#1
Christian Science Monitor
27 July 2001
Arms deal rattles cold warriors
As US and Russian leaders move to revise weapons accords,
they face a tough sell to their militaries.
By Fred Weir and Robert P. Hey
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

The nascent move toward a strategic accord in Moscow and Washington over offensive and defensive weapons faces perhaps its toughest scrutiny from a tough-minded constituency - the military.

Behind the attempts by US and Russian negotiators this week in Moscow to lay the groundwork for a package deal lies a brass-button reality: a cold-war mentality that still runs deep among the generals in both countries. Their views will help decide whether any pact linking a reduction in offensive warheads with a US plan to build a missile-defense shield ever gets initialed.

In Russia, the Soviet-schooled military leadership remains deeply skeptical of Mr. Putin's decision to even talk about missile defense, as well as the ongoing expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe.

In the US, one element of the Pentagon remains convinced that deep cuts in the two sides' nuclear arsenals could end up making the strategic balance more unstable, and thus more dangerous.

Complicating the motivations on both sides are efforts to restructure the two countries' militaries to reflect 21st century doctrines.

"Russia's security doctrines are evolving, but past priorities are still very strong held," says Sergei Kazyonnov, chief expert at the official Institute of National Security and Strategic Research. "Our military elite will not take kindly to being told by Washington how Russia should defend itself."

Wariness at Pentagon

In America's military, with its long tradition of bowing to civilian control, positions are more nuanced. The view of top military commanders is not outright opposition, but pointed skepticism, toward a Bush-Putin arms deal.

The president would ultimately like to reduce the number of American and Russian warheads substantially below the 2,000 to 2,500 that President Clinton and former Russian President Boris Yeltsin sought to establish four years ago as a goal.

Many Pentagon officials would welcome having money shifted from the nuclear arsenal to other military needs. But Job 1, they say, is to be ready to accomplish objectives set by civilian leaders. At present, that means being ready to hit more than 2,000 targets in the former Soviet Union. And even if the benchmark is lowered, the question of adequate nuclear defenses remains.

Earlier this month, Adm. Richard Mies, head of the Strategic Command that controls nuclear weapons, warned Congress that more than the sheer number of warheads needs to be considered for US security.

In his prepared testimony, Admiral Mies quoted two former presidential advisers, whom he did not name, as saying:

"Given the clear risks and the elusive benefits inherent in additional deep cuts, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate such reductions to demonstrate exactly how and why such cuts would serve to enhance US security."

A lower number of warheads, Mies said, does not necessarily make the world safer. He pointed to a number of other factors as also key - including the ability to withstand a nuclear attack and strike back, and the ability to adapt deterrent forces to a rapidly changing future.

His testimony was perhaps the clearest statement yet of the Strategic Command's opposition to deep warhead cuts - a goal Bush raised in his election campaign last year and a key objective this week as his security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, sat down with counterparts in Moscow.

Sharply reducing warheads and missiles would free funds for other Bush defense priorities, from military readiness to his proposed antimissile defense system.

For that reason, "lurking below the surface [in the Pentagon] is a latent consensus among the military in favor of further offensive cuts," says Brookings Institution analyst Michael O'Hanlon in Washington.

But, with its direct oversight of the nuclear arsenal, the Strategic Command's voice is felt much more strongly.

For now, that resistance puts the brakes on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's efforts to reconfigure the military.

"If the Bush administration wants to have a new framework, they have got to lower numbers" of warheads, says Joseph Cirincione, executive director of the nonproliferation project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"The cold war is over," he adds. "But the cold war weapons and posture remain ... If Russia is not the enemy, why are our forces still configured as if they are?"

The Strategic Command is responsible for identifying targets in Russia, or anywhere else, for nuclear warheads. But those targets are set within broad parameters determined by civilian leaders - the president and Defense secretary.

What Mies is trying to do, says Heritage Foundation defense analyst Baker Spring in Washington, is to "make sure his command is capable of executing" current policy. That would seem to open up a solution, short of twisting arms: Civilian leaders could fundamentally change to overall guidance to the Strategic Command. A less-sweeping set of requirements for fending off Russia in case of nuclear war, they say, and a willingness to assume some risk, would mean the US would need fewer nuclear warheads.

And in Russia...

Experts say that Russia's Soviet-schooled military leadership may not be as ready for change as their young and pragmatic president.

"Our leading military officers, whose thinking is more traditional, tend to view NMD and NATO expansion as major threats which Russia cannot compromise with, but must struggle against," says Yuri Fyodorov, vice director of Pir, an independent political research center in Moscow. "They will not reconcile with this easily."

Russian defense policy has changed little over the past decade, largely because Mr. Yeltsin was unwilling to press painful downsizing and doctrinal changes on the Soviet-era armed forces.

After coming to power a year and a half ago, Putin pressured a reluctant Russian parliament to ratify long-stalled arms control treaties, announced sweeping military reforms, and hinted at key shifts in strategic thinking.

A resolution on national security adopted by the Kremlin last year upheld the traditional dominance of nuclear missile forces to deter an American attack, but introduced some new priorities. "Much more importance is now placed on fighting threats like international terrorism, domestic extremism, and cross-border narcotics trafficking," says Mr. Fyodorov.

Though some of Russia's immediate neighbors, such as the post-Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine, may worry that this spells more meddling by Moscow in their affairs, more distant countries are likely to be relieved that Russian power is apparently refocusing itself on regional concerns.

Putin has also begun purging upper military ranks in ways that suggest major policy shifts to come.

In March, he sacked Yeltsin's Defense Minister, Igor Sergeyev, and replaced him with close friend and former KGB officer Sergei Ivanov. "Sergeyev was a former commander of Russian strategic missile forces, and when he was fired, the status of this branch was lowered," says Alexander Savelyev, a military expert with the official Institute of World Economy and International Relations. "One of the signals was that Russia will now concentrate on building up its conventional forces, and the strategic nuclear component will no longer be dominant." Earlier this month, Putin removed Gen. Leonid Ivashov, known for his hawkish stands on NATO and NMD, from his job as head of the Defense Ministry's international department. Also sacked was General Staff spokesman Valery Manilov, a close ally of Sergeyev.

Still, experts caution that the Kremlin may not have made up its mind about which strategic direction to take. Simultaneous with the visible thawing toward the West, Putin is moving to cement military cooperation with China.

A 20-year Treaty of Friendship signed last week in Moscow between the two countries contains some "alliance-type obligations," according to Russian media.

These include a commitment by both not to enter into any agreement that would jeopardize "the national security and territorial integrity" of the other, and an agreement to immediately consult on a joint response to any threat of aggression against either country. "It is not at all clear what Russia's position is going to be, because the geopolitical situation is still in flux," says Fyodorov.

But, for now at least, Putin should be able to handle any resistance thrown up by the military bureaucracy. "Putin is still very popular, the economy is healthy, and it is a Russian tradition to obey the boss," says Mr. Kazyonnov. "The president is in a very strong position to pursue his policies - whatever they are."

Moreover, in a press conference last week, Putin insisted that Russia does not consider NATO to be an enemy - a declaration that must have shocked his elderly corps of generals, who have spent their lives preparing for an attack from that very quarter.

There should be "a single defense space in Europe," Putin argued, which could be achieved by Russia joining NATO, by the alliance disbanding unilaterally, or with the creation of a whole new security bloc with Russia at its heart.

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#2
strana.ru
July 26, 2001
U.S. NMD to threaten Russia 15 years later, Kokoshin
Do not wait for NMD deployment, former Security Council Secretary

If the U.S. Administration really talks about a new level of relations with Russia, it is necessary to deal with such issues as giving it the most favored nation treatment in trade and market economy status as well as guarantees on major credits and investments into the Russian economy, Andrei Kokoshin, former Secretary of Russia's Security Council and Defense Council, currently deputy of the State Duma, said in an interview with ORT network.

Speaking about the stage, at which America's NMD may directly threaten national security of Russia, he said, "It depends on the nature of our political relations."

"If they indeed grow deeper on the mutually beneficial and equal basis, it is one thing, but if they remain neither flesh nor good red herring, it is quite another," he said.

There is no NMD architecture at all thus far, and "the schemes, which are now talked about, are more likely the schemes of the previous administration," he said.

"There is a general concept as it were. When the new architecture appears is not known. So, for the time being the case in point is a strictly test program. Formally, it already may creep into the Red Zone, where doing it is banned by the ABM Treaty, but the real military threat may arise for us only when it is deployed on a wide scale and the number of interceptors exceeds, say, two, three thousand units," he said.

This type of developments may occur only if Russia has "bad relations with the United States," he stressed.

Given U.S. financing of R & D at the level of $70 to 80 billion, a real threat to Russia from the U.S. NMD may arise "some fifteen years later," he opined.

The offensive weapons will not mark time during that period either and Russia must not await deployment of the U.S. system, he said.

"Already we have a lot of technologies. I am proud I made a contribution of my own to that in my time," he said.

"Aside from the Administration, there is also the U.S. Congress. The Democrats have gained majority in the Senate and they have a different position on the ABM Treaty," he stressed.

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#3
Moscow Times
July 26, 2001
Duped by a Delayer
By Pavel Felgenhauer

The get-together of George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in Genoa ended in total confusion. A noncommittal three-sentence statement about arms control issued by the two presidents was interpreted as a "deal" and a breakthrough that will cut nuclear arsenals and at the same time allow the United States to deploy a national missile defense shield.

In Washington, Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott praised the agreement: "I think it's a very big deal." An Australian journalist phoned me to find out if I knew where to find on the web the text of the "treaty on a new strategic framework" Putin and Bush concluded in Genoa.

Of course, it all turned out to be spin. There was no "treaty," no "deal," or any other agreement on anything of substance. Bush and Putin just agreed to continue "consultations" on missile defense and on offensive nuclear weapons.

The basic foreign policy opinions of Russia's minute ruling ring were summarized before the summit in Genoa at a closed seminar in Moscow by a well-informed Kremlin insider: "America is today incapable of being an effective world leader and is proceeding from one foreign policy disaster to another; it's important that Moscow take a position of principle on NMD and refrain from any negotiations on modifying the 1972 ABM Treaty; it's important to have only 'consultations' with Washington on ABM, not 'negotiations' that will end in deadlock and surely worsen bilateral relations; the good news is that Washington is also not really serious about having negotiations."

The difference in diplomatic format between 'negotiations' and 'consultations' is that 'consultations' do not and cannot lead to any formal agreement. 'Consultations' are mostly held to find some common ground, if none in fact exists. After Genoa, American officials interpreted the results as Putin agreeing to NMD in return for a cut in offensive missiles, while Russian officials interpreted it as the United States "almost" agreeing to abandon missile defense in exchange for the same missile cut.

This "deal" that anyone can interpret as he or she wishes has now been passed to lower-ranking officials to work out some "compromise." Of course, eventual deadlock is inevitable. The same happened after the first Bush-Putin summit last month in Slovenia: Nice noncommital statements by the two leaders were followed by a cold shower when lower-ranking officials could not agree on anything.

It is hard to say today if Bush is an innocent layman in foreign policy and is allowing himself to be manipulated by a "trustworthy and straightforward" former KGB spy recruiter, or is he deliberately creating a false impression of a "breakthrough" where none exists.

Bush is receiving lots of public praise for being tough with Russia and so forcing Putin to concede. Maybe the exercise in hyperbole in Genoa was planned just to achieve this result. Or maybe Bush's advisers believe that it's prudent to try to appease Putin into making concessions, and if this does not work, well, America will go ahead with missile defense anyway.

Putin's policies seem to be more consistent and thought over. Only two months ago the Kremlin was in near panic that the West may purge Russia from what it likes to call the Group of Eight for human rights violations in Chechnya, abuse of the free press at home and because Russia's minute GDP does not really qualify it to be a member of the world richmen's club.

To counter this immediate threat, Kremlin insiders planned to forge a personal relationship with Bush, so Putin was nice and agreeable at each of their summits, but noncommital on detail. This policy worked to perfection: The West and the United States have fully embraced Putin, the threat of Russia being ousted from the G-8 is today nonexistent, while Moscow gave away virtually nothing in return.

Civilians in Chechnya were tortured and war crimes were committed while the Kremlin's chief executive was appeased at the summit in Genoa. It is an easy guess that when in several months Putin will be munching barbecue at Bush's ranch in Texas the abuse in Chechnya will still be going on.

After the future ground-breaking summit at the ranch, Putin's conservative apparatchiki (who happen to be his personal friends from the KGB) will again, no doubt, stall "the deal."

The mainstream American press has already figured out that Putin is a young pro-Western "liberal" leader who is forced to appease "conservatives." Putin has obviously learned from his predecessor Boris Yeltsin how to fix a reputation in the West that is virtually impossible to tarnish with any amount of abuse.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst based in Moscow.

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#4
Cleveland Plain Dealer
July 23, 2001
Give Russia A Little Room To Maneuver
By Elizabeth Sullivan
Sullivan is The Plain Dealer's foreign-affairs correspondent.

A has-been superpower lies at the heart of America's foreign-policy dilemmas. What is to be done about Russia? One can't just relegate a nation with 6,000 nuclear warheads to the garbage heap.

That's why President George W. Bush and his national security team are working so hard to look into Russia's soul, and co-opt it.

Yet that effort - single-mindedly geared to junking a 1972 arms accord - presents overlapping challenges.

How the Bush team resolves those challenges will determine to a large extent how successful it is in achieving other foreign-policy goals, including NATO enlargement and countering China's military ambitions.

But how does one co-opt a nation whose middle name is Pride and whose spoiler role in foreign affairs is so finely honed?

Sure, Russia is in slow decline. The average Russian man can't count on living past age 59. And Russia is crumbling, from the apartments to the bridges to the factories.

But Russians have rediscovered hope. Oil has breathed new life into the economy. So has the realization they don't have to depend on handouts from the West. And a ruble crisis that forced Russians to stop buying Italian dog food, imported cheese and other luxury items has fired up production again. Finally, workers get to work.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin is getting the credit for this, whether deserved or not. That's why virtually no one in Russia says much bad about Chechnya.

So Moscow may be weak, but it still matters. When did we last almost go to war with Russia? Hint: It wasn't the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

It was 1999, in Kosovo, when NATO's top commander, U.S. Gen. Wesley Clark, went ballistic over Russia's unauthorized move to take control of the main airport in Kosovo before any NATO soldiers got there.

There was still a lot of ill will in the Russian military over what it saw as the perfidy of NATO, a military alliance advertised in the post- Cold War context as a genial organization dedicated to democracy. Instead, NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days. Col. Gen. Viktor Zavarzin, a Russian military liaison, stormed out of Brussels. And in mid-June, in the eerie green lights of night-vision television cameras, he led a select group of Russian soldiers from Bosnia through cheering crowds in Serbia and into Kosovo, to be the first "NATO" force to take the province.

Fuming, Clark ordered his commander on the scene, British Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Jackson, to take back the airport. Jackson reportedly told Clark he had no intention of starting World War III, then invoked NATO's rarely used national command privilege to disobey Clark's orders.

Clark still fumes about this. "Mike Jackson's job was to get along with me," he said in February. "He was a lieutenant general working for me. . . . His job was to do what I told him to."

Maybe so. Maybe an armed confrontation in Kosovo would not have led to outright war. But what kind of working relationship with the Russians would it have led to? More particularly, what kind of Europe?

Today, elite Russian paratroopers and U.S. soldiers patrol together to keep Macedonia's guerrilla war from seeping back into Kosovo. Russians have already gone home in body bags. But Russia has secured its chief objective, to keep its hand in Europe.

That's the final but most important element of the conundrum. Where does Russia fit?

Bush says Russia is no longer an enemy. Putin will question that as long as NATO marches eastward toward its border. And Europe will not rest easy until this contradiction is resolved.

That's why Bush's blindered drive for missile defenses has put so many of our allies on edge.

They want to be reassured that Russia's security concerns about missile defense and other matters are not cavalierly dismissed in Washington. A fearful, insecure, insular Russia presents the worst possible scenario to Berlin, Paris and London. And it should to us, too.

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#5
Krasnaya Zvezda
July 26, 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTER SERGEI IVANOV: RUSSIA'S SECURITY THE MAIN CRITERION

At a meeting with representatives of the Russian press defence minister of Russia Sergei IVANOV highlighted some topical issues of military policy and the development of the Armed Forces. In a frank talk he expressed his opinion on the military and political situation in the world, the prospects of the development of the army and the navy, and the defence industry.

ABM: a Comprehensive Approach Needed

Speaking about the results of the Russian-US negotiations in Genoa, Russian defence minister stressed that the Presidents of both countries had come to the same conclusion: a comprehensive approach to the consideration of the issues of offensive and defensive armaments was needed. The ABM Treaty does not impede our plans and many things are based on it. The main item in our position is to ensure Russia's national security.

At the same time, the Russian defence minister noted, the world is changing. New threats appear. Incidentally, it is the USA that likes to speak on this topic. The so-called rogue states, in particular, are mentioned as one of the arguments for the USA to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. To put it mildly, this argument is not convincing: these countries are at best ready to create a medium-range missile capable of reaching the territory of Russia rather than that of the USA. Moreover, they can do so only from the theoretical point of view.

At the same time, Sergei Ivanov noted, the ABM Treaty is not a stumbling block today in our relations with the USA but a new stage of their development. On August 7-8 a group of experts led by first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces colonel-general Yuri Baluyevsky will be staying in Washington. Our experts will have to make a conclusion about whether or not some changes to the ABM Treaty would be detrimental to the national security of Russia. Moreover, the group will study not only the aspects of missile defence.

This week the Russian defence minister will meet with national security adviser to the US President Condoleezza Rice and in the middle of August he will have a meeting with US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. They will discuss the same question: the ABM Treaty. The Russian defence minister spoke resolutely against the militarisation of outer space. So far, this is the only medium where there are no weapons. Therefore, Pandora's box must be kept closed! Otherwise, unpredictable consequences for the entire world may follow.

Replying to Krasnaya Zvezda's question about the prospects of the army building, the defence minister stressed that the development of the Russian Armed Forces conceptually would also depend on the conclusions of Russian military experts after their visit to Washington. These conclusions may affect not only the nuclear containment forces but also the land troops, the front-line and sea-based aviation, and the navy.

Chechnya: Terrorists Are Doomed

The Russian defence minister stressed that now the main efforts of the anti-terrorist operation are aimed at destroying the heads of bandit formations. Information coming from various sources says that terrorists have begun to experience great difficulties. Khattab and Basayev have long stopped to participate personally in operations while field commanders who personally direct bandits' raids are regularly destroyed or taken captive.

The federal grouping feels real support of the local population. People have grown tired of lawlessness in the republic. For example, the notorious bandit Tsagorayev was killed by a 15-year-old Chechen boy. A whole set of serious social and economic measures are needed to fully stabilise the situation in the republic.

China: Only Friendship

We need to have civilised and friendly relations with he People's Republic of China, Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov said. China is an important economic, demographic and political factor. However, we do not develop any common military and strategic plans. Russia is quite capable of acting independently and does not intend to play someone's card against third countries.

Military and Industrial Complex: There Will Be a New Programme

As the Russian defence minister stressed, the Defence Ministry pays the greatest attention to the issues of the troops' combat readiness and combat training. However, their qualitative level directly depends on the armour and hardware that are supplied to the troops. That is why, the command of the country's chief military department closely watches the fulfilment of the part of the 2001 budget relating to the Armed Forces. So far, all expenditures have been made as stipulated in the budget.

At the same time, there has long been the need to adopt a new programme for the military and industrial complex. This programme will soon be presented to the Russian President.

Military Bases: Cuts Are Imminent

Russia and, therefore, its Armed Forces, will strictly observe its international commitments, the defence minister said.

In particular, in compliance with the Istanbul agreements, Russia will dispose of its military property in Trans-Dniestria. Incidentally, this is the largest arms depot in Europe and the most dangerous one.

That is why Russian units there had to guard weapons and ammunition to prevent their theft rather than to perform their peace-keeping functions. Therefore, the so-called actions of protest in the Trans-Dniestrian area are unfounded. We are not withdrawing from Trans-Dniestria; we are only disposing of unnecessary and dangerous weapons, the defence minister said.

However, Sergei Ivanov said, Russia needs to withdraw from the Cam Ranh naval base in Vietnam. At the same time, it is necessary to put in order naval bases on the Russian Pacific Coast: in Vladivostok, Kamchatka and other places.

Definitely, Russia must stay in Tajikistan and Armenia. At the same time, the military base in Abkhazia is not needed, although a peace-keeping base in Gudauta is so far necessary. Under the Istanbul accords, the country of stay must provide security for the withdrawal of troops from its territory. Unfortunately, Georgia is not fulfilling this obligation.

NATO: Lottery Without Any Win

NATO membership has not brought any benefits for the new member states. They have not received what they were lavishly promised. The only result is that the alliance's infrastructure has come close to the Russian borders.

A legitimate question arises: why was it all necessary? Does Russia threaten anyone? As a result of the admission of new members into NATO, strategic stability in the world has not become any stronger. The Russian Federation cannot but take into account the current situation on the western borders in ensuring its national security.

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#6
Vremya MN
July 26, 2001
LATEST POLL RESULTS
Author: Andrei Kolesnikov
Why are Russians so inconsistent in their attitude toward reforms?
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
SURPRISINGLY, 72% OF RUSSIANS APPROVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERFORMANCE, AND EXACTLY (!) THE SAME AMOUNT OF PEOPLE ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA. IT MEANS THAT PUTIN'S POPULARITY RATING IS NOT ONLY PEOPLE'S HOPES, BUT ALSO A PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION RATING.

Latest poll results seem to indicate that Russians are not very good at the economy, unwilling to keep up with plans for economic reform; they do not trust the government, but they more or less trust the head of state.

Opinion polling is a rather paradoxical process. However, it also indicates the balanced state of public opinion. According to June polls by the National Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), 41% of respondents believe that things are being done correctly in Russia - while another 41% think that Russia is heading into a dead end.

Surprisingly, 72% of Russians approve of the president's performance, and exactly (!) the same amount of people are dissatisfied with the situation in Russia. It means that Putin's popularity rating is not only people's hopes, but also a public dissatisfaction rating. Consequently, the dissatisfaction of Russians is equal to their hopes. There is another almost exact numerical coincidence: in June 49% of respondents approved of the activities of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov, while another 47% of respondents believe that they had managed to adapt to changes. Twenty eight percent of respondents think they will never be able to get used to the changes and the same amount of people are convinced that the current economic reforms will end in nothing.

It is indicative that Russians, who are naturally pessimistic and are not inclined to trust collective intellect (for instance, the government - 50% of respondents do not approve of the government's work and this index constantly grows) tie their hopes to the first persons in the state. For instance Mikhail Kasianov is on the forth place in the trust rating, though it has nothing to do with the trust rating of his cabinet of ministers. People who are strongly dissatisfied with their social position (22% of respondents said they are expecting their position to worsen), who are distrustful of any social reforms (41% of respondents are against the new Labor Code, though none of them has no idea what the contents of the new code is to be like) are rather tolerant to Valentina Matvienko, who has a very high trust rating. Kasianov's trust rating is 9%, Matvienko's rating is 8%.

Why do Russians not like the labor reform and simultaneously like the pension reform? Why are they afraid of the housing reform and are not very concerned of the results and consequences of the educational reform? Why in June 79% of Russians were dissatisfied with the economic course of the government (against 57% in May); but 30% of respondents (against 21% in May) believe that the reforms will be a success?

It is impossible to explain such discrepancies with the imperfection of the sociological science, which may allow a 20% variation in calculations. Each preference of respondents has certain reasons, historical roots and this moment's incentives. For instance, from the point of view of an ordinary Russian, the Labor Code reform should a priori worsen the position of a worker in relation to his employer - it is next to impossible to believe anything opposite after long decades of socialism and a total absence of any labor norms over the past decade. It is easier to understand the pension reform: you will have as large a pension as you earn in the young age, not like now. This carries a positive supply and much more radical and rapid decisions are possible in relation to the pension reform: working people are not dumb and they are always able to figure out what is more profitable for them.

No one believes in the housing reform, for it is absolutely impossible to believe that the permanently drunken plumber would finally become sober one day if he has a competitor and the tariff growth will prevent pipes from breaking down. People do not like the economic course, because they are not used to trusting the government and the reformers, while the word "reforms" still remains positive for the majority of Russians.

So currently the score between those who trust their minds and their hearts is 41:41, which means that Russia has a chance that common sense will finally prevail, and lead us to civilization.

Translated be Arina Yevtikhova

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#7
stratfor.com
Kremlin Winning War Against 'Independent' Media Outlets

Analysis

The "independent" media in Russia is becoming a casualty of President Vladimir Putin's crackdown on Russian oligarchs. Television networks are finding they must either tow the government line or come under state scrutiny. Putin's efforts to create a functional economy require taming the oligarchs, and those are the very people who run Russia's media.

The last so-called independent branch of Vladimir Gusinsky's media empire has fallen with the takeover of Echo Moscow radio by the state-run Russian gas giant, Gazprom, on July 11. But the final evisceration of Echo Moscow couldn't herald nightfall for the free press in Russia, for there never really was a dawn. The Russian press has never been truly free.

During the 1990s, oligarchs like Gusinsky acquired media outlets and used them as weapons to lash out at the government for policies they considered dangerous to their business and economic interests. In media coverage at that time, no topic was taboo, and politicians were regularly, and quite harshly, lampooned. In its recent moves, the government has been accused of attempting to silence its most influential and powerful critics.

While Putin does seem to be targeting outlets that are critical of the Kremlin, his moves are actually part of a wider conflict with Russia's economic elite. Whether it be government action like limiting investment in the media or closing a newspaper, these are smaller offensives in a bigger war.

The formerly independent NTV television station, taken over by Gazprom in April, was Gusinsky's favorite mouthpiece to criticize the government. TV6, currently in the Kremlin's sights, served the interests of Boris Berezovsky, another oligarch seen as aligned against Putin. Both oligarchs have fled abroad to evade charges of corruption and graft. Now that Gusinsky's power has been reduced and Berezovsky is on the run, Putin should have an easier time of managing the other oligarchs.

With Gusinsky and Berezovsky's media assets either on the block or locked up, the largest concentration of independent media outlets left belongs to Vladimir Potanin's Prof-Media, which includes the leading daily newspaper, Izvestia. But Potanin is an unlikely target: He's less a critical editorialist and more a high-rolling businessman. While Potanin may have drawn the Kremlin's attention for his insider work in rigging the privatization nearly 10 years ago of Norilsk Nickel, the world's largest nickel and palladium producer, Izvestia is not the lampooning medium TV6 once was. So long as Potanin pays his taxes on time, he'll stay in print.

The Kremlin's efforts are reaching beyond the oligarchs. Both Radio Free Europe, the U.S. government media grouping, and the BBC operate widely in Russia and have had minimal tangles with Russian authorities. But the Kremlin is throwing up barriers to possible overseas investments. This month it enacted a law that bars majority foreign ownership in Russian television. While the law was already in the works, CNN creator Ted Turner's attempt to buy into Russian media spurred legislative action.

Immediately after that law was created, the government went a step farther. It cut off negotiations with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the country's single biggest investor, for repairs to the Ostankino television tower. The bank made its loan contingent on charging all broadcasters the same rate to use the facility. But Moscow prefers to use its own pricing structure as another tool to lock out messages it finds distasteful. The government subsequently scuttled the loan, despite the negative signal it sent to the foreign investors whom Russia desperately needs.

Other techniques favored by the Kremlin include persecution for tax arrears, leaning on banks to call in overdue loans and demanding a carousel of operating permits. Oligarchs running Russian media outlets face a stark choice: stop pushing their own agendas or face shutdown. The remaining independent media lack the heft, circulation or notoriety to withstand any sort of government, or government-encouraged, assault.

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#8
BBC Monitoring
German commentator assesses need for further NATO enlargement
Source: Die Welt web site, Berlin, in German 26 Jul 01

A German commentator has argued that NATO's enlargement should only take place if it increases the security of the alliance. The commentator recalls developments in recent years and argues that the next wave of enlargement may not improve stability in Europe. The following is the text of a commentary by Michael Stuermer headlined: "NATO enlargement at any price?" from German newspaper Die Welt web site on 26 July

Ten years ago NATO lost its organizing principle and since then the Western alliance has not found a new role. The simple expansion of the Western alliance as an unlimited process is not acceptable. Sooner or later the marginal utility becomes evident. At that point NATO is no longer a system of collective defence but an open system where everyone is allied with everyone, and thus no one is allied with anyone.

In November next year the NATO summit in Prague will reach a decision-making point. Expanding to take in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was one thing, expanding - if not restricted to Slovenia - to include the Baltic states is quite another. Russia, the United States, Europe: Everything has changed. What a few years ago still looked like a sequence of easy acquisitions will change NATO to the point of being unrecognizable. A sharp change in climate between Russia and the West threatens.

The first enlargement already was accompanied by mixed feelings. Agreement had been reached on the Partnership for Peace and thus on a system that from Brussels organized Europe's map beyond NATO in the name of peace. Then in the 1994 American election campaign the Republicans vied with the Democrats to see who could offer more in the fight for the Polish vote. German policy did not want to lag behind. Russia and was initially placated by the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, but the Russians expected joint decision-making whereas NATO granted a look at decisions already made. The importance of the Council was further diminished by the Kosovo war.

At that time it was obvious the continued expansion process would carry a price. Either it would be continued in the direction of Russia and thus get too close to the Russians, or be stopped and thus recognize the Kremlin's unstated claim to the "near abroad", the countries of the former Soviet Union. But the NATO sages acted according to the principle, "Time will bring an answer".

The time has come, the answer has not, and the mixture of feelings among the Europeans and in Washington is striking. Russia announces a new Cold War and wants to neutralize the American missile defence by deploying more multiple-warhead nuclear missiles (MIRV). Russian factories, unmoved and well-paid, deliver advanced nuclear and weapons technology to the "rogue states" hated by America. Putin cultivates an alliance with China. It is questionable whether in this situation NATO enlargement improves the balance of stability in Europe.

The USA no longer sees the focus of its interests in Europe. It is relying on a maritime strategy, and no sea power has ever been permanently engaged in the heart of distant continents. America's missile armament programme is investing resources lacking elsewhere in space technologies. But the USA remains the power which alone gives meaning and credibility to NATO enlargement: For East Central Europe this is not about being allied with Luxembourg or Germany, but for once in history with the stronger battalions.

The next NATO enlargement will also profoundly change Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates "one for all, all for one". On the one hand neither nuclear weapons nor allied troops should be stationed in the Baltic states; on the other, these states cannot be seriously defended militarily. A leading American Senator, asked about the future of Article Five, said it means everything: "From a nuclear answer to rejection in the form of a postcard". But this article not only prescribes the scale of military planning, it also keeps the Alliance together politically.

Time is pressing, and damage limitation also. Expansion against Russia is possible but not advisable. If America is not seriously engaged it would be better for it not to happen. The next enlargement has a new quality. The expansion has no end, but an overextended, overstrained and underfinanced NATO can soon become hollow. If enlargement increases the security of the alliance states then it must happen, otherwise not.

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#9
The Economist (UK)
July 21-27, 2001
In search of an identity
Russia is still struggling to come to terms with its new status as an ex-superpower

THERE are three elements in Russia's approach to the outside world. The first is to seek good ties with the West. The Russians have said they are looking for partnership with Western Europe, and for a businesslike relationship with America. To that end, the second element—playing geopolitical games aimed at undermining American world “hegemony”—seems less than helpful. The third is to consolidate Russian influence in the former Soviet empire, especially in the weak, unstable and quarrelsome bits.

The results have been mixed. Trade ties with Europe have become increasingly solid, especially in natural-gas exports. Russia would like to join the World Trade Organisation, which will give the stronger Russian companies a better chance in world markets but let in more competition. On the other hand, inward foreign investment has been disappointing. The total since 1991 amounts to only $22 billion—half the figure for Poland.

The big gap is political. Western attitudes to Russia's behaviour in Chechnya range from concern to horror. The war to restore Russian rule there, prompted by a series of terrorist attacks in August and September 1999, shows no sign of ending. Almost all the top rebel commanders are still at large. Russia's puppet government is on the verge of collapse. The fighting has killed or maimed tens of thousands of civilians; hundreds of thousands have fled their homes. There have been atrocities on both sides, but the balance of blame is overwhelmingly on the much more powerful Russian side. The Kremlin brusquely brushes aside complaints about the many well-documented cases of torture, arbitrary executions, abductions and other outrages that breach numerous international agreements signed by Russia, as well as its own laws and constitution. Critics see Russia's behaviour towards the Chechens as symptomatic of its own decayed and lawless system of government.

As democracy in Russia shrivels, it moves further away from western standards. Despite official insistence that the press is free and human rights are respected, there are legitimate doubts. Some foreigners even question whether Russia should continue to be a member of the G8, alongside the world's seven big advanced democracies.

Fiddle, fumble

The geopolitical games are not particularly successful either. Mr Putin jets around the world to visit former Soviet allies such as Cuba, Libya, Vietnam and North Korea, and cultivates Iran and Iraq. But friendships with poor pariah countries serve little political or economic purpose. Policy towards China and India has been rather more productive. Arms sales are flourishing. Russia has also joined up with five other countries worried by Islamic terrorism (China, Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) in a security grouping called the “Shanghai six”, but to little effect so far.

Russia's patent military weakness (barring possession of unusable weapons of mass destruction, and the ability to sell advanced arms abroad) makes any attempt to flex its withered superpower muscles pointless. Plans announced last year to restore a blue-water navy seem to have been shelved. Russia seems to be giving up its last big overseas naval base, in Vietnam. Attempts to stand up to the West on issues such as Nato enlargement tend to follow a sterile pattern of warnings, tantrums, sulks and grudging acceptance.

The success story, of sorts, is in the inner part of the former Soviet empire, where Russian clout is steadily growing. Fears of Islamic terrorist insurgency have made the countries of Central Asia much more receptive to offers of Russian military help. The other successful policy has been the use of gas debts to gain equity stakes in important industries. Russian influence in Ukraine has risen sharply after a series of political hiccups there in the past year. Viktor Chernomyrdin, the new Russian ambassador to Ukraine (and a former prime minister), is referred to, only half-jokingly, as Mr Putin's viceroy in Kiev.

So where does Russia go from here? The first question is what price Mr Putin is willing to pay to be friends with Europe. Dmitri Trenin, a retired colonel turned pundit, says Russia should accept that its superpower days are over, and try to join countries such as Britain, France and Germany to become another big post-imperial member of the European club. But so far, Mr Putin seems more interested in Europe as a source of modernisation and stability for Russia than as a club with its own demanding rules about democracy and the rule of law.

The second question is about the clash between Russia's economic weakness and its lingering desire to regain great-power status. Russia's western neighbours hope that, when push comes to shove, Mr Putin's craving for respectability will prevent him from doing anything too unpleasant. They do not have much other leverage: thanks to the oil boom, Russia is no longer dependent on foreign loans to stay afloat.

In the short and medium term, the likeliest outcome is that the economy will grow just enough to keep the country from collapsing, postponing any crunch. If so, Russia will stagger on much as it is now: a large, poor, mostly backward place with a maddening habit of wasting its potential. If the decline worsens, though, all the old fears about Russia that haunted the 1990s—disintegration, unrest, loose nukes, disease and pollution—will re-emerge, with even fewer hopes of recovery.

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#10
The Russia Journal
www.russiajournal.com
July 20-26, 2001
‘Russia bigger threat than N. Korea’
Ex-CIA Director Turner’s inside look at NMD, U.S.-Russia relations
By YURY SIGOV

Moscow and Washington have long been in the frontline of ideological and military confrontation, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union this rivalry has only intensified.

With debate raging on National Missile Defense (NMD), more observers than ever are touting their views on the future of U.S.-Russian relations, and whether Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush will build on recent cooperation or force the two powers into further division.

One observer with the advantage of having seen things from the inside, however, is retired Adm. Stansfield Turner, the CIA’s director from 1977-81, during President Jimmy Carter’s administration.

Known for his controversial attempt to gain the upper hand over the Soviet spying system by focusing on "technical collection systems" that include satellites rather than human operatives, Turner started his career in the U.S. Navy, where he served as commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet and commanded NATO’s southern flank.

Turner is known for his frank speaking on Russia and, in this two-part interview, the former Cold War warrior talks about missile defense, Putin and Bush, NATO expansion and the future of relations between the two countries.

The Russia Journal: While we were adversaries in the past, under Yeltsin and Clinton we were almost partners. Now, however, America is working on a missile defense system, completely destroying all previous agreements and pacts on strategic armaments. America says there is a threat from North Korea and other rogue states, but Russia doesn’t buy this argument. Who are you trying to defend against? Who is threatening America?

Adm. Stansfield Turner: Russia was invaded in 1812 by Napoleon, and again in 1941 by the Germans. Mongols and Tartars invaded much earlier. Our country has never been invaded. Two big oceans were our missile defense system for 200 years.

We are very concerned today and feel vulnerable, so we believe there is a threat to us. Similarly, Europeans understand vulnerability. All Europe has been invaded many times. You have to understand our psychology.

We built anti-bomber defenses in the ’60s and failed. In the ’70s we built defenses in North Dakota and operated them for just four months. We spent a lot of money on it, but it finally didn’t work. Now we are doing it again. We say we are acting against North Korea, but I don’t think they are so stupid as to launch missiles at us. If they do, we will know exactly where they came from – not a generalized place, but the exact location. We can destroy them immediately.

Of course, they can send a missile in a tanker to the San Francisco Bay area or any U.S. Pacific port. This NMD system is against Russia, not North Korea. Why? Because if your government loses control of the situation, one Russian colonel who doesn’t like America and her wealth may push the button and say: "Never mind, let these bastards die."

This is a much bigger threat than North Korea for us. Our president will never say what I said to you – that the new missile defense system is against Russia or China. He is selling the idea to the American people that there is a threat from North Korea and the so-called rogue states.

But there is a weak point in this theory. Even if Russia is a weak country, she will have enough nuclear deterrence against us, and will have the capability to destroy our cities. The concept of nuclear deterrence is built on the threat of retaliation. Russia would still have enough nuclear missiles with all our anti-missile systems. Can you imagine an American president saying "I destroyed all Russian nuclear missiles, but we lost New York and Los Angeles from two Russian nuclear missiles that had been launched before we could hit them?"

RJ: What are your views on the current state of U.S.-Russian relations? Can our countries trust each other, and did the Soviet Union and the United States reach any level of trust in the days when you headed the CIA?

ST: There was always some kind of trust between us. We always trusted each other on arms-control agreements. That was important – there was a mutual interest in avoiding a nuclear war. However, a great deal of mistrust was also present in our relations.

RJ: Was it a personal mistrust between the leaders of the two countries, or rather a mistrust based on ideology?

ST: Of course, on ideology. Much of that was based on misunderstanding. We didn’t understand and still don’t understand Russian culture, the Russian way of thinking. For a Russian journalist who is writing from America, I suppose it would be very hard to tell the truth to a Russian audience because Russian people might think that you are biased toward America.

The same problem exists for Americans, even for those who traveled to Russia or have been working there. In spite of studying Russia for some time as head of the CIA, I was stunned by the conditions in Russia when I traveled through the country on the Trans-Siberian railroad in 1990. I was really stunned by the backwardness of your provinces; conditions were much more primitive than I expected, and buildings and facilities were in a bad state of disrepair. This was not in any information on Russia provided to me. When the train stopped and we could walk around, it proved much worse that I anticipated.

RJ: When the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia took over its obligations, Moscow retained the U.S.S.R.’s foreign-policy strategy of viewing America as an enemy and a threat. The same happened with Russia in America. For Washington, Russia is still a major threat even though communism has collapsed and the Soviet Union doesn’t exist anymore. What is behind this mutual heritage of hate?

ST: I don’t think that the American people think of Russia as a threat today. Russia, with an economy and gross domestic product about equal to Portugal’s, is not a threat to the U.S. except on the nuclear issue. The Soviet Union had been a threat for many years, and when the Soviet Union collapsed, we lost a threat; we lost an obvious enemy. Now we are trying to find another enemy, and some people are trying to make it China.

Until Russia builds a stable economy, some Americans will think that the unpredictability of Russia could be a threat. When I read reports from Moscow that some Russian soldiers are begging for food because they are not paid, I, as a military man myself, understand that you cannot rebuild the military for a long time if you have gone so far down. If you don’t feed your army and don’t pay them, you cannot be a threat to us.

But we in the States are worried much more by the cohesiveness of your government. If your government doesn’t control the situation, your nuclear arsenal being out of control could be a worry for you, for the entire world. That is why we should cooperate with Russia. Since you are poor, and we are rich, it is up to us to make a step forward and help. We can afford it and you can’t. Another question is whether this help would work.

RJ: For the past 10 years, America has provided Russia with a lot of help, cooperated on many projects, pumped in millions of dollars. And that didn’t help. Moreover, Americans are blamed for destroying the Russian economy. What was wrong with the way the U.S. administered assistance all these years?

ST: I think we didn’t understand the difficulties with Russia’s transition period. We thought that you had enough background in democracy, market principles and freedoms, and we would just have to push all these things and everything will go well with Russia. In Poland, everything worked because they had seen market principles at work and had only spent a very limited time living under a socialist system. We employed the same ideas in Russia as in some countries of Eastern Europe.

There was no base in Russia on which to build a structure of a new state. What was the result? That the more we helped people in Russia, the less result we had. However, we didn’t want to do any harm to Russia. Russia is too big, and if you have problems, it will bring problems for the United States in the long run. Yes, we don’t understand sometimes how to help Russia, but we don’t want to hurt Russians.

RJ: The Russian president says that the country is becoming stronger economically, there is a growth in production, our armed forces are receiving what they need and we are militarily strong. At the same time, U.S.-based observers say that Russia is very weak – economically, militarily and politically. How weak in your opinion is Russia? Does it present a major threat for the United States?

ST: Let’s re-member 1962. Khrushev pulled back from his threats to launch missiles on the United States, but President Kennedy also pulled back missiles from Turkey. They both understood that if we hit Russia, they would hit Florida from Cuba, and we would not be able to stop it.

At the same time, to possess nuclear arms is not a symbol of strength. Who has used nuclear arms after Hiroshima? Nobody. Everybody is afraid of the consequences. Whatever missile defense we have, we cannot knock out all the missiles of the other side. When Reagan was president of the United States, he approved so-called Star Wars, but he couldn’t guarantee that all the Soviet missiles would be knocked out.

The same is true now. Even if we could knock out 99 percent of Russian missiles, 1 percent would still hit America. From the 3,000-4,000 missiles that you have, there would be still 30-40 missiles that we could not destroy. It means that New York, Los Angeles, Washington and other cities would be destroyed.

And remember, here we are talking about just 1 percent of Russian missiles. And what if we can hit only 80 percent of them? No anti-missile defense system will ever work to 100 percent.

(Yury Sigov is U.S. bureau chief for Novye Izvestia. See next week’s issue for Part II of this interview.)
 

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