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CDI Russia Weekly #166 10 August 2001
 
Edited by David Johnson, djohnson@cdi.org Contents 
 
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Contents

1. AFP
Putin draws leadership lessons from Kursk tragedy
 
2. Moscow Times
Pavel Felgenhauer
Playing With the Tigers
 
3. Baltimore Sun
Lee Feinstein
U.S. won't go solo on arms control
 
4. strana.ru
Dmitry Gortnostayev
Cautious invitations should be treated cautiously.
Continued debate on prospects for Russia joining NATO.
 
5. International
Herald
Tribune

William Pfaff
NATO'S MOVE EAST OUTFLANKS THE EU
 
6. RFE/RL
Don Hill
In Moscow, Salvation Army's Days May Be Numbered
 
7. Delovye Lyudi
EVERYTHING IS QUIET AGAIN...Vladimir Lukin discusses the future of Russian-US relations
 
8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Alexander Lukin
RUSSIA AND CHINA: FRIENDS OR RIVALS?
 
9. Moscow Times
Carlotta Gall
Dispatches From the Chechen Front
 
10. AFP

Putin wraps up Ukraine opposition leader for Kuchma's birthday: press
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 

 

#1
Putin draws leadership lessons from Kursk tragedy

MOSCOW, Aug 9 (AFP) -
Image is everything and Soviet-era evasion tactics no longer work.

Or so Vladimir Putin learned one year ago when he made his biggest presidential blunder to date by showing up tanned and rested at his seaside resort while Russia shook in horror watching 118 men perish inside the crippled Kursk nuclear submarine.

It was a mistake the Kremlin has since made sure Putin would never repeat. He has been jetted out to sites of Russia's latest disasters and the world's press has been invited to witness -- from afar -- the raising of the Kursk from the Barents seabed next month.

But skeptical military analysts question the motives behind this unprecedented operation and the Kremlin's new and seemingly media-friendly approach.

They also argue that Putin failed to seize the day and has done little to push through long-overdue military reforms that could prevent another Kursk from ever sinking.

"I should have gone back to Moscow," Putin confessed before a US television audience one month after the August 12 accident that caught him lounging on the Black Sea in a short-sleeve shirt.

A former KGB spy, Putin bristled at the idea that he had sought to sweep the disaster under the rug as had been the customary practice of his Soviet-era predecessors. It took him four days to comment on the accident.

"Perhaps, yes, it would have looked better (to break off the vacation). This situation was used to attack Russia and the post of the president, which is bad and dangerous at this stage."

Putin's can-do image took a beating and some even predicted his presidency could fall within months. It never did and Putin is as popular now as ever before.

Some snappy Kremlin PR work helped do the trick. Others suggest the administration has since cracked down on the media to make sure that Putin's name is never dragged through the mud in public again.

But perhaps of greater consequence are Putin's attempts to make sure that Russia's military -- a key player in his bid to resurrect the nation's pride and self-esteem -- is never again so humiliated.

He has boosted military spending by 22.5 percent in 2001 to some nine billion dollars and is attempting to trim the fat from Russia's bloated and largely dysfunctional Soviet-era force.

"Putin is now being guided by economic realism in his approach to the military," said Boris Makarenko, deputy head of Moscow's Center for Political Technologies think-tank.

"He is cutting the army and shutting down navy bases. But he has also learned a public relations lesson. He acts much more quickly when new tragedies occur."

But military analysts note that his reform efforts are being fought tooth and nail by a hugely conservative and secretive military leadership.

They also suggest that Putin has some skeletons in the cupboard to hide about the Kursk, and query his reasons for raising the craft despite concerns about the operation's safety and evidence that most relatives now want the vessel to stay where it is.

"Russian officials emphatically deny that there are any nukes on the Kursk," independent military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer recently wrote in the English language Moscow Times daily.

"But a Norwegian naval official told me in April that one of their divers who went down to the Kursk (last summer) recorded emissions that indicate there are nukes on board," Felgenhauer wrote.

The analyst noted that the Kursk was ready to go on patrol into NATO-controlled waters after the Barents Sea and for this reason was most likely fitted with nuclear-tipped Granit rockets.

Details about these are one of Russia's most guarded secrets. Some analysts suggest that these were partially recovered during last summer's dives that were officially carried out to salvage the bodies of the crew.

Even lawmakers who support Putin cast doubt that he is raising Russia's most modern nuclear submarine solely in order to to keep his promise to the victims' families and discover what actually sank that craft.

"If the government was interested in disclosing the truth, than it would have already done so," said liberal parliament deputy Irina Khakamada.

"It is impossible to discover the truth in Russia," she told the Vlast weekly.

Indeed most agree that no matter what secrets rest with the Kursk, the very guarded mentality of Russia's military leadership will mean any visible reforms -- on issues ranging from safety procedures to equipment upkeep and respect for soldiers serving in the force -- will take years to take hold.

"They are increasing military spending," noted Yury Gladkevich of Russia's AVN military news agency. "But with corruption in the army running so high, this money is unlikely to hit its mark."

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#2
Moscow Times
August 9, 2001
Playing With the Tigers
By Pavel Felgenhauer

Only weeks ago, President Vladimir Putin had a nice summit with his U.S. counterpart George W. Bush that ended with an alleged "agreement" to allow the United States to build a national missile defense. This week Putin lavishly entertained in Moscow the Stalinist leader of North Korea who Washington believes to be the prime source of a "rogue state" ballistic missile threat.

Kim Jong-il and his delegation visited several important military-industrial facilities, including the Khrunichev missile-building complex that now makes space rockets but in Soviet times was one of the main intercontinental ballistic missile-building centers.

It was officially announced that at Khrunichev Kim and his entourage visited the workshop where Rokot space launchers are assembled. In the West, Rokot is better known as the SS-19 two-stage ICBM. The Russian missile industry is planning to use a slightly remodeled SS-19 to launch small satellites into low orbit, but the project has been stalled for years because no cash-paying customer wants to risk losing a valuable payload by sending it up on a repainted second-hand ICBM.

Maybe the North Koreans want a Rokot. A relatively modern Russian ICBM could boost the lagging North Korean missile program that for years has been using remodeled ancient Soviet R-11 (Scud) one-stage short-range missiles.

Of course, taking a North Korean delegation that included military personnel and probably rocket specialists into a converted ICBM assembly plant is not, legally speaking, proliferation of forbidden rocket technology, but it is close and extremely provocative.

The sting seems to have worked: The Kim visit forced Washington to make official what it was offering for months behind closed doors. Last week, White House National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice told reporters that the Bush administration will try to work out a new strategic framework with Russia that could include joint military exercises and sharing of NMD technology — provided Russia stops assisting Iran and North Korea.

Unofficially, the United States is also telling Russia to constrain its military cooperation with China so as not to give Beijing the capability to threaten U.S. allies, first of all Taiwan. In addition, Washington wants Moscow to stop supporting Iraq, not to sell modern arms to Syria or Libya and in general behave as America's friend if it seriously wants to be one.

Because of the constant preliminary probing, the official offer to share NMD technology was no surprise to Moscow. For months the standard Russian response was "We cannot consider an offer unofficially," while in the Kremlin a coordinated response was worked out.

Only hours after Rice's offer, a Russian "diplomatic source" told Interfax that attempts to link Russian-U.S. relations with Russia's relations with third countries are unacceptable. "We cannot and will not fall for this bait," the source said.

Such a reply is in line with the present Kremlin strategy of building a "multipolar" world in which Russia is envisaged as an ancient Chinese Middle Kingdom — a country that is at the center of world politics, friendly to all, but not to close to anyone, sitting on a hill, watching the tigers fight in the valley and also reaping benefits by providing ammunition for the fray.

It is a seductive idea: to sell rogue states military technology and then make extra money by helping the West build defensive countermeasures.

In the Far East this concept has been working not so badly.

In the 1990s, South Korea quietly bought from Russia limited quantities of Soviet-made weapons that North Korea had in its inventory.

In the early 1990s, General Anatoly Funtikov, who was at the time chief of armaments in the Defense Ministry, told me: "We had to dig three old Scuds out of piles of litter left after the Soviet Union, but the South Koreans paid a handsome price for them."

Japan also paid a relatively high price to train several of its pilots to master Su-27 fighters, and the United States began seeking (and buying) Russian rockets and torpedos after China acquired similar weapons. It is reasonable to expect that if Russia sells some new weapons to North Korea, there will be others cashing in later.

No matter if Kim "pays" for his new T-80 tanks and other weapons by providing slave labor or other unusual barter. Anyway, the Omsk Transmash factory has not been able to sell to anyone hundreds of T-80 tanks it made in 1991 and 1992 for a decade.

If the West does not like this, it will have to live with it.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst. based in Moscow.

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#3
Baltimore Sun
August 6, 2001
U.S. won't go solo on arms control
By Lee Feinstein
Lee Feinstein, visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, was deputy director of the policy planning staff at the State Department during the Clinton administration.

WASHINGTON - Don't believe all the tough talk.

The recent opening of simultaneous "consultations" in Moscow between the United States and Russia on nuclear cutbacks and missile defense is the latest sign the Bush administration prefers engaging Russia on nuclear issues rather than going it alone.

Until now, the administration said negotiating reductions with Moscow, which was cutting its forces anyway, was unnecessary, and administration officials had questioned the need for a binding agreement to overhaul or replace the 1972 ABM treaty.

Officially, the president's senior advisers are still holding to that position. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has been careful to describe the bargaining not as negotiations but as "consultations" - the same term used by the Clinton administration in its pursuit of a compromise with Moscow on these issues.

But whatever word is used to describe the talks, it's clear the administration is embarked on a high-profile exchange in which mutually agreed nuclear cuts would be the payoff for Russian agreement to permit the administration to move ahead on missile defense.

Russian President Vladimir Putin can claim the U.S. agreement to discuss nuclear reductions and defense together as a significant victory. Russia has sought to link offense and defense discussions since the Clinton administration. The Bush team is evidently betting that handing Mr. Putin this tactical victory now will make it easier for him to cut a missile defense deal down the road.

Critics of the ABM treaty in the administration and Congress have also publicly criticized the beginning of U.S.-Russia talks. In recent testimony, the State Department's chief arms control adviser, John Bolton, reasserted that the administration's first choice is mutual withdrawal from the ABM treaty, not a replacement agreement.

But U.S. officials also indicated they would be prepared to accept a "political declaration" with Moscow. This could leave a lot of room for maneuver on both sides - if they want it.

Many important agreements over the years, including, for example, the 1975 Helsinki accords, which created what is now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, were not treaties but politically binding agreements not subject to ratification in the U.S. Senate.

Although the outlines of a deal with Russia are evident, closing one will not be easy, as the Clinton administration learned.

On arms cuts, Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin had reached basic agreement to reduce their nuclear forces to 2,500 long-range weapons each. But Moscow later said it wanted cutbacks to 1,500 or lower before it would consider even very limited changes to the ABM treaty.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and many members of Congress balked at cutting U.S. nuclear forces more deeply. President Bush has called for deep nuclear reductions without assigning any number, and hopefully he will have a better time getting domestic support for further cuts than his predecessor.

On defenses, many administration officials want to avoid enforceable limits on the U.S. ability to test and deploy a missile system, including on space-based weapons, a particular concern of Moscow's.

Another scenario is that Russia and the United States might agree to disagree. In this case, the United States might violate rather than abrogate the ABM Treaty and Russia might protest the violation but keep the door open to further discussions, despite the breach.

In the United States, conducting a missile test that might violate the ABM treaty would be applauded by those who believe the accord has outlived its usefulness and might afford the administration additional flexibility to cut a deal with Moscow after the violation. Mr. Putin might also see some benefit domestically in protesting an American violation, and later reaching an agreement with the United States that he could sell as placing limits on the American program.

If the United States and Russia cannot agree on a more or less cooperative approach, then the administration would have to decide whether to scale back its missile defense ambitions or face the music in the Senate and internationally and go it alone.

Judging by the recent actions of the new administration, as opposed to some of its words, alone seems to be a place it would rather not be.

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#4
strana.ru
August 9, 2001
Cautious invitations should be treated cautiously
Continued debate on prospects for Russia joining NATO

By Dmitry Gortnostayev

The debate on the subject of Russia joining NATO has flared up again following the German Chancellor's statement that he would welcome Moscow's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. Gerhard Schroeder said in an interview in Stern magazine "the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council can't be the last word in the relationship between NATO and Russia. Thinking in long-term historical dimensions, Russia's NATO membership can't be ruled out," the Chancellor said.

Schroeder's statement is the latest in a series of statements by Western leaders who have spoken about the possibility of Russia being invited to the military-political bloc even if only theoretically. The bloc was created for the express purpose of containing Russia although this country had a different name and was within somewhat different borders at the time. But that really makes no difference. However you look at it, NATO is still a cold War relic. It was founded to offset "the Soviet threat." An organization created with the aim of rolling the Soviet back is still in existence although the threat has disappeared and so has the Warsaw Pact and even the Soviet Union is no more.

NATO leaders have been dropping thick hints that they might include Moscow in their club. On certain conditions, needless to say, but so far nothing is known about them. As a matter of fact, even those who make statements of this sort are not aware of them. While NATO is apparently trying to create the impression that its treatment of Russia is one of goodwill, the West is keeping Russia at a distance, and a considerable distance too.

George W. Bush became the first Western leader to hold out a serious prospect of Russia acquiring membership of NATO but he spoke in very cautious and carefully selected phrases without saying outright that Moscow might be incorporated into the alliance.

Bush was speaking at a Ljubljana press conference after a meeting with Vladimir Putin. Significantly the Russian president recalled what he said in an interview with a Western journalist in the spring of 2000. When the journalist asked him whether Russia could ever join NATO, Putin said, "Why not?" No less, no more. He did not ask for membership, nor did he even attempt to hint that Moscow might be interested.

Nevertheless, reaction was not long in coming. The then State Secretary Madeleine Albright hastened to say, albeit not in public, that NATO was not looking forward to Russia joining it. It is noteworthy that nobody had expected her to give a reply.

While in Ljubljana Putin also recalled another historical fact: a note issued by the Soviet government in 1954, which indicated that the Soviet Union might want to join NATO. The reply from Brussels then differed little from what Albright said on the subject: NATO leaders said they were flatly opposed to the Soviet Union joining NATO.

Interestingly, the objections that were put forward as an excuse for denying membership to the Soviet Union in 1954 have long since sunk into the Lethe. At the time Moscow was reproached for its human rights record and its military presence in Austria. Although those factors have long since ceased to exist, for some reason Western countries are still reluctant to share a military-political alliance with Russia.

Even Bush's overly guarded statement was in effect disavowed by State Secretary Colin Powell only a couple of days after the end of the Ljubljana summit when he said in a televised interview that Bush was certainly not talking about the prospect of Russian membership of NATO.

Now the Bundeskanzler has spoken on the same subject. He may have been guided by more sincere motives but that makes no difference in substance. The statement itself is probably the first and direct statement of its kind. In a way it is an emblematic event. The question, however, is what will come after this signal.

Russia's short-term and possibly long-term position on its membership of the North-Atlantic Alliance may depend on the answer to that question. It can only say "yes" or "no" if it knows the real intentions of its partners or at least what proposals they have in mind.

Nothing of the kind is in evidence so far. What we see is transparent hints or at best political declarations. But the real fact is that Western politicians take a negative view of the idea of Russian membership of NATO. On many occasions in the past they sought to explain in detail why a merger of the Russian Federation and the North-Atlantic alliance - two military and political forces - was impossible. True, that was relatively a long time ago but one is more inclined to believe something that was said a long time ago but clearly than more recent statements couched in semi-hints.

Javier Solana, the man who led NATO at the height of sharp debates over NATO expansion and events in Yugoslavia, has repeatedly albeit privately insisted that Russia cannot join NATO under any circumstances, each time supporting his tenet with substantive arguments.

One of those arguments was the following: NATO was not founded with a view to incorporating Russia into it in the first place. Another popular argument shared by the Secretary General's subordinates was that Russia was too vast a country to be incorporated into anything, and for that reason if it joined NATO, this would undermine the organization from within.

That premise needs to be carefully considered, especially at a time when the West does not fully trust Russia.

As for Schroeder's statement, it largely fits into the context of Putin's "Why not?" It is noteworthy, however, that good manners should prompt the host to be more explicit in his invitation, especially considering that the formula used by Schroeder is binding on no one (incidentally, he quoted U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice) and considering that the statement might reflect quite specific interests of a number of NATO members, interests which are not necessarily linked to Russian membership of the alliance.

After all, Moscow could be given to understand that it is welcome in the North-Atlantic bloc and edged toward making an application for membership, thereby depriving it of an argument against the bid of Baltic countries to enter NATO - if you have nothing against your own membership, NATO might argue, why are opposed to others joining the alliance? After that NATO might accepts all applications - except Russia's.

And so, any proposals, or to be more exact, any propositions and suggestions of the kind made by Schroeder, Bush and Rice, should be treated with caution. Moscow needs to wait and see what exactly NATO capitals mean.

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#5
International Herald Tribune
August 3, 2001
NATO'S MOVE EAST OUTFLANKS THE EU
By William Pfaff

With the end of the Cold War, the European Union concluded that it had to expand to include the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But expansion remains a complex affair of unresolved questions and problems.

The Irish voted in June not to ratify the expansion treaty, causing consternation in Brussels and speculation on how this veto (the EU decision has to be unanimous) can be reversed or circumvented. The Irish turnout was low and unrepresentative, so it probably can be done. But public opinion throughout the EU seems unenthusiastic if not hostile to expansion. Expansion in practice creates a European Union very different from the one the Europeans aimed to create before the collapse of communism. "Europe," as it now exists, consists of historically Roman Catholic and Reformation Europe, plus Orthodox Greece.

The cultural barriers to bringing other Balkan or historically Orthodox countries into the EU are real, which is why none are on the first list of candidates. Europe is expanding out of a sense of obligation a sense that in fairness or justice this has to be done.

There nonetheless has been no great haste to enlarge. Countries have been invited to post their candidatures and, in return, have been sent lists of the difficult conditions they must fulfill to make their political institutions, systems of justice and economies compatible with those of the EU countries.

They have diligently been trying to conform, but the process has caused resentment, as has the belief that membership conditions were made easier for Spain, Portugal and Ireland when, like today's candidates, they were much poorer than existing members.

To be united, or reunited, to "Europe" seemed a wonderful dream to the Communist countries at the time the Soviet system collapsed. It seemed history's reward to them for what they had suffered at the hands of Hitler, Stalin and Stalin's successors. But it was too good to be true. Twelve years later they still are waiting.

In the meantime, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization arrived. NATO also delayed offering them full membership, but provided immediate cooperation inside the so-called Partnership for Peace; officer instruction at the U.S.-run Marshall Center in Germany; participation in peacekeeping assignments; and, most important, an enthusiastic welcome from the United States.

The association with NATO conveyed an implicit security guarantee, which these countries wanted more than anything else.

The United States also got something it did not expect, but which now is very valuable: an implicit alliance with these countries.

When the European Union finally gets around to admitting candidate states, the latter can be expected to do their best to block the EU from becoming a strategic rival to the United States. They will be able to say "no" to EU ambitions that conflict with U.S. interests.

One might say "if" the EU gets around to admitting them. However, if all the EU's members eventually ratify the treaty on enlargement, the candidates will automatically be admitted, as soon as they meet the requirements. The West Europeans are faithfully trying to help them do so. The interior ministers of five current candidate countries Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have been meeting here at the second session of the Salzburg Forum, which is sponsored by Austria.

The forum was concerned with the most difficult problems, those of organized crime, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, asylum, police cooperation and standards, and border control.

All the candidates would automatically become part of the so- called Schengen area of the EU, where there are no internal travel restrictions, so the external borders have to be solid.

There are serious operational problems, and since public opinion in the EU is extremely sensitive on this matter, they have to be solved before expansion is acceptable. The current hope is that some, if not all, of these five candidates will be inside the EU in time to take part in European Parliament elections in 2004.

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#6
Russia: In Moscow, Salvation Army's Days May Be Numbered
By Don Hill

Around the world, the Salvation Army works like a military organization to fight for people who are hungry, sick, homeless, or lonely. But bureaucrats in the Moscow city justice department are made uneasy by the Christian group's name, the military titles of its leaders, and the brass buttons on its uniforms. RFE/RL correspondent Don Hill says the group these days finds itself in double trouble.

Prague, 9 August 2001 (RFE/RL) -- The Salvation Army has never been easy for Russian officials to understand.

Russia's Bolsheviks booted the Christian organization out of Leninist Russia in 1923 and the communists kept them out for nearly 70 years. The Army only came marching back in 1991 near the end of Mikhail Gorbachev's time in power.

In 1997 -- six years after the breakup of the Soviet Union -- Russia adopted what it called a "freedom of conscience" law. It established, among other things, that religious organizations outside of Russia's four main religions -- the Russian Orthodox Church, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism -- must renew their registrations with federal and local authorities. By this time, the Salvation Army had established itself in 14 Russian cities and towns.

Vladimir Ryakhovsky, a lawyer with the Slavic Center for Law and Justice in Moscow, tells RFE/RL that at the federal level and in all but one of those communities, re-registering the Salvation Army was a routine exercise. In Moscow, however, it was anything but routine:

"The court in Moscow decided that the activities of this kind of group are illegal. They ruled it is a representative office of a foreign religion. These are some of the problems the Salvation Army ran up against in Moscow. In other cities we haven't seen problems of this kind."

The Salvation Army's double trouble is this: If it is a religious organization, as the Salvation Army insists it is, then it must register or endlessly violate the law with any religious activities. But the Moscow authorities will not permit it to register, giving among other reasons that it appears to be a military organization rather than a religious one.

When Methodist minister William Booth established the Salvation Army in 1865 in London's impoverished East End, he said he intended the group to be a Christian denomination whose mission would be to follow the command of Jesus Christ to feed and clothe the poor and give succor to the sick and helpless. To emphasize its recruits' dedication, he gave them military titles and simple uniforms and required them to sign what he called "Articles of War."

Ordained ministers were "officers" with titles like captain, major, and colonel. Ministers-in-charge were "commanding officers." And he organized the group in "corps, divisions, and territories."

The organization's activities, however, are anything but traditionally military. It distributes food and clothing, organizes visits and long-term care for shut-ins, and conducts religious services with emphasis on joyous singing, instrumental music, hand clapping, and free prayer.

The Slavic Center's Ryakhovsky, who represents the Salvation Army in its legal battles with the Moscow city administration, says it is incredible that anyone would think the group constitutes a military security threat:

"I do not understand how anyone could confuse this group with a military organization. This is just absurd."

In some places in Russia, the ability of religious organizations to re-register is determined by local religious expert committees. In Moscow, the city justice department is the authority. Justice department deputy Vladimir Zhbankov says he does not care that a federal expert committee has ruled that the Salvation Army is a legitimate religious denomination. He also says that the issue is not whether the Salvation Army is militaristic. It is that they call themselves an army. As he puts it: "They are a military organization in form. Such organizations have a special status under the law."

Some foreign evangelical religious organizations have offended Orthodox Church authorities by the aggressiveness -- and success -- with which they proselytize for converts. But the Salvation Army commander in Moscow, Colonel Kenneth Baillie, says that is not how his organization operates. He said, "We are careful about preaching to needy people when all they want is a bowl of soup."

A reporter for "The New York Times" in Moscow called recently on shut-in Tatyana Medvedeva, a Salvation Army beneficiary. One of the organization's "soldiers" regularly does her shopping, fetches her medicine, and visits with her to relieve her lonely days. She was incredulous when told of the group's legal troubles, saying: "God save us from people who don't know what they are talking about."

Time appears to be running out for the Salvation Army in Moscow. Although the lawyer, Ryakhovsky, says he still is exploring legal avenues, the group has exhausted the immediately available options there. The Moscow city court last month denied their appeal against a ruling that it had applied too late to register and failed to meet the criteria for an independent religious organization:

"Certain bureaucrats in Moscow's justice department decided to refuse registration to the Salvation Army, the ones that said this organization will never be registered in Moscow. It was purely an ideological, purely a political decision."

The Christian group has taken its case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, charging that the Moscow bureaucrats are violating both Russia's Constitution and its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. If the court takes up the case, the burden could shift to Moscow to explain its stand.

(RFE/RL's Bruce Pannier contributed to this feature.)

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#7
Delovye Lyudi
No. 124-125
July-August 2001
EVERYTHING IS QUIET AGAIN...
Vladimir Lukin discusses the future of Russian-US relations

Author: Alexander Tribunsky
MOSCOW NEEDS TO ENSURE GOOD RELATIONS WITH EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES AT THE SAME TIME. AT PRESENT, STRATEGIC STABILITY IS AT THE TOP OF THE AGENDA FOR FORTHCOMING TALKS. BUT IT MUST BE QUITE CLEAR THAT NUCLEAR PARITY IS NON-NEGOTIABLE, THOUGH RUSSIA IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS EVERYTHING ELSE.

An interivew with Vladimir Lukin, deputy Duma speaker and a former ambassador to the United States, on the future of Russian-US relations.

Question: What effect do you think the recent meeting between presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in Ljubljana will have on Russian-US relations?

Vladimir Lukin: The first personal meeting between the presidents of Russia and the United States wasn't bad - precisely because it was an ordinary meeting which did not include any serious discussions. Washington was not really prepared for this turn of events, and Putin was correct to concentrate on psychological factors in the first contact.

Question: How would you say our bilateral relations will develop in the near future? Say, over the next several months?

Lukin: Intensive efforts to resolve the urgent problems, primarily strategic problems, will begin this autumn. Economic, social, and cultural issues predominate in Russia's relations with Europe, but priorities in relations with the United States are different. They are strategic issues, and strategic nuclear issues. I think we will gradually start having substantial negotiations on the need to pool our efforts and evaluate the reality of the nuclear threat together.

How can we seriously accept the major thesis presented by the Americans - that the United States needs a national missile defense, and will have to sacrifice the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972, just because North Korea tested a missile? That missile's range was only 1,200 to 1,300 kilometers. A child could do the arithmetic and come to the inevitable conclusion that such weapons systems cannot hope to reach the United States. Yes, they can reach Japan - or Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in Russia - but not the United States. So why would the US need a national missile defense?

I do think that our political leaders, especially the president, were correct in making it clear that unless our opinion is heeded, all previous nuclear arms accords would be jeopardized. Moscow may raise the subject of using multiple warheads, and that won't lead to anything good. That is why an alternative solution will be better for all the states involved. We would do better to discuss what threats really exist, and which of them affect Russia, Europe, and the United States. And we should decide, all of us together, precisely how these problems should be handled.

Question: What treatment can Russia expect from the United States at present?

Lukin: Russia is a European state, but its mentality still clings to the past status of a super-power. This is the foremost factor in our relationship with the United States. It is time we got used to the idea that our relationship with the United States will no longer be "special" in all spheres. In fact, we don't need it. I think we had better understand that Russia should enter the 21st century as a leading European power.

As for the United States, we should promote constructive relations with it, but this particular country should be viewed as an external factor. At the same time, Europe should gradually become an internal phenomenon for us to a larger and larger extent. Paradoxically enough, over the last 15-20 years Russia has become a European state on a range of criteria, despite all its zig-zagging and setbacks. That is not something that can be said for the United States. It's enough to take a look at how the American "melting pot" of ethnic groups operates. Until recently, the United States was mostly populated by Caucasians and some Afro-Americans. These days it is a different nation already, a nation with considerable Latin American and Pacific elements.

Neither should we forget the major differences of opinion between Europe and the United States. The most recent European summits have been very difficult and complicated from the psychological point of view. Moreover, they revealed a lot of friction. Some Russian leaders may be tempted to take advantage of this discord. They should resist the temptation. It would be a grave error. Despite all these controversies, and a certain chill in relations between the Western leaders, Europe and America have a great many common interests. The West always consolidates against the intruder whenever anyone tries to interfere in relations between the Western capitals. That is why Moscow should be careful to construct its foreign policy in such a way as to ensure good relations with Europe and the United States at the same time. Russia can do more to emphasize its European involvement, for example. This way Russia will set up the optimal foreign policy conditions to favor finding a solution to its major - economic and social - problems.

Question: Putin was unexpectedly sharp in his statement on the possibility of using multiple warheads in response to Washington's plans for a national missile defense. Do you think it prudent to anger the United States and its president this way?

Lukin: It's just that Russia made it absolutely plain to the United States that it is prepared to discuss all topics except one: the existing nuclear parity. The number of missile systems doesn't matter. What matters is that if one side delivers a nuclear strike, the target should retain sufficient resources for a damaging reciprocal strike. This state of affairs should remain intact thoughout the next 30-40 years. Moscow is prepared to discuss everything else. But if the United States tries to disrupt this parity unilaterally, Russia will not tolerate it, because it cannot afford to lose such an important factor in its political influence. This stand on the matter should be made absolutely clear.

Question: Does Russia have the technical capacities to come up with something to counter a missile shield?

Lukin: Russia has a certain amount of resources nowadays, but some systems are becoming obsolete. It follows that their maintenance is the first problem. This can be ensured, their working lifespans can be extended in various ways. Along with that, Russia has the so-called "reverse potential". Satan-type missiles (SS-18 and SS-20) are not combat-ready at this point, due to a number of international accords, but that could be changed. Besides, Russia can increase output of new missiles like the Topol-M. Additional investment would be required, but I think the money would be found if necessary. The current economic situation makes it possible. We also have tactical nuclear devices, much more of them than the United States has. Sure, Russia is supposed to dismantle them all, but if the Americans refuse to take our interests into account, the Kremlin may revise its obligations in this sphere, despite all its affection for Europe.

Question: Would you care to predict the future of missile defenses?

Lukin: It it too early for that, but I'm acquainted with the American way of conducting negotiations. At first, Washington always tries to throw the other side off balance, indicating that no alternatives to its stance are to be discussed. So it's important for the other side to be more resolute and composed than the Americans are. The Americans always allow for the possibility of a last-minute compromise. What Washington is saying now about its national missile defense is quite different from what it was saying in January and February. The Americans are predictable, and that is good.

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#8
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
August 3, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIA AND CHINA: FRIENDS OR RIVALS?
By Dr. Alexander LUKIN (Political Sciences)

The Russo-Chinese Treaty of Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, signed in Moscow in mid-July, provoked broad and contradictory comments in Russia and abroad. Some people say that the two countries are moving towards a new union spearheaded against the USA and the West. Others claim that this is a purely declarative document of no practical value.

But both these opinions are rather shallow. The Russo-Chinese treaty does not stipulate the creation of a union. Unlike the 1950 Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Union and Mutual Assistance, the new treaty does not bind the sides to pool forces against an aggression. The cautiously worded 2001 treaty carefully avoids any ideological statements or impossible obligations, which shows that the leaders of the two countries were working for the future and tried to avoid a repetition of past mistakes. For the 1950 treaty died long before its official expiry date.

But this does not mean that the new treaty has no practical value. It sealed a vital trend in modern international relations, that is, the striving of two large world powers, members of the nuclear club and permanent members of the UN Security Council, for closer cooperation.

Friends Against Whom?

Like the whole of Russo-Chinese cooperation, the treaty has two aspects: international and bilateral. The virtually complete coincidence of the sides' views of international problems serves as a powerful booster of bilateral relations. The two countries' leaders said more than once in Beijing and Moscow that Russo-Chinese rapprochement is not spearheaded against third countries, in particular against the USA. And this is absolutely true in that Russia and China do not regard the USA and the West as a whole as an adversary.

On the contrary, the two countries want to maintain good economic and political relations with the West as an earnest of their development that fully meets their strategic goals. However, it is also true that Russo-Chinese rapprochement is precipitated, to a degree, by certain negative (from the viewpoint of Moscow and Beijing) trends in international development, which have been actively encouraged by Washington of late.

One of them is the striving to reduce the role of the UN and its agencies, the NATO attempts to take over the functions of the UN Security Council, interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states under humanitarian pretexts, support for separatist movements, the NATO enlargement, the intention of the USA to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and its unwillingness to join several other international agreements. On the whole, two trends of international development appeared after the end of the Cold War.

The USA, which emerged from the Cold War considerably stronger and claimed the role of the only world leader, feels constrained by the norms of the present international law based on the principle of sovereignty of states. Russia, weakened by the Cold War, and China, which (just as several other large states, such as India and Iran, who are not strong enough to resist the US pressure) is not yet strong enough are seeking to coordinate efforts in order to uphold a world of sovereign nations and its agencies, above all the UN, which suits their purposes. The Russo-Chinese treaty, with its obligation to preserve the role of the UN, its confirmation of the fundamental agreements on which strategic stability is based (meaning above all the ABM Treaty) and rejection of attempts at interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, is a broad programme of preserving the post-war system of international law. The same goal was pursued by the concept of a multipolar world, on which Russia and China signed a separate declaration two years ago.

Russia and China do not want to worsen their relations with the USA or create an anti-American union. Such rather unnatural union would be possible only if a threat coming from the USA is seen by them to be more dangerous than a threat engendered by refusal to collaborate with the West. But we must admit that Washington, and especially the new Republican administration, is doing much for the appearance of such opinion in Moscow and Beijing.

Not Brothers but Partners?

The treaty is very important for bilateral relations. China hailed its provision on respect for the choice of development ways, which amounts to Russia's refusal to lecture China on the preference of this or that political system or on human rights.

Of great interest is Article 8 of the treaty, which prohibits the use of the territory of Russia and China by third countries to the detriment of state sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the sides, as well as the operation of organisations and groups that can do such damage. This article apparently covers a point of bilateral interest, namely struggle against separatist movements supported by international terrorist organisations or third countries.

As for Russia, it values very much Article 6, which recognises the existing state border and seals the need to maintain the status quo at uncoordinated parts of the border. This provision rules out any speculations about China's alleged plans of claiming Russian territories or alleged policy of settling the Russian Far East.

No Harm In Vigilance

Some politicians in Russia fear that Russian-made weapons sold to China could be turned against Russia in case of deterioration of bilateral relations. I don't think there are grounds for such fears today. Experts say that so far the standards of the Chinese army are not high enough to pose a threat to Russia in the foreseeable future. In addition, China's main efforts are directed at settling the problem of Taiwan, which can take decades. In this situation it would be short-sighted to reject profitable contracts, which help to keep afloat the Russian defence industries and provide an income to thousands of their staff.

However, a rapid development of China is facing Russia with several serious problems. Judging by everything, the Russian leadership is aware of this. President Vladimir Putin said in Blagoveshchensk a year ago about the problems of the Russian Far East that "unless we take serious efforts soon, the Russian population [of the region] will speak mostly Japanese, Chinese and Korean languages in a few decades." Although the current Chinese leadership has no territorial claims to Russia, nobody knows what will happen in a more remote future.

Broad economic cooperation with China could become a major factor of development of the Russian Far East. But the economic component of bilateral relations is so far lagging behind the political one. The volume of Russo-Chinese trade is ten times smaller than China's trade with the USA. The development of bilateral trade had been hindered for a long period of time by the ruination of the Russian economy and general chaos in the country. But now that the situation is being improved in Russia economic cooperation should become the top priority subject on bilateral agenda, because strategic collaboration may wither very soon without reliance on real common economic interests.

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#9
Moscow Times
August 10, 2001
Dispatches From the Chechen Front
By Carlotta Gall

It seems incredible that seven years after Russia first intervened in Chechnya to suppress its bid for independence, it is still waging a war there. It is no longer surprising that Russia's politicians and generals are so cynically careless about the suffering of the Chechen people and of their own soldiers, but it is hard to understand how the Russian public puts up with it.

Even if Russia was so weary and beaten up that it embraced Vladimir Putin and his new war in the 2000 election, I cannot help thinking that the public outcry at the Kursk disaster last August was not just about the sailors drowned in that submarine, but about all the young lives lost in service of a cruel and indifferent state, the tens of thousands killed over a decade in Afghanistan, and now thousands more in the Caucasus.

The fate of Chechnya is largely forgotten or ignored internationally, which is also shortsighted but not incredible. Few foreign reporters go there anymore because of the difficulties thrown in the way by the Russian authorities, and perhaps also because of their own reluctance or lack of interest.

There have been two extraordinary exceptions to this during the second war of the decade in Chechnya, which began in September 1999: Anna Politkovskaya, reporter for the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, and Anne Nivat, Moscow correspondent for the French daily, Libďration. Politkovskaya's A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya, and Nivat's Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter Behind the Lines of the War in Chechnya are books produced from their reports. Both have appeared in English translation.

Their accounts represent some of the finest journalism to come out of the seven years of tumult in Chechnya. Both concentrate on the fate of civilians and individual stories, and tell gripping, and often heart-rending tales of people and combatants caught up in the war. Together they amount to a profoundly anti-war testimony, showing so clearly how mistaken the world and Moscow's leaders are to forget the war or ignore the brutality which can only rebound on Russia and its leaders.

In this sense Politkovskaya's "A Dirty War" is by far the more important of the two books. A Russian journalist known for her reports on social issues, she began writing articles around the edges of the conflict in Chechnya, until she was drawn in to rail against the injustice and social trauma of every aspect of the war. The book is a collection of those articles, written for the Russian reader but with an intensity and informative power that will be appreciated by readers abroad.

The publishers have added an introduction by Thomas de Waal that helps place the conflict in a larger historical and political context, and examines how the second Chechen war began only three years after the first ended with a peace deal. (Thomas de Waal and I co-wrote "Chechnya: A Small Victorious War," published in 1997.)

De Waal blames the rebel commander Shamil Basayev for his invasion of Dagestan in August 1999, and a murky mixture of Dagestani warlords and secret service connections for the apartment bombings that killed hundreds of Russians and led directly to the Russian invasion. I would add the very aggressive hand of Vladimir Putin that Chechen officials said they had felt in the months before the outbreak of war, when he took over as head of the Federal Security Service. And I blame Russia for failing to work with the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov in the interim years after the first war, and in fact persistently seeking to undermine him.

Politkovskaya's book is a hugely important contribution because hers is one of the few voices in Russia to question the morality of President Putin's military campaign in Chechnya, which he insists on calling an "anti-terrorist operation." She is troubled to witness the terrible wrongs done to Chechen civilians as well as to the Russians still living there. And she is caustic in her criticism of the authorities, whether small time bureaucrats, brutish generals or the president himself.

"What earthly use to me is the Putin we see, prancing about on television and telling us he's going to 'wipe out' the bandits after they're cornered 'in the toilet'?" she writes, repeating Putin's infamous phrase. "I want a different Putin. Not the man who, in front of the television cameras, climbed into the cockpit of a bomber wearing a pilot's helmet that was obviously the wrong size, but someone who will go to the Staropromyslovsky district and visit the Grozny old people's home," she says, writing during a long campaign with her newspaper to help the old people trapped under the bombardment of the city.

Politkovskaya appears ahead of the curve in Russia. The majority of the population still supports Putin and his campaign against the Chechens, who have been successfully branded terrorists by politicians and the state media. But she warns that the brutality being meted out in Chechnya will rebound on Russian society, turning the Chechens more resolutely against Russia with every atrocity, creating brutal Russian soldiers who return home violent or crazed, and trampling civic and human rights for society at large.

She is modest in her aims. "My notes are written for the future. They are the testimony of the innocent victims of the new Chechen war, which is why I record all the detail I can," she writes.

Yet her understanding of the war and its consequences leads her to some shocking conclusions and, when she feels like it, she weighs in with withering comment or that cynicism so peculiar to Russian journalism.

"Abandon all logic, ye who travel here. Shake off your Moscow stereotypes and conceptions," she writes. Far from the confident, purposeful army that the authorities depict, storming forward without losses, "you see exhausted men with unbalanced minds. Then there's the flu, scabies, rotting feet, drunkenness and hashish."

Politkovskaya shows how morale among the Russian troops, which began at a high level nearly two years ago, is now dangerously low. She writes that the catchphrase among the troops is: "I've no wish to die," and as soldiers run amok, she says, the dangers are increasing for the civilian population. She describes a mad general riddling a cow with bullets in a senseless act of cruelty, a scary encounter with two young OMON riot police who watch violent videos and talk only of dismembering their enemies, and the looting, killing sprees and corruption at checkpoints that were so common in the 1994-96 war.

The authorities have to act differently, either focusing the war within clear limits or a local arena, or else halting it altogether, she concludes at the end of one report. "The settling of accounts lies ahead," she warns in another.

Nivat's book, "Chienne de Guerre" is a lighter read, almost a travelogue through wartime Chechnya. It bears the most appalling title — literally translated it means "War Bitch" — apparently a play on the name of a feminist group in France called "Chienne de Garde," and an attempt to make something sexy out of the danger of being a war correspondent. The jacket cover bears not one but two photos of herself, but none of the Chechens she is writing about. Instead of giving background to the war, the preface is all about Nivat.

But the window dressing is misleading, because most of the writing is in the best tradition of war reporting. Her descriptive writing is her strength; she displays a light touch, using short, succinct phrases, and avoids drawing conclusions to what she is witnessing. She travels almost purely on the Chechen side, staying in villages with families and friends, sheltering from Russian bombardments with them, interviewing ordinary people as well as several of the rebel leaders and commanders, and twice meeting the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, who is continuing to fight from a base somewhere in the woods.

By necessity Nivat was mostly traveling incognito, outside the official accredited trips. As a result, she has little material from the Russian side, and what she does have is flat.

But her book brings the Chechen experience of the war alive and close up as no other account has. She writes at the end that Russia has won the propaganda war, if not the military campaign, but her reports and this book will deny them of that victory. For it above all shows the Chechen civilians as they always were, generous, hospitable, brave in the face of impossible odds, educated and law-abiding, nothing like the terrorists so commonly depicted by Russian officials.

Her eye-witness account of the disastrous rebel retreat from Grozny in February 2000, and the terrifying bombing unleashed on the village of Alkhan Kala afterwards, will surely be remembered as one of the great pieces of reporting from the war, equaled only by the remarkable photographs taken that day by Thomas Dworzak, unfortunately not reproduced in the book.

She ends with a simple but important conclusion: that the war will not cease until first Russia, and then the rest of the international community work towards that end.

"One way or another the Russians will be forced to come to the negotiating table," she quotes Maskhadov as saying in the summer of 2000. He said he thought Putin had realized the generals who promised him a quick victory were good-for-nothings, but that he could not yet acknowledge that officially. "And the Russians will leave in the end," the Chechen president said.

"A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya," by Anna Politkovskaya. 336 pages. The Harvill Press, $17.00

"Chienne de Guerre: A Woman Reporter behind the Lines of the War in Chechnya," by Anne Nivat. 273 pages. Public Affairs, $25.00

Carlotta Gall is a reporter with the New York Times in the Balkans and covered the first war in Chechnya for The Moscow Times. Her book, "Chechnya: A Small Victorious War," co-written with Thomas de Waal, was published by Macmillan in London in 1997. She has been denied a visa by the Russian authorities since October 1999.

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#10
Putin wraps up Ukraine opposition leader for Kuchma's birthday: press

MOSCOW, Aug 9 (AFP) -
Russian President Vladimir Putin wished his Ukrainian counterpart Leonid Kuchma happy birthday Thursday as newspapers here accused the Kremlin of going after Ukraine's top opposition figure at Kiev's bidding.

Putin telephoned Kuchma, who faces legislative elections in March next year, on the occasion of his 63rd birthday to wish him "good health and future success in the fulfilment of his state duties," a Kremlin statement said.

The greetings came a day after Russian military prosecutors dropped a political bombshell in Ukraine by saying that they had opened a criminal inquiry into Ukrainian opposition figurehead, Yulia Timoshenko, over a 1996 corruption scandal that allegedly cost the Russian defence ministry 450 million dollars.

A glamorous 40-year-old who heads the centre-right Batkivshina party and a key opposition bloc known as the National Salvation Front, Timoshenko has been in and out of jail in Ukraine this year on what she claims are trumped-up fraud charges.

Russian newspapers were in no doubt that Putin had thrown in his lot with the scandal-wracked Kuchma, under pressure to resign in recent months over allegations of involvement in the death of an opposition journalist.

"Russia helps to knock out Ukrainian opposition," the liberal Izvestia daily splashed across its front-page above two photographs of Timoshenko, at freedom and behind bars.

"A present for President Kuchma," the respected Kommersant daily headlined its front page story on the surprise announcement from Moscow.

Commentators voiced scepticism as to why Russian prosecutors had waited five years to launch their investigation into Timoshenko for allegedly bribing Russian officials in a murky scam involving Ukrainian gas debts to Russia.

"There is a question that begs itself: why has this affair only emerged now, and was not passed onto the Ukrainian side immediately," Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily wrote.

"It is clear there were political reasons. It was not in the existing Kremlin leadership's interests then to provoke a scandal at the highest political level," the newspaper added.

Timoshenko, former Ukrainian energy minister, has already twice been arrested by the Ukrainian authorities on charges of forgery and allegedly concealing millions of dollars in profits from Russian gas imports.

Released after a court ruled there was insufficient evidence to justify her arrest, she claims the legal actions have been masterminded by the authorities in retaliation for her opposition activity.

The Russian prosecutor's office said the charges were linked to the alleged embezzlement of 450 million dollars by the former head of finances at the Russian defence ministry, Colonel General Georgy Oleinik.

The money was paid to United Energy Systems of Ukraine -- a firm headed by Timoshenko which was the main distributor for natural gas sold in Ukraine -- which then used it to repay part of Ukraine's gas debts to Russia's Gazprom.

In July 1995, customs officers found 100,000 dollars in Timoshenko's hand luggage as she was about to fly out from Vnukovo airport in Moscow, according to the Russian investigation.

Russian prosecutors said they had passed the case on to their Ukrainian counterparts as the two countries have an agreement not to extradite one another's nationals.

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