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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-
The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
BIWEEKLY BRIEFING Wednesday/October 10, 2001

TOWARDS GEOSTRATEGIC REALIGNMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA
Prof. Stephen Blank
AUTHOR BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent the views of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government

Traditionally crisis denotes both challenge and opportunity. The new anti-terrorist war offers the United States and Central Asian governments both a challenge and an opportunity to effect a mutually advantageous regional geopolitical realignment. Should this realignment take place, it can alleviate many other security dilemmas that afflict Central Asia and its neighbors.

BACKGROUND: Central Asia's fundamental geostrategic attribute is that its proximity to East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East makes it part of an ever dynamic system of interstate relations. The competing struggles for influence there among numerous powers great and small, and the Central Asian rulers' determination to maintain their maximum freedom by diversifying their security policies are constant factors of regional relationships. The impending war against Afghanistan-based terrorism offers these states a chance to escape from Russo-Chinese efforts to dominate them, as expressed in the recent evolution of the "Shanghai" Cooperation.

The "Shanghai-6" organization has become a platform for joint Russo-Chinese denunciations of American policies and for a collective security organization that actually allows for either Russia and/or China to project military forces into the area. Allegedly they would be defending Central Asia against separatism, terrorism, and extremism, a justification that also could allow Russian forces to fight alongside China in a Taiwan scenario. Yet despite Russia's denunciations of terrorism, little material aid has flowed to Central Asia and there is reason to suspect Russian collusion with at least some of the alleged terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). After all, Russia is the only power who gains any benefit from the perpetuation of insurgency in Central Asia, because that offers it a pretext, now enshrined in the Shanghai-6 communique, to project its military power into the region. Simultaneously, few Central Asian statesmen can regard with equanimity the possibility of China projecting forces into their territories.

The impending war offers them a chance to break out of this dead end. It is noteworthy that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the states with most to lose from Russo-Chinese condominium and those who wished for previous Western support against terrorism, were relatively quick to promise Washington bases, overflight rights, intelligence sharing, etc. Undoubtedly their determination to do so and thus display their full sovereignty on defense issues forced Russia's hand and induced President Putin to make a large offer of cooperation with Washington. Nevertheless Moscow and Beijing decidedly view American presence in Central Asia with apprehension and clearly want to limit the U.S. regional presence in terms of its size, duration, and mission.

IMPLICATIONS: This situation offers both Washington and Central Asia an opportunity, especially if Washington can not only alter the Afghan authorities' (whomever they eventually are) support for international and cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking, but also induce Pakistan and/or Iran to stop supporting terrorism or insurgencies, either in Kashmir or the Middle East. To the degree that Washington can persuade or, more bluntly, frighten, either Tehran or Islamabad into reshaping their regional foreign policies, it can support more alternatives for Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan as well as smaller Kyrgyzstan and even Russian client Tajikistan to expand and diversify their international trade to those states. That possibility entails energy pipelines and the construction of major infrastructural and transportation outlets that will greatly stimulate trade among all these states. Such large-scale growth of trade, provided Afghanistan is pacified and becomes the recipient of sustained international efforts at reconstruction, offers Central Asia major security and economic benefits. It would certainly help the regional governments overcome the logjam concerning pipelines and shatter the material basis for the Iranian-Russian alliance, partly directed against Central Asian governments and Azerbaijan.

This strategic realignment also offers a possibility for genuine Indo-Pakistani negotiations and reduced tensions between Iran and its neighbors and/or Israel. Either or both of those outcomes would clearly be mutually beneficial for everyone in the Middle East, Central Asia, and/or South Asia. While this vision may seem too audacious, this crisis and the fact that the war is not likely to be a short one, offers the possibilities for major restructuring of Central Asian alignments to the benefit of local regimes and the United States.

CONCLUSIONS: As the U.S.-led coalition commences its war against terrorist networks emanating from Central Asia, Washington should keep the larger perspective in mind. Central Asia suffers from pervasive misrule, and accompanying major economic problems which are exacerbated by the drug trade, insurgency originating in Afghanistan, and by Russian efforts to keep it economically dependent based on an essentially colonial exploitation of energy and raw materials. If this coalition can win and exact changed security policies from those who wish to join it like Pakistan or possibly Iran, the road is open to alleviating (though hardly curing) many of the evils that beset the region and stimulate violence and terror. That outcome alone, if it can be realized, would sufficiently justify the war that is now beginning.

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