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CDI Russia Weekly #174 5October2001

Edited by David Johnson   Printer-Friendly Web Version    Plain Text

1. AFP
Putin seeks West's payback for Russian backing of anti-terror campaign
 
2. Moscow Times
Pavel Felgenhauer 		The Kremlin's New Priority
 
 
3. RFE/RL
Paul Goble 		Making Distinctions In Chechnya
 
4. Novoe Vremya
Dmitry Trenin 		MEETING ON THE ELBE II.
The Russian-American military alliance: for and against.
 
5. AFP Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan emerges as key state in US anti-terror campaign
 
6. Moskovsky Komsomolets U.S.-DECLARED ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION RAISES MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT GIVES ANSWERS.
Interview with Sergei ROGOV, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies.
 
7. The
Jamestown
Foundation
Prism
Petr Silantyev 		A POSITIVE IMAGE OF RUSSIA
 
8. The
Globe and Mail
(Canada)
Andrei Piontkovsky 		A selective sort of sorrow
 
9. The
Russia Journal
Alexander Golts 		Time to move beyond Army’s little squares.
Russian troops are still incapable of carrying out large-scale operations.
 

  

 

#1
 Putin seeks West's payback for Russian backing of anti-terror campaign

MOSCOW, Oct 4 (AFP) -
President Vladimir Putin looked set Thursday to exploit Russia's backing of the US-led anti-terror campaign in a bid to win major concessions in redrawing the map of international security after the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

Putin was expected to develop Russia's new pro-Western stance in talks with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was to fly to Moscow late Thursday to consolidate the Kremlin's support for possible strikes on Afghanistan.

The hastily-arranged meeting is seen here as a mark of Western gratitude for Russia's solidarity in the fight against international terrorism, and the first of many dividends Putin could expect from the United States and its NATO allies.

NATO Secretary-General George Robertson hailed Moscow as "a special and major partner" after talks Wednesday in Brussels where Putin also managed to elicit European Union support for Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organisation.

The timing of the Blair visit, with the US-led coalition gearing up for military strikes against Osama bin Laden and his terrorist al-Qaeda network, signalled "the readiness of London to integrate Russia in international structures," foreign ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko said here.

Putin told journalists in Brussels that last month's attacks in the United States meant it was "time to reflect on the creation of permanent consultative structures in the security field."

Among a number of "profound" changes, Putin has signalled that Russia would be prepared to drop its long-standing opposition to NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe if Moscow was given a role within a reformed Alliance.

"If NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political organisation, of course we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion, if we feel involved in such processes," he added.

Last month's terrorist attacks marked a "seismic seachange of historic proportions" in relations between the United States and Russia, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said Wednesday.

Powell said Russia's pledge of full cooperation with a US-led anti-terror coalition as well as the improvement in ties between Moscow and NATO would have been "unthinkable" in the past.

Speaking before he left for Moscow, Blair hailed Russia's "unprecedented solidarity" in the international campaign against terrorism.

"Putin made a shrewd choice at a critical moment -- he backed the United States in its anti-terror crusade, and this decision could prove decisive for Russia's future," political analyst Viktor Kremenyuk, of Moscow's US-Canada Institute, told AFP.

"Understanding that NATO enlargement is unstoppable, he found a tactical solution to the stand-off, by declaring that NATO was no longer an enemy," he added.

Putin is also expected to seek Western support -- or at any rate, silence -- over Russia's much-criticised two-year war against Islamic separatists in Chechnya.

Putin has drawn a parallel between the kamikaze attacks on the US and a string of attacks carried out Russia in 1999 by suspected Chechen rebels, who he said were bankrolled and armed by "international terrorism centres".

"We see the same hand (of) international terrorists (in those bombings)", he said on Wednesday.

Russia also hopes that its objections to US plans to build a missile defence shield in contravention of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic MissileTreaty will also get a more receptive hearing in the light of Russia's new pro-Western stance.

Putin has offered unprecedented Russian assistance to the US-led anti-terror campaign, including overflight of its airspace to target Afghan bases run by bin Laden, the prime suspect in last month's terror attacks in New York and Washington.

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#2
Moscow Times
October 4, 2001
The Kremlin's New Priority
By Pavel Felgenhauer

Two years ago, more than 100,000 Russian troops invaded Chechnya. The invasion was supposedly intended to punish Chechen warlords for an attack on neighboring Dagestan in August 1999 and for terrorist bombings of apartment blocks in Moscow. But it soon became clear that the real goal was to crush Chechen attempts to become independent once and for all by military might.

Thousands of Russian soldiers, Chechen rebels and Chechen civilians have since lost their lives. The Chechen capital, Grozny, and many villages have been razed. But the Chechen resistance still endures and Chechen fighters still resist an enemy that is vastly superior in numbers, armaments and firepower.

Despite the continued fighting, many in Moscow believe that the Russian army has broken the backbone of the resistance and that a "war of attrition" may continue almost indefinitely, until the small Chechen nation is completely worn out and surrenders.

But now Russia is getting deeper and deeper into Afghanistan and cannot keep as many troops in Chechnya as it has done for the last two years. A partial withdrawal seems inevitable. In fact the intention to begin withdrawing soon has been announced by President Vladimir Putin's representative in the Caucasus, Viktor Kazantsev.

Since 1996, Russia has been secretly supplying the anti-Taliban opposition Northern Alliance in Afghanistan with arms and ammunition. Last week Putin officially acknowledged this "secret" and promised to give the Northern Alliance more arms. It has also been well known that unmarked Russian bombers have attacked military targets in Afghanistan on behalf of the Northern Alliance.

Last week it was reported that soldiers of the 201st motorized rifle division based in Tajikistan have built several pontoon bridges, established bridgeheads on the Afghan bank of the Pyandzh River and are moving large numbers of tanks, APCs and other heavy military equipment into Afghanistan to strengthen the Northern Alliance.

Soldiers of the 201st division are openly training Afghan tank crews and are helping to maintain military hardware. Northern Alliance commanders are also openly admitting that there are many Russian pilots, advisers and other military personnel directly involved in combat with the Taliban militia inside Afghanistan.

For a week or so the Northern Alliance has been announcing that its forces are attacking the Taliban. But it seems this offensive has not been very successful. The Taliban have mostly held their positions and have not even engaged all their reserves. It seems that the Taliban can stop the Northern Alliance with one hand tied behind their back.

Western leaders may claim they will defeat the Taliban, but the West and the United States do not have enough forces in Central Asia to do the job. Angered by U.S. air strikes, the Taliban may take revenge on their neighbors, and Russia will be forced to rush reinforcements into the area.

Last week 1,500 soldiers were airlifted into Tajikistan to join the 201st division. But Defense Ministry officials say they need up to 50,000 soldiers to stop a possible armed incursion by the Taliban.

Only in Chechnya does Russia currently have a substantial combat-ready force. However, before troops can be sent to Central Asia, the Chechen rebels have to be neutralized by an offensive or by peace talks.

Last week, Russian forces in Chechnya began a series of major attacks after the expiration of Putin's 72-hour ultimatum. Large parts of Chechnya have been sealed off by troops conducting "mopping-up" operations in towns and villages. In the first day of "mopping up," 27 alleged rebels were reported killed and 69 suspects arrested. By now hundreds of other Chechen suspects may have been murdered by Russian troops.

At the same time the Kremlin announced that negotiations were under way to organize talks between rebel Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and Kazantsev. Maskhadov has always offered to open negotiations with Moscow without preconditions, but he cannot settle for anything less than independence or he will lose all credibility and support within the resistance.

The Kremlin is apparently trying to decimate the rebels and negotiate a peace deal at the same time. Maybe it is doing this to "impose" peace on Maskhadov and his supporters, but in the past such tactics have failed, as has almost everything Russia does in Chechnya.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.

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#3
Russia: Analysis From Washington -- Making Distinctions In Chechnya
By Paul Goble

Washington, 3 October 2001 (RFE/RL) -- Russian officials in recent weeks have stepped up their efforts to portray the Chechen militants as terrorists and argue that the Russian campaign in the North Caucasus is part of the international antiterrorist effort.

But a Russian journalist who has covered the conflict there argues that in so doing, Moscow is failing to make and thus to exploit distinctions among Chechens fighting Russian forces between those with a pro-Western orientation and those who look to the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Anna Politkovskaya writes in the current issue of "Novaya gazeta" that Russian commanders have failed to focus on and make use of the increasingly deep "abyss" dividing Chechen separatists. Instead, they have taken refuge in a broad-brush approach, lumping all the Chechens into the category of "Muslim fundamentalist terrorists." She suggests that there are three main categories among the Chechen field commanders:

First, there are those who may be called "pro-Western." They want "European rules applied to Chechnya, they want human rights in their traditional Western form, and they appeal to the European Union and other international organizations." And this group seeks "international trials for war crimes." According to Politkovskaya, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov is "the foremost leader in this camp" at least "for the time being." Other Chechen field commanders in this group view themselves as defenders of the Chechen national traditions and are actively opposed to Islamic fundamentalist groups like the Wahhabis that they feel undermine national unity and purpose.

The second group, Politkovskaya argues, are "the pro-Arabs" who "look to the Arab East for models." They seek "Arab-style Islamization of Chechnya, and they seek to attract followers by arguing that it will lead to the influx of "Middle Eastern and Arab-African money" to Chechnya. Politkovskaya suggests that some in this camp -- particularly commanders Shamil Basaev and Khattab -- are only in it for the money, while others actually accept the Islamic perspective.

And what Politkovskaya called the "third force" in Chechnya includes the majority of the relatively small armed groups "that have joined the fray not so much to attack the federal forces [out of principle] as to take revenge for their dead or missing relatives." This group, diverse in many ways, does not care about coordination, command, or broader political goals. Instead, those in this category are waging war on highly specific targets rather than pursuing any more general goals. This group gets its funding by theft or from economic groups on the ground. It places no hope in foreigners for either assistance or as models of current or future behavior.

Politkovskaya suggests that Moscow should play on these divisions, supporting the pro-Western side against the pro-Arab one. "Any secret service in the world would have done so," she writes. "Anyone but the Russian secret services."

She points to two major reasons for that: First of all the Russian secret services have their own ties with the pro-Arab Chechens and exploit these connections for their own purposes, some narrowly selfish such as corruption and others with broader geopolitical goals.

And second, Politkovskaya writes, "The Kremlin is determined to preserve the controllable, smoldering conflict in the Caucasus as the regime's major political reserve." Indeed, Russian polls suggest, President Vladimir Putin's high standing with Russian voters reflects at least in part their support for a vigorous campaign against the Chechens.

But in addition to the reasons Politkovskaya enumerates, there is yet another reason why Moscow may not now be interested in making the distinctions among Chechens that she suggests. Russian officials in recent weeks have sought to portray their efforts in Chechnya as being part of the common international struggle against terrorism and to demand that the West refrain from criticizing what Russian forces are doing there because of what the West may do elsewhere to fight terrorists.

Were the Russian authorities to do as Politkovskaya suggests, they would likely have greater difficulty in portraying to either domestic audiences or abroad the struggle of the Chechens as terrorism.

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#4
Novoe Vremya
No. 39
September 2001
MEETING ON THE ELBE II
The Russian-American military alliance: for and against
Author: Dmitry Trenin
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

NOW, AFTER PRESIDENT BUSH'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS AND ON THE EVE OF THE US COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATION, RUSSIA IS FACING A DIFFICULT CHOICE. THE DILEMMA IS FORMULATED SIMPLY - JOIN THE AMERICANS IN THE BATTLE, OR SIT IT OUT. THE STAKES ARE HIGH INDEED.

President Vladimir Putin assured the United States of Russia's political and moral support right after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Now, after President Bush's address to Congress and on the eve of the US counter-terrorism operation, Russia is facing a difficult choice. The dilemma is formulated simply - join the Americans in the battle, or sit it out. The stakes are high indeed.

The majority of the Russian political elite oppose the idea of involvement. This is what its position comes down to.

September 11, 2001, did not turn the world upside down. All old problems - NATO eastward expansion, the situation in the Balkans, the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty - still await their solutions. The terrorist operation became a horrendous corollary of America's own foreign policy. Residents of American cities have been given a taste of what residents of Belgrade and Baghdad had already lived through. The United States spared neither time nor effort to criticize Russia for the indiscriminate use of force in Chechnya. Now that it is in a similar position, it is prepared to throw its whole military might against the Taliban. Russia has already fought in Afghanistan once. The war cost it 15,000 lives. There is no reason why Russia should make the same mistake again.

There are some specific arguments as well along with all these generalizations. Here are some of them.

* Asymmetric nature of the existing Russian-American relations. Certain growth of Russia's political weight notwithstanding, actual clouts wielded by Washington and Moscow are such that Russia may only hope to become America's smaller partner, a kind of "senior among the juniors".

* Absence of a joint mechanism of decision making. There is another way of putting it: America is not prepared to submit all its plans to Russia for approval. Essentially, Russia will be forced to accept everything the United States decides.

* The possibility in case of success that the United States will settle in the Central Asia and the Caspian region as the dominant state and drive Russia out.

* The possibility that America's erroneous actions may spark a wave of religious extremism, separatism, and terrorism which will sweep to the north of Afghanistan and promptly do away with fragile stability in the Caucasus. Such a wave may even threaten to split Russia into religious and ethnic enclaves.

* The suspicion that the Americans who are in charge of the international coalition will resort to air-strikes, leaving land operations to the Russians.

At first sight, all these arguments are valid. The United States will be in sole charge of the operation indeed. No one can even hope for the use of the "Bosnian formula" in decision making this time. The polar fears concerning long-term American presence in the Central Asian region and concerning America's possible decision to exit the area altogether lend credibility to each other. Only the argument concerning using the Russians in land operations is absolutely incorrect. It seems that truly the best option for the Russian Federation is to let the Americans do what they think best and consequently answer for their actions. Meanwhile, the Kremlin may call for higher role of the UN, broader powers of the UN Security Council, and even reinstitution of the Military Staff Committee. Moscow can easily put forth these initiatives knowing well in advance that nothing will come of them. The Kremlin may concentrate on Chechnya, exterminating extremists, terrorists, and separatists there particularly since the situation in the world as such that no one will dare criticize Moscow for its policy in Chechnya.

This is the first time Moscow and Washington have a common enemy since 1945. If the factor sufficient for accomplishing what was not accomplished when the Cold War ended - for Russia's integration into the security system "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" (as the saying goes) on mutually acceptable terms?

Until September 11, America's attitude toward Russia was fairly skeptical. Its interest in Russia grew enormously in the wake of the terrorist attacks. The Americans are attracted by Russia's convenient position on the globe, its military potential, military-political positions and infrastructures in Central Asia, contacts with the Northern Alliance in Taliban, its almost two decades worth of experience of combating Afghani mujahedin, Tajik islamists, Chechen separatists, and finally international terrorists. America needs Russia as a military ally nowadays, not as a proof of universal nature of democratic values and certainly not as an economic partner.

This is a rare chance. Russia has faced a choice until now: self- isolation ("great Russia"), revision of the outcome of the Cold War (the so called "Oriental choice", or integration into Europe. Three options. The former is a deadend, the middle is fatal, and the third is the best but taken with a pointed lack of enthusiasm until now. An alliance with the United States and NATO, on the contrary, allows Russia to make its contribution into the new venture with military- political hard currency. Psychologically, it is much more comfortable, it paves way to full-scale integration on better conditions.

If Moscow goes for it, the Russians may expect their participation in actions together with the United States and other members of the international coalition to up Russia's international image, to reinforce its positions with regard to NATO, to make the United States more sensitive to Russia's security interests, and finally to facilitate solutions to a number of well-known problems. Among other things, Western aid will help the Russian Armed Forces.

In the United States, relations of allies with Russia are promoted by a part of the administration and establishment thinking that Russia's ambiguous status in the modern world is something America cannot afford. As a true friend and reliable ally, Russia will be sympathized with in America to an extent no company concerned with image improvement cen ever hope to accomplish. Russia's new image in the United States and Europe will truly become its invaluable asset.

In Russia, this alliance with the United States is promoted by the part of the political elite convinced of the necessity of integration into Western (European) structures and has been striving for integration into these structures on more or less acceptable conditions. Without successs. History offers Russia unique chance to accomplish its goal, converting America's need of a strategic ally into conditions acceptable for Russia.

Success of the pro-alliance forces in the United States and Russia will greatly depend on the stand of presidents Putin and Bush, on their abilities actually to lead the elites and societies toward closer cooperation of the two states. They may also expect the traditional "national security bureaucracies" (i.e. military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities) of the two states may be relatively easily geared for acting side by side provided the circumstances are right. Never known for finesse, the Russian military sees it clearly: "Arabs there, Arabs here" and awaits orders. They are ready.

Putin can put to rest his fears (provided he has them) of a serious domestic opposition to the alliance with America and NATO. State bureaucracy is always sensitive to the president's mood. It will do as it is told. Zyuganov's boring and Shandybin's jolly muttering in the Duma will vie with Zhirinovsky's aphorisms. The regions will not object, to say the least.

Implementation of this policy will be difficult indeed. Global vision should go side by side with the vision of pragmatic strategy of the way.

Russia should fortify its counter-terrorism position and abandon the very idea of neutrality between civilization and barbarism. It must join the broad international coalition. Within the framework of coalition already it should contribute to fortification of moderate and non-aggressive forces in the Middle East, to isolation of terrorists within regions and states. At the same time, Russia should make use of the situation to find mutually acceptable and beneficial solutions to the problems marring Russian-American relations from anti-ballistic missile defense systems to NATO eastward expansion to Russian arms export to Iran. The problem of anti-ballistic missile defense systems might be solved by the proposal to combine the American national and Russian initiatives concerning pan-European systems; NATO membership for the Baltic states might be traded for a truly operational Russian-NATO alliance; and the Iranian problem may be solved within the framework of the counter-terrorism coalition in which Tehran may participate.

A correct choice will earn Putin a place in the history books, where he will not be remembered as a hostage of the Chechen war but as a leader on a global scale - one of the leaders of the international counter-terrorism coalition, and the man who secured Russia a decent place in Europe. Time is running out. Broad Russian-American mutual understanding may be achieved as soon as this month -ironically enough, at the Shanghai meeting.

(Translated by A. Ignatkin)

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#5
Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan emerges as key state in US anti-terror campaign

TASHKENT, Oct 4 (AFP) -
Mainly Muslim Uzbekistan emerged as a forward base in strikes against Afghanistan as US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was to head to Tashkent Friday in an effort to bolster support of this strategic Central Asian state.

An Uzbek foreign ministry spokesman said Rumsfeld was expected in Tashkent Friday afternoon on a lightning trip that will first take him to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Egypt.

The spokesman was unable to say with whom Rumsfeld was likely to meet or what the US defense secretary was planning to discuss with Uzbek leaders.

The strongly secular authorities in this mainly Muslim state of 24 million people, which shares a 130-kilometre border (80-mile) with Afghanistan, have offered the US military access to Uzbekistan's bases and overflight rights.

Rumsfeld has told reporters it was "an open question" what role Uzbekistan might play in any anti-terrorist campaign.

"To the extent that there are things that may or may not be done from a military standpoint, clearly it would be desirable for countries to participate in that," Rumsfeld said.

"Furthermore we want them to participate by giving us intelligence," he said. "Countries on the periphery of Afghanistan in this case have a lot more information than countries that are not on the periphery."

Most observers believe that Uzbekistan's common border with Afghanistan and the unlikelihood of extensive deployment in Pakistan have made the country seem very attractive to US military strategists.

Uzbekistan is also more independent of its former Soviet master Moscow than neighbouring Tajikistan, where Russia has some 10,000 troops patrolling the Tajik frontier with Afghanistan.

The Central Asian republic was once a springboard for the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

The southern city of Termez has a bridge built to facilitate the transport of equipment into Afghanistan, on the strategic route to Mazar-i-Sharif where fighting between the Taliban and Northern Alliance has recently raged.

The Central Asian state also has a number of military air bases that could be of use to the United States, including a modern base at Khanabad, near Karshi, and Tuzel, in the suburbs of the capital Tashkent.

According to eye-witness reports that have yet to be officially confirmed, US military aircraft carrying reconnaissance equipment had landed at the Tuzel air base.

Russian television also reported that a US military transport plane had landed at Khanabad in the south of the Central Asian state.

Asked whether US military personnel were in Uzbekistan, Rumsfeld said that there were likely some military personnel attached to the US embassy in the country.

But when pressed on the presence of combat troops, he said, "Now we're getting into semantics."

Uzbek officials in this secretive and highly controlled state, ruled by autocratic President Islam Karimov, have also remained tight-lipped.

Uzbekistan, which has deep concerns about the spread of Islamic extremism in Central Asia, has much to gain from cooperating with the United States.

Karimov blames Islamic rebels funded by Afghanistan for bomb blasts which rocked Tashkent in 1999, killing 16 people, and for incursions into the south of the country last year.

Some observers believe Tashkent may hope to quash criticism of its poor human rights record in return for cooperating with the United States, as well as to boost its international standing.

New York-based Human Rights Watch warned Thursday that Rumsfeld should make clear to Uzbekistan that its new relationship with Washington is not a green light "to add further abuses to its already abysmal human rights record."

"If the United States is going to ally itself with Uzbekistan, it has to find a way to avoid aligning itself with Uzbekistan's brutal policies," said Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch.

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#6
Moskovsky Komsomolets
No. 218
October 3, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

U.S.-DECLARED ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION RAISES MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT GIVES ANSWERS

Interview with Sergei ROGOV, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies

Question: What do you think of the September 11 events in the United States?

Answer: There are events and events. There are scandals which remain in the focus of universal attention for some time but which decide nothing. And there are other, global events. Such as the breakup of the U.S.S.R. or the unification of the two Germanys. Such events determine the life of many people for decades ahead. And not in one country but around the world.

The September 11 terrorist operation in the U.S.A. was a terrible shock, a strike at the national self-consciousness of the entire American people. An event which in terms of its significance can be compared to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. If you remember, it was Pearl Harbor that turned the United States from a continental state, whose interests were confined to the exploration of the vast expenses of North America, into a world power.

Perhaps, the September 11 attack has finally put an end to the United States' self-isolation. Paradoxically, despite half a century of America's active involvement in international developments, until recently it retained the image of a "fortress" screened off from the rest of the world not by a high fence but by missile interceptors. A fortress which lives according to its own laws and which can do anything it likes, even use force, if necessary.

Today, everyone understands that America's exceptional nature or super-defence does not exist. The fortress has collapsed. For the first time in U.S. history, war against it was launched on its own territory. Within one hour, more civilians were killed than over the 150 years of wars ever waged by the United States. The number of victims still remains unknown, as many of those who died under the ruins of the World Trade Center will never be identified. Yet it is already clear that the terrorist attacks killed by far more people than Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor did.

Question: World War II was followed by Vietnam in which the United States did not win fame, to put it mildly.

Answer: The Americans now simply have to revise the lessons of the Vietnam war which took place 30 years ago. Now they seem to have overcome the Vietnamese syndrome. America is again ready to fight overseas. It is ready to wage a war which will inflict losses not only on the enemy, as was the case in Kosovo, but also on its own citizens.

Question: Do you think the Americans are really ready for that?

Answer: Yes they are. Recent public opinion polls have revealed very serious changes in the Americans' consciousness. Naturally, they were largely caused by emotions, by the well-understandable hysteria. Later, the pendulum, which has swung so sharply towards militarism, will return closer to the midpoint but never to the position it occupied before September 11.

This is connected not only with international affairs. America has long claimed the role of the leader of democracy. But the fear it felt during the terrorist attacks has made an overwhelming majority of its citizens ready to waive their privileges for the sake of their personal safety.

Today Americans agree that police can stop and search anyone in the street with no apparent reason. The Department of Justice now seeks to gain the right to tap telephone conversations and check E-mails without a relevant court decision. The U.S. government is preparing a bill which will allow it to detain any foreigner for an indefinite period of time or deport him or her, also without a court decision. In other words, we are witnessing the collapse of principles which until recently seemed unshakeable for the U.S.A.

Question: America's war against terrorists reminds me of a fight between an elephant and an annoying little dog: their forces are incomparable.

Answer: Let's analyze the following thing: what is the worth of the colossal military and economic might of the huge superpower which proved unable to defend ordinary people from a small group of terrorists? Terrorists using primitive methods and based in the world's most backward country. "Fortress America" accounts for 40 percent of the world's defence spending! There has hardly ever been a conflict in the world's history that was characterized by such asymmetry between the attacker and the target.

Terrorism has existed for centuries. But usually it pursued either national or political purposes. Present-day terrorism is the reverse side of the globalization process when states operating on the international scene have been joined by other players, such as multinational corporations or international syndicates. It is not accidental that Osama bin Laden's organization is often described as a holding company or corporation, because it operates in strict conformity with the rules of conduct of any multinational corporation. The scope of operations, financing, the use of up-to-date technologies ...

Question: Are you deliberately avoiding any mention of terrorists' religion? After President Bush declared a crusade against international terrorism, many people took it as the beginning of a war between the Christian civilization and the Islamic world.

Answer: Well, this is a very primitive interpretation of what is going on. No doubt, Islam, as the youngest religion in the world, is now living through intense internal processes which Christianity witnessed several ages earlier. Europe had religious wars, too, and heretics were burned at the stake...

There is another very important aspect here: Islamic religious extremism has given rise to an absolutely new type of terror. Formerly, any terrorist preparing an attack knew that he was running risks and could die. But death was not an obligatory part of the act of terror.

Present-day fanatics fulfilling bin Laden's orders no longer think how they can escape following a terrorist attack. They just have no need to, as there is no escape, either, because their goal is to reach Heaven. And here many laws that determined the conduct of secret services in many countries stop working. As the enemy has no self-preservation instinct, the possibility of fighting it is very low.

Terror is a game without rules. Now the United States is trying to figure out where a new strike can be delivered. Some suggest placing air defense systems near each nuclear power plant. OK, suppose they have done it, and what about chemical plants? Or large industrial facilities? And Manhattan? There are still so many skyscrapers left there...

Question: If this is a game without rules and if terrorism has no face, who will America fight?

Answer: It seems the United States itself does not know this. Do you remember the motto with which the incumbent U.S. Administration came to power? It was simple: the country must be further strengthened as the only superpower. Bush Jr. and his supporters criticized Clinton not for wishing to make the world unipolar. They criticized him for doing this in a too delicate manner. They would like him to bang his fist on the table, so that the whole world immediately recognize the U.S.A. as its only leader, come to attention and orient itself to the U.S. economy.

All means were good to implement this idea: further strengthening of America's military superiority, implementation of plans to build a national missile defence system, and withdrawal from international agreements which Washington believed restricted its actions.

These sentiments prevailed in the American elite until September 11, until the United States encountered an enemy against which even state-of-the-art weapons turned out absolutely inefficient.

Of course, theoretically America can shower the whole of Afghanistan with nuclear bombs. But such a decision can hardly be made in the 21st century.

Or, perhaps, the U.S.A. should use precision-guided weapons capable of hitting any target on the planet without unnecessary casualties? But in Afghanistan there are no targets deserving to be bombed, as U.S. Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld said. Fire cruise missiles at each tent under which the Taliban sleep? This will hardly yield any good results.

Today Americans themselves ask more and more often: What are the objectives of the war proclaimed by President Bush? "A crusade against international terrorism" sounds good, but there arises another question: Does the United States plan to fight ALL terrorist organizations in the world? Or only Islamic ones? Or only bin Laden alone? Or states supporting terrorists?

Other things remain unclear, too. How should anti-terrorist struggle be conducted? If the matter at issue is physical destruction of terrorists, it means that one state undertakes to destroy "enemies of the people" without trial.

Finally, there is a question about the boundaries of the United States' unilateral actions. It seems that the aspirations of George Bush and his team are obvious. But struggle against international terrorism, which they have proclaimed, requires the establishment of an international coalition.

The United States has already tried to imitate Bush Sr.'s Operation Desert Storm style and set up such a coalition - but on a different, Hollywood-style basis: a sheriff chasing robbers invites all trigger-happy people to join him. Only in real life the number of such people has proved to be much smaller. Also, it has turned out that it is the United States' closest allies in the Islamic world that are needed most of all to fight bin Laden and the Taliban. However, it is not at all easy to make Saudi Arabia or Pakistan fight brothers in faith and meet U.S. demands. For the Pakistani leadership, excessive involvement in American games may have serious consequences inside the country, up to the replacement of the ruling regime.

Question: A spokesman for the U.S. Administration said the other day that, if the Taliban extradites bin Laden to America, the U.S.A. will not interfere in Afghanistan's home affairs, no matter who rules there: the Northern Alliance or the Taliban...

Answer: This is a very strange statement. President Bush immediately after the terrorist attacks said that America would punish not only terrorists but also countries supporting them and giving them shelter. To strike at bin Laden and not to strike at the Taliban would mean for Washington to refute itself.

On the other hand, if America actually begins to overthrow the Taliban regime, it will thus support the Northern Alliance which is hostile to Pakistan. And Pakistan is now a U.S. ally. So, the United States has not yet decided on the strategy of its further actions, let alone their details. It will take weeks or even months before things will begin to clear up.

Question: Do you think Russia can join in the U.S. anti-terrorist operation? And if it can, what role will it play?

Answer: For the first time since 1945 Russia and the U.S.A. have a common enemy. Common because bin Laden's organization actively supported Chechen rebels. In addition, the Taliban pose a great threat to present-day ruling regimes in former Soviet republics in Central Asia. If they fall, any new government is sure to be much more pro-Islamic and much more anti-Russian.

When two states have a common enemy, they usually begin to cooperate. Without a common enemy, countries can coexist and even be on friendly terms but nothing more. Remember the "strategic partnership" between Russia and the U.S.A. proclaimed by presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in 1993? It did not materialise for many reasons, but above all because there was nothing or no one in the world against whom we could be friends. Many political scientists said jokingly then that Russia and the United States would have no grounds for pooling efforts until Martians or some other little green men come to the Earth from outer space.

So, the "little green men" have already come...

Look, over the 200-odd years of U.S. history, Russia and the United States were allies many times. A common enemy united our two countries which had basically different political and economic systems. The only exception was the Cold War.

Question: In former years, the United States formed an alliance with a powerful, well-armed empire. Present-day Russia is not like that.

Answer: A political alliance does not at all require that allies be equal in strength. It needs only coincidence of the allies' major national interests.

Bin Laden's organization or the Taliban pose an obvious threat to our national interests. If Russia and the U.S.A. come to the conclusion that we have a common enemy, it means we already can and even must work out mechanisms for cooperation and define terms of mutual assistance.

There are purely technical aspects of the problem here: whether or not Russia should allow U.S. aircraft to fly over its territory, or whether or not Russia should send its commandos to areas where combat operations are conducted or just send humanitarian aid. There are many more questions, but the most important thing is the political aspect: if Russia and the United States form an anti-terrorist alliance, does the U.S.A. plan to continue actually supporting Chechen terrorists? And will its allies - Saudi Arabia and Turkey - continue providing financial and military support for the rebels?

So, Russia has much room for bargaining here.

Question: But you can bargain only with someone who is asking you for something. So far, as follows from Vladimir Putin's recent speech before German politicians, the United States has not asked us for help. Answer: There is a difference, not always noticeable, between politicians' official statements and what is actually taking place. We should not hurry. There is a hard-and-fast rule in international relations which cannot be violated under any circumstances: even if you do something in your own interests, you must demand that your ally do something in return. Otherwise, he will simply swallow the free refreshments but will not be in a hurry to reciprocate.

Interview taken by Yuri RYAZHSKY.

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#7
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM
A monthly on the post-Soviet states
September 2001 Volume VII, Issue 9 Part 2

A POSITIVE IMAGE OF RUSSIA
 By Petr Silantyev
Petr Silantyev is a Russian journalist working as a consultant with RIA Novosti.

Ten years ago a man lay down in front of a tank on the embankment beside the Russian White House. The images taken by our camera team were shown all over the world. "The Transfiguration." That's what we called our report on the events of those three days in August 1991 when we first saw in our fellow countrymen not the faceless "Soviet people," but the citizens of a new country.

Seven months ago Russia's Press Minister Mikhail Lesin announced his department's plans to promote a positive image of Russia in the United States, pledging to invest plenty of money in this.

I could only welcome the minister's educational ambitions, given that I am always writing about what I think is the top priority: For Russia and the United States, West and East, to focus more effort and resources into improving their basic knowledge of each other. But there is something I would like to clarify something.

What is "a positive image of Russia"? As an American analyst once said, propaganda cannot be any better than the policy it is promoting. But what is good and bad?

In the Library of Congress and in the public libraries of any American town you will find books by Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Chekhov. They have always been published and republished in the United States. America's great writers learnt from them and were inspired by them. Known in dry officialese as "Russia's invaluable contribution to world culture," this is perhaps the most important collection of knowledge about our country which mankind possesses. Russia's great authors wrote about the struggles of the undying human spirit embodied in the Russian people on the Russian land. I would venture to propose that from their point of view, in the twenty-first century the sense of the nineteenth century. It is only the manner of our existence that changes.

LIBRARIES ECLIPSED BY THE INTERNET

I do not hold with theories of the irreversible dangers of computerized virtual reality. Books, incidentally, are also a virtual reality. The first printers were also considered to be evil sorcerers by some of their contemporaries. The Internet is only taking its first steps, even if they are fast, big steps. It stumbles, naturally, but it moves forward. I know how to place Russia's "golden library" on the net in such a way as to guarantee that it will reach a sufficient audience of users, including Americans. I will not be able to achieve my patent, however, judging by the reaction of the decisionmakers I have approached with my proposals. Their attitude can be detected in a statement about the Russians made by the head of Gazprom Media, Alfred Kokh, in an interview in the United States a couple of years ago: "They are still so enamored of their ballet and classical literature that they are no longer capable of doing anything new."

No, I don't think we are capable of adding anything fundamentally new to the principle of how to sell oil, gas, aluminum and so on. I would also agree that we have the country and the economy that we deserve. Kokh says that thinking and inventing is not the same as knowing how to work, "in the sense of digging," as he put it in his memorable interview. Kokh and the other titans of new Russian capitalism did indeed take risks and did not shy away from finding clever ways of digging a path through the blockages in the Soviet empire, upwards to a bright future.

In the corridors outside the first session of the Council of Ministers in the White House after the putsch had failed, I remember one of the victors letting slip that "we will have to walk over certain layers of society." And the Morlock remained stuck where they were. What can the success of people like Kokh lend to the image of the future depicted by Wells 100 years ago? Or to a positive image of the new Russia?

I also remember watching an old man, shaven, albeit badly, with medals on his clean but threadbare jacket, looking around in embarrassment and then heading over to the rubbish bin where I had just thrown out some old, battered books and magazines, choosing himself something to read. Was he a Morlok too?

I do not pine for the Soviet socialist state that collapsed in 1991. But I do get a lump in my throat thinking about the old people who deceived themselves and were themselves deceived.

The most despicable thing in the country of "developed socialism" were the lies. But then, state-sponsored lies are despicable in any social and political system. In a totalitarian state everyone lies to everyone about everything: That is what holds it together. It is a widely accepted fact that the fall of the Soviet regime began with glasnost, the Russian version of the First Amendment. At that time we did not only acquire freedom of speech; we were freed of the fear of Big Brother.

The people who gathered on the Moscow barricades on August 19 experienced the thrill of being free among the free. Were we also deceiving ourselves? But that fleeting moment did occur: A moment of truth, a "positive image of Russia."

Gorbachev said that no one would ever learn the whole truth about the putsch. In 1991 the bust-ups between him, the putsch committee and Yeltsin were far less important than the truth that opened up before the defenders of the White House: Soviet politicians and generals, the embodiment of state power, were as naked as the Emperor in his new clothes. Not just because the putsch committee suffered a humiliating defeat. Its very creation was just another recipe thought up by the "cooks" running the country (as in Lenin's famous dictum). And though it was a minority of Muscovites who turned out onto Moscow's streets, the majority were already so fed up with the stupidity and hypocrisy of the party nomenklatura that they were ready to sympathize with any opposition. Such mass awakenings in world history rarely lead to what one might call a revolution. We know how all revolutions end. We also know what has happened in Russia over the last ten years. There is a joke that sums it up: A man is handing out leaflets in Red Square. The KGB pick him up, and take a look at the leaflets: "But there's nothing written on them!!" The man responds, "Why write it down? Everything's clear anyway."

It is clear that the three days in August were the culmination of the democratic process in Russia. It is clear that the new-born democracy was premature. It is clear that, having been the demos--the people--for a short time, the Russians quickly turned back into the ochlos--the mob--but more atomized and disunited than under the Soviets. The catharsis of liberation was gradually replaced, at best, by a cynical indifference to so called public interests, and at worst by a new fear of and servility towards the new authorities.

Just before the modest anniversary celebrations of the August events, a former member of the putsch committee commented that "the people did not understand our noble aims". He now probably takes comfort from the fact that the people did not understand Russia's "democrats" either. In the autumn of 1993 my cameraman and I, among other correspondents, were on the receiving end of blows from the truncheons of the superbly equipped burly young men cordoning off the crowd which was once again "defending" White House, this time from Yeltsin. This time the mass opposition was being managed by "cooks" in the form of comic opera characters, and as expected they lost. The "pointless and savage insurrection" was professionally put down by tanks and riot police, but the professionals drew their own lessons for the future and prepared for it for another seven years. In 2000 Vladimir Putin was elected president of Russia. The votes of the majority, which included the defenders on the barricades from both 1991 and 1993, went in favor of the "strong hand," the guarantor of stability, the one single leader of Russian-style "manageable democracy."

Putin's team won and is still winning, using PR combined with the subordination of the main news channels in one form or another. There are certain advantages to be had both from the monopoly on information that state's "organs of control" enjoy, and also from professional knowledge of methods of "gray" and "black" propaganda. It may be assumed that the final "house-training" of the opposition and the purging of popular political rivals as well as unpopular oligarchs will be implemented by using exactly these methods. But on the whole, prior to 2004 the main task of state PR will be to create some sort of blanket virtual reality in patriotic-religious tones, to compensate for the dashed expectations of the electorate.

I will accept both patriotism and Orthodoxy. Russia would not have survived its 1,000 years without them. We would not have the history or the culture that we are so proud of, however paltry Kokh thinks it to be.

My only fear is that the advertising and PR professionals that I know may supplant the truth with lies.

There are two approaches to what is called the mass audience: To lower the level of the virtual product to the level of the given audience, or to raise the audience to the level of the product (ideology, religion, image). If we are talking about commercial advertising, then we may even allow that the first option is preferable. But when we want to make sure that we Russians are understood and respected in the outside world, a different quality is needed, both of the product and its producers.

As far as I know, Russia's Press Ministry is holding a competition among advertising companies to participate in a "PR campaign to promote a positive image of Russia." The ministry will probably make its choice in collaboration with the president's administration, which also plans to recreate something like the Novosti Press Agency--the main foreign policy propaganda tool in Soviet times (the state news agency RIA Novosti has succeeded it, but its capabilities clearly fall short of the budget and staffing power of the old Novosti).

Thus the quality--and content--of the image of Russia will be controlled exclusively by the highest organs of the state. This is where it is tempting to replace Russia's Story with Putin's Story. Naturally, it is possible and indeed necessary to talk about the difficult achievements of the current Russian leadership, about the construction of the new Russian state and about those who are building it. But this will not be the whole truth. Governments and states are transitory, but Russia and her fate will remain as they always have been: An enigma not only to foreigners, but also to the Russians themselves.

The "eternal questions" remain--not about the state, but about man. About the true and the false in him. About his future on the Earth and in Russia. About Faith, Hope and Love, which--however friendly the patriarch is with the president--depend least of all on the state. And the state? Well, the state is what we are ourselves.

Are we good or bad? "Negative" or "positive"? However much money is spent, I don't think that any journalist or any PR company in the world could provide an answer to that--let alone the answer that the press minister wants. Another level is needed here. Ask the old man, my friends: He will give you Tolstoy to read.

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#8
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
4 October 2001
A selective sort of sorrow
 By ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY
Andrei Piontkovsky is director of the Centre of Strategic Research in Moscow.

'We're sorry for the Americans, but not for America" -- such is the formula that politicians are eagerly dishing up to the Russian public. The formula's therapeutic value is that it makes it possible to indulge in a bit of petty schadenfreude without feeling the unpleasant side effect of shame.

The hypocritical political correctness of the first part of the formula anesthetizes basic shame, while its second part gives social acceptance to hostile instincts that have already received the status of a patriotic public anti-globalism stance.

Russian politicians have also taken a liking to lecturing the U.S. in a condescending tone. Comfortably seated before Russian TV cameras -- or before BBC or CNN cameras for those with more nerve -- they epitomize justice and reason as they talk about the need for restraint and the unacceptability of mass bombings, which could lead to civilian deaths, create refugees and inflict suffering on people, which would only fuel hatred toward America and breed new kamikaze fighters.

But where were today's suddenly proclaimed universal humanists and wise strategists just two years ago in Chechnya when they made all the mistakes and committed all the crimes they're now warning the Americans against.

They were exactly where they are now, moving from one TV studio to another, rubbing their hands and declaring with a triumphant flash in their eyes that the West won't dare reproach them now for their policies in Chechnya, that Russia will now have carte blanche against the Chechens and that this will be the minimum price the West will have to pay for Russia's co-operation in the fight against international terrorism.

Former Russian deputy prime minister Boris Nemtsov, incidentally, was mighty quick to publicly renounce his recent proposals to negotiate with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. In an interview with Moskovsky Komsomolets, he said: "Russia is becoming closer to the West. We face a common threat, a common enemy. . . . It's not even worth mentioning that, once those responsible for these terrorist acts are identified, they will be eliminated. Whether we're talking about a particular group or an entire country, this isn't important. What's important is another detail -- the emphasis now will also be on eliminating potential terrorists."

It's hard to know what's more amazing -- the enormity of these words, or the hollow and lightweight nature of this particular Russian politician.

The West won't dare, of course. The West hasn't dared for a long time. But what else are all these good people, these Russian politicians with their president at their head, planning to do?

Each of the Chechen wars has claimed more lives through our bombings and artillery fire than were lost in New York and Washington on Sept. 11. The Chechens who died beneath the ruins of their homes that we destroyed in Grozny were of the same flesh and blood as their brothers and sisters in Moscow, Washington or New York. But did we ever remember with a minute of silence these tens of thousands of our fellow citizens consigned to the "collateral damage" column in military reports?

For the Russian politicians and the public, Chechen human material doesn't hold the same value as that of Americans. Why be hypocritical about it? There's a simple formula that would sum up the situation: "We'd be sorry to lose Chechnya as part of the Russian Federation, but we wouldn't be sorry to lose the Chechens."

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#9
The Russia Journal
September 28-October 4, 2001
Time to move beyond Army’s little squares
 Russian troops are still incapable of carrying out large-scale operations
By ALEXANDER GOLTS

At first glance, the recent events in the United States look like a triumph for the Russian military’s strategic thinking. Time and time again, Russian military officials told the Americans that a national missile defense system would not protect the country from new types of threats.

Moreover, Russian General Headquarters decided over a year ago that in addition to the Chechen separatists, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan posed a security threat to Russia. The response was a decision to deploy a large military group to protect Central Asia and Russia’s southern borders.

In pursuit of this plan, the Defense Ministry and General Headquarters consider one of the main steps to be the merger of the Urals and Volga military districts. Russian military officials announced at the beginning of September that the merger – begun in March – was complete. But does this mean that Russia is better prepared than the United States for a potential war?

The merger’s main achievement so far is its attempts to form an enormous command structure encompassing six republics and 11 oblasts. Leaving aside the question of whether threats like the Taliban can be countered with a regular army, more pressing issues, such as exactly which army the new Ural-Volga military district is planning to send into battle, need to be addressed.

Under its "expanded command," after all the hype, thereare only two divisions – the 27th Division, stationed in the Orenburg Oblast, and the 201st Division stationed in Tajikistan. Both are inherited from Volga military district. The old Ural military district has only one unit known to be more-or-less combat-ready.

With cutbacks already under way in the military at the moment, it’s hard to imagine that the Defense Ministry will be able to find the material, financial and human resources to create new military units. This means the "mobile rapid reaction groups" that the Kremlin wants to send to fight the Taliban would be formed from existing divisions.

But the 201st Division is already stationed at the centerstage of future military actions. It could be reinforced by tapping the 27th Division or sending in one or two regiments from the Siberian military district. Such an operation would require a large-scale, well-coordinated air and rail transport plan, not to mention plans on how to use the troops.

This, it seems, would explain why the head of General Headquarters, Anatoly Kvashnin, spoke out so categorically against the possibility of Russian troops participating in U.S.-led anti-terrorist operations. Kvashnin realized that Russian troops aren’t ready for large-scale operations.

Clearly, the effectiveness of future operations hardly depends on the merger of two military districts. On the contrary, as several hundred senior officers descend on Yekaterinburg to set up their new joint headquarters, their work is likely to be slowed considerably, if not paralyzed. Just finding accommodation will probably take up most of their time.

The reality is that the generals at General Headquarters know perfectly well that the military districts – an essential element of the country’s military organization – don’t meet modern requirements. The districts were created in the mid-19th century, as Russia switched to a conscript army, mainly to oversee the draft. Command functions were a secondary activity – without a successful draft, after all, there isn’t much to command.

Today, the system no longer makes sense. Attempts to mobilize conscripts during recent maneuvers in the Leningrad military district showed the futility of large-scale drafts. Moreover, given the country’s demographic situation, the "conscript resource" looks set to shrink substantially in the coming years.

What’s more, for the last decade the Russian military has been relying on arms and ammunition stockpiled during the Soviet era, in preparation for the strategic deployment of several million men. Given all this, the generals’ promises that when the time comes, reservists will be adequately equipped and supported seem flimsy.

It’s time for the Russian military to abandon the district structure and adopt a system of strategic commands created for specific tasks linked neither to mobilization nor geography. But that kind of reform would hinge on a move from a conscript to a professional army.

Neither the Kremlin nor the generals are ready for this. That is why officers at General Headquarters are busy doing what in army slang is called "drawing squares." In other words, they’ve drawn up plans for re-stationing troops and deploying servicemen, setting everything out in neat and tidy schemes made up of little squares.

But the Army’s real needs have nothing to do with little squares. The Volga-Ural military district, until it was broken up in 1989, was not distinguished for the high quality of its troops. When it comes down to it, all of these organizational maneuvers – such as taking the Space Forces out from under the control of the Strategic Missile Forces, or reincarnating the Chief Ground Forces Command – are just a poor imitation of useful activity. Real reform is still a long way off.

But the way the military situation is shaping up, Russia could end up paying very dearly for its generals’ attempts to substitute little squares for genuine military reform.

 
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