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Moscow, 6 September: The United States is dragging its feet, without any
reason, with drafting a Treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic
offensive weapons (START-3). This opinion was expressed by Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov in his book "New Russian diplomacy. Decade of the
country's foreign policy."
The book is put out by the Moscow Publishing House OLMA-PRESS.
The author claims as unsubstantiated references "to allegedly considerable
superiority of Russia in the sphere of non-strategic nuclear weapons",
which some people in the USA use to delay the drafting of a START-3 Treaty.
The minister argues that if the question is raised about tactical nuclear
weapons, Russia "fully dismantled them from its surface ships and
multi-targeted submarines as well as land-based naval aviation".
Russia "liquidated a third of its nuclear ammunition from the total
quantity of sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation". It completes
destruction of nuclear warheads of tactical missiles, nuclear artillery
shells and nuclear mines.
"Half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half of nuclear
air bombs were also destroyed."
Ivanov notes that President Vladimir Putin suggested in November 2000 that
the two countries should reach the level of 1,500 warheads and less as a
follow-up of the joint statement by the Russian and US leaders of 1997 on
bringing down the level of strategic nuclear charges.
The Russian minister stresses that "it is now high time to start real
negotiating process". However, he notes, "some people in Washington are not
averse to replace this work with talk on preference of unilateral steps,
free from mutual legal obligations".
TOP OF PAGE
Moscow, 6 September: Russia and the United States "bear special
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the world",
said Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. He expressed this viewpoint in
his book "New Russian Diplomacy. Ten Years of the Country's Foreign Policy"
published by the Moscow "OLMA- PRESS" publishers.
Proceeding from this thesis, Ivanov calls for the building of "pragmatic,
constructive and predictable relations" between Moscow and Washington.
Ivanov notes that in the 1990s, the interests of the two powers "sometimes
contradicted each other" in the world arena and that the US attempts at
"ousting Russia from the former Soviet space" have acted as a new irritant
in their relationship.
According to the Russian foreign minister, "Washington obviously overvalued
its own potentialities and its reluctance to take into consideration the
objective processes evolving in modern international relations". Ivanov
notes, however, that at the most decisive moments, "realism invariably took
the upper hand" in bilateral relations and the parties never interrupted
their dialogue.
On relations with the new, Republican administration, Ivanov notes that the
start was "far from easy". He recalls that "a series of unfriendly steps"
was taken, including the expulsion of Russian diplomats, a measure to which
Russia found "an adequate response".
Igor Ivanov believes that "the first complexities were rather transient in
character and have not eradicated possibilities for cooperation".
Drawing on opinions of experts, the minister arrives at a conclusion that a
number of problems which the United States is likely to run against in its
foreign policy, economic and other spheres "will inevitably force
Washington to modify its course towards Russia, making it more restrained".
Contacts with the new Washington leadership, the foreign minister believes,
have shown that "both parties converge in the main direction: only on the
basis of equitable and mutually beneficial dialogue and realistic
interaction between Russia and the United States is it possible to
effectively counter new global challenges and threats".
TOP OF PAGE
At the start of September, the mass media traditionally try to enthuse
their audiences with something new and different. So I thought, why
shouldn't a columnist do the same?
Up until now in this column, I have drawn readers' attention to
particularly interesting press materials. So now let me open the new
working season with a survey of a whole journalistic field.
I will start with press coverage of military issues. Clearly what we need
here is an expert, whose opinion is held in high regard by those who are
being surveyed. My interlocutor is Vitaly Shlykov, retired military
intelligence officer, former deputy chairman of the Russian government's
Military Affairs Committee, member of the Council for Foreign and Defense
Policy ...
Is the level of debate regarding the army's problems today adequate to the
country's needs?
What, at the end of the day, is public debate? It is: discussion within the
military itself; the work of independent analytical centers; a plethora of
specialized publications; parliamentary hearings. And of course, it's
journalists who are capable of providing an interested public with
well-informed articles.
How would you assess the role of journalism in this debate?
Rather highly. It really carries the burden for all the rest. I could give
you a dozen names of journalists who write both interesting and very
competent pieces: Pavel Felgenhauer, columnist for Moscow News and The
Moscow Times; Viktor Litovkin of Obshchaya Gazeta; Alexander Golts of the
old Itogi; a team of authors working in the Voyennoye Obozreniye of
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. I am very much looking forward to the publication of
Rossiisky Voin, which Vitaly Tretyakov plans to put out.
However, mass journalism only follows events and comments on what has
happened. Thus, almost by definition it cannot be much better than military
policy itself. That is, journalists criticize a lot and correct stupid
decisions and sometimes their criticism is even-heeded and the stupid
decisions are revoked ... only to be replaced by even stupider decisions.
Thus overall, for all the big names and the good articles, the main upshot
is a lot of running around in circles.
Imagine that you yourself are military affairs editor for a serious
newspaper ...
I fear that I would have to go against the existing canons of journalism.
First, I would forego condescending and denunciatory tones. The current
leadership of the country is seriously intent upon reform, but does not
know how to go about it. It needs to be criticized, but should not be
mocked. Second, I would occupy myself with basics such as clarifying
certain fundamental concepts, e.g. what is military professionalism. I
would turn to our military history and to the history and practice of other
armies. Maybe, as a result we would have some understanding of the
direction in which the Russian army needs to be reformed. Take note that if
done in the right way it would in no way run counter to the natural desire
of editors to sell copies.
Is Vitaly Shlykov being naive? Check out the site: www.mfit.ru, where his
"academic" works can be read. I am sure you will put your favorite
detective story to the side as soon as you do.
Alexei Pankin is the editor of Sreda, a magazine for media professionals
TOP OF PAGE
This could have been a spectacular triumph for Russia's restored imperial
foreign policy: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Iranian Defense
Minister Ali Shamkhani in town at the same time like barbarian rulers
crowding into ancient Rome to lobby their case.
Sharon did in fact come to Moscow this week, but it was announced in Tehran
that Shamkhani had postponed his visit so as not to be in town at the same
time as the leader of the "Zionist regime." Iran is today in the final
stages of completing a package of arms deals with Russia to the tune of $10
billion. But the Iranians are not at all a Russian client state and have
not hesitated to use the occasion to emphasise this.
In the first half of the 1990s, Iran acquired more than $5 billion worth of
Russian weapons. With Russian help, Iran refurbished its army with more
than a thousand T-72 tanks and over 1,500 BMP-2 armored combat vehicles. At
the same time, Iran purchased long-range (300 kilometers) S-200 air defense
missiles, 26 MiG-29 jets, Kilo submarines and guided anti-ship missiles.
An agreement was reached that Iran would get the technology to make up to
130 Mig-29 fighters itself. But the agreement was frozen in 1995 by Moscow
because of American pressure.
Today, Iran wants to further advance its army's overall fighting capability
by acquiring more armor and also relatively cheap Russian Su-25 armored
fighter planes to support its tanks on the battlefield. At the same time,
Iran wants to buy S-300 air defense missiles (200-kilometer range), new
fighters and sophisticated anti-ship weapons to deploy in the Strait of
Hormuz -- the bottleneck of the Persian gulf.
Most of the new air-, land- and sea-based weapons Iran acquired from Russia
before were deployed to form an integrated defense structure in the Strait
of Hormuz. The most likely scenario is that the new purchases will also go
there.
This does not mean that Tehran is imminently planning an all-out war in the
area, but such a conflict is not totally out of the question. The religious
autocrats that control Iran are increasingly losing public support at home,
especially among the educated classes. An armed conflict with "Zionists"
and the United States may be a good pretext to crack down on any "liberal"
opposition.
In the future, Iran may have the capability to launch several medium-range
ballistic missiles at Israel to support the Palestinian cause. In response
to inevitable Israeli or U.S. retaliation, Iran could deploy new Russian
sea mines, Kilo submarines and land- and air-based anti-ship missiles to
close the Hormuz to oil traffic from the Gulf. Iran would also need modern
fighters and air defense missiles to defend its naval bases and missiles
from American air attacks long enough for the West to feel the pain of an
oil embargo.
Such a conflict would send oil prices sky-high. Iran could benefit
financially and Russia even more so. It's easy to understand why Moscow is
so eager to sell Iran lots of new weapons and technology. Russia has also
in principle agreed to sell Syria new fighters and S-300 missiles. At the
same time, the Kremlin wants to have mutually beneficial relations with
Israel and the United States.
Moscow wants a free hand to play states off against each other in a
"multi-polar world" -- maintaining equidistance from all. But in the long
run, Russia is too weak to play such an imperial role.
Up to 80 percent of Russia's defense production is today exported. China,
India and Iran are the main patrons of Russia's defense industry, which
gives these nations increased leverage over Russian foreign and defense
policy. In fact, China, India and Iran are increasingly treating Russia as
a client state. One of the main arguments today in Moscow for not agreeing
with American missile defense plans is that Beijing will be outraged by
such a "betrayal" and will punish Russia.
Israel is also trying to use economic arguments, including arms trade, to
pull Russia onto its side of the Middle East conflict. In 1997, Israel and
Russia signed their first major arms deal to jointly produce an
early-warning A-50 "Falcon" plane for China. But last year, Washington
pressured the Israelis to cancel the deal. Now Israel and Russia are trying
to sell the plane to India.
Arms exports, unlike oil and gas, do not bring a lot of export duties or
any other revenues to the Russian budget, since the defense industry very
rarely shows any profits. The billions from Russian arms trade with
authoritarian Asian regimes are somehow distributed within the Russian
bureaucracy without much control exercised by the state. Israel and the
United States cannot compete with this to prevent Russia from increasingly
becoming a client arms-producing state for various anti-Western regimes.
Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.
TOP OF PAGE
Ozerov:
The military reform concerns the whole of society
and will be successful only if not just institutes of power,
but also political parties, movements and associations and all
citizens of Russia work for it. Reducing the military reform to
the reduction of the armed forces or modernisation of weapons
and hardware would be a narrow-minded approach. The Federation
Council committee on defence and security has elaborated two
strategic goals, which are the legal backing of the military
reform and the social protection of retired servicemen and
their families.
The question of modernisation of weapons and hardware
cannot be tackled without lawmakers either. It is with great
difficulties that we are compiling a list of defence
enterprises that are to be privatised. Which enterprises should
be governed by the state and which should produce civilian
commodities? This is a question for the whole of society.
Question:
Let's recall your committee's address to the
president concerning the privatisation of the aircraft
manufacturing association in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, which produces
the world's best Su planes.
Answer:
The planned privatisation of that association
concerns not only the Khabarovsk territory, although the city
depends on that enterprise, which provides jobs to the people
and money to the local budgets. The problem is much more
serious, as it concerns the fighting ability of the state. The
association is working in a stable regime now, fulfilling the
orders of the Defence Ministry and turning out consumer goods.
It is also completing preparations for the production of
civilian planes.
One can forecast the future of that association on the
example of the Amursky shipyards, where two unfinished nuclear
submarines have been idling in the dock for a decade. Committee
members supported me exactly because they saw the address to
the president not as lobbying for the interests of a territory,
but concern for the preservation and development of national
aircraft manufacturing. They were unanimous in that hasty
decisions in the interests of one department or territory must
not be made on such vital enterprises.
Question:
The ultimate goal of the reform is the creation
of a professional army. But will not the termination of
conscription and the introduction of alternative service affect
the feeling of patriotism?
Answer:
I believe that a transition to a fully
professional army would be a gross mistake in view of the
distinctive historical features of Russia and its geopolitical
and geostrategic situation.
I have met with the military and politicians of Western
Europe. The officials of the German defence ministry and the
Bundesrat and Bundestag deputies say, for example, that their
country would never have a fully professional army. There are
historical reasons for not doing this in Russia, too. The
struggle for the survival of the state, which went on for
centuries, has engendered in the Russian citizens a feeling of
kinship with the country's fate. And patriotism has always been
instilled in our young people during conscription service.
Neither is Russia prepared to have a professional army for
economic reasons.
Question:
The security of Russia and protection of
sovereignty are acquiring a special meaning now. We no longer
have allies or the Iron Curtain, and the borders, after
disintegration of the Soviet Union, are no longer sealed. But
NATO has come very close to our borders.
Answer:
The NATO eastward enlargement is one of the
questions on which the country is fully unanimous. We
understand that each state is free to choose methods of
defence. But this should not damage neighbouring countries. We
frequently ask our NATO vis-a-vis: Who is threatening European
countries? Why are they developing the military, and not the
political component of the bloc? It is no longer necessary to
deploy more missiles today. Instead, it would be enough to
develop the infrastructure, maintain deployment airfields and
develop elint warfare and reconnaissance equipment.
The NATO eastward enlargement will not do any good to
Russia. We admit that barbed wire is poor protection from these
problems. This is why we are working at all possible levels and
through all possible channels in an attempt to make our
colleagues in European parliaments see our concern over the
creation of new division lines on the continent. Regrettably,
they do not always accept our arguments. It can happen that the
Kaliningrad Region will be surrounded by NATO members on all
sides.
Question:
And it is not just the Baltic countries, but
also Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine who express a desire to join
NATO.
Answer:
Our delegation recently went to Brussels, where it
met with deputies from the NATO parliaments to analyse the
implementation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. It is a fact
that the USA and its allies are exceeding the framework of the
act. I mean not only the bombing of Yugoslavia, when NATO
exceeded the zone of its responsibility and used its armed
forces without the UN Security Council's sanction. That example
showed that NATO can forget about international legal norms in
critical situations, when they act under the cover of
humanitarian operations.
This is why we must inform them of our complaints and
carry out a military reform to create armed forces that would
be able to give an adequate reply to any actions in new
conditions. The more so that there are quite enough challenges
facing Russia and the rest of the international community. One
of them is the deployment of the NMD system in the USA.
Question:
The situation in the West is complicated, but
the situation in the Far East is not simple either. Relations
with neighbouring China have always been of great importance
for the people of the Russian Far East.
Answer:
We should work in two directions there,
strengthening the border with China and developing trade,
economic and other relations with it. And it is not only in
Moscow that these questions should be tackled. Khabarovsk has
recently hosted an international seminar, which was attended by
our colleagues from the neighbouring Chinese province of
Heilongjiang. The border with China has not been fully marked
yet and there are disputed islands in the mouth of the River
Ussuri.
We must not permit the situation to become critical there,
because the number of population in China is incomparably
larger than the number of population on our side of the Amur.
Yet I think that China, a great power, is turning into our
strategic partner after the signing of the latest agreements
with it. This is a good beginning that must be developed,
including by our lawmakers.
TOP OF PAGE
PUTIN SOFTENS TONE ON BALTIC QUEST FOR NATO.
Visiting Finland on September
2-3, President Vladimir Putin toned down Russia's objections to the Baltic
states' goal of joining NATO. Queried repeatedly by the media on that issue,
Putin chose to reply more in sorrow and feigned astonishment than in anger.
At the concluding joint press conference with Finnish President Tarja
Halonen, Putin declared that Russia does not plan any "campaign of hysteria"
over Estonia's, Latvia's and Lithuania's determination to become NATO
members. "It is their choice, but we do not see any objective reasons for
the Baltic states to join NATO."
Putin also harkened back to the argument that "NATO's eastward enlargement
is anachronistic. We are not glad about this, we think it is a mistake. This
step will not contribute to European security." And he also used some
old-style defensive language in protesting Russia's peaceful intentions:
"Only a feverish mind can imagine that any country in Europe, Russia
included, harbors aggressive intentions." Whether calculated or an
impromptu, this last observation would seem to exonerate NATO as well.
On the whole, Putin appeared intent on casting himself and by implication
Russia as a party to a debate, rather than a practitioner of intimidation
vis-a-vis neighbors who wish to join NATO. Putin's stance carries two
interrelated implications. First, that Moscow is beginning to realize that
it can not-least of all through bluster-stop NATO's Baltic enlargement.
Second, that it might try to influence the actual terms of the Baltic
states' accession, by initiating a dialogue with NATO and possibly with the
Baltic states themselves on the issue. Perhaps Moscow is beginning to
position itself for such discussions in the hope of securing some quid pro
quo, or stretching out the enlargement timetable in the region, or
negotiating limits to NATO's future military deployments there.
As could be expected, Putin underscored the nonalignment of host country
Finland, and neutrality in general, as an suitable foreign policy model for
Russia's neighbors. But his remarks on the subject carried rather an
academic and almost routine tenor. For her part, the Finnish president
declared in Putin's presence that the Baltic states' NATO membership was
both a matter of sovereign choice and one of "when, rather than if." With
that, Halonen eliminated the reservations she had notoriously expressed in
the Spiegel interview earlier this year, and which had boomeranged both at
home and in the neighboring Baltic states.
The preceding week, nonaligned Finland and neutral Sweden had taken a step
clearly related to Putin's Finnish visit. During a regular session of the
five Nordic and three Baltic states' foreign affairs ministers, Sweden and
Finland endorsed the sovereign right of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to
join NATO, while stressing at the same time that such a development need not
or would not cause Stockholm and Helsinki to follow suit. Putin must have
found this latter point reassuring, although-or perhaps because-this is
increasingly a matter of debate in Sweden or Finland (Helsingin Sanomat,
September 1, 4; Interfax, Russian Television, September 2-3; BNS, September
2-4; see the Monitor, June 20, July 5, 13, 30, August 27; Fortnight in
Review, June 22, August 31).
TOP OF PAGE
ANALYSTS WHO COMMENTED ON ILYA KLEBANOV'S PROMISE TO INCREASE ARMS
EXPORTS TO $6 BILLION A YEAR SAY THAT SUCH PROSPECTS ARE UNREALISTIC.
RUSSIA WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO OUTSTRIP FRANCE AND BRITAIN. STILL, THE
MINISTER REMAINS OPTIMISTIC FOR THE DEFENSE SECTOR.
Russia will take second place after the US regarding the volume
of arms exports in 2001. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov made this
prediction at a meeting dedicated to the prospects of the defense
complex in Siberia, which was held in Novosibirsk on September 4.
According to him, the growth will continue even though Russia cannot
hand out loans to its foreign customers. As far as Russia's revenues
from weapons exports are concerned, Ilya Klebanov said that "their sum
will reach $6 billion a year".
Reports concerning revenues of other countries and their profit
rating are rather subjective. Foreign countries do not announce all
its exports contracts. Nevertheless, the leaders of this market are
well-known. According to London Institute for Strategic Research the
US takes first place ($26.2 billion). The UK exports weapons for $9.98
billion. France ($6.6 billion) and Russia ($3.5 billion) take third
and fourth place respectively. Ilya Klebanov said last March that in
the near future Russia would take second place after the US (the gap
between Russia and the UK was close to $1 billion in 2000). To all
appearances, Russia has to outstrip Germany and France if it wants to
be the second weapons exporter in the world. Certain differences in
the deputy prime minister's statements show that Russia does not have
a precise system for preparing weapons sales ratings.
The possibility that Russia will take second place in 2001 is
weak. Monstantin Makienko, Deputy Director of the Center for Analyzing
Strategies and Technologies, said in an interview with Vremya Novostei
that "it is unlikely that Russia will manage to break through to
second place among foreign weapons exporters". He said in particular:
"Russia will never be able to outstrip France - its average annual
exports are close to $4.4 billion". The second argument is that
rivalry with the UK which exports weapons for $5 to $9 billion.
According to Makienko, the third factor which separates Russia from
second place is Israel's growing role on the international weapons
market. It is not ruled out that this country will be able to push
Russia from its fourth place. The expert said that Ilya Klebanov's
promise to increase weapons sales to $6 billion a year is unrealistic.
(Translated by Alexander Dubovoi)
TOP OF PAGE
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. Bush's recent statement that the United States will
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty "at a time convenient to
America" raises an important question. Namely, how does the Bush
administration define what is "convenient" in foreign policy?
The administration's handling of missile defense suggests that it may seek
the convenience of doing whatever it wants whenever it prefers at the expense
of getting the right outcome.
The administration is right to pursue limited missile defenses. It is also
wise to cultivate a sense of inevitability behind missile defense to blunt
European skepticism and Russian foot-dragging (not to mention domestic U.S.
opposition).
Similarly, common sense suggests that America should not unduly limit its
flexibility before testing has determined which technological approaches to
missile defense are likely to be most successful.
But the deployment of a missile-defense system cannot be viewed in isolation
from other important American interests. Rather, it should be assessed in the
context of other key U.S. priorities, including maintaining relations with
Russia, China and our European allies and limiting the very nuclear
proliferation that it is to protect us against.
Russia obviously will not declare war on the United States if it withdraws
from the ABM Treaty. In fact, despite ominous pronouncements, Moscow is
unlikely to make real changes in its nuclear policies or force levels. Even
if it does, there is little cause for alarm. The Cold War is over, and the
Russian arsenal is most unlikely to be used against us.
But this does not mean that the United States can pull out of the treaty
unilaterally without cost. The pragmatic Vladimir Putin government - keenly
aware of American power - will not become overtly hostile to the United
States, but the Kremlin will be considerably less accommodating of U.S.
interests in other areas.
For starters, Russia will likely be even less restrained in arming China and
anyone else prepared to pay in cash and on time. The collapse of the
arms-control regime will reduce Moscow's inclination to cooperate with the
United States in safeguarding its nuclear materials, limiting foreign access
to its nuclear technologies and pursuing other nonproliferation efforts. Iran
may well be the main beneficiary.
Beijing is sure to react similarly, given that the impact on its relatively
small ICBM force will be greater and more immediate. Chinese cooperation on
nonproliferation matters, particularly vis-a-vis North Korea and Pakistan, is
likely to be limited at best. In concert with Russia, China could also
effectively frustrate U.S. efforts to use the United Nations Security Council
to advance American interests.
Our European allies would doubtless grudgingly support the United States if
forced to choose between this country and Russia. The danger, however, is not
that Europe will walk away from America but that it will see less reason to
walk the extra mile for America.
Every day, every month, every year, Britain, France, Germany and others will
decide how much support to offer the United States with respect to Russia,
China, Iraq, Iran, Israel, international trade and every other contentious
matter in today's increasingly complex world. A unilateral U.S. withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty would fuel European support for the view that the United
States is a "rogue superpower" rather than a credible world leader.
Such concerns would not be paramount if unilateral abandonment of the treaty
were the only way to build missile defenses. The irony is that Russian
officials have already admitted that the ABM accord is not sacred and that
the United States could be permitted to test and deploy limited ABM systems
in the context of offensive reductions both sides want.
Some in Russia have gone farther by suggesting that the planned test facility
in Alaska could be consistent with the ABM Treaty in its current form. The
Putin administration is eager to obtain the potential benefits of a stronger
U.S.-Russian relationship and recognizes that it has much to lose.
Under the circumstances, a deal almost entirely on American terms should be
possible to achieve. Moving ahead without a deal risks creating a
self-fulfilling prophecy in which Russia and China may feed growing
proliferation that accelerates and heightens the threats to the United States
and necessitates increasingly elaborate and expensive defenses. Surely, it is
worth a little inconvenience today to avoid considerable additional costs -
to our security and to our budget - in coming years.
The real question, then, is what's the rush? Why is the Bush administration
talking about withdrawal from the ABM Treaty without genuinely trying to
reach an agreement? Has missile defense developed into a religious dogma for
the right as arms control has for the left?
Like any president, George W. Bush is entitled to his ideological
predispositions. But, as a responsible leader, he should recognize that it is
not convenient for America to provoke acrimony when an attractive deal is
within reach.
TOP OF PAGE
QUESTIONS RAISED ABOUT SIZE OF RUSSIAN ARMY; IMPACT OF DEFENSE CUTS.
In an article published on August 30 by the Moscow Times, the well-known Russian
military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer (for his analysis of Russian arms sales
figures see the Monitor, August 29) casts a critical eye on the manpower
cuts envisaged under the Kremlin's current military reform program. Official
Russian sources today peg the strength of Russia's regular armed forces at
about 1.2 million men, and claim that planned personnel reductions will
lower that figure to 800,000-850,000 by the year 2005. But Felgenhauer, who
is reported to have good contacts within the military, disputes both these
figures and the military and political leadership's real policies with
respect to military manpower issues. In a nutshell, Felgenhauer charges that
the armed forces will never get down to the approximate and well-publicized
850,000 figure because the armed forces today actually number closer to 1.4
million (he provides the figure of 1,365,000). And this means, he says, that
even if the planned reductions take place the army will still number about
one million men. Indeed, Felgenhauer charges that military leaders--with the
knowledge or acquiescence of their political counterparts--have understated
the real size of the Russian army for nearly a decade. And if such lies
obscured the partial failure of earlier manpower reduction efforts, he
argues, then why should the same thing not happen again under President
Vladimir Putin? In this same context, Felgenhauer also argues that since the
demise of the Soviet Union Russian military leaders have consistently tried
to maintain the size of the armed forces in hopes that the "bad years" would
eventually pass and that they could then restore the army to its former
glory. He suggests that that sentiment is alive and well in Moscow today (Moscow Times, August 30).
Felgenhauer's provocative assertions raise a number of obvious questions.
Not the least among them pertains to the argument contained in numerous
Russian press reports of recent years to the effect that the Russian army
has actually had fewer--not more--than the statutory number of men in
uniform (the 1.2 million figure) because of a combination of low
conscription rates and a mass out-migration from military service of
disillusioned younger officers. Indeed, it has not been unusual to see
suggestions in the Russian press that the armed forces could actually
implement a large portion of the manpower reductions now being mandated by
the Kremlin not by dismissing more soldiers but simply by eliminating
existing, unfilled posts. Felgenhauer himself wrote last November that the
"Defense Ministry will be reduced by 365,000 staff positions. Not men, you
will note, but staff positions. Since thousands of positions are not
occupied at present... there will be no need for mass discharges" (Moscow
Times, November 16, 2000).
Russian generals, moreover, have continued to corroborate this view in
remarks made this year. A top General Staff officer, for example, said in
February that the previous fall's conscription campaign had left the army
ten percent under full strength and that even after the planned reductions
are implemented low draft rates will keep the army at least 5 percent below
statutory strength (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 20). Such alleged concerns
about the draft army extend also to the officer corps. Reports suggest that
more than 100,000 officers have left the armed forces over the past three
years and that the army now faces significant shortages of junior officers
(Versia, March 6-13; Moskovsky Komsomolets, February 24, 2000). According to
Russian military commentator Aleksandr Golts, senior officers currently
outnumber junior officers in the Russian armed forces and there is now one
officer for every two soldiers--an astonishing ratio (The Russia Journal,
May 9).
Despite such numbers, Felgenhauer is not alone in suggesting that the
military leadership has been hiding the fact that the army is actually
bigger than official figures would suggest. Segodnya published a piece early
last fall, for example, making essentially the same point that Felgenhauer's
more recent article: It pegged the strength of the army at that time at 1.4
million and predicted that planned reductions would still leave the army
with about a million men (Segodnya, September 16).
It is easy in such instances to question the reliability of Russian
newspaper reporting on the armed forces. But while that may be a
contributing factor to the current confusion, the bigger problem is the
armed forces own lack of accountability to the public and the manner in
which--even ten years after the Soviet Union's demise--Russian military
leaders are able still to shield the armed forces from some of even the most
rudimentary forms of public scrutiny. Whether the army is actually bigger or
smaller than reported, therefore, the real issue of concern for those hoping
to reform the armed forces should be the one of accountability. But despite
launching what it is portraying as a major restructuring and reform of the
armed forces, the current Kremlin leadership does not appear to have any
particular interest in addressing this question of accountability. Indeed,
the current military reform plan itself was formulated under President
Vladimir Putin's direction in a fashion more in keeping with Russia's
totalitarian past than in what the Kremlin would have us believe is its
democratic future. That bodes ill for the future of the Kremlin military
reform plan, and for the prospects of military reform contributing to
Russia's development as a properly functioning democracy.
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Moscow, 6 September: Moscow has again denied claims by Washington that it is
providing Iran with technologies for making weapons of mass destruction.
"Russia strictly abides by all international nonproliferation regimes and
no-one has ever shown us any founded and documentary evidence that we broke
these regimes," a high-ranking representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry
told Interfax on Thursday [6 September] on condition of anonymity.
It has been reported from Washington that a high-ranking staff member of the
US State Department has said that Russian companies continue to supply
technologies for making weapons of mass destruction to Iran.
When developing military-technical cooperation with Iran, Russia sticks to
all the international regimes that set limits on the cooperation, the Russian
source said. "We intend to keep to this principle in the future," he noted.
The military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran "does not
endanger any third country. It is as transparent as possible and complies
with the interests of our countries," the source noted.
"All the lamentations about the alleged exceeding of international regimes in
military-technical cooperation between Russia and Iran are not grounded," he
noted.
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Efforts to raise the sunken Russian submarine "Kursk" hit another snag this
week when a cable on a crucial underwater saw broke. The saw was repaired and
work has resumed, but what can't be smoothed over are questions about the
safety of the operation -- both for the divers and the public.
Moscow, 6 September 2001 (RFE/RL) -- British deep-sea divers are using a
unique underwater saw in their efforts to raise the Russian nuclear submarine
"Kursk," which sank to the bottom of the Barents Sea a year ago, killing all
118 crew members on board.
The saw is being used to slice off the bow of the "Kursk," where the ship's
torpedoes were stored. The mangled bow will remain on the sea floor, while
the remainder of the vessel -- including conventionally armed missiles and
its two nuclear reactors -- will be brought to the surface in a delicate
operation that officials hope to complete later this month.
Last week, the Dutch salvage team began work to cut off the 20,000-tonne
sub's front section. According to Northern F leet officials, the
remote-controlled underwater saw has already cut 1.5 meters deep into the
outer hull.
But work was interrupted earlier this week when one of the cables on the saw
tore apart after hitting a rock.
Captain Igor Dygalo, assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy,
told RFE/RL yesterday that he was hopeful that the problem would soon be
fixed:
"At the moment, [British divers] are working to fix [the saw cable]. We think
it will be fixed late today."
Repairs to the underwater saw were completed and work resumed early today.
But what cannot be as easily smoothed over, however, are nagging concerns
about the safety of the operation.
The mission to raise the Kursk began in mid-July and is designed to lift all
but the sub's first compartment, which was heavily damaged in the unexplained
blasts that are believed to have caused the "Kursk" to sink.
Russian President Vladimir Putin -- who was criticized for his slow response
to the tragedy -- promised families of the victims that t he submarine would
be raised to discover what caused it to sink and to give the dead crewmen
inside a decent burial. Twelve bodies have already been recovered.
The salvage team has cut 26 holes in the sub's hull. The holes will be fitted
with steel cables, each capable of carrying 900 tonnes. The plan is to use
these cables to lift the sub to the surface and attach it to massive
pontoons, after which it will be towed into the port of Roslyakovo, in the
Murmansk region. There, it will be hoisted into dry dock and inspected for
clues as to what caused the disaster. Any remaining bodies will also be
removed.
The massive salvage effort is not without its critics. Many point to the high
cost of the operation -- an estimated $70 million -- and the risks to the
divers involved. They say the "Kursk" may still house live torpedoes and
cruise missiles that could explode. And then there is the problem of the
submarine's two nuclear reactors.
Vice-Admiral Mikhail Motsak of the Russian Navy says any torpedoes or
missiles on board were more than likely destroyed in the explosions that sunk
the sub. And ITAR-TASS quotes Captain Dygalo as saying that radiation levels
in the area around the wrecked sub are normal, indicating that the nuclear
reactors have not been damaged.
In an interview with RFE/RL, Dygalo emphasized that the salvage operation is
quite safe and that every contingency has been considered:
"These kinds of operations are always very difficult. But the security aspect
of the [rescue] operation has been studied very carefully, and I think that
the risks are very little. Nobody wants to risk peoples' lives. For that
reason, the operation is done according to very strong security measures."
But critics of the mission say the possible hazards are difficult for anyone
to foresee. Aleksei Yablokov is president of Russia's Center for
Environmental Policy. He fears that slicing off the bow of the sub could
release radiation into the environment:
"A little nuclear pollution may take place after the sawing of the sub. This
is the first risk. There are no guarantees that the pipes connected to the
reactor are [still] intact after that powerful blast. It is possible that in
the reactor's section, there is some radioactivity and the water [inside it]
can flow to the environment."
Yablokov acknowledges that such a scenario represents only a small danger for
the environment. But he says that the physical stresses placed on the sub
during the raising could result in more serious problems.
"The second and more serious danger is that during the raising operation, the
sub may bend and that the pins that [guarantee] the reactors are switched off
may move. Then an uncontrolled atomic reaction may start. This means that the
reactors may start working. Then we may have serious radioactive pollution."
Yablokov said such a scenario would result in an environmental disaster --
not so big as the Chornobyl disaster, he said, "But it wouldn't help the
environment."
Despite the potential risks, however, it's clear the salvage operation is
going ahead. Captain Dygalo of the Russian Navy tells RFE/RL that, even
taking into account delays such as that caused by the broken saw, work is
still on track to raise the submarine by the end of September. Bad winter
weather in the Barents Sea could hamper salvage efforts if they are delayed
any further.
Privately, Navy officials say the operation could drag on into October..
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WASHINGTON, Sept 5 (AFP) - The United States remains
deeply concerned about the situation in Chechnya and
is planning to send its new ambassador to Moscow to
the breakaway Russian republic soon to get a
first-hand look at the ongoing conflict there, a
senior US official said Wednesday.
The envoy, Alexander "Sandy" Versbow, plans to travel
to Chechnya within the "next month to
month-and-a-half" pending permission from Russian
authorities, the official said.
"Chechnya remains a real mess and there are no signs
the Russians are looking for a political way out which
is unfortunate because there is no likelihood they
will succeed with their military strategy," he said.
The official, speaking to reporters at the State
Department on condition of anonymity, said that in
addition to Moscow's continued offensives in Chechnya
Washington was distressed that no progress appeared to
have been made in bringing Russian soldiers to justice
for alleged atrocities in the republic.
"I can't say we're seeing genuine efforts to hold
accountable those soldiers and officers involved in
atrocities and excesses," the official said.
Vershbow's trip is aimed at showing "we are genuinely
concerned about the path the Russians are on (and) to
support the international agencies that are engaged in
dealing with refugees and displaced persons," he
added.
The official spoke as reports from Moscow on Wednesday
said that Russian troops backed by attack helicopters
had killed dozens of Chechen fighters during raids on
mountain villages in southeastern Chechnya.
The rebels, meanwhile, claimed to have killed about 30
Russian soldiers, while suffering only three losses
themselves.
Since the beginning of the latest conflict in Chechnya
in 1999, both sides have regularly inflated the number
of losses of their adversaries while playing down
their own losses, in an intense propaganda war.
While supporting Russia's territorial sovereignty,
Washington has repeatedly called on Moscow to seek a
political solution to the conflict.
US diplomats have also angered their Russian
counterparts by meeting on several occasions by
meeting in Washington with members of the Chechnya's
self-styled government including the republic's
"foreign minister."
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Russian liberal politician Boris Nemtsov made a visitr to Chechnya this
week that nearly ended in tragedy. Fortunately, what is considered by law
enforcers to have been an attempt on life of the leader of the Union of the
Rightist Forces (SPS) was successfully averted by the republican FSB
department - field engineers defused three powerful landmines planted by
the road Nemtsov’s motorcade was taking.
It is yet to be determined who and why attempted on Boris Nemtsov’s life,
especially since the Union of the Rightist Forces members are deeply
convinced they have no enemies in the region. Chechen separatist leaders
have nothing against Boris Nemtsov or our party, the SPS Moscow office said
on Wednesday, as they learnt of the attempt.
The delegation, consisting of the SPS members, their aides, and
journalists, headed by Boris Nemtsov, visited the Republic of Chechnya on
Wednesday, September 5. They left Moscow for Nazran at 10:00 am on
Wednesday morning. From Nazran they headed to the Chechen district of
Achkhoi-Martan.
They met with the head of pro-Moscow Chechen government Stanislav Ilyasov
and the officials of the Achkhoi-Martan district administration.
Not so long ago the party launched an ambitious project aimed at equipping
Russian secondary schools with computers. At their own expense the Rights
helped to install computers in schools of Ryazan, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk,
Khabarovsk and Nizhny Novgorod.
Earlier this year the Rights decided that Chechen schoolchildren should be
granted web access. Computers were installed in two schools of Chechen
district of Achkhoi-Martan; computer training courses for schoolteachers
were organized.
However, problems with web connection emerged in Achkhoi-Martan where there
is only one telephone line, used by the district administration office.
Nemtsov met with Achkhoi-Martan officials to discuss the problem with
telephone lines.
The talks proved a success. It was agreed that new telephone lines would be
installed so that Achkhoi schoolchildren get the access to the web.
Reportedly, Russian businessmen promised to help with financing.
SPS office reported on Wednesday that the Chechen PM Stanislav Ilyasov had
tried to dissuade Nemtsov from coming to Chechnya, saying the trip could be
quite dangerous, especially on the eve of the so-called Independence Day of
the republic of Ichkeria – the name the separatists prefer to the more
known Chechnya, which is marked on September 6. But Nemtsov would not
revise his plans.
Also on Wednesday Boris Nemtsov announced the party had set up an
organizational committee for the creation of its regional branch in the
Chechen Republic. Deputy chairman of the State Duma defence committee
Eduard Vorobyev was elected head of the organizational committee. A
constituent conference of the SPS Chechen branch will be held in Grozny by
the end of the year, Vorobyev said. Before this, consultations will be held
with the heads of Chechen districts.
On Wednesday evening Nemtsov met with the Ingush president Ruslan Aushev to
discuss possible ways of peace settlement in Chechnya. After the meeting
Nemtsov said: "We believe a negotiating process should be launched, and
launched with those who represent the warring side, with those who disagree
with the present situation”. Both Nemtsov and Aushev see separatist leader
Aslan Maskhadov as a party to the talks, Nemtsov said.
"But as the federal government and the president have serious doubts about
this, the Union of Right Forces is suggesting a compromise: let the Chechen
people elect their representatives to the talks themselves," he said. He
did not rule out that Maskhadov would be one of the chosen after all.
Nemtsov said he intended to report to Vladimir Putin on the results of his
visit to Chechnya.
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MOSCOW, Sept 6 (AFP) -
"The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons must vote in favor
of the delay, until 2012, for the elimination of our arsenal," he said in a
press conference.
Moscow announced recently that it would be unable, because of financial
reasons, to destroy its 40,000-tonne-stock of chemical weapons by 2007, the
2007 date fixed by the 1997 International Chemical Weapons Convention, and
would need five more years to complete the task.
Kiriyenko, who heads the Russian commission for chemical weapons disarmement,
said the 1997 treaty provides for such a five-year delay.
Kiriyenko also announced that Russia had multiplied its budget for the
project by six in 2002, and would alot 1.2 billion rubles (42 million
dollars, 46 million euros).
According to Kiriyenko, Moscow's chemical weapons arsenal is the world's
biggest, followed by 30,000-tonne stockpile held by the United States.
"Each shell or bomb, and there are billions, must be treated individually,"
Kiriyenko said.
It is estimated that destroying the arsenal will cost 90 billion rubles (3.0
billion dollars, 3.5 euros), and the United States has offered to contribute
up to 800 million dollars (about 900 million euros), Kiriyenko said.
Moscow hopes to set up three destruction centers, and has begun construction
of one, in Gornyi in southern Russia, which is due to be completed in May
2002. The two others should be operational by 2005, Kiriyenko said.
Kiriyenko spoke at a press conference in Moscow after visiting Tokyo and
before leaving for Washington, London, Rome, Paris, Berlin, and The Hague to
defend his country's program to destroy chemical weapons.
On September 25, he will attend a special session of the Organization for the
Banning of Chemical Weapons in The Hague.
TOP OF PAGE
PRESIDENT PUTIN IS VERY POPULAR, HOSTING A STRING OF VISITS FROM
FOREIGN DIGNITARIES. ARE ALL THESE MEETINGS MORE SHOW OR SUBSTANCE?
RUSSIA SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO REPEAT THE MISTAKES IT MADE THE LAST
TIME ITS POPULARITY SUDDENLY ROSE.
Yesterday the King of Spain, Juan Carlos I, stopped off in Moscow
for a short visit. His appearance was without much pomp or excitement.
Not long ago a visit by the European monarch to the Russian
capital would have roused universal attention, but now hardly any.
Moscow had not experienced such masses of crowds for a long time,
until those who wanted to mingle with Russian leaders and with
President Putin in person. Putin had not even had time to return from
Finland, where he met with President Tarja Halonen, before Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and President Vladimir Voronin of Moldova
were already waiting for him in Russia. Voronin has just left, Sharon
is still here, and the Spanish king arrives here too. That is not
counting guests of lesser rank, like Italian and Colombian foreign
ministers Ruggiero and De Soto, or the CIS foreign ministers meeting
in Moscow. Also champing at the bit was Iranian Defense Minister Ali
Shamkhani, but he was forced to wait until Sharon had left. Tomorrow
Arafat's deputy, Mahmud Abbas, and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji rush in.
Kremlin officials remark with satisfaction that the "fault" for
such popularity lies with the President himself: he's just a terribly
pleasant person to have a discussion with. The unexpectedly delighted
reactions of George Bush following the meeting held in Ljubljana also
confirm this, bringing about bewilderment in his fellow Republicans,
who had not talked with Putin. Everyone is also striving to invite the
Russian leader to talks in informal settings: Bush at a Texas ranch,
Sharon on a farm in the Negev Desert.
Our government has something to be happy about: not long ago the
world still associated Russia exclusively with the war in Chechnya,
the "Russian Mafia" and corruption. But now, when we are again in
fashion, it is worth remembering the lesson of the previous period of
enthusiasm for Russia: 10 - 12 years ago, at the dawn of democracy.
Enchantment quickly changed into disappointment and then into
distaste. For the time being the succession of visits, for all their
importance, are reminiscent more of social life than of really
concrete work. The main thing is not to get carried away by it, as
happened in the last such twist of history.
(Translated by Alexander Mazzucchelli)
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