#1
USA procrastinates with START-3 Treaty - Russian foreign minister's book
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 6 September: The United States is dragging its feet, without any reason, with drafting a Treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons (START-3). This opinion was expressed by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in his book "New Russian diplomacy. Decade of the country's foreign policy."

The book is put out by the Moscow Publishing House OLMA-PRESS.

The author claims as unsubstantiated references "to allegedly considerable superiority of Russia in the sphere of non-strategic nuclear weapons", which some people in the USA use to delay the drafting of a START-3 Treaty.

The minister argues that if the question is raised about tactical nuclear weapons, Russia "fully dismantled them from its surface ships and multi-targeted submarines as well as land-based naval aviation".

Russia "liquidated a third of its nuclear ammunition from the total quantity of sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation". It completes destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines.

"Half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of nuclear air bombs were also destroyed."

Ivanov notes that President Vladimir Putin suggested in November 2000 that the two countries should reach the level of 1,500 warheads and less as a follow-up of the joint statement by the Russian and US leaders of 1997 on bringing down the level of strategic nuclear charges.

The Russian minister stresses that "it is now high time to start real negotiating process". However, he notes, "some people in Washington are not averse to replace this work with talk on preference of unilateral steps, free from mutual legal obligations".

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#2
Russia, USA bear responsibility for world security, foreign minister says
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 6 September: Russia and the United States "bear special responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world", said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. He expressed this viewpoint in his book "New Russian Diplomacy. Ten Years of the Country's Foreign Policy" published by the Moscow "OLMA- PRESS" publishers.

Proceeding from this thesis, Ivanov calls for the building of "pragmatic, constructive and predictable relations" between Moscow and Washington. Ivanov notes that in the 1990s, the interests of the two powers "sometimes contradicted each other" in the world arena and that the US attempts at "ousting Russia from the former Soviet space" have acted as a new irritant in their relationship.

According to the Russian foreign minister, "Washington obviously overvalued its own potentialities and its reluctance to take into consideration the objective processes evolving in modern international relations". Ivanov notes, however, that at the most decisive moments, "realism invariably took the upper hand" in bilateral relations and the parties never interrupted their dialogue.

On relations with the new, Republican administration, Ivanov notes that the start was "far from easy". He recalls that "a series of unfriendly steps" was taken, including the expulsion of Russian diplomats, a measure to which Russia found "an adequate response".

Igor Ivanov believes that "the first complexities were rather transient in character and have not eradicated possibilities for cooperation".

Drawing on opinions of experts, the minister arrives at a conclusion that a number of problems which the United States is likely to run against in its foreign policy, economic and other spheres "will inevitably force Washington to modify its course towards Russia, making it more restrained".

Contacts with the new Washington leadership, the foreign minister believes, have shown that "both parties converge in the main direction: only on the basis of equitable and mutually beneficial dialogue and realistic interaction between Russia and the United States is it possible to effectively counter new global challenges and threats".

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#3
Moscow Times
September 4, 2001
Understanding The Role of Journalism
By Alexei Pankin

At the start of September, the mass media traditionally try to enthuse their audiences with something new and different. So I thought, why shouldn't a columnist do the same?

Up until now in this column, I have drawn readers' attention to particularly interesting press materials. So now let me open the new working season with a survey of a whole journalistic field.

I will start with press coverage of military issues. Clearly what we need here is an expert, whose opinion is held in high regard by those who are being surveyed. My interlocutor is Vitaly Shlykov, retired military intelligence officer, former deputy chairman of the Russian government's Military Affairs Committee, member of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy ...

Is the level of debate regarding the army's problems today adequate to the country's needs?

What, at the end of the day, is public debate? It is: discussion within the military itself; the work of independent analytical centers; a plethora of specialized publications; parliamentary hearings. And of course, it's journalists who are capable of providing an interested public with well-informed articles.

How would you assess the role of journalism in this debate? Rather highly. It really carries the burden for all the rest. I could give you a dozen names of journalists who write both interesting and very competent pieces: Pavel Felgenhauer, columnist for Moscow News and The Moscow Times; Viktor Litovkin of Obshchaya Gazeta; Alexander Golts of the old Itogi; a team of authors working in the Voyennoye Obozreniye of Nezavisimaya Gazeta. I am very much looking forward to the publication of Rossiisky Voin, which Vitaly Tretyakov plans to put out.

However, mass journalism only follows events and comments on what has happened. Thus, almost by definition it cannot be much better than military policy itself. That is, journalists criticize a lot and correct stupid decisions and sometimes their criticism is even-heeded and the stupid decisions are revoked ... only to be replaced by even stupider decisions. Thus overall, for all the big names and the good articles, the main upshot is a lot of running around in circles.

Imagine that you yourself are military affairs editor for a serious newspaper ...

I fear that I would have to go against the existing canons of journalism. First, I would forego condescending and denunciatory tones. The current leadership of the country is seriously intent upon reform, but does not know how to go about it. It needs to be criticized, but should not be mocked. Second, I would occupy myself with basics such as clarifying certain fundamental concepts, e.g. what is military professionalism. I would turn to our military history and to the history and practice of other armies. Maybe, as a result we would have some understanding of the direction in which the Russian army needs to be reformed. Take note that if done in the right way it would in no way run counter to the natural desire of editors to sell copies.

Is Vitaly Shlykov being naive? Check out the site: www.mfit.ru, where his "academic" works can be read. I am sure you will put your favorite detective story to the side as soon as you do.

Alexei Pankin is the editor of Sreda, a magazine for media professionals

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#4
Moscow Times
September 6, 2001
Patron or Client State?
By Pavel Felgenhauer

This could have been a spectacular triumph for Russia's restored imperial foreign policy: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani in town at the same time like barbarian rulers crowding into ancient Rome to lobby their case.

Sharon did in fact come to Moscow this week, but it was announced in Tehran that Shamkhani had postponed his visit so as not to be in town at the same time as the leader of the "Zionist regime." Iran is today in the final stages of completing a package of arms deals with Russia to the tune of $10 billion. But the Iranians are not at all a Russian client state and have not hesitated to use the occasion to emphasise this.

In the first half of the 1990s, Iran acquired more than $5 billion worth of Russian weapons. With Russian help, Iran refurbished its army with more than a thousand T-72 tanks and over 1,500 BMP-2 armored combat vehicles. At the same time, Iran purchased long-range (300 kilometers) S-200 air defense missiles, 26 MiG-29 jets, Kilo submarines and guided anti-ship missiles.

An agreement was reached that Iran would get the technology to make up to 130 Mig-29 fighters itself. But the agreement was frozen in 1995 by Moscow because of American pressure.

Today, Iran wants to further advance its army's overall fighting capability by acquiring more armor and also relatively cheap Russian Su-25 armored fighter planes to support its tanks on the battlefield. At the same time, Iran wants to buy S-300 air defense missiles (200-kilometer range), new fighters and sophisticated anti-ship weapons to deploy in the Strait of Hormuz -- the bottleneck of the Persian gulf.

Most of the new air-, land- and sea-based weapons Iran acquired from Russia before were deployed to form an integrated defense structure in the Strait of Hormuz. The most likely scenario is that the new purchases will also go there.

This does not mean that Tehran is imminently planning an all-out war in the area, but such a conflict is not totally out of the question. The religious autocrats that control Iran are increasingly losing public support at home, especially among the educated classes. An armed conflict with "Zionists" and the United States may be a good pretext to crack down on any "liberal" opposition.

In the future, Iran may have the capability to launch several medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel to support the Palestinian cause. In response to inevitable Israeli or U.S. retaliation, Iran could deploy new Russian sea mines, Kilo submarines and land- and air-based anti-ship missiles to close the Hormuz to oil traffic from the Gulf. Iran would also need modern fighters and air defense missiles to defend its naval bases and missiles from American air attacks long enough for the West to feel the pain of an oil embargo.

Such a conflict would send oil prices sky-high. Iran could benefit financially and Russia even more so. It's easy to understand why Moscow is so eager to sell Iran lots of new weapons and technology. Russia has also in principle agreed to sell Syria new fighters and S-300 missiles. At the same time, the Kremlin wants to have mutually beneficial relations with Israel and the United States.

Moscow wants a free hand to play states off against each other in a "multi-polar world" -- maintaining equidistance from all. But in the long run, Russia is too weak to play such an imperial role.

Up to 80 percent of Russia's defense production is today exported. China, India and Iran are the main patrons of Russia's defense industry, which gives these nations increased leverage over Russian foreign and defense policy. In fact, China, India and Iran are increasingly treating Russia as a client state. One of the main arguments today in Moscow for not agreeing with American missile defense plans is that Beijing will be outraged by such a "betrayal" and will punish Russia.

Israel is also trying to use economic arguments, including arms trade, to pull Russia onto its side of the Middle East conflict. In 1997, Israel and Russia signed their first major arms deal to jointly produce an early-warning A-50 "Falcon" plane for China. But last year, Washington pressured the Israelis to cancel the deal. Now Israel and Russia are trying to sell the plane to India.

Arms exports, unlike oil and gas, do not bring a lot of export duties or any other revenues to the Russian budget, since the defense industry very rarely shows any profits. The billions from Russian arms trade with authoritarian Asian regimes are somehow distributed within the Russian bureaucracy without much control exercised by the state. Israel and the United States cannot compete with this to prevent Russia from increasingly becoming a client arms-producing state for various anti-Western regimes.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.

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#5
Parlamentskaya Gazeta
September 5, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA FIRMLY AGAINST NATO'S EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT
Viktor OZEROV, Chairman of the Federation Council committee on defence and security, interviewed by Andrei KHOROSHILOV

Ozerov: The military reform concerns the whole of society and will be successful only if not just institutes of power, but also political parties, movements and associations and all citizens of Russia work for it. Reducing the military reform to the reduction of the armed forces or modernisation of weapons and hardware would be a narrow-minded approach. The Federation Council committee on defence and security has elaborated two strategic goals, which are the legal backing of the military reform and the social protection of retired servicemen and their families.

The question of modernisation of weapons and hardware cannot be tackled without lawmakers either. It is with great difficulties that we are compiling a list of defence enterprises that are to be privatised. Which enterprises should be governed by the state and which should produce civilian commodities? This is a question for the whole of society.

Question: Let's recall your committee's address to the president concerning the privatisation of the aircraft manufacturing association in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, which produces the world's best Su planes.

Answer: The planned privatisation of that association concerns not only the Khabarovsk territory, although the city depends on that enterprise, which provides jobs to the people and money to the local budgets. The problem is much more serious, as it concerns the fighting ability of the state. The association is working in a stable regime now, fulfilling the orders of the Defence Ministry and turning out consumer goods. It is also completing preparations for the production of civilian planes.

One can forecast the future of that association on the example of the Amursky shipyards, where two unfinished nuclear submarines have been idling in the dock for a decade. Committee members supported me exactly because they saw the address to the president not as lobbying for the interests of a territory, but concern for the preservation and development of national aircraft manufacturing. They were unanimous in that hasty decisions in the interests of one department or territory must not be made on such vital enterprises.

Question: The ultimate goal of the reform is the creation of a professional army. But will not the termination of conscription and the introduction of alternative service affect the feeling of patriotism?

Answer: I believe that a transition to a fully professional army would be a gross mistake in view of the distinctive historical features of Russia and its geopolitical and geostrategic situation.

I have met with the military and politicians of Western Europe. The officials of the German defence ministry and the Bundesrat and Bundestag deputies say, for example, that their country would never have a fully professional army. There are historical reasons for not doing this in Russia, too. The struggle for the survival of the state, which went on for centuries, has engendered in the Russian citizens a feeling of kinship with the country's fate. And patriotism has always been instilled in our young people during conscription service. Neither is Russia prepared to have a professional army for economic reasons.

Question: The security of Russia and protection of sovereignty are acquiring a special meaning now. We no longer have allies or the Iron Curtain, and the borders, after disintegration of the Soviet Union, are no longer sealed. But NATO has come very close to our borders.

Answer: The NATO eastward enlargement is one of the questions on which the country is fully unanimous. We understand that each state is free to choose methods of defence. But this should not damage neighbouring countries. We frequently ask our NATO vis-a-vis: Who is threatening European countries? Why are they developing the military, and not the political component of the bloc? It is no longer necessary to deploy more missiles today. Instead, it would be enough to develop the infrastructure, maintain deployment airfields and develop elint warfare and reconnaissance equipment.

The NATO eastward enlargement will not do any good to Russia. We admit that barbed wire is poor protection from these problems. This is why we are working at all possible levels and through all possible channels in an attempt to make our colleagues in European parliaments see our concern over the creation of new division lines on the continent. Regrettably, they do not always accept our arguments. It can happen that the Kaliningrad Region will be surrounded by NATO members on all sides.

Question: And it is not just the Baltic countries, but also Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine who express a desire to join NATO.

Answer: Our delegation recently went to Brussels, where it met with deputies from the NATO parliaments to analyse the implementation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It is a fact that the USA and its allies are exceeding the framework of the act. I mean not only the bombing of Yugoslavia, when NATO exceeded the zone of its responsibility and used its armed forces without the UN Security Council's sanction. That example showed that NATO can forget about international legal norms in critical situations, when they act under the cover of humanitarian operations.

This is why we must inform them of our complaints and carry out a military reform to create armed forces that would be able to give an adequate reply to any actions in new conditions. The more so that there are quite enough challenges facing Russia and the rest of the international community. One of them is the deployment of the NMD system in the USA.

Question: The situation in the West is complicated, but the situation in the Far East is not simple either. Relations with neighbouring China have always been of great importance for the people of the Russian Far East.

Answer: We should work in two directions there, strengthening the border with China and developing trade, economic and other relations with it. And it is not only in Moscow that these questions should be tackled. Khabarovsk has recently hosted an international seminar, which was attended by our colleagues from the neighbouring Chinese province of Heilongjiang. The border with China has not been fully marked yet and there are disputed islands in the mouth of the River Ussuri.

We must not permit the situation to become critical there, because the number of population in China is incomparably larger than the number of population on our side of the Amur. Yet I think that China, a great power, is turning into our strategic partner after the signing of the latest agreements with it. This is a good beginning that must be developed, including by our lawmakers.

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#6
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
September 6, 2001

PUTIN SOFTENS TONE ON BALTIC QUEST FOR NATO. Visiting Finland on September 2-3, President Vladimir Putin toned down Russia's objections to the Baltic states' goal of joining NATO. Queried repeatedly by the media on that issue, Putin chose to reply more in sorrow and feigned astonishment than in anger.

At the concluding joint press conference with Finnish President Tarja Halonen, Putin declared that Russia does not plan any "campaign of hysteria" over Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's determination to become NATO members. "It is their choice, but we do not see any objective reasons for the Baltic states to join NATO."

Putin also harkened back to the argument that "NATO's eastward enlargement is anachronistic. We are not glad about this, we think it is a mistake. This step will not contribute to European security." And he also used some old-style defensive language in protesting Russia's peaceful intentions: "Only a feverish mind can imagine that any country in Europe, Russia included, harbors aggressive intentions." Whether calculated or an impromptu, this last observation would seem to exonerate NATO as well.

On the whole, Putin appeared intent on casting himself and by implication Russia as a party to a debate, rather than a practitioner of intimidation vis-a-vis neighbors who wish to join NATO. Putin's stance carries two interrelated implications. First, that Moscow is beginning to realize that it can not-least of all through bluster-stop NATO's Baltic enlargement. Second, that it might try to influence the actual terms of the Baltic states' accession, by initiating a dialogue with NATO and possibly with the Baltic states themselves on the issue. Perhaps Moscow is beginning to position itself for such discussions in the hope of securing some quid pro quo, or stretching out the enlargement timetable in the region, or negotiating limits to NATO's future military deployments there.

As could be expected, Putin underscored the nonalignment of host country Finland, and neutrality in general, as an suitable foreign policy model for Russia's neighbors. But his remarks on the subject carried rather an academic and almost routine tenor. For her part, the Finnish president declared in Putin's presence that the Baltic states' NATO membership was both a matter of sovereign choice and one of "when, rather than if." With that, Halonen eliminated the reservations she had notoriously expressed in the Spiegel interview earlier this year, and which had boomeranged both at home and in the neighboring Baltic states.

The preceding week, nonaligned Finland and neutral Sweden had taken a step clearly related to Putin's Finnish visit. During a regular session of the five Nordic and three Baltic states' foreign affairs ministers, Sweden and Finland endorsed the sovereign right of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to join NATO, while stressing at the same time that such a development need not or would not cause Stockholm and Helsinki to follow suit. Putin must have found this latter point reassuring, although-or perhaps because-this is increasingly a matter of debate in Sweden or Finland (Helsingin Sanomat, September 1, 4; Interfax, Russian Television, September 2-3; BNS, September 2-4; see the Monitor, June 20, July 5, 13, 30, August 27; Fortnight in Review, June 22, August 31).

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#7
Vremya Novostei
September 5, 2001
GOLDEN PROMISES
Russia wants to take second place on the international weapons market
Author: Olga Antonova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

ANALYSTS WHO COMMENTED ON ILYA KLEBANOV'S PROMISE TO INCREASE ARMS EXPORTS TO $6 BILLION A YEAR SAY THAT SUCH PROSPECTS ARE UNREALISTIC. RUSSIA WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO OUTSTRIP FRANCE AND BRITAIN. STILL, THE MINISTER REMAINS OPTIMISTIC FOR THE DEFENSE SECTOR.

Russia will take second place after the US regarding the volume of arms exports in 2001. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov made this prediction at a meeting dedicated to the prospects of the defense complex in Siberia, which was held in Novosibirsk on September 4. According to him, the growth will continue even though Russia cannot hand out loans to its foreign customers. As far as Russia's revenues from weapons exports are concerned, Ilya Klebanov said that "their sum will reach $6 billion a year".

Reports concerning revenues of other countries and their profit rating are rather subjective. Foreign countries do not announce all its exports contracts. Nevertheless, the leaders of this market are well-known. According to London Institute for Strategic Research the US takes first place ($26.2 billion). The UK exports weapons for $9.98 billion. France ($6.6 billion) and Russia ($3.5 billion) take third and fourth place respectively. Ilya Klebanov said last March that in the near future Russia would take second place after the US (the gap between Russia and the UK was close to $1 billion in 2000). To all appearances, Russia has to outstrip Germany and France if it wants to be the second weapons exporter in the world. Certain differences in the deputy prime minister's statements show that Russia does not have a precise system for preparing weapons sales ratings.

The possibility that Russia will take second place in 2001 is weak. Monstantin Makienko, Deputy Director of the Center for Analyzing Strategies and Technologies, said in an interview with Vremya Novostei that "it is unlikely that Russia will manage to break through to second place among foreign weapons exporters". He said in particular: "Russia will never be able to outstrip France - its average annual exports are close to $4.4 billion". The second argument is that rivalry with the UK which exports weapons for $5 to $9 billion. According to Makienko, the third factor which separates Russia from second place is Israel's growing role on the international weapons market. It is not ruled out that this country will be able to push Russia from its fourth place. The expert said that Ilya Klebanov's promise to increase weapons sales to $6 billion a year is unrealistic.

(Translated by Alexander Dubovoi)

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#8
Newsday
September 5, 2001
Abandoning ABM Treaty Would Cost U.S.
By Dimitri Simes and Paul J. Saunders
Dimitri Simes is president of The Nixon Center. Paul J. Saunders is the center's director.

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. Bush's recent statement that the United States will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty "at a time convenient to America" raises an important question. Namely, how does the Bush administration define what is "convenient" in foreign policy?

The administration's handling of missile defense suggests that it may seek the convenience of doing whatever it wants whenever it prefers at the expense of getting the right outcome.

The administration is right to pursue limited missile defenses. It is also wise to cultivate a sense of inevitability behind missile defense to blunt European skepticism and Russian foot-dragging (not to mention domestic U.S. opposition).

Similarly, common sense suggests that America should not unduly limit its flexibility before testing has determined which technological approaches to missile defense are likely to be most successful.

But the deployment of a missile-defense system cannot be viewed in isolation from other important American interests. Rather, it should be assessed in the context of other key U.S. priorities, including maintaining relations with Russia, China and our European allies and limiting the very nuclear proliferation that it is to protect us against.

Russia obviously will not declare war on the United States if it withdraws from the ABM Treaty. In fact, despite ominous pronouncements, Moscow is unlikely to make real changes in its nuclear policies or force levels. Even if it does, there is little cause for alarm. The Cold War is over, and the Russian arsenal is most unlikely to be used against us.

But this does not mean that the United States can pull out of the treaty unilaterally without cost. The pragmatic Vladimir Putin government - keenly aware of American power - will not become overtly hostile to the United States, but the Kremlin will be considerably less accommodating of U.S. interests in other areas.

For starters, Russia will likely be even less restrained in arming China and anyone else prepared to pay in cash and on time. The collapse of the arms-control regime will reduce Moscow's inclination to cooperate with the United States in safeguarding its nuclear materials, limiting foreign access to its nuclear technologies and pursuing other nonproliferation efforts. Iran may well be the main beneficiary.

Beijing is sure to react similarly, given that the impact on its relatively small ICBM force will be greater and more immediate. Chinese cooperation on nonproliferation matters, particularly vis-a-vis North Korea and Pakistan, is likely to be limited at best. In concert with Russia, China could also effectively frustrate U.S. efforts to use the United Nations Security Council to advance American interests.

Our European allies would doubtless grudgingly support the United States if forced to choose between this country and Russia. The danger, however, is not that Europe will walk away from America but that it will see less reason to walk the extra mile for America.

Every day, every month, every year, Britain, France, Germany and others will decide how much support to offer the United States with respect to Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, Israel, international trade and every other contentious matter in today's increasingly complex world. A unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would fuel European support for the view that the United States is a "rogue superpower" rather than a credible world leader.

Such concerns would not be paramount if unilateral abandonment of the treaty were the only way to build missile defenses. The irony is that Russian officials have already admitted that the ABM accord is not sacred and that the United States could be permitted to test and deploy limited ABM systems in the context of offensive reductions both sides want.

Some in Russia have gone farther by suggesting that the planned test facility in Alaska could be consistent with the ABM Treaty in its current form. The Putin administration is eager to obtain the potential benefits of a stronger U.S.-Russian relationship and recognizes that it has much to lose.

Under the circumstances, a deal almost entirely on American terms should be possible to achieve. Moving ahead without a deal risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which Russia and China may feed growing proliferation that accelerates and heightens the threats to the United States and necessitates increasingly elaborate and expensive defenses. Surely, it is worth a little inconvenience today to avoid considerable additional costs - to our security and to our budget - in coming years.

The real question, then, is what's the rush? Why is the Bush administration talking about withdrawal from the ABM Treaty without genuinely trying to reach an agreement? Has missile defense developed into a religious dogma for the right as arms control has for the left?

Like any president, George W. Bush is entitled to his ideological predispositions. But, as a responsible leader, he should recognize that it is not convenient for America to provoke acrimony when an attractive deal is within reach.

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#9
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
September 5, 2001

QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT SIZE OF RUSSIAN ARMY; IMPACT OF DEFENSE CUTS. In an article published on August 30 by the Moscow Times, the well-known Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer (for his analysis of Russian arms sales figures see the Monitor, August 29) casts a critical eye on the manpower cuts envisaged under the Kremlin's current military reform program. Official Russian sources today peg the strength of Russia's regular armed forces at about 1.2 million men, and claim that planned personnel reductions will lower that figure to 800,000-850,000 by the year 2005. But Felgenhauer, who is reported to have good contacts within the military, disputes both these figures and the military and political leadership's real policies with respect to military manpower issues. In a nutshell, Felgenhauer charges that the armed forces will never get down to the approximate and well-publicized 850,000 figure because the armed forces today actually number closer to 1.4 million (he provides the figure of 1,365,000). And this means, he says, that even if the planned reductions take place the army will still number about one million men. Indeed, Felgenhauer charges that military leaders--with the knowledge or acquiescence of their political counterparts--have understated the real size of the Russian army for nearly a decade. And if such lies obscured the partial failure of earlier manpower reduction efforts, he argues, then why should the same thing not happen again under President Vladimir Putin? In this same context, Felgenhauer also argues that since the demise of the Soviet Union Russian military leaders have consistently tried to maintain the size of the armed forces in hopes that the "bad years" would eventually pass and that they could then restore the army to its former glory. He suggests that that sentiment is alive and well in Moscow today (Moscow Times, August 30).

Felgenhauer's provocative assertions raise a number of obvious questions. Not the least among them pertains to the argument contained in numerous Russian press reports of recent years to the effect that the Russian army has actually had fewer--not more--than the statutory number of men in uniform (the 1.2 million figure) because of a combination of low conscription rates and a mass out-migration from military service of disillusioned younger officers. Indeed, it has not been unusual to see suggestions in the Russian press that the armed forces could actually implement a large portion of the manpower reductions now being mandated by the Kremlin not by dismissing more soldiers but simply by eliminating existing, unfilled posts. Felgenhauer himself wrote last November that the "Defense Ministry will be reduced by 365,000 staff positions. Not men, you will note, but staff positions. Since thousands of positions are not occupied at present... there will be no need for mass discharges" (Moscow Times, November 16, 2000).

Russian generals, moreover, have continued to corroborate this view in remarks made this year. A top General Staff officer, for example, said in February that the previous fall's conscription campaign had left the army ten percent under full strength and that even after the planned reductions are implemented low draft rates will keep the army at least 5 percent below statutory strength (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 20). Such alleged concerns about the draft army extend also to the officer corps. Reports suggest that more than 100,000 officers have left the armed forces over the past three years and that the army now faces significant shortages of junior officers (Versia, March 6-13; Moskovsky Komsomolets, February 24, 2000). According to Russian military commentator Aleksandr Golts, senior officers currently outnumber junior officers in the Russian armed forces and there is now one officer for every two soldiers--an astonishing ratio (The Russia Journal, May 9).

Despite such numbers, Felgenhauer is not alone in suggesting that the military leadership has been hiding the fact that the army is actually bigger than official figures would suggest. Segodnya published a piece early last fall, for example, making essentially the same point that Felgenhauer's more recent article: It pegged the strength of the army at that time at 1.4 million and predicted that planned reductions would still leave the army with about a million men (Segodnya, September 16).

It is easy in such instances to question the reliability of Russian newspaper reporting on the armed forces. But while that may be a contributing factor to the current confusion, the bigger problem is the armed forces own lack of accountability to the public and the manner in which--even ten years after the Soviet Union's demise--Russian military leaders are able still to shield the armed forces from some of even the most rudimentary forms of public scrutiny. Whether the army is actually bigger or smaller than reported, therefore, the real issue of concern for those hoping to reform the armed forces should be the one of accountability. But despite launching what it is portraying as a major restructuring and reform of the armed forces, the current Kremlin leadership does not appear to have any particular interest in addressing this question of accountability. Indeed, the current military reform plan itself was formulated under President Vladimir Putin's direction in a fashion more in keeping with Russia's totalitarian past than in what the Kremlin would have us believe is its democratic future. That bodes ill for the future of the Kremlin military reform plan, and for the prospects of military reform contributing to Russia's development as a properly functioning democracy.

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#10
Russia strongly denies US allegations on banned technology sales to Iran
Interfax

Moscow, 6 September: Moscow has again denied claims by Washington that it is providing Iran with technologies for making weapons of mass destruction.

"Russia strictly abides by all international nonproliferation regimes and no-one has ever shown us any founded and documentary evidence that we broke these regimes," a high-ranking representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry told Interfax on Thursday [6 September] on condition of anonymity.

It has been reported from Washington that a high-ranking staff member of the US State Department has said that Russian companies continue to supply technologies for making weapons of mass destruction to Iran.

When developing military-technical cooperation with Iran, Russia sticks to all the international regimes that set limits on the cooperation, the Russian source said. "We intend to keep to this principle in the future," he noted.

The military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran "does not endanger any third country. It is as transparent as possible and complies with the interests of our countries," the source noted.

"All the lamentations about the alleged exceeding of international regimes in military-technical cooperation between Russia and Iran are not grounded," he noted.

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#11
Russia: 'Kursk' Salvage Effort Moves Forward, Despite Snags, Critics
By Francesca Mereu

Efforts to raise the sunken Russian submarine "Kursk" hit another snag this week when a cable on a crucial underwater saw broke. The saw was repaired and work has resumed, but what can't be smoothed over are questions about the safety of the operation -- both for the divers and the public.

Moscow, 6 September 2001 (RFE/RL) -- British deep-sea divers are using a unique underwater saw in their efforts to raise the Russian nuclear submarine "Kursk," which sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea a year ago, killing all 118 crew members on board.

The saw is being used to slice off the bow of the "Kursk," where the ship's torpedoes were stored. The mangled bow will remain on the sea floor, while the remainder of the vessel -- including conventionally armed missiles and its two nuclear reactors -- will be brought to the surface in a delicate operation that officials hope to complete later this month.

Last week, the Dutch salvage team began work to cut off the 20,000-tonne sub's front section. According to Northern F leet officials, the remote-controlled underwater saw has already cut 1.5 meters deep into the outer hull.

But work was interrupted earlier this week when one of the cables on the saw tore apart after hitting a rock.

Captain Igor Dygalo, assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, told RFE/RL yesterday that he was hopeful that the problem would soon be fixed:

"At the moment, [British divers] are working to fix [the saw cable]. We think it will be fixed late today."

Repairs to the underwater saw were completed and work resumed early today. But what cannot be as easily smoothed over, however, are nagging concerns about the safety of the operation.

The mission to raise the Kursk began in mid-July and is designed to lift all but the sub's first compartment, which was heavily damaged in the unexplained blasts that are believed to have caused the "Kursk" to sink.

Russian President Vladimir Putin -- who was criticized for his slow response to the tragedy -- promised families of the victims that t he submarine would be raised to discover what caused it to sink and to give the dead crewmen inside a decent burial. Twelve bodies have already been recovered.

The salvage team has cut 26 holes in the sub's hull. The holes will be fitted with steel cables, each capable of carrying 900 tonnes. The plan is to use these cables to lift the sub to the surface and attach it to massive pontoons, after which it will be towed into the port of Roslyakovo, in the Murmansk region. There, it will be hoisted into dry dock and inspected for clues as to what caused the disaster. Any remaining bodies will also be removed.

The massive salvage effort is not without its critics. Many point to the high cost of the operation -- an estimated $70 million -- and the risks to the divers involved. They say the "Kursk" may still house live torpedoes and cruise missiles that could explode. And then there is the problem of the submarine's two nuclear reactors.

Vice-Admiral Mikhail Motsak of the Russian Navy says any torpedoes or missiles on board were more than likely destroyed in the explosions that sunk the sub. And ITAR-TASS quotes Captain Dygalo as saying that radiation levels in the area around the wrecked sub are normal, indicating that the nuclear reactors have not been damaged.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Dygalo emphasized that the salvage operation is quite safe and that every contingency has been considered:

"These kinds of operations are always very difficult. But the security aspect of the [rescue] operation has been studied very carefully, and I think that the risks are very little. Nobody wants to risk peoples' lives. For that reason, the operation is done according to very strong security measures."

But critics of the mission say the possible hazards are difficult for anyone to foresee. Aleksei Yablokov is president of Russia's Center for Environmental Policy. He fears that slicing off the bow of the sub could release radiation into the environment:

"A little nuclear pollution may take place after the sawing of the sub. This is the first risk. There are no guarantees that the pipes connected to the reactor are [still] intact after that powerful blast. It is possible that in the reactor's section, there is some radioactivity and the water [inside it] can flow to the environment."

Yablokov acknowledges that such a scenario represents only a small danger for the environment. But he says that the physical stresses placed on the sub during the raising could result in more serious problems.

"The second and more serious danger is that during the raising operation, the sub may bend and that the pins that [guarantee] the reactors are switched off may move. Then an uncontrolled atomic reaction may start. This means that the reactors may start working. Then we may have serious radioactive pollution."

Yablokov said such a scenario would result in an environmental disaster -- not so big as the Chornobyl disaster, he said, "But it wouldn't help the environment."

Despite the potential risks, however, it's clear the salvage operation is going ahead. Captain Dygalo of the Russian Navy tells RFE/RL that, even taking into account delays such as that caused by the broken saw, work is still on track to raise the submarine by the end of September. Bad winter weather in the Barents Sea could hamper salvage efforts if they are delayed any further.

Privately, Navy officials say the operation could drag on into October..

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#12
US envoy to Russia plans trip to Chechnya

WASHINGTON, Sept 5 (AFP) - The United States remains deeply concerned about the situation in Chechnya and is planning to send its new ambassador to Moscow to the breakaway Russian republic soon to get a first-hand look at the ongoing conflict there, a senior US official said Wednesday.

The envoy, Alexander "Sandy" Versbow, plans to travel to Chechnya within the "next month to month-and-a-half" pending permission from Russian authorities, the official said.

"Chechnya remains a real mess and there are no signs the Russians are looking for a political way out which is unfortunate because there is no likelihood they will succeed with their military strategy," he said. The official, speaking to reporters at the State Department on condition of anonymity, said that in addition to Moscow's continued offensives in Chechnya Washington was distressed that no progress appeared to have been made in bringing Russian soldiers to justice for alleged atrocities in the republic.

"I can't say we're seeing genuine efforts to hold accountable those soldiers and officers involved in atrocities and excesses," the official said.

Vershbow's trip is aimed at showing "we are genuinely concerned about the path the Russians are on (and) to support the international agencies that are engaged in dealing with refugees and displaced persons," he added.

The official spoke as reports from Moscow on Wednesday said that Russian troops backed by attack helicopters had killed dozens of Chechen fighters during raids on mountain villages in southeastern Chechnya.

The rebels, meanwhile, claimed to have killed about 30 Russian soldiers, while suffering only three losses themselves.

Since the beginning of the latest conflict in Chechnya in 1999, both sides have regularly inflated the number of losses of their adversaries while playing down their own losses, in an intense propaganda war.

While supporting Russia's territorial sovereignty, Washington has repeatedly called on Moscow to seek a political solution to the conflict.

US diplomats have also angered their Russian counterparts by meeting on several occasions by meeting in Washington with members of the Chechnya's self-styled government including the republic's "foreign minister."

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#13
gazeta.ru
September 6, 2001
Nemtsov Brings Internet, Fresh Peace Proposals to Chechnya
By Artyom Vernidoub

Russian liberal politician Boris Nemtsov made a visitr to Chechnya this week that nearly ended in tragedy. Fortunately, what is considered by law enforcers to have been an attempt on life of the leader of the Union of the Rightist Forces (SPS) was successfully averted by the republican FSB department - field engineers defused three powerful landmines planted by the road Nemtsov’s motorcade was taking.

It is yet to be determined who and why attempted on Boris Nemtsov’s life, especially since the Union of the Rightist Forces members are deeply convinced they have no enemies in the region. Chechen separatist leaders have nothing against Boris Nemtsov or our party, the SPS Moscow office said on Wednesday, as they learnt of the attempt.

The delegation, consisting of the SPS members, their aides, and journalists, headed by Boris Nemtsov, visited the Republic of Chechnya on Wednesday, September 5. They left Moscow for Nazran at 10:00 am on Wednesday morning. From Nazran they headed to the Chechen district of Achkhoi-Martan.

They met with the head of pro-Moscow Chechen government Stanislav Ilyasov and the officials of the Achkhoi-Martan district administration.

Not so long ago the party launched an ambitious project aimed at equipping Russian secondary schools with computers. At their own expense the Rights helped to install computers in schools of Ryazan, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk, Khabarovsk and Nizhny Novgorod.

Earlier this year the Rights decided that Chechen schoolchildren should be granted web access. Computers were installed in two schools of Chechen district of Achkhoi-Martan; computer training courses for schoolteachers were organized.

However, problems with web connection emerged in Achkhoi-Martan where there is only one telephone line, used by the district administration office. Nemtsov met with Achkhoi-Martan officials to discuss the problem with telephone lines.

The talks proved a success. It was agreed that new telephone lines would be installed so that Achkhoi schoolchildren get the access to the web. Reportedly, Russian businessmen promised to help with financing.

SPS office reported on Wednesday that the Chechen PM Stanislav Ilyasov had tried to dissuade Nemtsov from coming to Chechnya, saying the trip could be quite dangerous, especially on the eve of the so-called Independence Day of the republic of Ichkeria – the name the separatists prefer to the more known Chechnya, which is marked on September 6. But Nemtsov would not revise his plans.

Also on Wednesday Boris Nemtsov announced the party had set up an organizational committee for the creation of its regional branch in the Chechen Republic. Deputy chairman of the State Duma defence committee Eduard Vorobyev was elected head of the organizational committee. A constituent conference of the SPS Chechen branch will be held in Grozny by the end of the year, Vorobyev said. Before this, consultations will be held with the heads of Chechen districts.

On Wednesday evening Nemtsov met with the Ingush president Ruslan Aushev to discuss possible ways of peace settlement in Chechnya. After the meeting Nemtsov said: "We believe a negotiating process should be launched, and launched with those who represent the warring side, with those who disagree with the present situation”. Both Nemtsov and Aushev see separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov as a party to the talks, Nemtsov said.

"But as the federal government and the president have serious doubts about this, the Union of Right Forces is suggesting a compromise: let the Chechen people elect their representatives to the talks themselves," he said. He did not rule out that Maskhadov would be one of the chosen after all.

Nemtsov said he intended to report to Vladimir Putin on the results of his visit to Chechnya.

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#14
Russia pleads for more time to destroy chemical weapons

MOSCOW, Sept 6 (AFP) -
Former Russian prime minister Sergei Kiriyenko appealed to the international community on Thursday to accept his country's decision to extend the deadline for destruction of its chemical weapons stock.

"The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons must vote in favor of the delay, until 2012, for the elimination of our arsenal," he said in a press conference.

Moscow announced recently that it would be unable, because of financial reasons, to destroy its 40,000-tonne-stock of chemical weapons by 2007, the 2007 date fixed by the 1997 International Chemical Weapons Convention, and would need five more years to complete the task.

Kiriyenko, who heads the Russian commission for chemical weapons disarmement, said the 1997 treaty provides for such a five-year delay.

Kiriyenko also announced that Russia had multiplied its budget for the project by six in 2002, and would alot 1.2 billion rubles (42 million dollars, 46 million euros).

According to Kiriyenko, Moscow's chemical weapons arsenal is the world's biggest, followed by 30,000-tonne stockpile held by the United States.

"Each shell or bomb, and there are billions, must be treated individually," Kiriyenko said.

It is estimated that destroying the arsenal will cost 90 billion rubles (3.0 billion dollars, 3.5 euros), and the United States has offered to contribute up to 800 million dollars (about 900 million euros), Kiriyenko said.

Moscow hopes to set up three destruction centers, and has begun construction of one, in Gornyi in southern Russia, which is due to be completed in May 2002. The two others should be operational by 2005, Kiriyenko said.

Kiriyenko spoke at a press conference in Moscow after visiting Tokyo and before leaving for Washington, London, Rome, Paris, Berlin, and The Hague to defend his country's program to destroy chemical weapons.

On September 25, he will attend a special session of the Organization for the Banning of Chemical Weapons in The Hague.

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#15
Vremya Novostei
September 6, 2001
GET A PIECE OF PUTIN
Foreign heads of state and ministers rush to visit President Putin
Author: Fedor Lukianov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]

PRESIDENT PUTIN IS VERY POPULAR, HOSTING A STRING OF VISITS FROM FOREIGN DIGNITARIES. ARE ALL THESE MEETINGS MORE SHOW OR SUBSTANCE? RUSSIA SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO REPEAT THE MISTAKES IT MADE THE LAST TIME ITS POPULARITY SUDDENLY ROSE.

Yesterday the King of Spain, Juan Carlos I, stopped off in Moscow for a short visit. His appearance was without much pomp or excitement.

Not long ago a visit by the European monarch to the Russian capital would have roused universal attention, but now hardly any. Moscow had not experienced such masses of crowds for a long time, until those who wanted to mingle with Russian leaders and with President Putin in person. Putin had not even had time to return from Finland, where he met with President Tarja Halonen, before Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and President Vladimir Voronin of Moldova were already waiting for him in Russia. Voronin has just left, Sharon is still here, and the Spanish king arrives here too. That is not counting guests of lesser rank, like Italian and Colombian foreign ministers Ruggiero and De Soto, or the CIS foreign ministers meeting in Moscow. Also champing at the bit was Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani, but he was forced to wait until Sharon had left. Tomorrow Arafat's deputy, Mahmud Abbas, and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji rush in.

Kremlin officials remark with satisfaction that the "fault" for such popularity lies with the President himself: he's just a terribly pleasant person to have a discussion with. The unexpectedly delighted reactions of George Bush following the meeting held in Ljubljana also confirm this, bringing about bewilderment in his fellow Republicans, who had not talked with Putin. Everyone is also striving to invite the Russian leader to talks in informal settings: Bush at a Texas ranch, Sharon on a farm in the Negev Desert.

Our government has something to be happy about: not long ago the world still associated Russia exclusively with the war in Chechnya, the "Russian Mafia" and corruption. But now, when we are again in fashion, it is worth remembering the lesson of the previous period of enthusiasm for Russia: 10 - 12 years ago, at the dawn of democracy. Enchantment quickly changed into disappointment and then into distaste. For the time being the succession of visits, for all their importance, are reminiscent more of social life than of really concrete work. The main thing is not to get carried away by it, as happened in the last such twist of history.

(Translated by Alexander Mazzucchelli)

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