#9
The Taipei Times
October 15, 2001
Ice thaws between Russia, US
A warming in relations between the two countries has been rapid.
Building on the links now calls for well-honed management skills and a real desire to alter the face of international politics
By Ralph Cossa
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

With the horrific terrorists attacks of Sept. 11 and the subsequent international moves against terrorism comes the opportunity to create a new global paradigm for the post post-Cold War world, built upon a common goal of ridding the world of international terrorism It is a goal that most nations, regardless of political system or religious belief (including Islam), can embrace equally, even if a common definition of what constitutes "international terrorism" may prove elusive.

Once before, from 1990 to 1991, there was an opportunity to create "a new world order" as a diverse group of nations came together to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But, as the Iraqi occupation ended, so too ended this first attempt by Washington to develop a more broad-based global security framework.

The Russians, no longer enemies of the US, were still not true friends. In fact, before Sept. 11, growing differences between Moscow and Washington seemed to far exceed common interests or objectives. The differences, already festering during Bill Clinton's administration, seemed exacerbated with the advent of the George W. Bush administration, despite some apparent positive personal chemistry between presidents Bush and Putin. In short, prospects for cooperation on strategic issues seemed increasingly slim.

All this changed on Sept 11. The terrorist attacks created a new strategic rationale for cooperation, generating an opportunity for a fundamentally changed relationship between Washington and Moscow (and, for that matter, with Beijing and other Asian nations as well). A positive outcome is by no means assured. It will require careful, skilled management and a genuine desire to transform international politics. But, the opportunity and incentive are now there and the first steps have already been taken.

Russian president Putin was the first foreign leader to call president Bush on Sept. 11 to express outrage over the attack and pledge his support.

Russian actions went beyond mere atmospherics. Immediately after the attack, US military forces worldwide were placed on high alert. During the Cold War, this would have automatically prompted Moscow to respond in kind. Even in the post-Cold War world, a decision by Russia to increase its own military alert status would not have been considered out of the ordinary.

What was truly extraordinary was Putin's order for Russian troops to stand down so as not to add to international tensions, a decision he personally relayed to Bush. As Bush later observed, "it was a moment where it clearly said to me that [president Putin] understands the Cold War is over." To demonstrate that he also understood, Bush added Putin to the list of close allies he called immediately before the initiation of military operations against Afghanistan -- an equally extraordinary event.

As part of Russia's contribution to the war front, Putin agreed to share intelligence with Washington and to open Russian airspace to US humanitarian and support flights; he even raised the prospect of Russian search and rescue support for US combat operations, while increasing Moscow's support to anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Most significantly, after some initial hedging Putin gave the green light to the former Soviet Central Asian Republics to allow US military forces to stage out of bases there. Much has been written about Chinese concerns about a possible US military presence in Central Asia, but the region remains first and foremost in the Russian sphere of influence.

Russian acceptance (much less active support) of a US military presence in its "near abroad" would have been unthinkable on Sept. 10.

It behooves Washington, however, to ensure Moscow (no less than Beijing) that it does not seek long-term military presence in this region. Access rights and staging bases in Central Asia may be critical to conducting sustained combat operations against terrorist camps (and the Taliban leadership) in Afghanistan. Establishing permanent US military bases in the region makes little sense, however, and runs the risk of undermining the chances of genuine long-term cooperation between Washington and Moscow.

Even with this new-found spirit of cooperation, contentious issues remain. While Washington may be more understanding and tolerant of Moscow's efforts to quell its own terrorist threat (emanating from Chechnya), criticism over human rights and other perceived Russian infringements on civil liberties is sure to continue. And then there's missile defense.

Predictably, opponents of missile defense were quick, in the wake of Sept. 11, to point out that such defenses were useless against the more likely threats the US faces today. Equally predictably, proponents argued that terrorists willing to conduct such a heinous act would certainly not hesitate to fire a missile at a US city, were they to get their hands on one.

Regardless of which argument one favors, in times of crisis Washington politicians and defense planners normally err on the side of being more, not less, cautious. It appears inevitable, therefore, that some form of missile defense will remain a key component of Washington's overall homeland defense plan.

However, the debate over how comprehensive an umbrella will be built is likely to be affected. Both the shock to the economy caused by the terrorist assault and the massive costs involved in developing a comprehensive homeland defense system provide additional incentive for developing a more modest, limited system. Even before Sept. 11, it appeared that the seeds had been sown for some type of compromise between Washington and Moscow. After all, the size and sophistication of Moscow's nuclear arsenal gives it a great deal of flexibility.

Moscow can easily live with a limited MD system aimed only at deterring attack from rogue states or responding to accidental or unauthorized launches. Meanwhile, Washington may also see the wisdom in delaying its decision to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or become willing once again to enter into negotiations on its amendment.

Both President Bush and President Putin seem serious about wanting to redefine US-Russia relations in order to finally put Cold War habits and constraints behind them. The war on terrorism presents them with a golden opportunity to do just that -- if the Cold Warriors in both camps can be held in check.

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