack of September 11 appears to have refocused U.S. attention on the need 
to prevent other countries or terrorist groups from seizing this material. 

Obviously, U.S. facilities need to have the best possible security, and 
additional resources and attention should be applied. But the more likely 
scenario -- that Russian material will be seized and used against U.S. 
territory or allies -- should be given increased funding and attention as 
well. How much of the administrations $40 billion anti-terror package will be 
applied to these threats remains to be seen. 

Jon Wolfsthal is an associate in the Non-Proliferation Project at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C.

*******

#8
Los Angeles Times
October 17, 2001
Sept. 11 Verdict: Yes to Missile Defense
By PHILIP H. GORDON and MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, Philip H. Gordon and Michael E. 
O'Hanlon are senior fellows at the Brookings Institution

Predictably, both supporters and opponents of ballistic missile defenses 
claim that the events of Sept. 11 strengthen their case. Proponents claim 
that the attacks showed that we need to protect ourselves against unexpected 
but devastating threats, while opponents point out that the terrorists did 
not need ballistic missiles--merely knives and box cutters--to perpetrate 
their crimes.

President Bush weighed in on the debate last week, arguing that there is no 
better example of the new threats we face than the Sept. 11 attacks and that 
"the case is more strong today than it was on Sept. 10 that the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is outmoded." Bush has a point that the attacks 
reinforce the case for missile defense, but only for a defense limited in 
size and scale, and deployed in a way that does not threaten other great 
powers. Bush will need to show that he understands this point when he meets 
with Russian and Chinese leaders this weekend at the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation summit in Shanghai. Opponents of missile defense are clearly 
right that a wide range of threats to the United States exists and that 
addressing such threats requires resources. If missile defense becomes an 
exclusive obsession, we may devote too few dollars to counter other, more 
likely threats through means such as airport security, the Coast Guard, 
immigration and customs agencies and defenses against chemical or biological 
attack with "suitcase bombs." Leading Democrats already were making these 
arguments before Sept. 11.

Unconstrained pursuit of missile defense could also worsen relations among 
the major powers, impeding security cooperation on dangers that may be even 
more pressing. To deal with the terrorist threat, for example, we need the 
cooperation of Russia and China, primarily to cut off terrorists' access to 
financial resources and to track them down through intelligence, customs and 
law enforcement activities. We also need Russian and Chinese help to put 
diplomatic pressure on key regional players such as Pakistan and Iran and to 
halt proliferation so that the next terrorist attack does not involve a 
weapon of mass destruction.

These realities do not mean that U.S. foreign policy must be designed to 
please Beijing and Moscow. But we must avoid making them feel threatened if 
we want them on our side. Given their own sense of the threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism, China and Russia are likely to join forces with the United 
States in this fight if we play our cards right.

As missile defense proponents rightly argue, however, the Sept. 11 attacks 
remind us that seemingly remote or abstract dangers can become tragically 
real very quickly. That fact bolsters the case for some type of long-range 
missile defense. Currently, among extremist countries only North Korea is 
believed to be capable of developing a long-range missile within a few years, 
but countries such as Iraq and Iran might have them within a decade.

It is true that terrorists probably will never use long-range ballistic 
missiles against the United States. They do not have the resources to acquire 
them or the territory on which to base them. Moreover, they can seek to 
accomplish their hateful goals with less advanced means, such as dispersing 
biological agents at a sporting event or blowing up a cargo ship full of 
chemicals as it approaches a port.

Yet even if terrorists may not find ballistic missiles useful, an enemy 
country might. Being able to threaten the United States with a biological or 
nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile could allow an adversary state to act 
aggressively against its neighbors in the hopes that, with Americans at risk, 
Washington would not retaliate. A hostile state armed with ballistic missiles 
could also harbor terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, with the knowledge that 
a U.S. with no missile defense would be highly reluctant to threaten enough 
force to capture him or overthrow the country's ruling regime.

The lesson of the terrorist attacks is not that the U.S. should abandon all 
missile defense plans. Rather, it should pursue a limited long-range missile 
defense within a framework that reassures Russia and China and that does not 
hinder other efforts to defend the U.S. against threats that are even more 
imminent. 

*******

#9
The Taipei Times
October 15, 2001
Ice thaws between Russia, US
A warming in relations between the two countries has been rapid. Building on 
the links now calls for well-honed management skills and a real desire to 
alter the face of international politics 
By Ralph Cossa
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based 
non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington.

With the horrific terrorists attacks of Sept. 11 and the subsequent 
international moves against terrorism comes the opportunity to create a new 
global paradigm for the post post-Cold War world, built upon a common goal of 
ridding the world of international terrorism It is a goal that most nations, 
regardless of political system or religious belief (including Islam), can 
embrace equally, even if a common definition of what constitutes 
"international terrorism" may prove elusive.

Once before, from 1990 to 1991, there was an opportunity to create "a new 
world order" as a diverse group of nations came together to repel the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. But, as the Iraqi occupation ended, so too ended this 
first attempt by Washington to develop a more broad-based global security 
framework.

The Russians, no longer enemies of the US, were still not true friends. In 
fact, before Sept. 11, growing differences between Moscow and Washington 
seemed to far exceed common interests or objectives. The differences, already 
festering during Bill Clinton's administration, seemed exacerbated with the 
advent of the George W. Bush administration, despite some apparent positive 
personal chemistry between presidents Bush and Putin. In short, prospects for 
cooperation on strategic issues seemed increasingly slim.

All this changed on Sept 11. The terrorist attacks created a new strategic 
rationale for cooperation, generating an opportunity for a fundamentally 
changed relationship between Washington and Moscow (and, for that matter, 
with Beijing and other Asian nations as well). A positive outcome is by no 
means assured. It will require careful, skilled management and a genuine 
desire to transform international politics. But, the opportunity and 
incentive are now there and the first steps have already been taken.

Russian president Putin was the first foreign leader to call president Bush 
on Sept. 11 to express outrage over the attack and pledge his support.

Russian actions went beyond mere atmospherics. Immediately after the attack, 
US military forces worldwide were placed on high alert. During the Cold War, 
this would have automatically prompted Moscow to respond in kind. Even in the 
post-Cold War world, a decision by Russia to increase its own military alert 
status would not have been considered out of the ordinary.

What was truly extraordinary was Putin's order for Russian troops to stand 
down so as not to add to international tensions, a decision he personally 
relayed to Bush. As Bush later observed, "it was a moment where it clearly 
said to me that [president Putin] understands the Cold War is over." To 
demonstrate that he also understood, Bush added Putin to the list of close 
allies he called immediately before the initiation of military operations 
against Afghanistan -- an equally extraordinary event.

As part of Russia's contribution to the war front, Putin agreed to share 
intelligence with Washington and to open Russian airspace to US humanitarian 
and support flights; he even raised the prospect of Russian search and rescue 
support for US combat operations, while increasing Moscow's support to 
anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Most significantly, after some initial 
hedging Putin gave the green light to the former Soviet Central Asian 
Republics to allow US military forces to stage out of bases there. Much has 
been written about Chinese concerns about a possible US military presence in 
Central Asia, but the region remains first and foremost in the Russian sphere 
of influence.

Russian acceptance (much less active support) of a US military presence in 
its "near abroad" would have been unthinkable on Sept. 10.

It behooves Washington, however, to ensure Moscow (no less than Beijing) that 
it does not seek long-term military presence in this region. Access rights 
and staging bases in Central Asia may be critical to conducting sustained 
combat operations against terrorist camps (and the Taliban leadership) in 
Afghanistan. Establishing permanent US military bases in the region makes 
little sense, however, and runs the risk of undermining the chances of 
genuine long-term cooperation between Washington and Moscow.

Even with this new-found spirit of cooperation, contentious issues remain. 
While Washington may be more understanding and tolerant of Moscow's efforts 
to quell its own terrorist threat (emanating from Chechnya), criticism over 
human rights and other perceived Russian infringements on civil liberties is 
sure to continue. And then there's missile defense.

Predictably, opponents of missile defense were quick, in the wake of Sept. 
11, to point out that such defenses were useless against the more likely 
threats the US faces today. Equally predictably, proponents argued that 
terrorists willing to conduct such a heinous act would certainly not hesitate 
to fire a missile at a US city, were they to get their hands on one.

Regardless of which argument one favors, in times of crisis Washington 
politicians and defense planners normally err on the side of being more, not 
less, cautious. It appears inevitable, therefore, that some form of missile 
defense will remain a key component of Washington's overall homeland defense 
plan.

However, the debate over how comprehensive an umbrella will be built is 
likely to be affected. Both the shock to the economy caused by the terrorist 
assault and the massive costs involved in developing a comprehensive homeland 
defense system provide additional incentive for developing a more modest, 
limited system. Even before Sept. 11, it appeared that the seeds had been 
sown for some type of compromise between Washington and Moscow. After all, 
the size and sophistication of Moscow's nuclear arsenal gives it a great deal 
of flexibility.

Moscow can easily live with a limited MD system aimed only at deterring 
attack from rogue states or responding to accidental or unauthorized 
launches. Meanwhile, Washington may also see the wisdom in delaying its 
decision to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or become willing once 
again to enter into negotiations on its amendment.

Both President Bush and President Putin seem serious about wanting to 
redefine US-Russia relations in order to finally put Cold War habits and 
constraints behind them. The war on terrorism presents them with a golden 
opportunity to do just that -- if the Cold Warriors in both camps can be held 
in check. 

*******

#10
Sizable Russian Military, Foreign Ministry Opposition to Putin Noted  

Moskovskiye Novosti
16 October 2001
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Yuriy Fedorov of the Center for Policy Studies: "Silent 
Resistance of the Generals" 

    The statement of President Putin that supported 
the antiterrorist operation of the United States and Great Britain in 
Afghanistan patently puts in opposition to the president a substantial 
part of military and diplomatic personnel. The contrast between the 
traditional anti-American rhetoric of certain representatives of these 
departments and the clearly stated position of the president is all too 
striking. Putin did not in his speech make even the traditional--and 
hypocritical, as a rule--allowances for "the impermissibility of losses 
among the peaceful population." And although none of this crowd has 
ventured to criticize the president openly, it is known that his speech 
caused displeasure among anti-American military officers, in the 
conservative part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and among their 
traditional Arab "allies". 
    There are in Russia three positions in respect to the situation in 
Afghanistan. The first, which was expressed by the president, is one of 
supporting the antiterrorist operation, having forgotten the old grudges 
against American policy in Afghanistan. The second position may be called 
positive-neutral. Not taking part in the combat operations directly but 
supporting the fight against terrorism in every possible way, aiding the 
Americans with advice and information. The third position is negative 
neutrality. Its supporters propose not only that a maximum distance be 
kept from the actions of the Americans but also that there be constant 
reiteration of the fact that they "themselves are to blame" for what 
happened on 11 September. The initial premise: we sympathize with all 
forces that are fighting American hegemony. There are even those that 
like to repeat that Afghanistan could be used as a "diversionary 
conflict," a second Vietnam. We recall that during the Vietnam war the 
United States was forced to divert its attention from European affairs 
and to comport itself very peaceably in respect to the USSR. Why, they 
say, should Afghanistan not become a second such "diversionary conflict"? 
    All this is, naturally, contrary to the officially stated plans of 
the president. It should be noted that such a contradiction was 
characteristic of the period of rule of President Yeltsin also. Back in 
1992 the military and conservative diplomats were able to form their own 
alternative "power center," which actively influenced the country's 
foreign policy. This center was engaged for the first time in the summer 
of 1992, when Yeltsin's visit to Japan, during which the signing of 
agreements on a normalization of relations with Japan had been planned, 
was canceled. It is now no secret that the visit was canceled in 
connection with the protest of the military, although it is well known 
that conservative forces in the Ministry of Defense had at that time only 
just gone through the "post-putsch" purge and were seriously demoralized. 
    As far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concerned, it is 
indicative that Yuriy Kunadze, deputy minister of foreign affairs, who 
had initiated Yeltsin's visit to Japan, was forced out of the ministry 
shortly after. All people from the inner circle of Andrey Kozyrev, former 
minister in 1991-1996, were gradually forced out of Smolenskaya 
Ploshchad. 
    The anti-American "power center" preserved its influence even after 
the unrealized 1992 visit. Egotistical departmental interests were often 
paramount here. It was important to offer its answer to the question: 
"Who is our enemy?" If the enemy is the United States, ballistic missiles 
and, consequently, the corresponding headquarters at the Ministry of 
Defense are needed. Diplomats, journalists, and intelligence officers, 
accustomed to life in the West, would not in this case be out of a 
job--should not someone be keeping an eye on these villains? If, though, 
the enemy is not in America but somewhere closer to home, a heap of 
unpleasant things needs to be done: the military, to reorganize for a 
fight against terrorism, and diiplomats, to meet not with their American 
counterparts in Washington but with compatriots in the near abroad or 
with all kinds of unattractive people in Afghanistan or the 
Transcaucasus. Do you see the difference? 
    The corresponding foreign policy concept was created also. Prince 
Gorchakov's idea of a balance between different "power centers," not bad 
for the 19th century, but absolutely outmoded now, was taken as the 
basis. In practice this meant a broadening of contacts with anti-American 
regimes along with cool (without a slide into cold war) relations with 
the United States. The purpose is the creation of an informal coalition 
of various regimes geared to a limitation of American influence. 
    What Putin is now saying is an absolute break with this concept. The 
president has made his choice. But the question is whether the 
fulfillment of Putin's plans is possible with the former personnel. There 
has been something of a replacement in the Ministry of Defense. Both 
General Ivashov, who is allergic to NATO, and Yakovlev, the militant 
commander of the strategic missile forces, have left their posts. It 
remains to hope that the absence of "purges" in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs means just one thing: they know their duty there--implementing 
the president's plans--as it is. 

*******

#11
Moscow Times
October 19, 2001
Landmark in U.S.-Russian Relations?
By Pavel Podlesny  
Pavel Podlesny heads foreign policy research at the USA and Canada
Institute. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
 
This weekend, at the informal summit of APEC member states in Shanghai, the
third meeting between Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush will
take place. The meeting will occur in the context of much improved
U.S.-Russian relations, particularly in the political sphere. Russia's
support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan has
provided a powerful boost for relations between the two countries.

Washington appreciates the important role that Russia has to play in the
fight against international terrorism (and primarily the Taliban), taking
into consideration its geostrategic position, its good relations with many
Islamic states and Russia's influence over the Central Asian states. Russia
has come to be seen as a generous partner. Moreover, some members of the
U.S. administration are saying that the joint fight against terrorism will
lead to a reorganization of the whole system of U.S.-Russian relations, and
may give rise to an opportunity for building a new strategic relationship
between our countries.

The meeting in Shanghai should not only provide a chance to cement the
positive changes of the past five weeks, but also for more substantive
discussion of approaches to the major issues in U.S.-Russian relations.
Apart from the fight against terrorism, the main issues are international
security, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the
regulation of regional conflicts, particularly in the Middle East.

Cooperation is crucial, especially in light of the fact that acts of
terrorism are likely to continue, including the use of biological weapons.
Each new terrorist act inevitably strengthens the threat of a clash along
civilizational lines.

On the agenda remain the issues of strategic stability, the creation of the
national missile defense system and cutting strategic weapons stocks. It
seems that the tragic events of Sept. 11 have elicited an ambiguous
reaction from Washington politicians regarding the development of the NMD
system. 

Those opposed believe it is better to focus on the problems of nuclear
security by reducing nuclear weapons arsenals, etc. 

However, NMD supporters — as the U.S. national security adviser Condoleeza
Rice underlined recently — see the terrorist acts as further confirmation
of the need to develop the NMD system, and it is in this context that Bush
intends to discuss the issue with Putin.

The issue of Russia's integration into European and international
organizations deserves the most serious of discussion, in particular the
possibility of Russian accession to NATO. This is an extremely important
and sensitive issue for European and international security and should not
be the subject of political conjecture.

If events show that the West and Russia are not yet ready to take such a
decision then eveything should be done to ensure maximum cooperation
between Russia and NATO within the existing institutional framework. Of
course, if NATO were to delay the second round of NATO expansion or were to
limit it, say, to the admission of Slovenia (which in no way affects
Russia's security interests), that would create a much more favorable
political climate for cooperation.

Expanding economic ties with the United States is also of importance.
Russia, however, clearly needs to accelerate formation of the relevant
political and legal underpinnings for facilitating foreign investment into
Russia.

In Washington, right-wing politicians are already warning Bush and his team
not to make any concessions to Russia. However, compromises and unilateral
gestures of good will are part and parcel of international practice, and
without them, qualitively better partner relations between Russia and the
United States will be impossible.

*******
 
#12
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
October 18, 2001

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC REVIVAL CONTINUES, DEFYING GLOBAL TRENDS. 
Russia's economic performance in 2001, while well behind the 
heady pace registered in 2000, has nevertheless surprised 
most observers. GDP grew by 5.0 percent in the first half of 
this year, according to a preliminary Goskomstat estimate. 
Given the worldwide slowdown in economic growth this year and 
the continued strengthening of the ruble, exports have held 
up better than had been anticipated. Russian energy exports 
have continued to expand, as world market energy prices have 
remained relatively strong.

At the same time, aggregate output growth has received a 
boost from buoyant domestic demand. Growing aggregate demand 
and the strengthening currency have caused imports to surge 
this year, somewhat diminishing the magnitude of Russia's 
current account surplus relative to that earned in 2000. 
However, at mid-year, the current account was still in 
surplus by US$21.2 billion compared with US$22.8 billion at 
mid-2000. Thus, the upward pressure on the exchange rate is 
continuing and the Central Bank of Russia has been actively 
intervening in the foreign exchange market to limit the real 
effective appreciation of the currency and the negative 
impact on Russian exporters.

Despite stiffer competition from imported goods made more 
affordable by the real effective appreciation of the ruble, 
Russian consumer goods producers have enjoyed growth in sales 
to the domestic market on the back of substantial real 
increases in wages and household incomes this year. Although 
profits have been squeezed at industrial enterprises, 
investment expenditures have continued to rise in real terms. 
Construction activity and some important branches of machine 
building have benefited. Finally, the interim reports on the 
ongoing harvest appear to indicate a very successful year for 
Russian agriculture.

Additionally, the economy seems buoyant this year across most 
of Russia's regions. In earlier years, the Moscow region 
often appeared to be growing far more rapidly than provincial 
Russia, and the Moscow standard of living is clearly well 
above that of the smaller cities. However, in the first seven 
months of this year, industry in Moscow was growing at very 
near the national average while retail trade increased at a 
rate 3 percentage points lower in Moscow than the 10-percent 
growth for Russia as a whole (Goskomstat, October 2001; 
Central Bank of Russia, September 2001).

*******

#13
The Asia Times
October 18, 2001
Moscow to take Central Asian worries to APEC 
By Sergei Blagov 

MOSCOW - Russia is due to take another step toward integration into the world 
economic community in the Asia-Pacific region at the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit to be held in Shanghai at the weekend. 

On the other hand, the Kremlin is keen to address its concerns over the 
global terrorist threat and the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan, which may 
affect Russia's Central Asian allies. 

Moscow expects that the summit will approve measures designed to oppose 
terrorism, and notably forestall "funding of extremism in any form", the 
official Russian RIA news agency quoted Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov as 
saying. Moscow also anticipates that the summit will approve a statement on 
combating terrorism, said Sergei Vasiliyev, head of Asia-Pacific department 
of the Russian foreign ministry. The statement is due to denounce terrorism 
as a phenomenon, but not its particular manifestations, he said. 

Although APEC focuses on building an economic community in the Asia-Pacific 
region, Russia further expects that the summit may approve measures "to 
forestall dangerous destabilization of the international economy and finances 
following major terrorist attacks", RIA quoted Russian foreign ministry 
spokesman Alexander Yakovenko as saying. 

However, the Russian delegation to the APEC summit will have some economic 
interests in mind. President Vladimir Putin is due to deliver 
economy-oriented remarks tentatively entitled "Russia's Role and 
Responsibilities in Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century". The Russian mission to 
Shanghai also includes some 40 of the country's leading businessmen. 

Russian officials have argued that this century is set to become the century 
of the Pacific Ocean, with Russia strategically located to take part in the 
process. 

Russia won membership to APEC at a meeting in Vancouver, Canada in 1997, but 
its formal accession, along with Peru and Vietnam, took place in the 
Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur in November 1998, making APEC a 21-nation 
bloc. 

Moscow has viewed APEC, which accounts for more than half of the world's 
total income and nearly half of its global trade, as a potentially huge 
export market. Russian officials have argued that such trade could also be 
valuable for other APEC members, offering access to Russia's vast natural and 
human resources and with the potential to serve as a bridge to Western 
Europe. 

However, it is understood that Moscow has had trouble defining clearly its 
goals in APEC and which areas of trade it should make a priority. Despite 
much-heralded plans of multibillion-dollar Russian oil and gas pipelines to 
Eastern Asia, so far Russian membership in APEC has failed to significantly 
benefit the country's far east regions or spur business in these remote 
areas. 

The Kremlin is also expected to take the opportunity of the APEC summit to 
discuss bilateral relations, notably ties with China. Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov, who attends the 13th APEC foreign ministers' meeting that was due to 
begin on Wednesday, is scheduled to meet his Chinese counterpart Tang 
Jiaxuan. They are expected to discuss the Afghan crisis because "both Russia 
and China are Afghanistan's neighbors and we are not indifferent on how a new 
government there is formed", RIA quoted the Russian foreign ministry as 
saying. 

Furthermore, on Friday Putin is due to meet Chinese President Jiang Zemin. 
They had formal talks in Shanghai just four months ago. At the fifth annual 
summit of the "Shanghai Five" in China on June 14-15, it was announced that 
the group would be transformed into a new international body, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, or SCO. Moscow and Beijing were expected to push 
the SCO to become a counterbalance to Washington's perceived predominance. 
The SCO includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrghyzstan and 
Tajikistan. 

However, it is understood that the SCO is unlikely to be a main focus at the 
APEC summit. Likewise, Moscow and Beijing are not expected in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks in the US to highlight the "multipolar" world concept, 
which has in the past been used to reflect Russia's and China's shared 
concerns over what they view as American dominance in the world. 

Since the landlocked former Soviet states of Central Asia are yet to be 
formally represented in APEC, Moscow may opt to deliver their shared anxiety 
over the Afghan crisis to the summit. 

It is hardly a coincidence that on Tuesday Putin and his Kazakh counterpart 
Nursultan Nazarbayev held telephone consultations relative to the "ongoing 
anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan and its repercussions for Central 
Asia", according to the Kremlin press service. 

The situation in Afghanistan may determine the "political and military 
situation in Central Asia," Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev said in an address 
to parliament on Tuesday. A peaceful Afghanistan would be beneficial for all 
Central Asia, the Kyrgyz leader said. 

Moreover, the Afghan crisis remains a matter of concern for the post-Soviet 
states. For instance, leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
are due to discuss Afghan and Central Asian developments at the CIS summit in 
Moscow on November 30. 

No big wonder then that Putin has ordered Igor Ivanov "to intensify the 
efforts of Russian diplomacy in terms of a post-conflict settlement in 
Afghanistan", according to Putin's press secretary Alexey Gromov. 

Specifically, on Friday emergency situation ministers of Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia are due to meet 
in the Tajik capital Dushanbe to discuss ways on how to deal with expected 
inflows of Afghan refugees, Russia's emergency situation ministry spokesman 
was quoted as saying by Interfax. "Uncontrolled exodus of refugees from 
Afghanistan should be prevented by international humanitarian efforts," the 
spokesman said. 

However, the Russian Federal Border Guard Service does not expect any sizable 
inflows of refugee unless "tragic mistakes" take place in the course of 
anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, the service's director Konstantin 
Totsky said in Moscow. In the event of such mistakes, namely strikes against 
civilian targets, Russian border guards in Tajikistan and their Central Asian 
colleagues are "ready to concentrate the refugees in border areas", he said. 

Since the beginning of the US anti-terrorist action in Afghanistan, the drug 
trade across the Tajik-Afghan border has increased considerably, the service 
said in a statement. Within the past week Russian border guards of the Khorog 
brigade have seized 46 kilograms of heroin and 370 kilograms of raw opium, 
the statement said. 

Russia leads the efforts of the CIS designed to forestall any negative 
repercussions from the ongoing Afghan crisis, Boris Pastukhov, head of CIS 
committee of the state Duma, the lower chamber of Russian parliament, told 
journalists in Moscow. However, he complained that Moscow's calls to 
strengthen the southern frontiers of the CIS largely fell on deaf ears as the 
Central Asian CIS states remained reluctant to commit their troops or bear 
the extra expenses of multilateral efforts. 

Despite widespread fears of refugee inflows, Russian military experts sound 
supportive. The first stage of the US and British military operation in 
Afghanistan "was carried out as it ought to have been carried out", General 
Boris Gromov, governor of Moscow region, was quoted as saying by RIA. Gromov, 
who commanded Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s, suggested that the 
best policy was to rely on special troops and refrain from resorting to a 
large-scale US invasion into Afghanistan. Such an invasion could become a 
quagmire and could require up to 140,000 foot soldiers, commented Gromov, who 
oversaw the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 after 10 years of 
occupation. 

The fate of Afghanistan is of "utmost strategic" importance for Russia, said 
deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, who is in charge of Russia's defense 
industries and arms exports. Moscow favors "a consolidated government in 
Afghanistan to represent all strata of Afghan people", he told Russian 
journalists while on a visit to India on Tuesday. 

Therefore, it is understood that the Russian mission to the Shanghai summit 
will try to get APEC to focus on economic issues as well as its concerns over 
the Afghan crisis and the situation in Central Asia. 

*******