#10
Sizable Russian Military, Foreign Ministry Opposition to Putin Noted
Moskovskiye Novosti
16 October 2001
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Yuriy Fedorov of the Center for Policy Studies:
"Silent Resistance of the Generals"

The statement of President Putin that supported the antiterrorist operation of the United States and Great Britain in Afghanistan patently puts in opposition to the president a substantial part of military and diplomatic personnel. The contrast between the traditional anti-American rhetoric of certain representatives of these departments and the clearly stated position of the president is all too striking. Putin did not in his speech make even the traditional--and hypocritical, as a rule--allowances for "the impermissibility of losses among the peaceful population." And although none of this crowd has ventured to criticize the president openly, it is known that his speech caused displeasure among anti-American military officers, in the conservative part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and among their traditional Arab "allies".

There are in Russia three positions in respect to the situation in Afghanistan. The first, which was expressed by the president, is one of supporting the antiterrorist operation, having forgotten the old grudges against American policy in Afghanistan. The second position may be called positive-neutral. Not taking part in the combat operations directly but supporting the fight against terrorism in every possible way, aiding the Americans with advice and information. The third position is negative neutrality. Its supporters propose not only that a maximum distance be kept from the actions of the Americans but also that there be constant reiteration of the fact that they "themselves are to blame" for what happened on 11 September. The initial premise: we sympathize with all forces that are fighting American hegemony. There are even those that like to repeat that Afghanistan could be used as a "diversionary conflict," a second Vietnam. We recall that during the Vietnam war the United States was forced to divert its attention from European affairs and to comport itself very peaceably in respect to the USSR. Why, they say, should Afghanistan not become a second such "diversionary conflict"?

All this is, naturally, contrary to the officially stated plans of the president. It should be noted that such a contradiction was characteristic of the period of rule of President Yeltsin also. Back in 1992 the military and conservative diplomats were able to form their own alternative "power center," which actively influenced the country's foreign policy. This center was engaged for the first time in the summer of 1992, when Yeltsin's visit to Japan, during which the signing of agreements on a normalization of relations with Japan had been planned, was canceled. It is now no secret that the visit was canceled in connection with the protest of the military, although it is well known that conservative forces in the Ministry of Defense had at that time only just gone through the "post-putsch" purge and were seriously demoralized.

As far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concerned, it is indicative that Yuriy Kunadze, deputy minister of foreign affairs, who had initiated Yeltsin's visit to Japan, was forced out of the ministry shortly after. All people from the inner circle of Andrey Kozyrev, former minister in 1991-1996, were gradually forced out of Smolenskaya Ploshchad.

The anti-American "power center" preserved its influence even after the unrealized 1992 visit. Egotistical departmental interests were often paramount here. It was important to offer its answer to the question: "Who is our enemy?" If the enemy is the United States, ballistic missiles and, consequently, the corresponding headquarters at the Ministry of Defense are needed. Diplomats, journalists, and intelligence officers, accustomed to life in the West, would not in this case be out of a job--should not someone be keeping an eye on these villains? If, though, the enemy is not in America but somewhere closer to home, a heap of unpleasant things needs to be done: the military, to reorganize for a fight against terrorism, and diiplomats, to meet not with their American counterparts in Washington but with compatriots in the near abroad or with all kinds of unattractive people in Afghanistan or the Transcaucasus. Do you see the difference?

The corresponding foreign policy concept was created also. Prince Gorchakov's idea of a balance between different "power centers," not bad for the 19th century, but absolutely outmoded now, was taken as the basis. In practice this meant a broadening of contacts with anti-American regimes along with cool (without a slide into cold war) relations with the United States. The purpose is the creation of an informal coalition of various regimes geared to a limitation of American influence.

What Putin is now saying is an absolute break with this concept. The president has made his choice. But the question is whether the fulfillment of Putin's plans is possible with the former personnel. There has been something of a replacement in the Ministry of Defense. Both General Ivashov, who is allergic to NATO, and Yakovlev, the militant commander of the strategic missile forces, have left their posts. It remains to hope that the absence of "purges" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs means just one thing: they know their duty there--implementing the president's plans--as it is.

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